


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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL  
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# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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# THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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NUMBER I

## VARIETIES OF SOCIOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

GEORGE E. VINCENT  
The University of Chicago

A request from the Sociology Club for a paper on "What is Sociology?" is something to ponder and philosophize upon. For nearly fourteen years the University has maintained a Department of Sociology; during ten years it has published a *Journal of Sociology*; for at least several quarters members of this club have pursued courses in sociology, listened to lectures on sociology, read articles entitled the "Province of Sociology," "The Scope of Sociology," "The Present Condition of Sociology," "The Future Prospects of Sociology"—and yet your president asks me to address you on the theme "What is Sociology?"

No one, so far as I know, is expected to produce papers in answer to such questions as "What is physics?" "What is chemistry?" or even "What is psychology?" Only the sociologist is made to stand and deliver at almost every turn. It would be easy to complain of this treatment, but if the student of society has the scientific spirit, he will ignore unpleasant personal implications and address himself to the facts. Why is this demand for definition so persistent? Why will the question refuse to stay answered? Why, after the safe phrase "the science of society" has been spoken, are no two answers to the question quite alike? How does it happen that Kidd can write the *Britannica* article on

<sup>1</sup>A paper read before the Sociology Club of the University of Chicago, May 8, 1906.

sociology and never mention Giddings, while the latter contributes to *Johnston's* on the same subject a sketch which ignores Kidd? Does Comte's "intellectual anarchy" still reign in the field of social physics? Are the three philosophies still hopelessly confused?

The answer is obvious. Sociology is not one; it is many. There are varieties of sociology. If these have a specific unity, this is largely obscured by the patent diversities. The term "sociology" means several different things, brings up a variety of images in the minds of men and women today. Hence the impossibility of saying definitely and definitively what sociology is. Most of the articles which bear the familiar heading might better be entitled "What Sociology Ought to Be." Still, in spite of all, "sociology" continues to be a noun of multitude. Yet the vogue of the term "sociology" must mean that it serves some purpose in modern life; it must stand for groups of ideas and give at least vague expression to them. What are the chief of these, the leading varieties of sociology?

But before addressing ourselves to this question, let me offer a few prelusive prolegomena upon the different attitudes which sociologists may take toward those who regard them with ill-concealed suspicion or amused tolerance. The protective instincts lead men of different temperaments to meet attack in different ways.

There is first of all the jocular sociologist, who disarms criticism by joining in the cheerful game of ridiculing his own chosen pursuits. This provides entertainment; it relieves the playful student from any suspicion of taking himself too seriously; it makes for good-fellowship and general merriment. But this jovial mood may easily go too far. There are strict limits to its value; it may easily degenerate into a kind of unconscious cynicism which destroys the earnestness and efficiency of the man into whose character it subtly makes its way.

Quite different from the jocular type is the over-serious sociologist, who feels himself the guardian of the ark, who walks with stately, even pompous stride, and betrays in his bearing a dignity almost pontifical. This, too, makes for amusement, but

not among the elect. The oracular, self-satisfied, and wholly convinced sociologist is not a type to be exalted, or, as Tarde would say, to be made a glorious center of radiating waves of imitation.

Again, there is the sensitive sociologist, wandering about the vague borders of his field waiting for assaults by predatory economists, historians, and political scientists, who are likely to regard him as a scientific poacher—although, to be sure, rather a poor shot. This pathetic soul is sure to have woes and wrongs, and may even, with due provocation, manage for himself a mild type of immolation. He is not an alluring object; his “particularization,” as Baldwin might say, is in little danger of being “generalized” by the group of sociologists.

Once more, there is the arrogant sociologist. He takes possession of the farm with assurance, contemptuous of the narrow, grubbing, and unrelated tasks of the specialists in the different fields. Or, to change the figure, he sets himself up as a kind of scientific “boss,” who will brook no interference, but makes quite clear what the duties of his “heelers” are. This kind of person must be caught young and reared upon mouth-filling phrases of a cosmic scope, quite detached from the humble researches of those plodding scientists who provide him with materials for generalization.

Sociology insists upon synthesis; the wise student of society will choose from these different attitudes elements of value. He will be a little jocular now and then; he may be a trifle sensitive when pushed too far; he should have the spirit to hold his own on occasion; he will feel a serious purpose dominating all his work. In short, he will maintain toward men and life the becoming attitude of the philosopher, seeking to know the why and how of things, sparing of praise and blame.

As we turn to the varieties of sociology, we note first the generic or catalogue use of the word. “Sociology” is the name for the large cabinet within which are to be found the pigeon-holes of the various social sciences. Thus, in Dewey’s library system “sociology” is the main heading, under which “political economy,” “political science,” “anthropology,” “ethnology,”

"penology," etc., form subgroups. This use of the term is convenient and has the sanction of good usage. In the annual French publication, *L'Année sociologique*," one finds subdivisions into "general sociology," "religious sociology," "moral and juridical sociology," "economic sociology," etc. In the first publication of the London Sociological Society there are papers on "Eugenics," "Civics," "The Position of Woman in Early Civilizations," and "Life in an Agricultural Village in England." Whether sociology ought to be used in this comprehensive fashion to include all aspects of social phenomena is, perhaps, fit subject for academic discussion, but such discussion would have little influence upon the facts. The word is used, and by intelligent people, as a label for all things social. It is convenient for this purpose, and will doubtless be employed in this popular way for many decades to come. It must be reluctantly admitted that people will continue to say "sociological" and "psychological" when any expert could tell them that what they really mean to say is "social" or "societary" or "psychic." It is quite futile to protest against popular usage of this sort, especially when it lends itself so readily to the expression of current ideas. The sociologist who wishes to set the public right will have all his spare energies employed in trying to make "the man in the street" distinguish between sociology and socialism. It may violate our scientific sensibilities, but we shall have to resign ourselves to letting people use the word "sociology" as a kind of omnibus to carry all the social sciences on their sometimes halting and often zigzag journey.

It is hard for sociologists, after having been so contemptuous about the philosophy of history, to face the fact that sociology is in large measure, as Barth insists, precisely this. Spencer has pointed out that the savage who explains the uprooting of a tree by the tempest as the work of angered spirits, and the modern scientist who attributes these phenomena to the force of air-currents, are both employing the same intellectual method, although under different conditions. It is equally true that to interpret the history of humanity in terms of a self-revealing spirit or of a divine purpose is in principle not different from an explana-

tion which implies the trend from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from simplicity to complexity, or which talks of adjustment to environment of struggling groups and interests and the "increasing individuation of the race." In both cases we have a process described by Mr. Fiske in that classically limpid term "deanthropomorphization."

To set forth in a large way the sweep of history, the development of institutions, is strictly to philosophize. To translate the forms and activities of society into the terms of anatomy and physiology is not to make a science—it is to philosophize in other phrases. To describe the common life of human groups in terms of social consciousness and public will is, strictly speaking, not to create a new science, but again to philosophize in another fashion. It is freely admitted by almost all sociologists that the subject is largely a philosophy; that it seeks to put together into one picture the various details which the social sciences provide. It is in a sense what Flint calls a "science of the sciences," which is only another way of saying that it philosophizes, synthesizes, their results.

Nor is there a single social philosophy. There are as many philosophies as there are different points of view. *Individualism* is a social philosophy which lays stress upon the initiating person consciously exploiting his fellows, carefully weighing his interests against those of society, feeling free in his choices, and accepting responsibility for his acts. On the other hand, there is a *collectivistic sociology* which lays all the emphasis on society and on social forces which are thought of as molding the individual to a type. Freedom of the will becomes hardly more than an illusion, and responsibility is diffused throughout society as a whole. There is, too, a *materialistic sociology* which sees in all social institutions the inevitable product of soil, climate, flora, fauna, and race; while over against this stands an *idealistic philosophy* interpreting social life and destiny in terms of "divine purpose," "perfectibility of humanity," or "stages in the progress of human consciousness of God." It used to be the fashion to deride such terms as *Christian sociology* and to show conclusively that a Christian sociology was quite as absurd as Baptist mathematics or Episcopal physics.

This smart saying, however, holds true only of sociology as a well-defined science—not as philosophy. It must be admitted, therefore, that there is a Christian sociology—i. e., an interpretation of the social order in terms of Christian doctrines and ideals. There can be a *Catholic sociology* or a *Mohammedan sociology*, or any type of social theory which interprets human life and destiny from some definite standpoint. To admit that sociology is a philosophy is not to detract from its dignity or value. If it were nothing more than a philosophy, it would justify itself. To have insisted upon seeing the social process whole, to have influenced the spirit and methods of all the social sciences, to have oriented them in a new direction—these are enduring services in which the sociologist may well feel satisfaction.

But sociology is more than a collective name, more than a philosophy of history. It is a science in the making. This is to be affirmed with faith, if not with dogmatism. The fact is widely denied, and in no pleasant terms. Thus a recent writer declares: "The name 'sociology' stands for no definite body of systematic knowledge. It is applied to an inchoate mass of speculation, often vague and conflicting, which represents the thoughts of various thinkers about social phenomena." The same person goes on to say that sociologists "appear to realize confusedly that they have on their hands a pedagogical 'white elephant' which defies classification."<sup>2</sup> Sociologists are ready to admit that as a science their subject is a becoming rather than a being. Tarde speaks of "this infant which people have undertaken to baptize before it was born."<sup>3</sup> Bascom sententiously remarks that "it will do no harm to call it a science, if we do not abate our effort to make it one."<sup>4</sup> Both within and without the field, then, men recognize the fact that sociology as a science is at best in the incipient stage.

Two tests may be applied to a science. Does it formulate definite, precise, general laws; is it able to predict the behavior of phenomena? One of the writers who have just been quoted

<sup>2</sup>Baldwin, "Present Position of Sociology," *Popular Science Monthly*, October, 1899.

<sup>3</sup>*La Logique sociale*, Preface, p. v.

<sup>4</sup>Quoted by Howerth, *Annals of American Academy*, September, 1894.



says: "It is impossible, I believe, to discover a single alleged ground-principle of sociology that has commanded general assent." This is a depressing statement. One hesitates to believe that things are quite so bad as that. Yet it must be owned that the number of laws of general sociology which differentiate themselves clearly from the platitudinous or the axiomatic is not large. Ross has in his latest volume<sup>5</sup> offered a list of social laws—some of them analogies from other sciences, some set forth as valid formulæ of sociology itself. One of these laws asserts that man-to-man struggle within a group weakens its efficiency in conflict with other groups. A principle like this is fundamental to all association; it is an induction from a wide field of social phenomena. It finds illustration as well in the struggles of a political "gang" as in the imperial policy of a great nation or in an attack upon the Mormon church. It is as precisely stated as "Gresham's law" or the law of "diminishing returns." To deny that sociology is making advance in the formulation of general principles is to blind one's self to facts. And yet the point where complacent satisfaction with achievement can be indulged lies far beyond the distant horizon.

Whether sociology as science is to be called "general" or "pure;" whether it is, as Giddings would have it, a "fundamental" science, or, as Small prefers to regard it, an organizing science, are interesting and important matters for consideration. The latter views, which seem at first glance antithetical, are after all to be reconciled. The contrast is something like that between induction and deduction. Both are aspects of one process. There is increasing agreement that sociology as science must deal with principles of association as such—principles which find concrete expression under varying conditions. These principles are fundamental, but they must be derived largely, as Small points out, from the results which the special social sciences provide. But such principles thus discovered in turn react upon the special sciences themselves.

There is good ground, then, for regarding sociology as a science, even though it be only a science in the making. Nor is

<sup>5</sup>Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*.

the chaos so complete as the cynical would have us believe. Sociologists, to be sure, have not reached a consensus comparable, for example, with that of the economists; but when variations in terminology have been eliminated, a considerable and ever-widening area of agreement emerges from the apparent confusion. Thus, as to society in general all agree that it is (1) a product of physical and psychical forces, (2) working in an evolutionary process in which (3) at first predominantly instinctive activities later yield in some measure to (4) reflective and purposeful policies. This view regards society as (5) an ongoing process in which interests and groups struggle for ascendancy and are ceaselessly organized and reorganized. As to the social group as a type of common mental life, it is further agreed that (1) individuals in their very personal growth unconsciously incorporate the standard of their group, by which they are, furthermore, (2) coerced into conscious conformity. The uniforming influence of imitation and group-ascendancy is counteracted by (3) leaders or authorities who initiate new ideas and activities to be selected and appropriated by all. Between such leaders with their followers a (4) struggle for ascendancy ensues. This results ultimately in (5) a relatively permanent body of customs and institutions imbedded in feeling; i. e., group-tradition or character. When the members of the group are aware of common ideas and purposes, a (6) social consciousness is developed.

If the tests of a science be formulation of laws and power to predict, sociology is not far advanced on the road to a scientific status. Such laws as have been put into definite form are, as has already been suggested, apparently an "elaboration of the obvious," or are philosophical rather than strictly scientific. Nevertheless, especially in the field of social psychology, more successful results have been achieved. Principles closely approaching in insight and accuracy the unquestioned laws of economics have been enunciated, and promise of progress in this direction is not wanting.<sup>6</sup> As to prediction, which is conditioned on the formulation of principles, the sociologist is even more cautious than the economist about foretelling a result in a given case. Certainly

<sup>6</sup>Cf. Ross, *op. cit.*

the point has not been reached where the sociologist is justified in dogmatizing on the basis of his scientific principles.

While, therefore, the sociologist is in no position to shout "Eureka," he has good reason to press on, with the confidence that sociology as a science will make for itself a place and render fundamental service to all the social sciences. The results of work being done in the field of folk-psychology, in the origin and development of such institutions as the family, private property, etc., may legitimately be claimed for sociology as a science. These are tangible, increasingly defined and precise, and are furthering the reinterpretation of many other problems.

Sociology is not only a general title, a philosophy of history, a science, but it is an art which seeks to translate principles into social welfare. The term "social technology," proposed by Dr. Henderson, is full of suggestion. It is this meaning of sociology which rises inevitably in the public mind. To the newspapers the sociologist is the man who deals with the problems of dependence, vice, and crime. Settlement residents, probation officers, investigators of housing conditions, students of penology, are all known to the reporter as "sociological workers."<sup>7</sup> Sociologists of the philosopher-scientist type used to resent this identification of sociology with social pathology. They were wont to insist, with some show of superiority, that the study of the normal was after all the important thing. One almost fancies that they resented a little the idea that sociology was chiefly concerned with caring for the "submerged tenth." There has been in the last decade a more tolerant and sympathetic attitude displayed. It is coming to be recognized that social technology and social science are engaged in mutual service, that the study of dependence and crime has fruitful results for social theory, while in turn social

<sup>7</sup>A typical newspaper attitude toward men and methods in this field is that of the *New York Sun*, as illustrated in the half humorous, half satirical accounts of the annual visit of Professor Bailey's Yale class to New York tenement districts and charitable institutions. The story of this pilgrimage was told the other day under the heading "Bill Bailey's Sociologists." The peregrinations of this party, which always includes a few divinity students, are depicted with much cleverness. The suggestion throughout is that of naive, unsophisticated, academic persons who deal with life in a *a priori* fashion.

theory offers guidance in practice. It would be futile for the sociologist, even were he so inclined, to change the popular impression that sociology is chiefly concerned with what are known as the social problems.

If our analysis be true, sociology means at least four somewhat different things, each of which might be further subdivided. To certain minds this diversity is a source of discouragement. The people who like to have their work laid out in definite fashion, who want to see the way made plain, the highroads fenced, the fields clearly bounded, are likely to be disheartened by the picture which this paper presents. But there is another point of view. Classifications and definitions are valuable to prevent confusion, to frustrate duplication, to keep the same things from being called by different names. But, after all, there is a certain arbitrariness about classification and methodology. The problem is the important thing. This is a day of borderland problems, when students in search of truth follow where the pursuit may lead, even though they transgress old scientific boundaries once held almost sacred. Definition and terminology record results even more than they guide to achievement. It is, I think, possible to note in sociology a slight reaction from the discussion of scope and method, valuable as this has been, toward the study of problems, the grouping of phenomena, the formulation of principles which later on will become subject-matter for organization and systematizing. A cynical writer in the *Nation* a half-dozen years ago advised sociologists to give less thought to what they themselves were called and what name was given to their pursuits, and to concentrate their energies on showing results for which labels could later be easily supplied. There are signs that this worldly wisdom is finding expression in sociology today. Perhaps the best advice to the young and aspiring sociologist is this: If you are unduly anxious about sociology, its meaning, its scope, its method, its future—throw off the burden of anxiety; and turn to some concrete problem of the common life, seek to make it your own, relate it to some general principle, give it a newer and truer interpretation. In the absorption of the work you will forget your uncertainty as to what it ought to be called.

## THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES<sup>1</sup>

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For "substance of doctrine" I agree with everything that Professor Vincent said last week about the varieties of sociology. I join heartily in his closing remarks to the effect that if you will take hold of any social problem and follow it back, and out, and up, as far as investigation will go, you will have the reality of sociology whether you have a name for it, and a definition of it, or not.

At the same time, while this inclusive aspect of sociology should be emphasized, while it should be made plain that there is room for many types of workers, I find that I am getting to be somewhat strenuous for a single, rather rigid test to separate the sociological sheep from the non-sociological goats.

A thousand men may be directly employed in putting up a Chicago building. Every one of them may put into the building something that is utterly indispensable. In a way we may say that every one of them is an architect. In strict literalness, only one architect may have had anything to do with the work. We might apply the word "architecture" in a loose sense to the whole motley collection of processes, from the contracting and excavating for the foundation, through the masonry, and frame construction, and carpentering, and plumbing, and electric wiring, and steam-fitting, and elevator-installing, and roofing, and floor-laying, and plastering, and painting, and glazing, and decorating. Nevertheless, only one man, among all that combined their labor to produce the building, would be admitted to the society of architects. His peers know perfectly well why they class themselves with him and separate themselves from all the rest of his co-laborers. It is not because he could have pro-

<sup>1</sup>A paper read before the Sociology Club of the University of Chicago, May 15, 1906.

duced the building alone. It is because he is the only man in the whole collection who could *think* the building before it was produced, and think it in such a way that his thoughts could show other men how to produce it. Other men can think their particular jobs, and fit them into the jobs of other crafts. The architect is the only one who can plan the whole system of jobs in advance, and mark out jobs for all the different kinds of workers who are needed to complete the building.

Now, I distinctly do *not* intend to compare the sociologist to the architect, and other types of social scientists to the job workers on the building, in any sense that would imply that the sociologist has any function in the way of *managing* the work of other scientists. The point of the comparison is simply this: Neither the stone mason, nor the structural iron-worker, nor the carpenter, nor the plumber, nor the steam-fitter, nor the roofer, nor the decorator is an *architect*, merely by virtue of doing work that goes into the completed structure of a house. Each is what he is, but he isn't an architect. In the same way, neither of the thousand and one types of people who work, and work profitably, upon theoretical or practical social problems are necessarily *sociologists*. To my mind, it all depends, not on the fact that they are dealing with society, but on the *way* in which they deal with society.

It may be profitable to draw still another primary distinction, namely, between essential divisions of labor in the work of getting or applying knowledge, and the *academic* division of labor which is represented by such conventional names as History, Political Economy, Political Science, Anthropology, Psychology, Ethics, Sociology, etc., etc. It is one thing to assign particular pieces of work to departments and instructors in a university, and quite another thing to make out the real reason, or lack of reason, that is underneath this conventional distribution. I am not now talking about the *practical* boundary lines between different departments in this or any other university; for there is no question at issue in that connection. For practical purposes the boundaries are as clearly defined, and as well understood as though they were marked by stone monuments set by surveyors.

On the other hand, these mechanical divisions of labor in a university are veritable travesties of scientific landmarks. Not a man of us can ask a question about any actual human problem, without rough-riding through the preserve of every one of these academic divisions of labor before he gets a final answer. Academic divisions of labor are pedagogical conveniences, but, to a very considerable extent, they are scientific inconveniences and impertinences.

For instance, suppose we are asking what effect different tenures of land have on the efficiency of cultivation. The historian, or the moralist, or the political scientist, or the ethnologist, or the psychologist, or the sociologist might start this question, and the answer might be of great interest from the view-point of either. To get an answer to the question, we should have to apply technique and information classed within the mysteries of each of these specialists. We should have to ransack racial records, and interpret social customs, and political systems, and ecclesiastical practices, and industrial organizations, and legal and moral codes. We should have to know how to separate evidence from irrelevance in each of these fields. We should have to learn how to distinguish causes from effects in each of these relations, so as to be sure we had not mistaken the one for the other; and we should have to learn how causes of the different kinds modify and neutralize or energize each other, so as not to imagine that we have in view *results* of a form of land-tenure, when they may be merely coincidences, connected with the tenure of land merely by the *post quod propter quod* assumption.

Now, this instance illustrates the situation in every academic department of the social sciences, whenever they touch a real human question. They simply cannot keep within the boundaries which they have drawn for their preserve. If they are dealing with mere hypothetical abstractions from the real social process, or if they are content merely to follow out certain phases of fact and stop there, the particular emphasis that they observe prevents them from appearing to encroach upon other specialists. It is really in this sense, and to this extent, that the agreement and harmony, of which I spoke a moment ago, exists between

academic departments. They are all exercising themselves chiefly on rudimentary technique, and are not under the necessity of carrying that technique very far in application to the real problems of life. If they were, it would be impossible to maintain the academic traditions of separateness. The different kinds of scientific workers would necessarily fall into hierarchies, like the laborers employed in building a house; each in the place determined by the actual relation of his work to the whole process of construction.

In order, therefore, to understand the elementary conceptions of the sociological argument, we must be able to see through the whole petty claptrap of academic divisions. A real scientific process ignores it as thoroughly as a lawyer pleading his cause selects his words and his constructions for the work they will do, regardless of the classifications of philologists and grammarians.

My argument, then, is that there is one great overtowering task for the human mind. That task is *to find out the meaning of human experience*. This is the inclusive, architectonic task of analysis, and then of synthesis, as we transpose knowledge into purpose. Now, I would divide thinkers primarily into those who have become conscious of this task, and have tackled it, from some point or other, and those who have not. The have-nots outnumber the haves some millions to one. By whatever name they call themselves, the majority are not sociologists. Whether they adopt the name "sociologist" or not, the minority are all in the same boat. They must inevitably, sooner or later, recognize their common lot, because they are prying into the same reality, and that reality must at last schoolmaster them all into one state of knowledge. The sociologists, as I use the term, are the people who have interpreted the omens to this extent and are deliberately trying to make out the forms and laws of relationship in human association in recognition of which we must at last organize all real knowledge of human affairs.

Probably, even to those who have studied sociology most, what I have said so far has a very abstract and empty sound. I will try to make it a little more definite.

So far as we are able to make out the contents of the savage



mind, whether in a primeval forest or in a modern city, it amounts to about this: Life presents itself as a daily and hourly recurring problem of ways and means to satisfy a very small collection of very primary wants. Life is a round of providing food and covering and shelter, and defense against nature and beasts and hostile men. There is no further outlook. The whole affair is summed up in a long-drawn-out striving to escape as many pangs of pain as possible, and to achieve as many as possible grunts of comfort. The people on this plane of life acquire a certain technique of food-getting, and house-building, and enemy-hunting, but beyond this they are conscious of no problem.

At the other extreme in principle are the people who get outside of themselves in thought, and encounter the question: What does this life of ours mean? What is it all about? Why live at all? Is there anything to wish for and hope for and work for, beyond food and clothes and shelter and comfort? If so, how shall we locate it and master it? We may typify this sort of people by the author of the book of Job, wrestling with the eternal problem of good and evil.

After men have once reached powers of reflection and abstraction that result in presenting this question, there is no salvation for them but in answering it. There is always the savage stratum, in every civilization, that has thought only for the elementary concrete facts nearest to the minimum problem of physical necessities. On the other hand, there is always a contingent of at least incipient philosophers. They are asking: What do these concrete experiences mean? All the attempted sciences of human life that ever have existed or ever will exist are nearer or remoter consequences of the disposition to ask this question. The actual form and content of the social sciences, as we find them at any moment, are reflections of the limitations within which the thinkers have been willing to confine themselves in their search for answer to the question.

From the beginning of abstract thinking, we have had, at the one extreme, *philosophers*, of whom Plato may be taken as the type. To them, as to the rabble, life as it presents itself in actual concrete experience is a great big mix. They find no clue in con-

crete circumstances that would show a place for everything, and help to put everything in its place. The confusion is hopeless. Such thinkers solve the puzzle by giving it up and betaking themselves to something easier. They withdraw themselves from the tangle of the real world and take refuge in a realm which their own minds construct. Apart and afar from literal life, they posit an idea. In their thoughts this idea conceives and brings forth a universe. Thereupon their task is to make this conceptual universe bring order out of chaos in explaining the actual universe.

As I shall acknowledge presently, there always has been, and there is always likely to be, a certain value in this largely unreal method of thinking. Speculative philosophy is one type of effort to answer the central human question: *What does life mean?* We need not try to deal out credit or discredit to such philosophy for its proportion of merit for search after truth. It is enough for the moment to place it, as one of the attempts to answer the main question.

At the other extreme there have always been men who, consciously or unconsciously, approached the same question from the opposite point of view. They have become conscious of a certain range of human interests, while they have ignored other interests, and they have tried to think systematically about those interests on which they center their attention. Then they have virtually—whether deliberately or not—tried to explain the meaning of life by means of their knowledge of these particular interests.

For instance, we may explain the growth of the so-called science of history in this way. For ordinary men it is a prodigious feat of the constructive imagination to take notice that the world is full of stronger men lording it over weaker men. Certain high-power tinctures of ordinariness, our Homers and our Virgils, have reflected vulgar interests, and rudimentary stages of generalization, by dressing up in fanciful form real or mythical exploits of heroes divine or human. They sing of "arms and a man." In these lyrics or epics, or merely in plain folk-lore, naïve versions of the meaning of life have been more or less evident.

But more sober, critical, literal attention to life is paid by another type of men. So far as life appeals to them seriously, it presents itself as at bottom the government of one man by another. The fact of great systems of sovereignty occupies the center of their field of view. The things chiefly worth remembering and reflecting on are the fortunes of men who conquer and wield political power, and thus control the destinies of all the rest of men. From this point of view Herodotus and Thucydides submit their answer as to the meaning of life. They set a model which is adopted, with variations, by the class of thinkers that we call historians down to the present hour. With a rough approximation to truth, we may say that all these men attempt to interpret life to us as an affair to be understood fundamentally as a function of government and sovereignty.

Of course, there has never been utter separation between the speculative and the positive method of approach, in the case of a single individual. Plato could not abstract himself utterly from the real world; while Herodotus and his successors have always seen the facts of history through the medium of a more or less definite philosophy. I am speaking now of types, without attempting to discuss the mixture of types in specific cases. I must also qualify the statement that the followers of Herodotus and Thucydides pictured life as an affair of government and of sovereignty. *One species* of their followers has held to that view. All the rest have more or less departed from it—for instance, the religious historians.

Two general propositions, therefore, are in point with reference to the historians: *First*, the one common element in their purposes is search for some part of the meaning of life. *Second*, the one common article in their methodological faith is that the desired meaning is to be discovered by making out some *continuity* of human experiences.

A moment ago I used the phrase "the so-called science of history." Just now it is the fad to be facetious at the expense of sociology, because the sociologists cannot agree upon an exact description of their field. But within three years I have heard the confession in open meetings of the American Historical Asso-

ciation, the American Economic Association, and the American Social Science Association for each of these sciences in turn, that it would be useless to spend time trying to make an acceptable definition of the division of knowledge in each case represented. Sociology is no more unfortunate in this respect than the older divisions of social science. They have simply existed long enough for their vagueness to have been accepted as inevitable. In point of fact, the supposed objectivity and unity of either of these sciences will never be made out, until it is a phase of that very unity which the sociologists are diligently laboring to discover.

I am not saying that the sociologists alone are scientific in their methods. On the contrary, the historians, the economists, and the political scientists are far in advance of the sociologists in perfecting their scientific technique. What I am urging is that the implicit task upon which we are all working is discovery of the meaning of human experience, and that the primary significance of the sociologists is in this message to their fellow-scientists: "Your technique cannot save you. It may be a millstone around the neck of your science. We shall never learn the meaning of human experience until we learn the meaning of *all* human experience. You cut human experience into convenient little abstract sections and thin layers, and when you have applied the microscope to them, you think you have found the secret of life. Human experience is not disconnected microscopic sections. It is a cosmos. Your abstractions will be abortions until you learn the meaning of them in their relations to the living whole." If we stop to take an inventory, it turns out that we have "histories" of everything from civilization to coinage. We have "histories" of church doctrine, and "histories" of military tactics. We have "histories" of language, and of painting, and of prostitution. We have "histories" of the idea of the devil, and "histories" of hymnology, and "histories" of the conflict of science and religion. We have constitutional histories, and political histories, and industrial histories, and military histories, and social histories. Between historians of any two of these groups of subject-matter it is possible, and even probable, that we should find nothing more in common than the two traits already named: i. e., both are trying to

make out some part of the meaning of life, and both are trying to do their share toward finding that meaning by running down a selected series of continuities.

As a sociologist I put in my word that this is all well so far as it goes, but a world full of workers merely from this point of view would never succeed in making out the meaning of human experience. The more we unravel these distinct strands of human continuity, and follow them back till they are lost in the mass of undifferentiated experience, the more evident and importunate becomes the demand for explanation of the strands by knowledge of the web of experience from which they have been disentangled. In other words, when we have divided life up into an indefinite number of series of continuities, we have not found out the meaning of life. We have merely made the enigma of life more perplexing. We thereby only succeed in giving ourselves more convincing evidence of the real task—viz., *to make out what all these series mean, not merely in their detached sequences, but in their actual working combinations.*

This brings us to the cardinal principle that *the meaning of experience is not to be discovered in continuity alone, in the historical sense.* Social causation is always contemporary as well as consecutive.

Not with conscious attention to this principle, but with instinctive reference to it, political science and political economy have come into existence. We may speak of Macchiavelli as the father of political science. Of course, he drew his observations largely from history; but he reflected at least as directly upon his first-hand contact with prince-craft. The thing worth knowing being how to govern a state, Macchiavelli set himself the task of putting in order what he knew about the way in which this was done by successful princes. A social science of *utility* was thus founded. Political science unmixed with any other science, and kept as a pure abstraction, according to the scheme of definition-makers, would be restricted simply to this problem, viz: *A certain system of political results being assumed as desirable, what maxims of conduct is it necessary for rulers to observe in order to achieve those results?* The fact that nobody is content to confine

himself to that form of question proves that people acute enough to deal with problems of government understandingly are at any rate partially conscious that an inquiry so limited would always be subordinate to a more fundamental inquiry, viz: What political results are desirable? Here again we raise a question which no academically bounded science can answer even in algebraic form. The answer is a function of the complete life of man. We must have a tentative solution of the main problem of the essential meaning of life, in order to furnish the answer. A political science that is moving along in harmony with the whole progressive gain of out-look and in-look about the meaning of life, must consequently be, not a permanent abstraction, but sooner or later a working partner with all the other types of investigation that are together closing in on the total meaning of life.

In other words, if our range of reflective interest were bounded by *political utility*, we should start with a more or less distinctly defined conception of what we meant by political utility. That conception would have to be either a hard and fast notion, fixed for all time, subject to no change; or it would have to be a provisional conception, subject to modification, in consequence of changes in our judgments of life-values. Assuming the former alternative, let us suppose that political utility, as we understand it, is represented by the utmost absence of friction in operating the present constitution and laws of the United States. But one of the three co-ordinate branches of this governmental system is the legislative. Not to speak of the other ways in which our constitution and laws actually change their content from time to time, several thousand bills are introduced at every session of our national legislature alone. These bills propose amendment or repeal of old laws, and enactment of new ones. Every bill that becomes a law may alter the standard of political utility that previously prevailed. Here is then our dilemma as political scientists. Either we must be stand-patters, and demand that legislation shall be reduced to an empty form, that it shall forever reiterate what exists today; or our political science must have a way of going outside of itself, and of finding means of deciding, first, whether a proposed law actually does involve a modified standard

of political utility; and if it does, then our political science needs an objective standard by which to decide whether the innovation in types of political utility is desirable or undesirable. To put it in another way, we must either commit ourselves unalterably to the position that there is nothing in the world greater or better or more desirable than our present machinery of government, that this system bounds our moral world; or we must concede that our theory, our science, of this system of government is merely a subordinate term in the equation of life, and that it has always to be held subject to modification by the values of other terms in the same equation.

For instance, suppose the proposition is a constitutional amendment providing for election of senators by direct ballot, instead of by legislatures. Such a proposition at once challenges the authority of that standard of political utility upon which, for the sake of argument, we are supposing our political science to be based. It introduces a modified conception of the kind of society we wish our government to secure. By what means shall we decide that the kind of society which would be promoted by popularly elected senators would be better or worse than the kind of society of which our present Senate is a factor? The type of political science which we are now discussing hypothetically would have prejudiced the case in one way. It would have assumed our present political system as a finality. By this very assumption it would make itself helpless for the present purpose. That is, it would have begged the question of human desirability. On the other hand, whoever proposes to change the present political order of the United States assumes a burden of proof that something else is better. If it is not a final order, why is it not? Whatever the proposed answer, it would have to rest on some principle broad enough and deep enough to serve as a common measure of existing standards of political utility, and of each and every other standard that might be brought into competition with it.

Before passing to the other alternative in political science, I should say that no such freak is known to exist as the political scientist who would deliberately and frankly support the concep-

tion of political science just illustrated. No political scientist has ever been heard of who did not, as a matter of fact, entertain some notion of a meaning of life in excess of political utility in the strict sense. The consequence is that no political science has ever been written in which the critical eye could not read between the lines more or less emphatic implications that the political science must after all, at last, be a function of a more inclusive science. Political utility is only a segment of human utility. This is not a theory of academic partisanship, it is not a professional bias that creates imaginary relations. It is a fact, which no bias can successfully ignore. This being the case, scientific progress, so far as political science is concerned, depends upon the degree in which actual political scientists have reconciled their specialization with this larger reality.

We may now go back to the other possible alternative in presumptions of political utility, viz., that political utility is a relative term, varying from age to age, from country to country, from race to race, in accordance with an indefinite number of circumstances. The moment we take this view we have committed our political science to interminable cycles of struggle with two questions instead of one; viz.: first, by what ways and means shall a given type of political utility be achieved; i. e., the question of political science in the narrowest sense; and, second, by what token shall we know whether a given type of political utility is preferable to another; for instance, a system in which the electoral franchise is restricted to men, versus one in which it is shared on equal terms by men and women?

It would be easy to show that, whatever steps we consent to take toward answering this latter type of question, these steps leave us no stopping-place till we have arrived at some result which we are willing to accept in answer to the fundamental question: What is the whole meaning of life? That is, we either expand our so-called political science into an all-round life-philosophy, or we acknowledge that it is merely fractional in its character, and that it must be supplemented by divisions of science which explore other segments of life-values. If we take the former of these alternatives, we virtually make the scope of



political science identical with that which I claim for sociology. I have no interest in quarreling about names, with men who take this view, and prefer to call it political science. If they are doing all that man can do to push inquiry into the whole meaning of life, God bless them, whatever identification tag they wear! My interest as a sociologist is in pointing out that men who organize their work from this point of view are on the same quest with the sociologists. Our business is to understand each other as soon as possible, and to help each other all we can in so perfecting our methods that we may make our utmost contribution to knowledge. Many German political scientists apparently mean just what I do by sociology when they use the term *Staatswissenschaft*. Literally translated, the term would be the "science of the state," or "civic science," or simply "civics." Interpreted by what some of them actually put into the term, it leaves out of the schedule nothing that occurs in human experience. The same is much more evidently true of another term which is used in much the same way by writers who start rather from the economic point of view, viz., *Sozialwissenschaft*.<sup>2</sup> There is nothing in a mere name, one way or the other. The chief strategic method for which the sociologists are fighting is interpretation of the parts of life by the whole of life. Whoever is not against us in this fight is on our side. The main contention is that no single connected series of human experiences can explain itself, because each series is a function of all the other human experiences that have occurred antecedent to it, and that are contemporary with it. Neither can any single cross-section of human experience explain itself, because it is merely a passing phase of the myriad series of causes and effects which are making the life of one moment and unmaking it in the next. The problem of human knowledge is an endless task, first, of analyzing all the experiences of life into their elements; second, of reconstructing these elements in such a way that they will interpret each other to our understanding, as they do not to our direct observation. The sociologists are attorneys for this latter share of the process of knowledge.

In dealing with the relation of sociology to *political economy*,

<sup>2</sup>Dietzel, *Theoretische Sozialökonomik*, p. 4.

what has already been said in connection with political science has to be repeated with changed terms.

In brief the situation is this: Adam Smith in effect defined the boundaries of a purely technical inquiry when he proposed the problem that may be expressed in this way: *What laws must a nation observe in order to amass the largest quantity of wealth?* Thereupon political economy became primarily an inquiry into the conditions which govern increase of national wealth. A logician from Mars, unless Mars is a sophists' colony, would have no difficulty whatever in placing such an inquiry where it belongs in the scale of knowledge. He would see at once that wealth is an incident in human life, and that the ratio of the importance of this incident varies from time to time, from place to place, from civilization to civilization. He would see that the question, *How shall we increase wealth?* is always subordinate to the question, *Why should we increase wealth?* and to the less general question, *What ratio do the reasons for increasing wealth bear, under existing circumstances, to the reasons for providing the other incidentals of life?* He would, accordingly, see that, on its merits as a section of science, not according to its capacity to stir up popular interest, political economy subtends relatively a very small angle of knowledge. It deals with material things and the means of obtaining them. But life, whether of the individual or of a nation, does not and cannot consist of the things that are possessed. It cannot do without a modicum of them, and it cannot advance from range to range of achievement without controlling corresponding quantities of them. But things are merely preliminaries to life. They bear the same relation to life that dealing out rations to an army bears to fighting battles. The commissary department is necessary, but supplies are not strategy. We are simply generalizing that proposition when we repeat that wealth is not life. We can no more solve the problem of life by solving the problem of wealth than we can solve military problems by analyzing foods. Life consists not in the accumulation of things, but in the experiences of persons. We are living in a stage of the development of western civilization in which the item of wealth occupies a far larger share of attention than its place in the scale of

human values justifies. For this reason, during the better part of a hundred years, political economy has been able to occupy a scientific prominence ridiculously out of proportion to its logical significance in the totality of human knowledge. Economists have gravely assumed that their economic knowledge qualifies them to settle all sorts of questions of public policy. This is as though pure mathematicians should claim the right to dictate the settlement of the financial and engineering and architectural problems involved in rebuilding San Francisco. The most convenient case in point is General Walker's volume, *Political Economy*, published in "The American Science Series for Schools and Colleges," in 1883. The opening paragraph reads as follows:

Political Economy, or Economics, is the name of that body of knowledge which relates to wealth. *Political Economy has to do with no other subject whatever, than wealth.* Especially should the student take care not to allow any purely political, ethical, or social considerations to influence him in his investigations. All that he has, as an economist, to do is to find out how wealth is produced, exchanged, distributed, and consumed. It will remain for the social philosopher, the moralist, or the statesman, to decide how far the pursuit of wealth, according to the laws discovered by the economist, should be subordinated to other, let us say higher, considerations. The more strictly the several branches of inquiry are kept apart, the better it will be for each and for all.<sup>1</sup>

If the proof of the pie were not in the eating, I should have no comments to pass on this paragraph, nor on the type of economic presumption that it represents. The amusing way in which the program works out in practice, however, is the sufficient reason for using this writer to point my moral. In the last 130 of the 476 pages in this book on *Political Economy*, as just defined, General Walker applies his economic principles to questions of public policy covering a range of social problems which can no more be solved by economics alone than problems in the treatment of diseases can be solved by anatomy.

The absurdity of the *non-sequitur* element in this situation is mitigated, but not removed, by the remark with which General Walker concludes the section just quoted, viz:

The economist may also be a social philosopher, a moralist, or a states-

<sup>1</sup>P. 1. Italics mine.

man, just as the mathematician may also be a chemist or a mechanic; but not, on that account, should the several subjects of inquiry be confounded.

From the standpoint of the pure logician standing outside of all the social sciences, and criticising them simply and solely as samples of reasoning, the clue to the conflict of claims between economics and sociology is briefly this: The economists have proceeded upon the assumption that being an economist one thereby is at once social philosopher, moralist, and statesman to the extent necessary to furnish an authoritative interpretation of life. The sociologists maintain, on the contrary, that this is no more necessarily the case than that the mathematician is *ipso facto* a chemist or a mechanic.

While I was serving a seven years' apprenticeship as a teacher of history and economics, with no thought of another vocation, and while I was trying to use General Walker's book as a basis for instruction in economics, the anomaly of the whole methodological presumption upon which current valuations of economic theory rested compelled me to calculate my bearings for myself. I would utter not a word or hint in disparagement of economic science. My affair is to make clear the necessary subordination of economic science in the complex process of interpreting life as a whole. Some of the men of largest mold that have dealt with social questions during the past century have been economists, and the economic basis of their opinions has doubtless been as secure as any portion of the reasoning upon which our policies have been founded. More than this, the public questions which have been to the fore during the past century have been of a nature which made it both safe and wise, in a large proportion of cases, to allow the economic factors to be decisive for working purposes; but this does nothing whatever to remove the fact that the whole problem of economics, even if it could be solved to stay solved for all times and places, is merely a fragment of the problem of life. With reference to the whole problem of the meaning of life, and the largest view of the conduct of life, we are merely in the kindergarten stage of social intelligence. Judged by the rules of exact science, our logical wrestlings with the problems of life so far are chiefly according to the easy-going rule

of catch-as-catch-can. If our problem is enlarged in scope from that of material gain, to that of the meaning of life in its whole intent and extent, the economic problem falls into a perspective which gives it very much the same relation to the life-problem at large that a supply of paint and a few yards of canvas would bear to the production of another Raphael.

Behind and around the economic problem are such problems as these: What other interests besides wealth occupy human life? What are the relations of these interests to each other? Are these relations constant or variable, and, if the latter, what are the principles and laws of variation? What ratios of value have these interests to each other in the economy of human life? By what means may we discover whether our valuations of these different interests are valid? What laws must be observed in getting satisfaction of these different interests? By what evidence shall we decide whether we are devoting proportionate or disproportionate attention to the different kinds of normal human interests? What laws must be observed in harmonizing human interests?

The great joke of nineteenth-century social science has been its grave and confident assumption that expert skill was required in solving the problems of wealth, and government, but that untutored common-sense is the only outfit necessary in dealing with any possible surplus problems for which history and economics and political science did not amply provide. Very slight logical analysis beneath the surface of this naïveté reveals that a new series of sciences is not merely possible but necessary before we can penetrate very far into the literal meaning of life.

Although his disciples have pretty generally ignored it, there is good reason to believe that Adam Smith quite distinctly perceived that substantially the hierarchy of questions just recited surrounds and subordinates the economic question. He probably had no doubt that a science which would securely answer all these questions was necessary in order to give economic science its final place in our system of knowledge. At present there are two possible logical alternatives for political economy: first, frankly to confine itself to the rôle of a technology of wealth-getting; second,

to enter into loyal correlation with an inclusive life-philosophy. Even if the former alternative were adopted, political economy would have to be revised whenever economic institutions came to be operated in accordance with modified social valuations. The questions that I have just proposed open up, therefore, some of those vistas of *lange Gedankenreihen*, with which Sombart is telling his economic colleagues they must learn to correlate their specific material, if they are to save economic theory from provincialism.

In all that I have said, I have gone far toward showing why the miscellany of so-called sociological pursuits that Professor Vincent told about last week not only may exist, but in the nature of the case must exist. Sociology is primarily a synthetic, coordinating conception. So long as we think of reality as cut up into detachable parts, which may be treated as entities in and of themselves, it is possible and natural to think of sciences of those parts of knowledge, clearly distinct from each other, and accurately definable in terms of the subject-matter which they monopolize. The moment we propose the question, What is the meaning of life? we imply an impeachment of the conception that the truth can be told about life if we divide it off into isolated unities. Our presumption is that these divisions of partial convenience are at last not traits of separation, but imaginary lines drawn by our reflection through a reality every phase of which must be known through its relations with the whole. Human life is an affair of individuals of like passions with each other, with essentially identical dependence upon the physical environment, with the ground-plan of their make-up substantially of one type, but in the course of generation after generation passing into individual and group variations which confuse their meaning in the whole life-process. Some individuals and groups come to be at an advantage, others at a disadvantage, physiologically or psychologically or institutionally, in adjusting themselves to the conditions of life. Each of these phases of human experience, whether past or present, has its quota of value in making out the meaning of life as a whole. *To my mind, the distinctive function of sociology, as a division of labor in social*

*science, is the mapping of the whole scope of human experience as a functional process, in which the elements of human experience get their meaning.* I recognize, however, the purely formal character of this division of scientific work. Not many people should engage in it. Possibly its future will be something like that of general biology, which is now merely a name for a synthetic view of the whole system of cause and effect that operates in vital phenomena; while all the concrete biological science is investigation of particular relations in which these laws appear. In order that sociology may get what Professor Ross calls "body," it must get out of the mere algebraic and geometric formulation of life-relations, and find the reality in actual human experiences. Referring now to a remark at the beginning, I would accordingly, for broadly scientific purposes, not at all to justify the division of academic departments, apply the term "sociological" to any division of labor, larger or smaller, which is actually trying to find out the meaning of a phase or fragment of life, historical, contemporary or constructive, *in its relation with the whole life-process.* In this sense, all historians, all ethnologists, all political scientists, all economists, all social ameliorators, are sociologists, *in the degree in which they consent to hold their part of scientific or social work as perpetually incidental and subordinate to advancing knowledge of the whole human process.* We can learn of this process precisely, only by studying the processes that compose it. These processes range from the baby getting acquainted with his toes, to collisions of civilizations. Whoever is studying any part of any one of these processes, whether from the historical, the analytic, or the constructive point of view, *provided he works with the presumption that the process he is studying somehow gets its full and final meaning from its connections with all the rest of human experience,* is doing all that the sociologist asks. He has logically correlated his work with the system of advancing knowledge which will grow into the ultimate social science.

Perhaps I have blundered in leaving myself so little room to speak of the relation of sociology to psychology. This is not because the relation is obscure or unimportant, but because in present sociology the function of psychology is regarded as too

evident for discussion. We take it for granted that the last answer which the human mind can ever give to the inclusive question, What is the meaning of life? will be, first, a version of objective experience in terms of the subjective experience which psychology explains; and, second, a valuation of each phase of the process in terms of the human personality in which the subjective and the objective experiences meet. Whether psychologist or sociologist will be senior partner in the business of reaching this rendering of life is a question that gives me the least possible concern. It is enough to know that, from this on, psychologists and sociologists will have so much in common that neither can afford to leave the other very long out of sight.

I said in the beginning that, even in our day of positive science, we cannot refuse to credit a certain value to speculative forms of philosophy. Every methodologist knows that knowledge does not and cannot progress in the line of strict induction alone. We put a few facts together in the form of a generalization. Then we use that generalization as a sort of staging to stand on while we are scanning a wider horizon for more facts. When we have enough new facts in our possession we construct another outlook tower of this material and proceed to explore further. Presently some thinkers are left standing upon the watch-towers long since abandoned by others who are afield for more facts. The two kinds of searchers pass signals back and forth, and are thus of mutual assistance. Social science is no more and no less dependent upon this interchange of method than physical science. We may call in Tennyson's hard-worked "flower in the crannied wall" to help us do justice to these reciprocating phases of the progress of knowledge:

Flower in the crannied wall,  
I pluck you out of the crannies:—  
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,  
Little flower—but if I could understand  
What you are, root and all, and all in all,  
I should know what God and man is.

True, but there is another attitude of our minds, and one that we have to adopt provisionally every now and then, to escape



losing our bearings in uncharted confusion. We say: "If I knew, all in all, what God is, and what man is, then I should know, all in all, what the flower in the crannied wall is."

Social science, like all other science, has been, on the whole, an irregularly ascending spiral from nescience to knowledge. To speak after the manner of the mathematicians, it has been a function of alternate inspections of flowers in crannied walls, and inferences from men and gods largely of our own construction. We are approaching something like reasoned and reasonable reciprocity between the particularizing and the generalizing search for real knowledge. How large a part we shall require of the hundred million years which Professor Chamberlin allows us for tenancy of our planet, in order to make social science as exact as possible, is a question that worries me much less than the immediate issue: Shall we apply all the logic that we ought to know, to our part in advancing social knowledge?

There is work enough for every type of competent laborer in the co-operative task of discovering the meaning of life.

## THE ADVENTITIOUS CHARACTER OF WOMAN

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There is more than one bit of evidence that nature changed her plan with reference to some organisms at the very last moment, and introduced a feature which was not contemplated at the outset. This change of plan is carried out through the specialization of some organ, sense, or habit, to such a degree as to make practically a new type of the organism. In the human species, for example, the atrophied organs distributed through the body are evidence that the physical make-up of the species was well-nigh definitely fixed before the advantage of free hands led to an erect posture, thereby throwing certain sets of muscles out of use; and the specialization of the voice as a means of communicating thought was, similarly, a device for relieving the hands of the burden of communication, and was not introduced systematically until a gesture language had been so well established that even now we fall back into it unconsciously, especially in moments of excitement, and attempt to talk with our hands and bodies.

But perhaps the most interesting modification or reversal of plan to be noted in mankind is connected with the relation of the two sexes. As will presently be indicated, life itself was in the beginning female, so far as sex could be postulated of it at all, and the life-process was primarily a female process, assisted by the male. In humankind as well, nature obviously started out on the plan of having woman the dominant force, with man as an aid; but after a certain time there was a reversal of plan, and man became dominant, and woman dropped back into a somewhat unstable and adventitious relation to the social process. Up to a certain point, in fact, in his physical and social evolution man shows an interesting structural and mental adaptation to woman, or to the reproductive process which she represents; while the later stages of history show, on the other hand, that

the mental attitude of woman, and consequently her forms of behavior, have been profoundly modified, and even her physical life deeply affected, by her effort to adjust to man.

The only attitude which nature can be said to show toward life is the design that the individual shall sustain its own life, and at death leave others of its kind—that it shall get food, avoid destruction, and reproduce. In pursuance of this policy it naturally turns out that those types showing greater morphological and functional complexity, along with freer movement and more mental ingenuity, come into the more perfect control and use of their environment, and consequently have greater likelihood of survival. Failing of this greater complexity, their chance of life lies in occupying so obscure a position, so to speak, that they do not come into collision with more dominant forms, or in reproducing at such a rate as to survive in spite of this. The number of devices in the way of modification of form and habit to secure advantage is practically infinite, but all progressive species have utilized the principle of sex as an accessory of success. By this principle greater variability is secured, and among the larger number of variations there is always a chance of the appearance of one of superior fitness. The male in many of the lower forms is very insignificant in size, economically useless (as among the bees), often a parasite on the female, and, as many biologists hold, merely a secondary device or after-thought of nature designed to secure greater variation than can be had by the asexual mode of reproduction. In other words, he is of use to the species by assisting the female to reproduce progressively fitter forms.

When, in the course of time, sexual reproduction eventuated in a mammalian type, with greater intimacy between mother and offspring and a longer period of dependence of offspring on the mother, the function of the male in assisting the female became social as well as biological; and this was pre-eminently so in the case of man, because of the pre-eminent helplessness of the human child. The characteristic helplessness of the child, which at first thought appears to be a disadvantage, is in fact the source of human superiority, since the design of nature in provid-

ing this condition of helplessness is to afford a lapse of time sufficient for the growth of the very complex mechanism, the human brain, which, along with free hands, is the medium through which man begins that reaction on his environment—inventing, exterminating, cultivating, domesticating, organizing—which ends in his supremacy.

It is plain, therefore, that species in which growth is slow are at an advantage, if to the care and nourishment of the female are added the providence and protection of the male; and this is especially true in mankind, where growth is not completed for a long period of years. In this connection we have an explanation of the alleged greater variability of the male. Instead of an insignificant addendum to the reproductive process, he becomes larger than the female, masterful, jealous, a fighting specialization—still an attaché of the female, but now a defender and provider. This is the general condition among mammals; and among mankind the longer dependence of children results in a correspondingly lengthened and intimate association of the parents, which we denominate marriage. For Westermarck is quite right in his view that children are not the result of marriage, but marriage is the result of children. From this point of view marriage is a union favored by the scheme of nature because it is favorable to the rearing and training of children, and the groups practicing marriage, or its animal analogue, have the best chance of survival.

But the evolution of a courageous and offensive disposition had naturally not resulted in an eminently domestic disposition. Man did the hunting and fighting. He was attached to the woman, but he was not steady. He did not stay at home. The woman and the child were the core of society, the fixed point, the point to which man came back. There consequently grew up a sort of dual society and dual activity. Man represented the more violent and spasmodic activities, involving motion and skilful co-ordinations, as well as organization for hunting and fighting; while woman carried on the steady, settled life. She was not able to wander readily from a fixed point, on account of her children; and, indeed, her physical organization fitted her for

endurance rather than movement. Consequently her attention was turned to industries, since these were compatible with settled and stationary habits. Agriculture, pottery, weaving, tanning, and all the industrial processes involved in working up the by-products of the chase, were developed by her. She seems to have been the first to domesticate animals—beginning, perhaps, with man. She built her house, and it was hers. She did not go to her husband's group after marriage. The child was hers, and remained a member of her group. The germ of social organization was, indeed, the woman and her children and her children's children. The old women were the heads of civil society, though the men had developed a fighting organization and technique which eventually swallowed them up.

From the standpoint of physical force, man was the master, and was often brutal enough. But woman led an independent life, to some extent. She was, if not economically independent, at least economically creative, and she enjoyed the great advantage of being less definitely interested in man than he was in her. For while woman is more deeply involved physiologically in the reproductive life than man, she is apparently less involved from the standpoint of immediate stimulus, or her interest is less acute in consciousness. The excess activity which characterizes man in his relation to the general environment holds also for his attitude toward woman. Not only is the male the wooer among the higher orders of animals and among men, but he has developed all the accessories for attracting attention—in the animals, plumage, color, voice, and graceful and surprising forms of motion; and in man, ornament and courageous action. For primitive man, like the male animal, was distinguished by ornament.

Up to this time the relation of man to woman was the natural development of a relation calculated to secure the best results for the species. His predacious disposition had been, in part at least, developed in the service of woman and her child, and he was emotionally dependent on her to such a degree that he used all the arts of attraction at his command to secure a relation with her. In the course of time, however, an important change took

place in environment conditions. While woman had been doing the general work and had developed the beginnings of many industries, man had become a specialist along another line. His occupation had been almost exclusively the pursuit of animals or conflict with his neighbors, and in this connection he had become an inventor of weapons and traps, and in addition had learned the value of acting in concert with his companions. But a hunting life cannot last forever; and when large game began to be exhausted, man found himself forced to abandon his destructive and predacious activities, and adopt the settled occupations of woman. To these he brought all the inventive technique and capacity for organized action which he had developed in his hunting and fighting life, with the result that he became the master of woman in a new sense. Not suddenly, but in the course of time, he usurped her primacy in the industrial pursuits, and through his organization of industry and the application of invention to the industrial processes became a creator of wealth on a scale before unknown. Gradually also he began to rely not altogether on ornament, exploits, and trophies to get the attention and favor of woman. When she was reduced to a condition of dependency on his activity, wooing became a less formidable matter, and he even began to negotiate for her and purchase her from her male kindred. In unadvanced stages of society, where machinery and the division of labor and a high degree of organization in industry have not been introduced, and even among our own lower classes, woman still retains a relation to industrial activities and has a relatively independent status. Among the Indians of this country it was recognized that a man could not become wealthy except through the possession of a sufficient number of wives to work up for trade the products of the chase; and today the West African youth does not seek a young woman in marriage but an old one, preferably a widow, who knows all about the arts of preparing and adulterating rubber. Among peasants, also, and plain people, the proverb recognizes that the "gray mare is the better horse." The heavy, strong, enduring, patient, often dominant type frequently seen among the lower classes, where alone woman is still economically

functional, is probably a good representative of what the women of our race were before they were reduced by man to a condition of parasitism which, in our middle and so-called higher classes, has profoundly affected their physical, mental, and moral life.

On the moral side, particularly, man's disposition to bend the situation to his pleasure placed woman in a hard position and resulted in the distortion of her nature, or rather in bringing to the front elemental traits which under our moral code are not reckoned the best. In the animal world the female is noted for her indirection. On account of the necessity of protecting her young, she is cautious and cunning, and in contrast with the open and pugnacious methods of the more untrammelled male, she relies on sober colors, concealment, evasion, and deception of the senses. This quality of cunning is, of course, not immoral in its origin, being merely a protective instinct developed along with maternal feeling. In woman, also, this tendency to prevail by passive means rather than by assault is natural; and especially under a system of male control, where self-realization is secured either through the manipulation of man or not at all, a resort to trickery, indirection, and hypocrisy is not to be wondered at. Man has, however, always insisted that woman shall be better than he is, and her immoralities are usually not such as he greatly disapproves. There has, in fact, been developed a peculiar code of morals to cover the peculiar case of woman. This may be called a morality of the person and of the bodily habits, as contrasted with the commercial and public morality of man. Purity, constancy, reserve, and devotion are the qualities in woman which please and flatter the jealous male; and woman has responded to these demands both really and seemingly. Without any consciousness of what she was doing (for all moral traditions fall in the general psychological region of habit), she acts in the manner which makes her most pleasing to men. And—always with the rather definite realization before her of what a dreadful thing it is to be an old maid—she has naïvely insisted that her sisters shall play well within the game, and has become herself the most strict censor of that morality which has become traditionally associated with woman. Fearing the obloquy which the

world attaches to a bad woman, she throws the first stone at any woman who bids for the favor of men by overstepping the modesty of nature. Morality, in the most general sense, represents the code under which activities are best carried on, and is worked out in the school of experience. It is pre-eminently an adult and a male system, and men are intelligent enough to recognize that neither women nor children have passed through this school. It is on this account that, while man is merciless to woman from the standpoint of personal behavior, he exempts her from anything in the way of contractual morality, or views her defections in this regard with allowance and even with amusement.

In the absence of any participation in commercial activity, and with no capital but her personal charms and her wits, and with the possibility of realizing on these only through a successful appeal to man, woman naturally puts her best foot first. It was, of course, always one of the functions of the female to charm the male; but so long as woman maintained her position of economic usefulness and her quasi-independence she had no great problem, for there was never a chance in primitive society, any more than in animal society, that a woman would go unmated. But when through man's economic and social organization, and the male initiative, she became dependent, and when in consequence he began to pick and choose with a degree of fastidiousness, and when the less charming women were not married—especially when invidious distinctions arose between the wed and unwed, and the desirably wed and the undesirably wed, woman had to charm for her life; and she not only employed the passive arts innate with her sex, but flashed forth in all the glitter which had been one of man's accessories in courtship, but which he had dispensed with when the superiority acquired through occupational pursuits enabled him to do so. Under a new stimulation to be attractive, and with the addition of ornament to the repertory of her charms, woman has assumed an almost aggressive attitude toward courtship. The means of attraction she employs are so highly elaborated, and her technique is so finished, that she is really more active in courtship than man.



We speak of man as the wooer, but falling in love is really mediated by the woman. By dress, behavior, coquetry, modesty, reserve, and occasional boldness she gains the attention of man and infatuates him. He does the courting, but she controls the process. "Er glaubt zu schieben, und er wird geschoben."

The condition of limited stimulation, also, in which woman finds herself as a result of the control by man of wealth, of affairs, of the substantial interests of society, and even of her own personality, leads woman to devote herself to display as an interest in itself, regardless of its effect on men. In doing this she is really falling back on an instinct. One of the most powerful stimulations to either sex is glitter, in the most general sense, and the interest in showing off begins in the coloration and plumage of animals, and continues as ornament in the human species. It is true that the wooing connotation of ornament was originally its most important one, and that it was characteristic of man in particular; but woman has generalized it as an interest, and as a means of self-realization. She seeks it as a means of charming men, of outdoing other women, and as an artistic interest; and her attention often takes that direction to such a degree that its acquisition means satisfaction, and its lack discontent. Sometimes, indeed, when a woman is married and knows that she is "sped," she drops the display pose altogether, tends to lose herself in household interests, and to become a slattern. On the other hand, she often makes marriage the occasion of display on a more elaborate scale, and is pitiless in her demands for the means to this. A glance at the windows of our great stores shows that men have organized their business in a full appreciation of these facts. Dressing, indeed, becomes a competitive game with women, and since their opponents and severest critics are women, it turns out curiously enough that they dress even more with reference to the opinion of women than for men.

The land hath bubbles as the water has,  
And these are of them.

It would, of course, be absurd to censure woman too greatly for these frailties, and it would be very unjust to imply that all women share them. Some women, in adapting themselves to the

situation, follow, apparently, a bent acquired in connection with the maternal instinct, and become true and devoted and grand to a degree hardly known by man. Others, following a bent gotten along with coquetry in connection with the wooing instinct, and having no activity through which their behavior is standardized, become difficle, unreal, inefficient, exacting, unsatisfied, absurd. And we have also the paradox that the same woman can be the two things at different times. There is therefore a basis of truth in Pope's hard saying that "Women have no characters at all." Because their problem is not to accommodate to the solid realities of the world of experience and sense, but to adjust themselves to the personality of men, it is not surprising that they should assume protean shapes.

Moreover, man is so affected by the charms of woman, and offers so easy a mark for her machinations, as to invite exploitation. Having been evolved largely through the stimulus of the female presence, he continues to be more profoundly affected by her presence and behavior than by any other stimulus whatever, unless it be the various forms of combat. From Sampson and Odysseus down, history and story recognize the ease and frequency with which a woman makes a fool of a man. The male protective and sentimental attitude is indeed incompatible with resistance. To charm, pursue, court, and possess the female involve a train of memories which color all after-relations with the whole sex. In both animals and men there is an instinctive disposition to endure a great deal from the female. The male animal takes the assaults of the female complacently and shamefacedly, "just like folks." Peasants laugh at the hysterical outbreaks of their women, and the "bold bad man" is as likely to be henpecked as any other. Woman is a disturbing element in business and in school to a degree not usually apprehended. In her presence a man instinctively assumes a different attitude. He is, in fact, so susceptible as seemingly, almost, to want to be victimized, and, as Locke expressed the matter, "It is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived."

This disposition of men and the detached condition of woman

have much to do with the emergence of the adventuress and the sporting-woman. Human nature was made for action, and perhaps the most distressing and disconcerting situation which confronts it is to be played on by stimulations without the ability to function. The mere superinducing of passivity, as in the extreme case of solitary confinement, is sufficient to produce insanity; and the emotion of dread, or passive fear, is said to be the most painful of emotions, because there is no possibility of relief by action. Modern woman is in a similar condition of constraint and unrest, which produces organic ravages for which no luxury can compensate. The general ill-health of girls of the better classes, and the equally general post-matrimonial breakdown, are probably due largely to the fact that the nervous organization demands more normal stimulations and reactions than are supplied. The American woman of the better classes has superior rights and no duties, and yet she is worrying herself to death—not over specific troubles, but because she has lost her connection with reality. Many women, more intelligent and energetic than their husbands and brothers, have no more serious occupations than to play the house-cat, with or without ornament. It is a wonder that more of them do not lose their minds; and that more of them do not break with the system entirely is due solely to the inhibitive effects of early habit and suggestion.

As long as woman is comfortably cared for by the men of her group or by marriage, she is not likely to do anything rash, especially if the moral standards in her family and community are severe. But an unattached woman has a tendency to become an adventuress—not so much on economic as on psychological grounds. Life is rarely so hard that a young woman cannot earn her bread; but she cannot always live and have the stimulations she craves. As long, however, as she remains with her people and is known to the whole community, she realizes that any infraction of the habits of the group, any immodesty or immorality, will ruin her standing and her chances of marriage, and bring her into shame and confusion. Consequently, good behavior is a protective measure—instinctive, of course; for it is not true that the ordinary girl has imagination enough to think

out a general attitude toward life other than that which is habitual in her group. But when she becomes detached from home and group, and is removed not only from surveillance, but from the ordinary stimulation and interest afforded by social life and acquaintanceship, her inhibitions are likely to be relaxed. The girl coming alone from the country to the city affords one of the clearest cases of detachment. Assuming that she comes to the city to earn her living, she is not only handicapped on the economic side to a degree which makes it impossible to obtain those accessories to her personality in the way of finery which would be sufficient to satisfy her and hold her attention if they were to be had in plenty, but she is lost from the sight of everyone whose opinion has any meaning to her, while the separation from her home community renders her condition peculiarly flat and lonely, and prepares her to accept any opportunity for stimulation. To be completely lost sight of by all who have previously known her may, under these circumstances, become an object—the only means by which she can without confusion accept more intense stimulations than are legitimate in the humdrum life of a poor home. And to pass from a regular to an irregular life for a season and back again, before the fact has been noted, is a course much more usual than is ordinarily suspected. The theory which accounts for the short career of the fast woman on the score of an early death is well-nigh groundless. Society simply cannot keep track of these women; and the world is so large that they reappear in the ordinary walks of life, marry and are given in marriage—and the world is no wiser. There are thousands of girls leading irregular lives in our large cities whose parents think they are in factories, stores, and business positions; and many of them will return to their native communities, or drift farther, and be married, and make good wives—uncommonly good wives, many of them, because they have had their fling. “If you drive nature out at the door, she will come back through the window;” and this interest in greater stimulation is, I believe, the dominant force in determining the choice—or, rather, the drift—of the so-called sporting-woman. She is seeking what, from the psychological standpoint, may be called a normal life.

The human mind was formed and fixed once for all in very early times, through a life of action and emergency, when the species was fighting, contriving, and inventing its way up from the sub-human condition; and the ground-patterns of interest have never been, and probably never will be, fundamentally changed. Consequently, all pursuits are irksome unless they are able, so to speak, to assume the guise of this early conflict for life in connection with which interest and modes of attention were developed. As a matter of fact, however, anything in the nature of a problem or a pursuit stimulates the emotional centers, and is interesting, because it is of the same general pattern as these primitive pursuits and problems. Scientific and artistic pursuits, business, and the various occupational callings are analogues of the hunting, flight, pursuit, courtship, and capture of early racial life, and the problems they present may, and do, become all-absorbing. The moral and educational problem of development has been, indeed, to substitute for the simple, co-ordinative killing, escaping, charming, deceiving, activities of early life, analogues which are increasingly serviceable to society, and to expand into a general social feeling the affection developed first in connection with courtship, the rearing of children, and joint predatory and defensive enterprises. The gamester, adventuress, and criminal are not usually abnormal in a biological sense, but have failed, through defective manipulation of their attention, to get interested in the right kind of problems. Their attention has not been diverted from interests of a primary type containing a maximum of the sensory, to interests of an analogous type containing more elements of reflection, and involving problems and processes of greater benefit to society.

The remedy for the irregularity, pettiness, ill-health, and unserviceableness of modern woman seems to lie, therefore, along educational lines. Not in a general and cultural education alone, but in a special and occupational interest and practice for women, married and unmarried. This should be preferably gainful, though not onerous nor incessant. It should, in fact, be a play-interest, in the sense that the interest of every artist and craftsman, who loves his work and functions through it, is a play-

interest. Normal life without normal stimulation is not possible, and the stimulations answering to the nature of the nervous organization seem best supplied by interesting forms of work. This reinstates racially developed stimulations better than anything except play; and interesting work is, psychologically speaking, play.

## SOCIOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION LINES. V

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### SECTION VIII. THE PHYSICAL SETTING OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

We now proceed to another of the problems of adjustment mentioned at the close of sec. vi. That section was devoted to the proposition that "social phenomena are psychic," and at its close several questions were raised and left unanswered. The first of those questions was treated in the last section, and now attention will be given to the second, namely, is it necessary to treat as "social phenomena" such realities as physical traits, which reveal themselves in the temperamental differences of Chinamen, Latins, and Anglo-Saxons, "as well as another class of material facts, represented by tenements, roads, factories, and the like."

*The bodies and the material works* of men are commonly regarded as social phenomena. But they are in a distinctly different class from such psychic realities as customs, institutions, beliefs, patriotism, and so forth. Certainly the two classes should not be confused in one jumble. The prevalent assumption that both should be treated as sociological phenomena seems to have been rather carelessly taken for granted, and it is worth while to test it by canvassing the question raised. May it not be that all social phenomena are psychic, and that even these physical phenomena would more properly be regarded as only the most intimate conditions and consequences of the sociological phenomena? All will agree that the definition of sociological phenomena should be as distinct as the nature of the subject allows, and that every unnecessary element of complexity and confusion should be eliminated. Evidently there is both a difference and a relationship between the bodies of men or the physical products of their activities, and those activities themselves. The

activities themselves are psychic phenomena, and are beyond question to be regarded as problem-phenomena for sociology, and it is essential to formulate as definite a notion as we can of the relationship between the evidently sociological phenomena which are psychic, and the physical phenomena most closely interwoven with them.

In so far as it has any bearing upon the scope and method of sociology, the question, What are sociological<sup>1</sup> phenomena, and what are not? means simply: What are the phenomena which the science called sociology should try to explain, and what phenomena should it not try to explain? There is a sense in which all science is one task—the intellectual comprehension of the phenomenal world—and the separate sciences but divisions of labor included in achieving that single result. One human mind may comprehend in outline the whole result of all sciences, and so all science achieved be gathered into a unity of comprehension; but the task of achieving such comprehension must be divided among many workers. According to the distinction of Lessing, science is both truth and the pursuit of truth; truth is one science, but the pursuit of truth must be subdivided into many sciences. In deciding which phenomena should be investigated by a single science, and be the special field of one group of workers, the criterion, to a considerable extent, is one of practical expediency, although of course the divisions of labor should correspond as far as possible to real differences in phenomena as they exist in their objectivity. When phenomena of a distinct class present great variety and intricacy, there is some presumption against including with them, as objects of investigation, phenomena of other and clearly different classes. The more intricate the phenomena a science has to explain, the more important it is to conceive of them clearly, as distinct from all other phenomena which that science is *not* expected to explain; and at the same time the more important it is to recognize extensive interrelations between them and other phenomena. And to confuse the related phenomena among the problem-phenomena would defeat both these ends.

<sup>1</sup>The adjective "sociological" conveys this meaning a little more accurately than the word "social," which I employ interchangeably with it, in the phrase "social, or sociological, phenomena."



The phenomenal world is a continuum. There are nowhere any fissures in it dividing the territory of one science from the neighboring sciences. Instead, the problem-phenomena of one science are found all commingled with conditioning phenomena, which in turn are problem-phenomena for other sciences. It would be hard to name a thing so simple that it does not present phenomena belonging to several sciences. *Things* are too concrete and complex to be dealt out among the several sciences. Even so apparently simple a thing as a boulder on the hillside has problems for the mathematician and the physicist; for the mineralogist, who asks after its constituents; the chemist, who demands *their* constituents; the dynamic geologist, who asks how it came on this hillside; and the paleobiologist, whose questions are about the fossils it contains. The divisions between kinds of phenomena are far subtler than divisions between things, and it is kinds of phenomena, with the questions that are to be asked about each kind, that can be distributed among the sciences. Each science has for its task to answer a set of questions about a set of problem-phenomena.<sup>2</sup>

Now, if a stone presents too great variety of problems to belong to any one science, shall we say that a city belongs bodily to the province of the single science of sociology? A city contains problem-phenomena for every science. And a sociologist who makes that city his laboratory, if he would devote himself, not to all sciences, but to one distinct science, must envisage a class of problem-phenomena different from the phenomena that other sciences explain. His object of investigation must be a class of phenomena, not a class of *concrete things*; still less must the congeries of widely different things which make up that which is perhaps the most complex of all concretes, a city, be regarded as belonging bodily to the sociologist to explain. At the same time it may be true that without the particular kind of phenomena which the sociologist explains the city could not be a city, and that all the non-sociological phenomena that are

<sup>2</sup> This statement is not invalidated for sciences in general if mathematics is shown to be an exception. These problem-phenomena, and the questions to be asked concerning them, constitute the territory of a science.

present in a city could not be got together without the sociological phenomena, or, if brought together by a miracle, would lack the essentials of being a city. In the heterogeneous complex, a city, the social phenomena may be the supremely interesting ones, and all the rest may perhaps be viewed as merely more or less intimate conditions or consequences of the social phenomena. But, in order to recognize the rest as conditions and as consequences of the social phenomena, it is necessary to distinguish them from the social phenomena.

The early, easy tendency is to classify concretes rather than the varieties of phenomena that are commingled to form concretes. This early stage of thought is exhibited by the attempt to conceive of the objects of sociological investigation as social organisms, or as societies in the highest degree concrete. It was shown in sec. ii that there does not exist in the world a highly developed society that is distinct and unified with reference to the social activities of its members, when these activities are considered as a whole. It is only with reference to some particular class of their activities that the members of a society are unified with each other, and distinct from outsiders. Thus we have political societies and religious societies, though "the attempt to distinguish an economic society encounters the greatest difficulty," and no advanced society is even tolerably distinct and unified with reference to the total complex tide of associative activity.<sup>3</sup> In spite of this, it is common to imagine that the province of sociology is "societies" thus complexly conceived, including in the concept "a society," not only an impossible coincidence, coextension, and colimitation of the multifarious, overlapping social activities, but also the bodies and the material works of the people, and sometimes, apparently, even the land that they occupy.

Our discussion of processes, as the ultimate objects of sociological investigation, may help us here. In the static, the extant,

<sup>3</sup> When this topic was discussed, room was allowed for the importance of studying the influence of political activities upon the non-political, and of non-political activities upon the political, but with recognition that it is only with reference to political activities that a political society is distinct and unified; and so of other than political societies.

the results of many processes and the problems of many sciences exist together in confusion. It is necessary for scientific analysis to disentangle the different kinds of processes. Human activities and experiences make up the social process—activities which are experiences, and experiences which are activities; and between these activities of human consciousness, and all other processes whatsoever, the distinction seems as clear and wide as any that does or can separate the provinces of sciences.

The statement that social phenomena are psychic, which is now before us for further consideration, and possible qualification, may be thus expanded: Activities and experiences that go on in consciousness are the only kind of phenomena which sociology has to explain, and sociology deals with other phenomena only as *conditions* or as *manifestations* of the psychic. If this statement is true, and an expedient guide for sociological investigation, then it must be shown to allow for all the dealings with things physical in which sociology can properly engage, at the same time that it sets off vast areas from which sociology does not draw any of its problems.

The view thus proposed forbids us to regard as a sociological phenomenon anything whatever that is in man's natural environment. A dry, warm climate may have been essential to the earliest civilization. Mountain ranges may have isolated social groups and condemned them to backwardness. Seacoasts with harbors may have enabled considerable populations to congregate and co-operate in food-getting, and later to engage in commerce, with the resulting contact with the ideas and wares and ways of other folk, and disposed them to receptivity, inventiveness, and democracy; when, if the same people had been enabled to congregate by the abundance afforded by a fertile inland plain, instead of by the fishy sea, they would have been found in conservatism, petty feudalism, and monarchy, and a generally contrasting culture. It may be that a climate like that of northern Europe, which once existed in southern Europe and northern Africa, together with the experiences and activities for which such a climatic area gives scope and stimulus, makes men grow tall, and blonde, and dolichocephalous, and reflective, and determined,

and conquering empire-builders; while the climate and conditions of central Africa allow men to become or to remain black, and prognathous, and skull-bound, and unreflective, and fickle; and yet, though all this be true, there is no reason why any sociologist should want to regard the facts of man's material environment as sociological phenomena. Has sociology to explain the facts of physical geography! No phenomena are sociological except those which sociology attempts to *explain*, but all the other phenomena in the universe may be factors in the explanation. To understand the flower in the crannied wall, and how it came to grow there, it may be necessary to understand God and man and all things; but that does not imply that God and man and all things are botanical phenomena. The boundaries of a science set off the phenomena which that science is to explain, its division of labor in the universal task of comprehension, the questions it is to answer; but do not limit the conditioning phenomena that may have to be recognized before the explanation is complete. Sociology cannot pretend to *explain* all the conditioning phenomena that it recognizes, climate and geologic formations, and flora and fauna, including bacteria, etc. To attempt it would be scarcely less than an attempted usurpation of the business of all sciences, and such an attempt and pretension would reach the last degree of absurdity. Since sociology cannot explain all phenomena that affect man, the question is what it *can* and *should* explain. When this question is answered, the scope of sociology will be defined. Each science has to deal with two sets of facts: first, those which it proposes to explain, which are of one definite and restricted class, though they may appear in the most various combinations with other facts; and, second, those which make up the conditions affecting the former—and these may be of *every* class. In its effort to explain the particular class of phenomena that constitutes its province, a science must take account of causal factors of many kinds. It must not balk at going anywhither after explanatory conditions, nor come back from its wide research bewildered as to its peculiar mission. While recognizing condition-facts of every kind, it must keep clear in mind the questions it seeks to answer, the phenomena it seeks to

explain, and not confuse its problem-phenomena to be explained with its conditioning phenomena that are factors in the explanation. It explains but one kind of effects, though it notes all kinds of causes that contribute to produce such effects. It has to do with only one kind of phenomena as resultant, but takes into account all the other kinds of phenomena that are components in the situation conditioning these resultant phenomena.

The doctrine that sociological phenomena are psychic allows sociology to deal with physical phenomena, not only in the way just indicated—that is, as conditions of the psychic—but also in another way, namely, as *manifestations* of psychic phenomena. Social phenomena, except those which arise in one's own consciousness, cannot be directly observed any more than ether and electricity. But they are abundantly disclosed by their physical manifestations. And the physical manifestations are not to be confused with the psychic phenomena which they reveal. As we have seen, it is not the breath that he agitates, when your friend speaks, nor the wrinkles in his skin when he smiles, nor even the neuroses in his cortex, that are the social phenomena, but his conscious thought and his love which the physical signs disclose. To hear and see such physical signs forever would apprise us of no social fact, if we perceived no psychic meaning in them; as physical facts with no possible psychic meaning or effect, they would be as insignificant for sociology, as the rustling of dead leaves.

The thoughts and the love of a conversing friend, and the other phenomena of association between twos and threes, are not more truly psychic than are the phenomena of association in which larger numbers are engaged. Just as truly psychic are the activities and experiences of whole populations or culture-groups—such phenomena of association on the grand scale as institutions, customs, patriotisms, creeds, moral judgments, and prevailing standards of ambition—which are the property of many minds and which especially command the investigations of sociology.<sup>4</sup> And what the voice and smiles of a friend are to the facts

<sup>4</sup>This does not imply that these activities are *identical* in any two minds, but they are so similar in many minds that their similarity constitutes a phenomenon of importance.

of association between twos and threes, that the visible conduct in which masses of men agree, and such material things as navies, factories, and the streets and structures of cities, are to the social activities in which greater numbers are combined. For the sociologist, navies, factories, and cities, as truly as books, are material manifestations of psychic realities. And he may read more about the psychic activity of our time in these monuments of our civilization than he could in carloads of certain books of the day; and the sale of such books by the carload may be a more significant manifestation of psychic reality than anything that is stated in those books. The Australian aborigine does not build factories for the same reason that he does not write books: for the lack of the ideas that must be put into them. He is without factories, not for lack of building *materials*, but for lack of building *ideas*, and building wants, and building purposes. A factory exhibits various physical and chemical qualities, but no one should expect the sociologist to explain these. It presents also a certain architectural character, and this is a psychic phenomenon, a "plan," a "design." It contains a variety of machinery adapted to special uses. These are mechanical "devices," and it may devolve on the sociologist to explain the existence of such plans, designs, and devices among one people, and their absence among another. A ship or a factory, a private domicile or a public church, or school, or courthouse, reveals not only the psychic activities comprised in the technological process of its construction, but reveals also, more or less completely, the uses for which it was built, purposes, aims, customs, institutions—all psychic. Roman roads, aqueducts, coliseums, temples, fortresses, help Roman books and works of art to reveal the psychic life of that ancient people. That psychic life is made up of the kind of phenomena in which sociology finds its problems. He who explains the psychic life of a people thereby explains their material works in the only sense in which sociology can explain them. Sociology explains the wants, purposes, ways of doing—in a word, the activities—which these material works disclose. If a city or a house were produced, as a cave is, by nature unaided by man's conscious activity, it would not offer a phenomenon for

the sociologist to explain. The physical phenomenon might be the same as a man-made dwelling, but the sociological phenomenon would be absent, because the psychic phenomenon was absent. It is the psychic activities embodied in, or revealed by, a dwelling which the sociologist sets out to explain. He explains only those qualities in the physical works of man which are imparted to them by man's psychic activities, and explains these only by explaining the psychic activities.

The material works of man, when once produced, become conditions of *further* activity and experience, and so demand the attention of the sociologist upon both the grounds on which material things can claim his interest; that is, both as manifestations, and also as conditions of the psychic phenomena which he is to study and explain.

It is no wonder if the bald statement that social phenomena are psychic at first is particularly startling to those sociologists of practical benevolence whose attention is much and profitably occupied with such material things as good roads, model tenements, sanitary workshops, well-constructed jails, etc. After the explanations that have just been made, it is plain that the view that social phenomena are psychic does not prohibit these practical sociologists from studying material phenomena of the kinds just referred to. On the contrary, the view justifies such study, both on the ground that good roads, model tenements, and the rest are manifestations of human activity, and on the ground that they are conditions of human activity and experience; and the whole interest of the "practical sociologist" in these material works of man rests upon one or the other of these grounds. He is interested in them only as affecting human life and activity, or as dependent on human activity for their existence and prevalence. All the questions of practical sociology are asked for the sake of promoting human welfare, and human welfare is human experience, and experience is psychic. Practical sociology, like general sociology, may be interested in all things that condition or reveal the psychic phenomena, but the psychic phenomena are the only ones in which it has any ultimate interest. Practical sociology asks about good roads and dwell-

ings, because roads and dwellings are conditions of conscious activity and experience. If at any time it asks also, what are the conditions of having good roads and dwellings, it asks what *activities* are the conditions of such roads and dwellings. It does not ask, as a sociological problem, after *all* the conditions of good roads and buildings, but only after the psychic conditions. The question, what proportion of sand to cement is a condition of good buildings, is not a sociological question; but the question, what ideals, and motives, and co-operating activities must be invoked in order to secure good buildings in an ill-housed neighborhood. When you tell us in what proportions to combine sand and cement, you are not showing any knowledge of "social technology," but only when you tell us how to elicit the necessary motives, ideals and activities; that is, how to supply the psychic requirements for the end desired, which indeed are by far the most important of all the different kinds of means that can be employed in securing ends.

And to know how to secure and employ these psychic means is the greatest and most important of all the "technologies." Applied sociology is, exactly, applied intelligence concerning the nature and rise, and consequently the method of promoting such intelligence, ideals, standards, desires, and individual and co-operative activities as are essential to human welfare. In securing good buildings it may be necessary to call in the chemical technologist, who knows about cement and how to supply it in proper quality; and the physical technologist, who knows about the strength of iron and wood, and how to arrange them at proper angles of support; and the social technologist, who knows about motives and how to elicit them. There is no occasion to confuse the functions of the three, certainly none to confuse the kind of knowledge each supplies, and the kind of phenomena each is expected to understand. Sociology as a science studies the nature and conditioning of psychic phenomena, whether regarded as ends or as means, or whether seen merely as phenomena with no regard to their being either ends or means.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Other sciences as pure science, can not regard their phenomena either as ends or as means. It is of great importance to keep in mind that sociology can, because *the valuing* of this or that as an end is itself a social phenomenon.



But practical sociology always regards social phenomena either as ends or as means, and practical sociology is the application of knowledge concerning the nature and conditioning of psychic phenomena so as to secure the psychic phenomena that are wanted, either as ends in themselves or as means to other psychic phenomena.

Leaving now the question about "tenements, roads, factories," and the other material works of man, what is to be said in regard to the other class of physical phenomena with which this section is to deal: the "physical traits, which reveal themselves in the temperamental differences of Chinamen, Latins, and Anglo-Saxons"—are they sociological phenomena?

That which can be transmitted by biological heredity is physical. A nervous system is not a fact in consciousness, but only the apparatus, furnished and ready, predisposed to certain types of conscious activity. Good nervous systems are more essential to social welfare than good roads or good dwellings. Is the presence of a particular type of nervous predispositions or somatic traits a phenomenon to be accounted for by sociology? Such physical facts are the most essential and intimate conditions of the psychic phenomena which sociology has to explain, but it is quite clear by now that being *conditions* of sociological phenomena is by no means the same as *being* sociological phenomena. Even the most intimate and essential condition of social phenomena is not by *that* made into a sociological phenomenon. Sociological phenomena are the problem-phenomena of sociology—the phenomena which sociology should try to explain, that is, account for. Now, should sociology attempt to explain or account for physical traits, or is it quite as important that the explanation of physical traits, as such, should be left to biology, biological ethnology, and physical psychology, as that plumbing and macadamizing should be left to mechanics and engineering?

Among the conditions that determine race traits are the socially prevalent psychic activities which are believed to result in hereditary aptitudes and which affect "public health." One part of the business of sociology, as we have conceived it, is to

learn the effects of social activities upon other social activities, and not only the direct effects, but also certain indirect effects. And social activities that affect public health and propagative selection, or "eugenics," do thereby indirectly but radically affect subsequent social activities. According to the sociological doctrine of conduct, set forth in the last part of sec. vii, it is a part of the business of sociology to estimate psychic activities as means to other psychic activities, and to point out the conduct that diminishes or enhances experience-values. To this end the sociologist must know how conduct affects activity and experience by first affecting the bodies of men and of races. He must know this, but it is not sure that he ought to find it out for himself—that is, to make the discovery of physical consequences of conduct a part of his scientific task. It may be that, according to the most expedient division of intellectual labor, he should leave it to the physiologist and physical anthropologist to discover the effects of drunkenness, licentiousness, sedentary habits, factory labor, and other socially prevalent conduct, upon the health and physical traits of individuals and peoples. Yet it would seem to be here, if anywhere, that we find a debatable task, one which may be performed either by the physiologist or by the sociologist, an instance in which physical phenomena may be problem-phenomena for sociology, an exception to the rule that problem-phenomena for sociology are psychic. But does the sociologist have any occasion to take it upon himself to find out even the physiological effects that flow from social practices, except in so far as the task of the physiologist is unfinished; and even then does not the sociologist desert his own particular province, and take it upon himself to offer aid in solving physiological instead of sociological problems whenever he undertakes to account for such phenomena? And, furthermore, even if the sociologist is justified in searching out physical effects of social conduct which the biologist has thus far overlooked, does not the sociologist do so always, for the sake either of evaluating the *conduct* by which these physical phenomena are caused, or of explaining the *conduct* and *experience* that result from these physical conditions? If so, then his interest in physiological phe-

nomena, like his interest in the geographic conditions that surround society, or in man's material works, is solely a means to the end of understanding psychic phenomena. In this light there seems to be no ground for modifying the statement that sociological phenomena are psychic, that sociology exists solely for the sake of understanding psychic phenomena, and gives attention to physical phenomena only in so far as it is necessary to the discharge of that task. In that case we have here merely one illustration of the general fact that the phenomena studied by a single science are inflected into the phenomenal universe in which the phenomena of all sciences exist together in a continuum of complex interrelationship, and the kind of phenomena is distinct notwithstanding the interrelationship with other phenomena.

We have seen that the habit of taking for our units of observation concretes as they exist together, instead of the different kinds of phenomena which are agglomerated into concretes, especially the habit of taking as units of observation the more or less imaginary agglomerations named social organisms, or concrete societies, instead of taking as our units social activities and relationships, is sufficient to account for much of the existing confusion as to the scope of sociology. And, following this clue, it seems logically practicable to conceive of the province of sociology so that none of its territory shall lie beyond the line that separates the conscious from the unconscious,<sup>6</sup> and thus to secure the chief criterion by which to recognize the problem-phenomena of sociology, and to distinguish them from the vast areas

<sup>6</sup> By "the conscious" I mean the *phenomenally* conscious, not the metaphysically or speculatively conscious, or the absolute consciousness which may include all phenomena. In the phenomenal world of science there is no plainer division than between that which *appears* to us as in consciousness, and that which does not. This assertion would not make it necessary to quarrel with one who held that the "threshold of consciousness" was passed in consequence of a mere change in the degree of activities that may go on in unconsciousness. Certainly it is not necessary or desirable to ignore the importance of those physical or physiological phenomena that take place when a sense organ is acted on by a stimulation too low in degree to evoke a conscious sensation, the nervous and muscular adjustments (comparable in a way to the well-directed activities of a frog without its head) that take place when a man performs habitual movements while his attention is entirely occupied with other matters, and the shuffling of neural connections in unconscious cerebration.

that lie beyond the territory of this science.<sup>7</sup> Once rid of the habit of taking concretes as the units of observation, we may find that it is only a matter of familiarity, and of forming a better habit, to be rid of confusion between all physical phenomena whatsoever, and social phenomena, which are the activities and experience of conscious associates, and therefore psychic. When these two classes of phenomena are most closely related, the distinction between them remains perfectly clear—even that between the conscious experience and the neurosis that underlies it. Even when most actively and intensely conscious, one is as unconscious of his own neuroses as of the circulation of the blood or of growth during childhood. Ages of experience passed before man discovered the existence of neuroses, and then he became aware of them through sense-perception and inference, but never became conscious of them.

After all that is said, it must be frankly admitted that the life of man is psycho-physical, and it is only by abstraction that the psychic and the physical can be separated. But it is only by abstraction that the phenomena of any science can be disentangled from the cosmic continuum. Phenomena exist together, but they must be thought apart before they can be comprehended together, and no phenomenal difference is more distinct than that between the phenomena which exist in human consciousness and those which do not. And if, for the sake of evaluating conduct, or of accounting for psychic phenomena that are due in part to physiological traits, the sociologist does sometimes trace the origin of physiological peculiarities, his researches concerning physical phenomena are by no means like the labors of chemists and physicists along the border line between those two sciences, because he searches not for the sake of explaining the physiological fact, and stopping there, but in order to put that knowledge to ultimate use in understanding or evaluating the psychic. Psychology itself is largely biology, and this will create in some minds a presumption that sociology must be so, too. But the difference between psychology and sociology is precisely such as to force

<sup>7</sup> How to distinguish the problems of sociology from those of psychology is the subject of the next section.

this necessity upon psychology and not on sociology. For the proof of this we must wait until the following section.

The doctrine that only psychic phenomena are sociological problem-phenomena, in the most ultimate and fundamental sense, is not inconsistent with the perception that the bodies and the material works of men are related to the sociological phenomena as no other physical phenomena are. They are the most intimate conditions and consequences of the social phenomena, and revealers of social phenomena. Accordingly they might be called **SOCIO-PHYSICAL PHENOMENA**. Whether this name is adopted or a better one is invented, some name is required to designate these phenomena so as to set them off from all other physical phenomena less related to the sociological, and to exalt them into their true relation to sociology without obscuring the fact that the components of the social process are not material things, but conscious activities. The name above suggested would preserve to the mind both of these essential distinctions, namely, that between these physical phenomena and all other physical phenomena, and that between even these physical phenomena and the social phenomena which are psychic.

Other physical phenomena, like those of climate and topography, merely affect the psychic phenomena, which are the essence of society. But such phenomena as death-rates and birth-rates, and such other phenomena as factories, cities, and navies, are not only conditions, but also consequences, of the psychic activities, and they reveal the presence and qualities of the psychic, and are the media by which the psychic acts upon the psychic. Indeed, one may say that sociology is a study of the psychic as revealed in the physical, and from this point of view we may be inclined to hold that the physical and the psychic are, for sociology, not only inseparable and indispensable, but also co-ordinate, being the subjective and objective aspects of the sociological phenomena. Or, one might even go so far as to say that sociology is the study of those physical phenomena which are due to psychic activity. And these might be adequate statements if they did not require this supplement: The socio-physical phenomena are not the ultimate objects of either prac-

tical or scientific interest for the sociologist; he studies them for the sake of knowing about the activities that underlie them or are conditioned by them. His ultimate interest is not in knowing about these material things, but in knowing about the great process of conscious activities which they reveal. The objective-psychic world is not open to sense-perception; its presence and character must be inferred from the conduct and the overt work of men; but the objective-psychic world is none the less a reality, none the less an object of scientific interest. And there seems no good reason for fostering and perpetuating the confusion between it and the material effects of man's activity. Roads, harbors, navies, and cities, if regarded merely as peculiarly arranged materials, with no significance as revealing human experience and activity, and somatic and temperamental traits regarded merely as physiological or pathological phenomena, would cease to be objects for sociology to explain; and if sociology does supply an element in the explanation of these material things, that element is the explanation of the conscious activities of men that went into the production of those phenomena. Physics and chemistry supply other elements in their explanation. The peculiar contribution of sociology is the explanation of the conscious activities revealed in the physical phenomena. And, since these things are so, how can we escape the view that the physical phenomena get their significance for sociology from their relation to the psychic, and that the psychic phenomena alone are in reality the problem-phenomena of this science?

Relations, as well as activities and things, are phenomena, and when we say that social phenomena are psychic, we must have in mind not only the activities, but also the relations between the activities, of men. Association involves two consciousnesses and an awareness that unites them; that is, the conscious activity of A and the conscious activity of B, and A's awareness of B's activity. The sociologist's interest in the relations between activities may be derivative and subordinate compared with his interest in the activities themselves, yet the study of the relations between activities is of great interest and importance for sociology. There are relations indicated by such words as "sugges-

tion," "imitation," "superiority and subordination" and "emulation." The change in A's consciousness, when he becomes aware of B and B's activity, is not merely that this awareness of B is added to what would otherwise have constituted A's state of consciousness; but the awareness of B's activity supplants other objects of attention in A, inhibits some activities in him and elicits others. And full knowledge of the relation between the activities of A and his associate B would include knowledge as to what awareness of B A has, and what kind of a response is elicited in A by this awareness of B and B's activity or B's supposed activity or B's anticipated activity. The relations between the activities of two associates are not mere relations of space and time, as witness Professor Tarde's Frenchman at the antipodes who is a Frenchman still, and Professor Cooley's schoolboy under the influence of Julius Cæsar. They are relations of resemblance and difference and—most important of all for science—relations between occasioning conditions and occasioned consequences. Likewise in thinking of *socio-physical* phenomena, we must include not only the bodies of men and the material things which they have produced, but also of the relations between these. These are relations of time and space, relations of propinquity and remoteness, of direction and of number. These relations between socio-physical phenomena may in many instances be as important for sociology as the things themselves, and for precisely the same reasons; they disclose the character of human activities and they condition human activities. As all economists now teach, "time" and "place" utilities are as real as "elementary utilities;" and "transportation" is as truly productive as "extractive industry." Moreover, these relations are truly "works of man," not excepting the relations established by "aggregation" and "composition." For migration is quite as truly a work of man as transportation of goods, and breeding and bearing of children quite as truly a work of man as stock-breeding. The brevity of this reference to the relations of social phenomena and of socio-physical phenomena is in contrast with their importance, but a fuller discussion of these relations is beyond the scope of the present section.

The statement that social phenomena are psychic would not

lose its significance if some qualifications were to be admitted, and it would be quite in consonance with the growing recognition of the general interrelation of phenomena if we were to say merely that the predominant character of sociological phenomena is psychic; or that the sociological, in its highest manifestations, is psychic; or that the blazing focus for sociological investigation is in psychic phenomena, while from this focus the view shades away more and more into the physical; and that, since nothing really within the field of investigation is unimportant, the field of a science should not be bounded, but only the center of its interest should be located. The assertion that social phenomena are psychic, if thus interpreted, would remain the necessary principle for the guidance of the sociologist. It locates the focus of the curve of the science of sociology, and whatever is within that science is brought there by the attraction of that focus; and the only true way to define a science may be to locate its focus, not its boundaries.

But though such an admission would not invalidate the general truth and importance of the assertion that social phenomena are psychic, it is possible that even this admission should not be made. It is possible that clearness of thought will be assisted, and finally comprehensiveness of thought as well, by keeping in mind the clearest of all phenomenal distinctions, that between the phenomena of consciousness and all others. It is possible that there is a deep need of a more conscious attempt to approach "psychic phenomena" (a phrase not interchangeable with "the phenomena of psychology") in a scientific spirit, and to develop the application of scientific method to them.

It was noted above that when the sociologist asks questions about socio-physical phenomena—about the physical effects of conduct, and about physiological traits that condition conduct—his inquiries differ from the researches of chemists and physicists in problems that belong equally to either of these sciences, because the sociologist seeks the physical knowledge, not for its own sake, but for the sake of understanding the psychic; and now it should be added that the social phenomena which are psychic do not shade into the socio-physical phenomena in any such way as the



phenomena of physics and chemistry, or of various other physical sciences shade into each other. The social and socio-physical phenomena are not two classes of facts that at some points become almost or quite indistinguishable from each other, and to that degree may share the interest of one science. But they are at all points clearly distinct from each other; yet, at all points, of interest to sociology, widely different as they are, for the interest of sociology in the socio-physical phenomena does not depend upon their coincidence with, or resemblance to, the objects of sociological explanations, but upon entirely different relations to them, namely, the relations of conditions or of consequences.

In presenting a view of truth which contrasts with prevalent conceptions, it is sometimes expedient to arrest attention by an abrupt or even extreme form of statement, and to let qualifications appear later, if they must. This method seems not to have been eschewed even by the author of the Sermon on the Mount. In sec. vi the doctrine that social phenomena are psychic was put forward with temporary disregard for possible qualifications; it sufficed for the time to promise at the close of the section that a discussion of such qualifications should follow. This discussion has proceeded with recognition of the dangerous tendency, when advocating any highly important view of truth, to exaggerate, to cast aside qualifications, and to run into too absolute negations and affirmations, and there has been an effort to make room for whatever qualifications the case requires. We have passed in review the physical phenomena, with reference to which there seemed to be most reason to question whether they might not be included on equal terms with the psychic among the problem-facts of sociology, with the result that even in regard to them there appears to be a logical distinction which relegates them to a dependent and vassal rank in which they derive their sociological significance from their peculiar relations to the psychic phenomena, which alone are the ultimate objects of scientific interest for sociology. If in the next section we succeed in distinguishing between sociology and psychology, something more will have been accomplished than to locate the focus of sociology; and whether or not the whole periphery can be rendered

as definite as the focus, there will be marked off from the rest of the cosmos an area within which the new science is to furnish explanation, an area within which it is at home, with plenty of definite work upon its hands. And such distinctness as the task of sociology assumes in this light is not gained by making it tenuous and abstract, as is done by Simmel, for example, but leaves it full of rich reality of human activity and experience.

Aware of the danger of exaggeration, and of going off into too absolute assertions, and deeply respecting the reluctance of sociologists to consider the possibility that the field of investigation proper to the science they are creating is confined to psychic phenomena and their interrelationships, we have considered the most probable sources from which there might arise intelligible qualifications of the proposition that social phenomena are psychic. The result is now before us. The experience-activities which constitute the social process imply actors with bodies, and are manifested in the material bodies of the actors and in the other material things upon which they work, while all their activities are conditioned by material environment. These material phenomena of various sorts are distinguished from the psychic phenomena, and at the same time related to them either as conditions or as effects. Physical phenomena of every kind may be conditions of psychic phenomena, and certain physical phenomena are also effects of psychic phenomena. These latter have for sociology a double interest: they are the media by which objective psychic phenomena become observable. As truly as material things have all their value for man, as means of maintaining and heightening his conscious experiences, so truly do material things have all their importance to the science of sociology as means of becoming aware of psychic phenomena, and as factors in their conditioning.<sup>8</sup> The plain distinction between the psychic phenomena which are to be described and explained, and the physical phenomena which are manifestations of the psychic, and useful in describing and explaining them, must be as patiently dwelt upon as it has been thoroughly ignored and confused. Conditioning phenomena are not to be included with the problem-phenom-

<sup>8</sup> This is an illustration rather than an argument.

ena of a science, but the conditioning phenomena that are taken into view in order to explain the problem-phenomena of a science may be of every kind, and belong to the fields of all the sciences. Neither are the effects, that reveal the presence and nature of the phenomena to be explained, to be confused with the problem-phenomena.

When sociology thinks itself called upon to *explain* physical phenomena, which it is the business of many special sciences to explain, then indeed it becomes a ridiculous hodgepodge and not a definable science; but when it takes account of all the multifarious phenomena that disclose or condition its particular problems, attempting to explain only the one class of phenomena, but explaining these in the light of all that affect them, then it is clearly distinct and definable in its purpose and its "field," and is doing what is done by every other science that explains the rise of phenomena out of complex conditions. The problems are what constitute the distinct field of a science, and the *problems* of sociology are not a hodgepodge; its problem-facts are the prevalent facts of human experience and activity. We are familiar with the fact that other sciences, which explain phenomena that arise by complex causation, use in their explanations facts of various kinds, each taking from the antecedent sciences whatever facts and explanations they have to furnish, that can be used in solving the later and more complicated problems. It is thus that psychology borrows the facts of physiology, it is thus that zoölogy and biology borrow the facts of chemistry and geography, and it is thus that sociology borrows facts of other sciences; and if sociology is the greatest borrower of all, it is because its problem-phenomena have the most complex causation. Here sociology introduces no practice that was not familiar in the older sciences, except that, besides dealing, as they do, with various kinds of related phenomena as conditions of those it is to explain, it also depends more than they do upon related phenomena as the means of becoming aware of the phenomena it is to explain. The effects by which the social activities reveal their presence and nature are in a degree explained by the explanation of the activities to which they are due. They are indis-

soluble from the social activities, and, in a subordinate sense, social phenomena, but only in a subordinate sense, since the attention which sociology gives them is given, not for their sake, but for the sake of the social activities which they reveal; and they are entirely different realities from those activities which are the phenomena of ultimate sociological interest. It is important to recognize the nature of their peculiar relations to the phenomena of ultimate interest, as well as to discriminate them clearly, and for this purpose the name "socio-physical phenomena" has been applied to them.

Sociology may continue to be regarded as a hodgepodge, and sociologists as poachers in the fields of other sciences, so long as sociologists themselves continue to add to the confusion, instead of presenting any clear distinction between the social phenomena which they seek to explain and the physical phenomena in which social phenomena are bodied forth, and by which they are conditioned. None need fear analysis; for though synthesis be the goal, only previous analysis can make it intelligent and trustworthy, a view and not a blur. The truth must be made clear that problem-phenomena may be distinct though no boundaries be set to the variety and extent of the related phenomena by reference to which the problem-phenomena are described and explained.

As the disentangling of problem-facts from the explanatory facts thus disposes of the error of those who object that sociology explains *too much*, and attempts an indefinite, heterogeneous, and incongruous work, so also it relieves the difficulty of those others who fear that sociology will include *too little* if we admit the restriction of its ultimate interest to the psychic. The latter thinkers realize how essential it is for sociology to take into account the physical disclosures and conditions of such phenomena, and so object to the unqualified declaration that the objects of the sociologist's investigation are psychic. They should welcome this view, for to say that whatever the sociologist studies, he studies *for the sake of understanding psychic phenomena*, does not exclude the physical facts from his range of vision. On the contrary, it allows and requires the sociologist to study all things that con-

tribute to an understanding of such phenomena. And these objectors ought rather to welcome the view here presented, since it affords the clear and unimpeachable justification of the sociologist against the charge that by handling these heterogeneous facts he reduces his science to a hodgepodge. We have but to reiterate the principle that it is with reference to its problem-facts alone that the province of a science of life can be circumscribed and defined; that its explanatory facts must be allowed to include every element in the heterogeneous environment which in any way conditions the phenomena to be explained, or reveals their nature; and that in proportion as the phenomena to be explained are removed from direct observation, but widely manifested in their consequences, and in proportion as they are the highly evolved product of complex causation, in such proportion the investigation that undertakes to explain them must be unrestricted in range, though definite in aim.

## THE LITERARY INTERESTS OF CHICAGO. VI AND VII

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### VI. THE COMMERCIALIZED MAGAZINES OF A COSMOPOLITAN CENTER, 1900 TO DATE

"Where Is the West? It would be easier to tell where is the East. That is always toward the Atlantic. Boston is East to Cleveland; Chicago is East to Colorado, and everything this side of the Cascade Mountains is East to the Pacific coast. It amounts to this: The West is where a man is; the East is where his father came from. So it comes to pass that the West has no fixed geographical limits like the South and New England. It is something more than a geographical term. Like Boston it is a state of mind. . . .

"The West means Americans who are controlled by certain ideas and motives. But American does not mean Anglo-Saxon beyond the Alleghanies. It is never, strictly speaking, a matter of descent; but this is doubly true of that region where blood and ideas and habits of every people under the sun are fusing into a new race. Inevitably the West is cosmopolitan. . . .

"The West is a synonym of vitality. No region knows larger zest in life. Whether it be in farming or in literature, it finds the world full of novelty. . . .

"And the West is also a synonym for democracy— . . . —that democracy of practice which sees a partner in every man and woman who is accomplishing something. . . .

"The old West with its romance is all but past. . . . The West, with its boundless interest in life, with its passion for creation, and with its democracy, is still new. The visitor from the East finds it crude, and often frankly materialistic in its judgments. But the crudity is disappearing in actual achievement, and the materialism, if more frank, is less treacherous than high finance. The West is human and so imperfect, but it is sincere. It is rough, but it is being educated.

"As a locality it may be shifting, but as a state of mind it is America in the making."—From the *World To-Day*, Chicago, February, 1905.

A few magazines, popular through certain literary forms of presentation and on account of their pictures, have grown up in Chicago during the present decade and have found places, appar-

ently permanent, in a good part of the market sought by the general periodical publishers of New York. They have been, and are, edited in such a manner as to reflect the social influences emanating from a city having the particular type of cosmopolitan character now attained by Chicago. They have been, and are, published with that strict attention to the commercial side which is one of the marked characteristics of a metropolis whose substantial citizens are now constantly proclaiming it to be "the Great Central Market." The *World To-Day* and the *Red Book* are the most important and significant of these present-day magazines. The *Sunday Magazine*, unique in its development as an adjunct to the Sunday edition of a daily newspaper, the *Record-Herald*, also shows some of the same points. There are others currently published, as well as some no longer appearing, which are of interest in considering the literary publishing undertaken at Chicago since 1900.

That cosmopolitanism is the general characteristic of Chicago today will doubtless be granted. It has been pointed out in the foregoing papers that the insistent western sectionalism of the prairie days, when Chicago was a small pioneer town, became modified by a new national spirit following the Civil War; that Chicago came to feel world-sympathy and also inner power from rapid growth toward a large city's dimensions in the years following the fire of 1871; that in the eighties the community attained the consciousness of being a material metropolis; and that for a brief time in the nineties it was a world-center of kaleidoscopic, external cosmopolitan activity. The city of the present has inherited these traditions. They have become traits of Chicago's community character, a fund of standing opinion, now held in a new combination. But what is the essential characteristic of the cosmopolitanism of Chicago today? In general it may be defined as an internal cosmopolitanism. It is not the dazzling kind that comes from the temporary residence in a nation's leading center of a shifting crowd of interesting cosmopolites, citizens of the world with no very strong national attachments, such as there is in Paris, and as there is in a lesser degree in New York. It is a different type of life in the large,

yet constantly and with accuracy described as cosmopolitan. It is the fusing in a composite, permanent, resident people of a great congeries of elements from Old and New World civilization; the interplay, in one community, of factors derived from all parts of Europe, and from America's East, South, and West. From such combining of varying elements, according to frequent statements by the publicists, comes whatever is typically American today. That is, the distinctively American is now cosmopolitan. The process which brings this about is possible only in a large city, a metropolis of such dimensions as to be an immense crucible. New York, being the largest city in the country and a metropolis permanently composed of many elements of population, and also constantly visited by a shifting crowd of cosmopolites such as is not often seen elsewhere in the United States, is, of course, the most cosmopolitan center in America. Since, however, the changing dress of external cosmopolitan life is most conspicuous there, and since New York is largely lacking in the western pioneer element, as a cosmopolis it is not purely typical of the developing character of America, with its inner fusing of heterogeneous elements. Chicago, having practically no exterior cosmopolitan aspect, and being the western center for permanent co-ordinating of a most comprehensive group of differing racial elements, is perhaps the most typical American city. At any rating given, it is certainly conspicuous for what has been described here as internal cosmopolitanism.

Among the influences felt from the traditions held by the various elements in Chicago's population of 2,000,000, the one coming from the New England men who settled here, or near here, is commanding. It permeates the life of the town. The "I Will" attitude expressed in the city's motto, the determination to do things, first in commercial and industrial enterprise, and then in general, comes most notably from this element. The Puritan aspect of this Anglo-Saxon influence has been greatly modified by the traditional attitudes of the great colonies of people from every European nation, who have become component parts of the community. More than a score of foreign languages are spoken here by permanent residents. The numbers of people using the



various tongues, pointed out in estimates by Professor Carl Darling Buck, in "A Sketch of the Linguistic Conditions in Chicago," Vol. VI of *The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, 1903, is as follows:

German .....	500,000	French .....	15,000
Polish .....	125,000	Irish .....	10,000
Swedish .....	100,000	Croatian and Servian .....	10,000
Bohemian .....	90,000	Slovakian .....	10,000
Norwegian .....	50,000	Lithuanian .....	10,000
Yiddish .....	50,000	Russian .....	7,000
Dutch .....	35,000	Hungarian .....	5,000
Italian .....	25,000	Greek .....	4,000
Danish .....	20,000		

And Frisian, Roumanian, Welsh, Slovenian, Flemish, Chinese, and Spanish, each by 1,000 or more.

Chicago is the fifth German city in the world, the third Swedish, the fourth Polish, and the second Bohemian.

For many years the German element has been considered of great influence in shaping the character of Chicago. "The most notable characteristic of Chicago's foreign population is the strength of the Scandinavian and Slavic elements," says Professor Buck in his monograph. "No other city in the country contains anything like as many representatives of these groups. The Slavs number a quarter of a million." He points out that in the Chicago linguistic grouping, Slavic comes next to Germanic, a "place which would be occupied by Romance in New York, Philadelphia, or Boston."

The most recent arrivals, ignorant immigrants from south-eastern Europe, belonging exclusively to the industrial group, have made no direct contributions to the literary and general artistic interests of the city. But the great majority of the colonies of foreign-born, through their dramatic and singing societies and other organizations, have added some elements to the general artistic activities and interests of the community.

The very amalgamation of the groups of foreign origin in the common life of the community—a process that seems incredibly rapid in its realization—causes a spread of the manifold effects of the many racial heritages, even though they are felt in modified forms. The maintenance of European customs as to drinking and Sunday recreation by the social organizations of the Euro-

pean-Americans has brought about a general attitude of liberality regarding personal habits. Notwithstanding occasional reactions by the ultra-Puritans among the leading element of the population, their own customs have changed.

The public schools are the greatest melting-pot. Concerning the Chicago-born children of the city's foreign-born population, Professor Buck, says:

The second generation is bi-lingual. The children first learn their mother-tongue, but as soon as they are on the street and in school they learn English, and it is not long before they speak it by preference. The third generation, even of unmixed foreign descent, knows only English.

The daily newspapers have a great influence in giving common interests and a common community-consciousness to the many elements in the composite citizenship. It is true that there are sixty-seven newspapers, including fourteen dailies, printed in foreign languages in Chicago. The editor of one of these papers informed the writer that, if it were not for the continued acquisitions from uninterrupted immigration, it would be only a few years before papers printed in the foreign languages would be discontinued, as would the use of the foreign tongues at church services. The great metropolitan newspapers of Chicago, in response to the broad range of interests naturally held by the mixed population of Chicago and the North Central States, are notable for the national and cosmopolitan view of American and foreign events which they present daily. It is a safe assertion that the Chicago papers give a better-proportioned presentation of the news of the whole world than do those of New York, where a much greater amount of space, proportionally, is taken up with the news of New Yorkers, whose typical attitude seems inclined to be that their metropolis is world enough in itself. The social settlements, a belt of them established in the densely populated river districts, northwest, west, and southwest of the heart of the city, are common meeting-ground for some accentuation, and chiefly for amalgamation of diverse interests.

Participation in political life, particularly as it relates to municipal affairs, provides a constantly absorbing common interest to all the people of Chicago. A great deal that is of signifi-

cance as to world-wide movements in the readjustment of social and economic relationships is fomenting in Chicago. The stratification of classes on the economic basis, with the houses of the poor in the river wards and those of the prosperous at favored sites along the shore of the lake, is distinct. Socialistic ideas, often brought directly by persons who have been under the influence of socialistic leaders in Europe, are in the air. The socialization of the urban transportation system is the leading local issue of the decade and has held attention for years. Both organized labor and organized capital are strongly intrenched in Chicago, and make the city and its streets their battlefield. Through all the confusion and controversy, there are many manifestations of the democratic character of the community.

Besides the social and economic conditions showing the internal cosmopolitanism of Chicago, there is a great variety of cultural interests, which are developments of cultivated cosmopolitanism. The Theodore Thomas Orchestra and Orchestra Hall, and the Art Institute, have been cited in foregoing papers. The number of theaters and performances of the drama has been greatly increased during recent years, and at present an important movement, headed by the Chicago Woman's Club, looking toward the establishment of a theater for the presentation of only the higher class of dramatic entertainments, is well started. The woman's clubs, with efforts so insistently laudable that they sometimes become a little ludicrous, are seriously and effectively promoting culture.

The institution which is probably doing the most to give the community a fixed ideal of the higher, intellectual life, is the University of Chicago.

"The City White hath fled the earth;  
But where her azure waters lie,  
A nobler city hath its birth,  
The City Gray that ne'er shall die."

The very presence, within the "City Black," of the university with its many beautiful and substantial buildings, halls, and laboratories set apart for the search after and dissemination of truth in all the fields of knowledge, and the reports of the activi-

ties of the searchers appearing constantly in the Chicago daily papers, however inadequate and distorted they may be from the point of view of the professors, impress the community with the idea of universal truth. The university helps toward eradication of the provincial. As to its direct influence on literary production, Mr. Walter A. Page, of Doubleday, Page & Co., New York, told the writer of this paper that no university in America is doing so much to encourage creative literary activity among its professors and students as the University of Chicago.

After all is said that may be said, however, about the concert of notes in the life of cosmopolitan Chicago, the fact remains that the one which sounds loudest and clearest is that of business. A typical expression of this was given in the following sentences by William E. Curtis, in the *Chicago Record-Herald*, November 18, 1904:

Chicago has pushed ahead more rapidly than any other city in the history of mankind.

She is the greatest of railway centers.

Her harbors float a greater tonnage than any other port in the world.

Chicago is the greatest cattle market in the world.

Chicago is the largest grain market.

Chicago is the biggest market for agricultural machinery.

Chicago does the largest mail-order business.

The largest trading in ready-made clothing.

She has the finest wholesale dry-goods establishment in the world.

She has the largest and finest retail department store in the world.

She is the largest hardware market in the world.

Chicago is the biggest furniture market.

Although in recent years much attention has been centered on the upbuilding of the cultural, artistic, and socializing activities of the community, there has been no movement of such momentum as that of the Chicago Commercial Association, which, reorganized in 1894, set out to boom Chicago as a national and world mart. Holding that the city is "the storm center of price competition," delegations of business men from the mercantile and manufacturing concerns in the association go out to various parts of the country on genuine campaigns in the interest of Chicago as the market-metropolis.

The romance of business battles has stirred many writers of fiction resident here to produce novels portraying the characters and narrating the incidents of this phase of the community's life. These are published by the established book-houses of New York and Boston. No magazine for literary expression of this kind of life has been undertaken here. The *Saturday Evening Post*, of Philadelphia, the general magazine which devotes more attention than any other to stories of the life of men of affairs, maintains in this city a western editorial office, with Mr. Forrest Crissey, a Chicago author of stories and verse, in charge, chiefly for the securing of manuscripts containing literary expression of such themes.

Incidental to the high development of business activity in Chicago has been a great increase in the class of the readers of magazine fiction who read merely for rest. Many business men and thousands of their clerks, after the rush and noise of the business day, do much reading for recreation, according to the testimony given for this paper on Chicago's literary interests, by the men behind the news-stands supplying them with periodicals. As a rule, they are not critical of the literary quality of the magazines read in this spirit, merely demanding stories diverting on account of incident.

That the various elements set forth in this brief outline of the character of the Chicago of today, and particularly the characteristics from the ideals of business, have been, and are, reflected in the origin, development, and character of the popular magazines published here today will be shown by the facts submitted in the detailed accounts. These magazines are produced as goods. They are put on the market to yield profits on investment. In their publication, literary productions of certain grades are commercialized. Because commercialized, these periodicals will be satirized—by idealists. But the history of the scores of periodicals attempted at Chicago in preceding decades has shown that the bulk have been nothing more than ephemeral efforts, because based on the floating foundation of literary sentiment—western literary sentiment. In this general experience the commercialization of popular literary magazines finds justification. The demand

for them reveals something which economists describe as an economic want. Only when produced on a business basis is the demand economically supplied. The professors in the English department of the Central Division of the Modern Language Association, at a conference in this city, in January, 1903, advocated the establishment of a western literary magazine to preserve the smaller literary productions of men who really write literature according to the academic standards of criticism. They declared that its publication could be provided for in no other way than by endowment. Such an endowed magazine has not been established in Chicago. For the general dissemination of any kind of literary periodical, endowment is not practical, certainly not economical. To exist and grow, a literary magazine, must be run—to use business colloquialism—as a “business proposition.” “But when the counting-room is put first, taste is perverted,” say objectors to this statement. The answer is that while the publisher of periodical and book fiction can do something in elevating reading taste, it is but little. The point of attack for that great work is not the publisher’s office, but the school and the home, where the taste of those making the demand for novels and literary magazines is acquired and definitely cultivated.

The *World To-Day*, a magazine in which a cosmorama of knowledge about world-events is made popular by means of an æsthetic gloss from the essay style of writing and from illustrations, mirrors not only in its present character, but also in the history of its development of character, more of the influences in the internal cosmopolitanism of Chicago than does any other periodical. This popular monthly of the literary journalistic order had its roots in a heavy, periodic encyclopedia and a religious weekly. The magazine is now in its sixth year, though during the first year of its publication it bore another name and was not of its present artistic character.

It was at first devoted to knowledge, and to knowledge unalloyed. The *Current Encyclopedia* was its name at the beginning. The initial number appeared July 15, 1901. The periodical was founded by Mr. William E. Ernst, who holds the office of vice-president and publisher in the *World To-Day* Company. He had

been in charge of the subscription book department of the Werner Company, then of Chicago, now of Akron, Ohio—a firm making large sales of standard encyclopedias. Mr. Ernst observed that the annual handbooks brought out to supplement the encyclopedia volumes were usually late. He therefore was impressed with the idea of publishing a “monthly record of human progress, containing the latest information on history, science, philosophy, literature, legislation, politics, industry, religion, education, art, etc,” to quote the subline to the title of the *Current Encyclopedia*.

Two similar periodicals, devoted to the knowledge-interests, had previously been published in Chicago. One was *Self Culture*, first brought out by the Werner Company in April, 1895. A file in the Newberry Library shows that this heavy magazine was distributed among the members of the “Home University League”—that is, among readers of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. By 1900, three years after the Werner Company had moved to Akron, the name of the magazine was changed to *Modern Culture*, and its ponderous appeal to the serious interest in knowledge gave place to the popularized form of magazine presentation. The other was *Progress*, also begun in 1895. This was a “home study” magazine, each monthly number containing “lessons.” It was issued by the “University Association” in the interests of university extension and World’s Congress extension. Right Rev. Samuel Fallows, D.D., bishop of the Reformed Episcopal church in the West and Northwest, chairman of the general education committee of the World’s Congress Auxiliary, and former state superintendent of public instruction in Wisconsin, was the chancellor of the association and the leading editor on the periodical’s staff of “instructors.” When the *Current Encyclopedia* was started, *Progress* was merged with it, and Bishop Fallows is still one of the directors of the *World To-Day* Company.

For the *Current Encyclopedia* Mr. Ernst estimated that from students, teachers, public speakers, newspaper editors, and serious-minded people generally there should be a demand requiring 100,000 copies each month. He organized a “Modern Research Society,” engaged Edmund Buckley, Ph.D., of the University of Chicago, as editor, and secured the services of a staff

of thirty-nine assistant editors, each in charge of editing the material on a subject in which he was a specialist. No advertising was solicited and not any published. That is, there was no effort to induce readers to make indirect payment toward the cost of satisfying their desire for knowledge. A price of 50 cents a copy and \$5 a year, was charged for the *Current Encyclopedia*. It was sold only by subscription. But the expected circulation was not secured. The maximum reached was 8,000. This was not sufficient to make the magazine self-supporting.

The experimenting to maintain this kind of periodical was continued for a year. Then what may be called the æsthetizing of the magazine was begun. "We saw there was a demand for the same material in a lighter vein than had marked the *Current Encyclopedia*," says Mr. Ernst. The very name of the magazine was too heavy. It was a title suggesting a ponderous tone and work in reading. The publisher found that the number of general readers really willing to labor in magazine perusal was most limited. It was decided first to alter the name of the magazine. At this time Mr. Albert G. Beaunisne, assistant to the publisher of the *Chicago Daily News*, became financially interested in Mr. Ernst's magazine venture. Through his influence negotiations over an offer of the editorship of the magazine were begun with Mr. Trumbull White, a seasoned Chicago newspaper man and foreign correspondent, who, however, became the editor to found the *Red Book*, and is now editor of Appleton's *Book-lover's Magazine* at New York. The name "Current Events" was under consideration. Mr. White said that was too commonplace. He proposed the "World of Today." This title, minus the preposition, was adopted.

At this point Mr. Ernst and Mr. Beaunisne went to Mr. E. A. Shepler, manager of the Western News Co., a constituent part of the American News Co., the periodical-distributing agency for the entire country. They asked him if matter-of-fact material written in an entertaining manner, profusely illustrated with half-tones, appearing in a magazine with a catchy cover design, would sell on the news-stands if published in Chicago. Mr. Shepler said to them:



You can succeed if you give the people their money's worth. There never has been a magazine published in Chicago that deserved to succeed in competition with those published in New York. Sentiment as to place of publication does not go. If you make the magazine worth its price, it will sell.

Mr. Ernst and his associates set about attempting to give the public its "money's worth" at twenty-five cents a copy.

The first number of the periodical under its present name, being the first of its second year, appeared on the news-stands in July, 1902. A total of only 5,000 copies was placed on distribution. A larger issue was put on sale in August; and in September, 8,000 copies were given to the news company. The annual subscribers numbered 7,000. Up to this time no advertisements had been solicited. Since, however, the sales had been encouraging, the publisher believed he had the nucleus of a circulation that would appeal to advertisers. He began seeking advertising contracts. But those advertisers who supply the magazine publishers with the bulk of their revenues did not show much interest in a circulation of only 15,000. Toward August of the next year, 1903, it became evident that steps to enlarge the number of readers were imperative. In this direction new editorial strength and the influence of the University of Chicago were sought.

During the late spring and summer of 1903 a weekly newspaper, with magazine cover, called *Christendom*, and bearing the imprint "Chicago," was to be found on the news-stands—that is, by one looking carefully. No. 1 of this journal came out April 18. *Christendom* was an incident in the religious-education movement. A gentleman who was intimately connected with the publication says: "*Christendom* originated in the fertile brain of the late Dr. William R. Harper, president of the University of Chicago." Dr. Harper, as founder of the Religious Education Association of the United States, and a leader in the movement for keeping religion constantly emphasized as one of the most fundamental forces in the life of a nation admittedly materialistic in its attitudes, desired to have information concerning current events popularly presented to magazine-readers with attention to this point of view. To judge from the announcements concerning

*Christendom*, the object of its sponsors was the establishment of an *Outlook* for the West—a weekly journal along the lines of the one edited by Dr. Lyman Abbott in New York.

Shailer Mathews, D.D., professor of New Testament history and interpretation, and one of the deans of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, was the editor of *Christendom*. He was nominated for this editorial office by Dr. Harper partly because he had been successful in the active editorial direction of the *Biblical World*. Skilled as a popularizer and scholarly as a research worker, not only in theological, but also in historical and sociological fields, Dr. Mathews is regarded as being unusually well qualified to be the editor of a magazine portraying current life in its larger relations and published for general distribution. *Christendom* was ably edited. Not many numbers had been put on sale, however, before it became apparent that the periodical was not going to be self-supporting. *Christendom* was discontinued August 23, 1903. From it the *World To-Day* acquired the new editorial strength which was being looked for eagerly by the publishers at that time. With the September, 1903, number Dr. Mathews became editor of the *World To-Day*, and Dr. Harper chairman of the directorate's editorial committee. All that was left of *Christendom* was absorbed by the *World To-Day*, which derived from it, besides editorial power, additional business strength. The *World To-Day* Company was reorganized, and the principal owners of stock in *Christendom* became officers and directors of the reorganized company. Prominent Chicago business and professional men, some also patrons of the University of Chicago, were among them. Mr. Francis W. Parker, a reform leader in active politics and a university trustee, became chairman of the finance committee. Mr. Beaunisne, chairman of the director's committee on publication for *Christendom*, who had previously become interested in the *World To-Day*, became treasurer of the publishing corporation.

That the *World To-Day* is regarded as a business investment is indicated by the fact that among its directors are Mr. John R. Thompson, the proprietor of a system of restaurants; Mr. Charles A. Marsh, the president of a lumber company; Mr. O.

F. Kropf, the secretary of a company manufacturing plumbers' supplies; and Mr. F. J. Llewellyn, a contracting manager. In the list of stockholders is Mr. Frank G. Logan, a former member of the Board of Trade. A majority of the owners of stock in the magazine company are actively engaged in local commercial enterprises. They have invested in the stock expecting returns at the normal rate of interest on capital. It is possible that more is looked for, since the amount of stock paid up, the preferred, is \$100,000, while the total capital stock of the company is put at \$430,000. It would, however, be unfair to assert that business gain has been the prime motive of investors in the *World To-Day* venture. The spirit of local pride, and the ambition of fostering agencies for intellectual and artistic advancement in a city that may be said to be not so much backward in culture as forward in business, have been important moving forces. All of the stockholders are residents of Chicago. All of them have expressed an earnest desire for the permanent establishment of a dignified literary magazine bearing the imprint of Chicago.

The friendly influence of the University of Chicago, in addition to these permanent assets of editorial and business power, was secured by the *World To-Day* with the taking over of the remnants of *Christendom*. It is difficult for one in any way connected with the university to estimate the influence exerted by the institution on the higher-life interests of the community. Mr. William Morton Payne, of the *Dial*, who is a Chicago literary critic in no way connected with the university, writing on "The Intellectual Life of Chicago" for the *World To-Day* of July, 1904, laid emphasis on "the predominant influence of a single institution—the University of Chicago—upon our intellectual development." Mr. Payne brought out this point, showing progress made in the city since the time he had been commissioned to write an article on "Literary Chicago" for the *New England Magazine*, in 1893, when the university was in its first academic year, and its influence only a promise. That the backing of the executive officers, the large faculty, and the patrons of the university has been an important factor in the growth of the *World To-Day*, published down-town and not in any way directly connected

with the university, is quite evident. Dr. Mathews says that the advantage which the magazine has in his own connection with the university lies in its editor's contact with the men on the faculties as individuals, and his nearness to them as a source of supply for valuable articles. Mr. Ernst, the publisher, speaking from the business man's point of view, says, however, that because the public is aware of the magazine's support by the university men, it has gained in standing with the public.

With the alignment of these editorial and business forces, in September, 1903 the *World To-Day* took on its present character of literary dress and pictorial attraction for the interest in the æsthetic, and the publishing company set about making it, not only self-supporting, but also profit-bearing. In this, the adjusting of business and literary interests is interesting, and illustrative of general facts in magazine publishing, not only at Chicago, but in the publishing field at large. To understand a correlating of such interests it is necessary to trace the lines in a web of economic wants in which the desires for instruction and entertainment through the medium of literary form and pictures are woven.

Advertising is the most important thread. The securing of contracts for publishing advertising became the main objective even of those directly interested in the *World To-Day* as a cultural agency. By far the largest part of the receipts of nearly every magazine comes from the advertising pages, as every casual magazine-reader appreciates. The receipts from the purchasers of the magazine at the news-stands, and from the subscribers by the year, cover only a small percentage of the total expenses of production. Of course, the advertisers put the expense of advertising into the prices of articles advertised. So it comes about that the people who buy the goods advertised in the magazines pay, when they purchase those goods, a literary toll. The advertisers are the toll-gate men, and through them indirectly the publishers collect fares for passage in whatever kind of literary omnibus they are running.

Now it happens that the kind of goods most advertised, those pushed into attention by means of brands and trade-marks, are certain staples of home consumption, such as soaps and breakfast

foods. Hence the people who must be reached by a magazine whose publishers wish to make it a medium for a large volume of this advertising are the home-maintainers. The publisher of the *World To-Day*, on the basis of experience in the development of this magazine, summed the situation up this way:

Advertising is the backbone of a magazine's success. Middle-class people with homes are the ones who buy the goods on which most money is spent for advertising. But to get this advertising for your magazine you first must have in its literary pages "the stuff" that will appeal to the people interested in those "ads."

The climax of this statement indicates the fact that the taste of that large body of citizens called the middle class has definitely determined in large part the editorial, literary, and artistic character of the *World To-Day*. The demand which its editor has avowedly aimed to supply is what he frankly describes as the bourgeoisie interests. The variations in taste which have been kept in mind are those of the people whom Charles Austin Bates, a New York advertising agency proprietor, in his book, *The Art and Literature of Business* (New York, 1902), treats of under the head "The Average American." He says (Vol. I, p. 284):

It is the great middle class that reads newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals, and these are the people that the advertiser wishes to reach. Taking them at random, one thousand of them is just about as valuable as another thousand.

But it is the Middle West average American, considered by Dr. Mathews to be the most typically American, whose tastes and interests have been kept in mind in the making of the *World To-Day*. A compact western circulation has been worked for by the publisher of the magazine, and 80 per cent. of the *World To-Day* readers are in homes west of the Alleghany Mountains, 60 per cent. being in the North Central States. The editor has quite naturally kept his finger on the pulse of the people in the region of which Chicago is the metropolis, and the publisher has expected the largest constituency there for the same reason. Incidentally, the advertisers who carry on big publicity campaigns have taken to conducting those campaigns by states, and Mr. Ernst has aimed to

meet this condition by building up a concentrated Middle West constituency. Further, it is not to be forgotten that Dr. Mathews and several members of the *World To-Day* Company are teachers, and that, despite the emphasis laid on making the magazine a success commercially, one of their aims has been to make it a means of leading public opinion. Therefore, since those asserting leadership must not get too far away from their publics, attention to the taste and opinion of the constituency has been exercised consciously and analytically. For these various reasons the taste and temper of Chicago and the Middle West have influenced Dr. Mathews directly as he determined the editorial content and literary form policies in the formation of the character of the *World To-Day*.

The desire to be instructed, and to be entertained while receiving instruction, felt generally by the average American, is regarded by the editor and publisher of the *World To-Day* as especially strong in the middle-class people with homes who make up the largest part of the population of the Middle West. Mr. Ernst, influenced by his experience with the *Current Encyclopedia*, lays emphasis on the desire for entertainment from literary forms and pictures. Dr. Mathews says his aim is equally to instruct and to entertain. The interest of intelligent home-maintainers in the literary presentation of serious subject-matter in form other than that of the story is what, in his opinion, makes a demand for such a periodical as the one he edits. His effort is "to put facts so as to be read." In an investigation of the extent of the market for books of fiction published in Chicago, pursued in this study, it was learned that two-thirds of the reading of the country is done by the one-half of the population residing east of Ohio. Mr. Ernst is authority for the statement that this holds true for the magazine reading of the country. But of the reading in the West a larger proportionate share is of serious subject-matter. Mr. Ernst presents some concrete facts on the circulation of other magazines to show that the people outside of that section known as the East do relatively more reading of serious writing than they do of fiction in periodicals. He says that the *Review of Reviews*, for example, has a larger percentage of its circulation in the West

than any story magazine has. Dr. Mathews, in a signed article on "Culture in the West," appearing in a "New West" number of his magazine, February, 1905, says of the *Atlantic Monthly* that, although it "appeals to the tradition of culture without relying upon the seductions of illustrations or sensational exposés, yet finds more than half its circulation west of Cleveland." He further says: "The view which the West takes of life, while not pessimistic, is serious;" and in the editorial leader for the same number, quoted in part for the headpiece of this paper, he further emphasizes this point. The interest of home people in every phase of progress is rated as fundamental in determining western taste, but the desire for virile expression and novelty modifies this in such a way that the taste in periodicals is for a magazine which is entertaining.

The "literary-information" class of magazines is the one to which the *World To-Day* belongs. It is not a literary magazine, in the literary critic's use of the adjective "literary," since in its contents there is to be found no exclusively imaginative writing. But since its pages show great dependence on a form of writing designed to appeal to the æsthetic interest, and since pictures are a leading factor in its entertaining of the public, the *World To-Day* merits minute attention for the purposes of looking into the orders of periodicals manifesting the literary phase of the general æsthetic interest at Chicago.

The table of contents for any issue of the *World To-Day* shows that they have been selected with a plan for consistent unity. The main motive throughout is the knowledge-interest. The first two pages are filled with an editorial printed in large type. This is an editorial written with "the psychological moment" in view, an expression designed to give new mental pictures concerning the question of the month dominating the minds of typical "average Americans." The next fifteen pages are devoted to a review of the "Events of the Month," under four subheads: "World Politics," "The Nation," "Art and Letters," and "The Religious World." A dozen "contributed articles" on a variety of subjects, written by men of more or less authority, then come to complete the main part of the magazine. They are followed

by short, signed articles in a department called "The Making of Tomorrow" which has a subline saying, "How the world of today is preparing for the world of tomorrow." Sections designated "Books and Reading" and "Calendar of the Month," and finally "The Encyclopedic Index," a survival of the magazine in its original form, complete the contents.

"National journalism" is the characterization of this array of material given by the editor, who is endeavoring each month to cover the entire field, in balance. Some down-town friends of the *World To-Day*, among them a literary critic, offer the objection that the magazine is too emphatic in its religious tone. On the other hand, some of the editor's theological friends are inclined to think it is too worldly. Dr. Mathews defends his policy, contending that no more attention is given to the record of religious movements than to others, and that the facts show religion to be one of the large forces in the life of the nation. Looking at the monthlies with which the *World To-Day* is competing, it appears to be true that the *World To-Day* is broader in scope. The *Review of Reviews* is predominantly a political and economic record. The *World's Work* makes special features of various topics, seeming to show little effort at a balanced view of the world-field. *McClure's Magazine* has recently specialized in municipal, political, and economic exposés. The *Outlook*, published as a weekly newspaper, with a monthly magazine number, carries out effectively the policy adopted by the *World To-Day*, and is even more insistent on attention to religious activity. Thus in its range of material, the appeal of the *World To-Day* reflects the character of Chicago, and is designed for the tastes of the people of "the new West" whom Dr. Mathews regards as particularly susceptible to the cosmopolitanism which he regards as typically American.

It is not the world-wide range of subject-matter that makes the *World To-Day* of interest from the point of view of æsthetics. What does is the style of writing in which this matter is presented. The encyclopedic form of statement is shunned. The ponderous circumlocution known as academic writing is studiously avoided. The essay style, brightened by a play of



imagination over matters of fact, pointed with epigrams, is what the editor wants, so that every paragraph shall be entertaining. Literary form of this kind is relied upon as a means of making the magazine popular. The composition of the editorial leaders, by Dr. Mathews himself, has been of this style, appealing to the general æsthetic interest, and the contributed articles have been written in this manner.

After all is said about the literary dress of the magazine, it is, however, through another medium that the *World To-Day* makes its telling appeal. The men behind news-stands, when asked what the people desire most, said: "They want to read pictures." The eye of a magazine-purchaser standing before a news-stand display of periodicals is caught by the original drawings of the *World To-Day* cover designs. For several issues after it became the *World To-Day*, the magazine lacked such a means of advertising itself. For some months also, the same design, containing only a small hemisphere for a decorative feature, was used, although this cover scheme was made to stand out by the use of different colors from month to month. As a permanent policy, the plan of printing a new cover, done in two or three colors, each month was adopted. The cover gives a promise of the illustrations on the reading-pages. Pictures fill nearly half of them. There is scarcely a page without some kind of a picture, quarter-page, half-page, or full-page in size. Besides portraits of individuals whose personalities are factors in the life of the world, there are scenes showing activities in fields and parks, on rivers and seas, in factories and legislative halls, and on the stages of theaters, as well as reproductions of masterly paintings. Excepting the reproductions of etched newspaper cartoons run in the review section, all the illustrations are half-tones, exceedingly well done. Fancy borders and backgrounds, in pale blue and cream-yellow tints, are used to give the larger half-tones added æsthetic values. The illustrations of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition number, September, 1904, made it, without doubt, one of the most beautiful magazines ever published. Summing up, it may be said that the *World To-Day* is like a wholesome cake of many layers, coated with frosting and decorated with designs in sugar of various colors.

For a year after the name of the magazine became the *World To-Day*, and for nearly another year after the formation of its character in the present editor's hands, the price of 25 cents a copy and \$3 per annum was maintained. This is the regular charge for the review magazines. But experience in marketing the *World To-Day* at this figure showed that the constituency of average Americans interested in its contents, and desired so as to command the largest volume of advertising, thought it too high. In July, 1904, the price was reduced to 10 cents a copy and \$1 a year. The publisher advertised the periodical as the "only magazine of its class for ten cents." As this is the price of popular fiction magazines, the new charge made a prejudice in favor of the *World To-Day*. Immediately sales doubled. Mr. Ernst estimated that in the western territory there were 300,000 people interested in such a magazine as his and able to afford it at this price. The circulation mounted to 60,000, then to 80,000 by February, 1905, and has reached 85,729, the steady increase having gained such momentum that in March, 1906, the price was raised to 15 cents a copy and \$1.50 for twelve numbers.

A magazine with contents so presented as to interest home-maintaining people having been developed, and circulation among them having been secured, and especially a circulation geographically compact, the desired and needed advertising contracts have been forthcoming for the *World To-Day*. In a tabulation of paid advertising in the "leading monthlies" of the country, appearing in *Printer's Ink*, November 9, 1904, the *World To-Day* ranked fourteenth. At that time, thirteen months after it had taken on its present character, the magazine had 83 pages and 19,256 agate lines of advertising. It has since advanced in rank to eleventh. Early in 1905 the magazine began to show a profit.

Judging the success of a contemporary periodical is handicapped by the natural enthusiasm felt for their literary children by editors and publishers, the chief sources of information. Moreover, unromantic as it may seem, the test of success for even a dignified journal, of genuine editorial, literary, and artistic quality, is that of the "going concern." However good a periodical may be, it is not a success if continuance is not assured.

It is safe to say that the *World To-Day* is a success, and to predict its permanence. The manager of the Western News Co., who has seen many ephemeral Chicago magazines dry up by the wayside, the literary critics and men in the publishing business at Chicago, and the western representatives of the older New York magazines have agreed in this statement and prediction. The chief reason for such success and promise is that the editor has proved skilful in having topics of world-wide information so clothed in a literary dress, with pictorial trimmings, as to make it appeal convincingly to the general æsthetic interest of middle-class people in the Middle West, the territory contiguous to the inwardly cosmopolitan metropolis in which it is published.

The *Red Book*, Chicago's first conspicuous success at publishing a fiction magazine of the contemporary popular type, came into being because several gentlemen who are Jews, the members of a prominent firm of merchants with headquarters at the center of the principal shopping street, thought they might make some money by satisfying the demand for stories. Stumer, Rosenthal & Eckstein is the firm name of these business men, Messrs. Louis M. Stumer, Abraham R. Stumer, Benjamin J. Rosenthal, and Louis Eckstein. They own and operate among other business enterprises, two retail millinery stores—"The Emporium" and the "Millinery World," a large "cut rate" drug-store—the "Public Drug Co.," two restaurants and an office building, in which the editorial and publishing offices of the *Red Book* are located.

Some pointers about publishing and advertising, and possible profits therefrom, had been picked up by individual members of this firm several years ago. Before joining this business partnership, Mr. Eckstein had been general passenger agent of the Wisconsin Central Railway, and in working up to that position had learned the ins and outs of the periodical advertising. Mr. Rosenthal, as a prominent member of the Chicago Board of Education, the Public Library Board, and the Chicago Centennial Celebration committee, had become acquainted with Mr. Dwight Allyn, a "star newspaper-man," who in June, 1900, started the *10 Story Book*. This is a small-sized Chicago monthly containing

"snappy" short stories, and is prosperous today. In its early stages Mr. Allyn, finding himself in need of funds to keep the venture alive, went to Mr. Rosenthal. He and some other members of his firm bought stock in Mr. Allyn's company—under contract, however, to sell it back to him prior to 1903. This they did, Mr. Allyn declining to sell out to them and to accept an offer for conducting the periodical on salary. In the meantime they had realized a small but neat profit on their investment.

After balancing accounts in the books of all their ventures at the end of 1902, Stumer, Rosenthal & Eckstein found that they had on hand a considerable amount of floating capital. Besides the retail establishments already mentioned, they had a wholesale millinery house, and were under contract to build a "skyscraper." They turned from the distinctly materialistic field of investment and asked: "If a small *10 Story Book* will make a small profit, why will not a large story-book bring in a big profit?" They decided to start such a magazine venture, to make a large outlay, take a large risk, and to await a large return.

In looking about for an editorial manager, they went to a man connected with the *Chicago Daily News*, whose assistant to the publisher is a prominent member of the *World To-Day* Company. They asked Mr. Charles M. Faye, the managing editor of that newspaper, with whom Mr. Eckstein had a personal acquaintance, to become the editor of the proposed magazine. Mr. Faye, instead of accepting, recommended Mr. Trumbull White, a prominent newspaper-man of the younger generation in Chicago, who had recently been abroad in charge of the foreign service for *The Chicago Record*, then under the same general management as *The Daily News*. Mr. White is a son of the Middle West become a "citizen of the world," by nature enthusiastic and optimistic, and endowed with a broad range of human sympathy—a man who has acquired the cosmopolitan point of view. After spending his youth in an Iowa village and receiving an eastern collegiate education at Amherst, Mr. White did local newspaper work and newspaper literary editing in Chicago. Then, while at London, St. Petersburg, and other foreign capitals as a newspaper correspondent, he contributed articles to magazines, inci-

dentally serving as authority on Asiatic affairs for the *World To-Day* when that magazine was the *Current Encyclopedia*. Having been connected with the press of Chicago for quite a number of years, he had been acquainted with newspaper men who had made futile efforts to establish literary periodicals. Among newspaper workers he was regarded as one of the best qualified to undertake the editing of a popular magazine.

Mr. White was engaged as editor, and the *Red Book* corporation, of which Mr. Eckstein is the president, was organized. This corporation has an official capitalization of but a few thousand dollars. Its stockholders are members of the Stumer, Rosenthal & Eckstein firm exclusively. This firm guarantees all bills against the magazine for paper, printing, manuscripts and distribution. The limit of *Red Book* obligations is, therefore, the total personal wealth of its members. The financial rate-sheets put this at \$1,000,000. Hence, the *Red Book* has been alone among Chicago periodical publishing efforts in having backing which was, for all practical purposes, unlimited.

An estimate of publishing cost rather startling to the capitalists of the firm was made at the outset by Mr. White, who, while engaged to be editor, had many of the duties of a publisher. He told them it would take three years of publishing the new magazine to place it on a self-supporting basis, and that during such period they must expect to see a temporary net less of \$100,000. Accepting the estimate, though with mental reservations as to its accuracy, Stumer, Rosenthal & Eckstein told Mr. White to go ahead with the venture.

The only instructions as to literary quality given to the editor were to produce a monthly book better than the *10 Story Book*. It was at once decided that the magazine should be devoted to fiction, that it should contain no serials, and that its pages should be filled with short stories written by contemporary authors. First the publishers prepared a small preliminary edition, of which only twenty copies were completed and taken to the *Red Book* office. They were never circulated. This preliminary number contained only a meager collection of stories and no photographic illustrations. A sample copy was taken to Mr. Shepler, the Western

News Co. manager, experienced in seeing Chicago publications die on the news-stands. Mr. Shepler told the publishers that, as it then appeared, their book was no better than any of the many ten-cent story magazines, and therefore it would not go. They stopped the binders. They enlarged the magazine, and added an illustration feature. The illustrations of the stories in the experimental number, as in the first six regular issues, were zinc etchings which looked cheap. For this reason some half-tone feature was especially desired. In the enlarged initial number a series of pictures in a "photographic art" department filling the first pages of the book was inserted. Since then the first pages—originally twelve, later twenty-eight—have regularly contained excellent full-page half-tones of the well-known actresses. In illustrating the stories, zinc etchings were soon dropped, and tooled half-tones of original drawings substituted. The illustrations, however, have not been of good quality, and the main pictorial appeal to the æsthetic sense has been the display of "photographic art."

The stories give the magazine its character. These are not of the classic type, and severe literary critics scoff when the *Red Book* is mentioned as a literary magazine. In the first place, the name *Red Book*, and the magazine's red cover regularly containing a drawing in which the figure of a woman wearing an evening gown appears, are more sensational in their suggestions than the contents of the stories warrant. Mr. White says that his aim in selecting manuscripts has been to secure stories providing "decent entertainment for people with red blood in their veins." Many of the stories in each number of the *Red Book* have not been above the mediocre in literary form, though each has had some quality sufficiently entertaining to satisfy the widespread interest in narrative. But in each number there have been a few stories by the best of the fiction-writers for the accredited American magazines. For example, Stuart Edward White, whose interpretations of the spirit of life in the western mountains have been widely acclaimed, has been a *Red Book* contributor. Further, stories from authors who reside in England have been published regularly in this Chicago magazine. So

many of them have been used that Mr. Crissey, the western editorial representative of the *Saturday Evening Post*, says that the *Red Book* publishes more good brief fiction from the authors of England than does any other short-story magazine in America.

That the *Red Book*, presenting this kind of literary and pictorial entertainment, has caught the fancy of thousands is shown by the sales records of the magazine. When the first edition, in its enlarged and revised form, was put out, 40,000 copies were sent to the Western News Co. and the other branches of the American News Co. Of these 14,000 were returned, showing a net first-number circulation larger by several thousand than that of any preceding literary publication in Chicago. Since then the output has been increased by thousands of copies monthly. For the February, 1905, issue, 275,000 copies were printed, and for June, 1906, 338,500. The publishers say that during no month has the number of unsold copies returned exceeded 5 per cent. of the issue.

The commercial means of satisfying the order of æsthetic want which these readers manifest is shown by the experience of the *Red Book* in securing its advertising patronage to be bound up in a bundle of more material wants. The aim of the publishers is not to attract the largest possible number of readers. It is, instead, to get the largest possible body of readers having the power to purchase the classes of goods that are most constantly and expensively advertised in magazines. The "ad-writers" create wants. The advertisements stimulate demands for the moderate-priced luxuries. While there is a constant interaction between the effects of the advertising pages and the reading-matter section, Mr. White holds that in the last analysis the constituency for the advertising matter is the one that controls policy. That it should be so is a business necessity with the *Red Book*, for while it costs 8½ cents a copy to produce the magazine, the news company pays only 5½ cents per copy for it, thus leaving a net loss on sales of 3 cents on each book. The advertising revenue must be secured. The State Street firm of merchant-publishers, through its heavy purchases for the store of the Public Drug Co., is in a position to command a large amount of patent-

medicine advertisements, and during the first few months of the magazine's publication practically all of its advertising pages were filled with cure-all announcements. But the people who pin their faith to proprietary-medicine men's assertions are not the ones who buy the luxuries and fancy staples which yield the bulk of magazine advertising returns at highest rates, and Mr. White declares they are not the people interested in the class of stories he has put in the *Red Book*. Further, Mr. White, in giving data for these papers, said: "Every magazine that pretends to decency in its contents must omit the patent-medicine advertisements." The relative amount of nostrum advertising in the *Red Book* has constantly decreased. Prohibitive rates have caused this kind to be dropped out. With recognition of the large circulation of the magazine, the advertising contracts of the character required have been secured in large numbers. At the end of its second year, the *Red Book* was on a profit-yielding basis, although at one time \$50,000 appeared to have been sunk in the venture. All who are prominently connected with publishing in Chicago say that the magazine is firmly established for the future.

The owners of the *Red Book* at the beginning of its third year decided to use their publishing organization for issuing a second short-story magazine. This is the *Monthly Story Magazine*, of which the first number appeared in May, 1905. Each number contains nearly 200 pages of complete stories. Although the Story-Press Corporation is the nominal publishing organization, manuscripts used for this publication come from the myriad of short-story writers. They are submitted, usually, for the *Red Book*, but are not regarded as up to the standard of that magazine. The accumulation of such manuscripts was one of the incidents that led to the starting of the side-issue periodical. Except for twelve pages of theatrical scenes, reproduced by halftones in an introductory department called "Stageland," and the advertisements, the contents of the *Monthly Story Magazine* are printed on the cheapest kind of paper. On account of its cheapness of production, this magazine, sold at ten cents a copy, brings a profit from its circulation of 100,000. It is a conspicuous example of commercializing the publishing of a kind of literary periodical.



The attention of the New York publishers of magazines has been arrested by the success of the *Red Book*. Being one of a very small number published in the West, as contrasted with the many turned out in New York, its large sales in the general magazine market have stood out conspicuously. New York magazine-publishers, in interviews for these papers so stated explicitly. Incidentally the sales of the *Red Book* in New York City have been larger than the sales in Chicago, though not larger in proportion to population. *Smith's Magazine*, brought out in New York after the Chicago publication had enjoyed two years of success, is regarded as a direct imitation of the *Red Book*. The most notable and complimentary New York recognition of the *Red Book*, however, has come in the loss to Chicago of Mr. White, its editor for the first three years. The well-established publishing house of D. Appleton & Co., on acquiring the high-grade *Booklover's Magazine* of Philadelphia, and converting it into *Appleton's Magazine*, called Mr. White to its editorship. On May 1, after Mr. Karl Edward Harriman, a short-story and magazine-article writer, for three years editor of the *Pilgrim*, published at Battle Creek, Mich., had been named as his successor with the *Red Book*, Mr. White went to New York to assume his new editorial duties. The attraction of Mr. White to the leading publishing center of the country is a unique recognition of success in Chicago as a growing publishing center.

The publishers of both the *Red Book* and the *World To-Day* are recognized, by the publishers of magazines at New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, to be competing in the general magazine market. The experiences of the editors and business directors of the *World To-Day* and the *Red Book* are instructive on the limitations and possibilities of Chicago as a place for producing and distributing popular magazines, in comparison with those of New York, the national publishing center.

The imprint "Chicago" has given these magazines an advantage in securing benefits from the metropolitan influence of Chicago in the Middle West, subtly aiding them to get large and concentrated circulations in that part of the national market comprised in this section. But it has handicapped their influence east of the Alleghanies. A New York imprint gives the advan-

tage of New York's influence as the national metropolis, not only in the East where two-thirds of the total reading is done, but also for a general circulation scattered throughout the country. The *World To-Day* has laid all possible emphasis on its Chicago connection, plainly showing itself by various articles and special western numbers to be an organ of Middle West Americanism. The *Red Book* has carried the word "Chicago" in fine type. Mr. White, before he went to New York, said that with the average reader, wherever found, the imprint has but little influence, the question being: Does the magazine offer the literary goods wanted?

Location in Chicago, through the editors' association with the type of cosmopolitan life here manifest, has had an important effect on the character of these magazines, making them typical of the composite interest of America. Dr. Mathews says it is hardly possible to express the national life from the "American-in-the-making state of mind" in a periodical published in the city of New York. Mr. White cites the rejection by several New York magazine-publishers of a western story by a well-known author, which later, when published in the *Red Book*, attracted widespread attention, as evidence that the eastern publishers do not know the taste of that part of the national public resident in the West. As exceptions to this generalization, however, Mr. White, several months before his call to the East, listed those western men who have become heads of New York publishing concerns. The western market is specially desirable because the West is growing more rapidly than the East in population, and the fertility of the Mississippi Valley assures such a growth continuously.

In that part of producing a magazine which involves the securing of acceptable manuscripts, the New York publisher has, of course, advantages. Many more authors are there, and consultations between editors and many authors can be had easily. These consultations are particularly desirable for a magazine like the *World To-Day*, for each number of which the editor adopts a plan, and then has many of the articles made to order. However, the mails are open, and to both the *Red Book* and the

*World To-Day* many more desirable manuscripts than could be used have been sent by contributors. At first the *Red Book* suffered from the fact that authors who had sent their productions to some of the Chicago periodical fiction-publishers whose magazines failed, leaving them without even postage to return unused manuscripts, were afraid to send any of their literary creations to another Chicago magazine. Mr. White was able to reduce this handicap and to secure an advantage with authors, traditionally in financial straits, by means of his strong financial backing. He evolved a scheme for paying authors on acceptance, instead of on publication of their productions. Manuscripts sent to the *Red Book* are read in the order of reception. On a story which the editor desires to accept he sets a price, and queries the author of it to find out if it is acceptable, notifying him that payment will be made at once. By following this plan the *Red Book* regularly has on hand several thousands of dollars' worth of manuscripts already paid for. One pitfall of too many literary periodicals attempted at Chicago, namely a too frequent use of the productions of Chicago authors, has been avoided by the *Red Book* editor, through applying the rule of judging manuscripts in the order of their arrival, regardless of personal acquaintance with the local contributors. The *Red Book's* stories from authors residing in England are contributed by a literary agency in New York, which represents these English authors in America. Native material also comes from a similar agency which represents American authors in America. There are no such agencies, which are clearing-houses for authors, in Chicago.

In securing original illustrations for fiction, a Chicago periodical editor is at an absolute and unqualified disadvantage which, according to Mr. White, is not likely to be overcome until there are many Chicago magazines making a constant demand for the work of illustrators. The capable illustrators are in New York. It is practically impossible to have their work submitted to a Chicago publisher by mail in the same way that manuscripts of authors can be and are sent on from New York. For illustrations of a given story, conferences between editor and artist, in order to make changes and corrections in drawings, are almost

imperative. For the *Red Book* an endeavor to develop local artists has been made. More than sixty pen-and-ink and wash-drawing workers have been tried out. They have been drawn from the daily newspaper art departments, the mercantile illustrating shops, the student classes of the Art Institute, and also the Art Academy. A specially comprehensive trial of art students was provided, manuscripts being given to them for competition and the prize illustrations used. After one such trial the art classes were dropped as a source of practical illustrators. Some twenty men, discovered in newspaper and trade illustrating work, have done the illustrating of *Red Book* manuscripts as piece-work. On the whole, the magazine has been less successfully illustrated than any New York rival periodical of the same literary grade. A few of the magazine's illustrators have done good work; but Mr. White, during his last year at Chicago, was in constant fear that these new illustrators would migrate east. The *World To-Day*, using original illustrations for its cover only, has not felt the absence of local artists so keenly. But the fact that the leading photographers who take pictures for half-tone illustrations of scenes bearing on current events are established in New York has caused delay in the filling of orders even when sent by wire. A large supply of satisfactory photographs, however, has been obtainable from photographers in Chicago and elsewhere without too great difficulty.

For the engraving required to get the most artistic effects in original illustrations, the *Red Book* has experienced a difficulty that would not have been felt in New York. Touches from hand-tooling of half-tone illustrations are needed to get the best values in black and white. At one engraving house a workman has been specially developed to do this class of work for the *Red Book*. He has not become enough of an artist to warrant attaching his name to the illustrations. For the general half-tone work, the Chicago engraving houses are as proficient as those anywhere. The half-tone photograph illustrations in the *World To-Day* are of the best magazine quality.

For printing, as for other mechanical parts of producing, some New York publishers have their own plants. A majority do not,

and no Chicago magazine publisher is so equipped. For the type-setting required in fine art printing, like some of that in *Harper's Magazine*, there is a large supply of skilled labor in New York. But the popular fiction or pictorial review magazine does not require this, and the development of high-class trade periodicals in Chicago has caused the establishment of well-equipped printing-houses, and drawn to the city a large number of skilled linotype operators. Labor disputes may be more frequent in Chicago than in New York. But one of Chicago's periodical publishers says that the complaints of the proprietors of the printing establishments against the highly organized Typographical Union, and their repeated threats of removal from Chicago are chiefly diplomatic statements incidental to industrial strife, made for the purpose of holding the union printers in check as much as possible. The press-work obtainable in Chicago is of a thoroughly satisfactory grade.

In getting the binding of his "book" done, the New York periodical publisher is at a decided advantage over his few Chicago competitors. For magazine-binding, a large force of girls working at high speed during only a few days each month is required. In New York there are so many magazines coming from the presses on different days of the month that skilled bindery workers can find constant employment by going from shop to shop. In Chicago the list of periodicals put up in standard magazine form is too small for the best development of such a force.

When it comes to distributing, the publishers of the two Chicago magazines under consideration have found an advantage in reaching the general market, and particularly the western market, from the very fact that so few are published in Chicago as compared with the many issued from New York. The news-stand sales of practically all magazines are made through the American News Co., which has a monopoly. The home office of the American News Co. at New York is often glutted with the output from the many New York magazine publishing-houses. The office of the Chicago branch, the Western News Co., never is. The manager of this branch, receiving the Chicago magazine output

for the entire field of the American News Co., and wishing to make the largest possible business showing for his branch of the concern, aids the Chicago publishers in every legitimate way. He has been in a position to turn the attention of his entire force toward rushing out shipments of the Chicago magazines. In one instance, when the *Red Book* issue was received a day late, by concentrating attention on it, he caused the copies to reach the retail market on time. Nearness of place of publication to the market does not cause the same problem for the *Red Book* as for the *World To-Day*, in its competition with review magazines. There is no element of immediate timeliness in the contents of the *Red Book* fiction. Its issues are printed a month before their distribution. But the *World To-Day*, in order that its record of the events of the month may be complete, must hold its columns open until the last possible day before the date of publication. Hence, if the first aim of the publishers were to reach the entire national market, they would be at a disadvantage in competition with publishers whose offices are at New York, nearer to the one-third of the country's territory in which two-thirds of the reading public is to be found. But reaching the market from rival centers works both ways. The *World To-Day* has an advantage over eastern publications in getting quickly to its most desired constituency in the Middle West. Another fact in the general publishing situation helps determine the date of publication for the *World To-Day*. It is that most of the ten- and fifteen-cent magazines appear at the stands ten days before the first day of the month indicated in their date lines. Mr. Ernst believes that it is more desirable to have the *World To-Day* come out at the same time as the popular magazines than to have its review cover later days. Hence the period it embraces is from the fifteenth to the fifteenth; and while the New York magazines with which it competes come out later—the *Review of Reviews*, a day or two before the first of the month of its date line; the *World's Work*, between the antecedent twenty-fifth and thirtieth; and *Current Literature*, on the thirtieth—the twentieth is the date on which the *World To-Day* appears.

As to gratis advertising of periodicals, the newspapers are as quick to publish "literary reading notices" sent out from Chicago publishers' offices as from those in New York. In securing annual subscribers whose orders are filled direct from magazine offices, results depend on the normal advertising through the news-stand displays and on special campaigns, there being no advantage in location at any particular publishing center.

In soliciting contracts for advertising to be published in a magazine, there is a great gain from location in New York, since the largest part of general advertising is placed through the New York offices of advertising agencies. The *Red Book* and *World To-Day* publishers, and those of other Chicago periodicals, have endeavored to offset their disadvantage on this score by maintaining eastern offices in New York chiefly for the handling of advertising business.

Summing up, the disadvantages of location in Chicago for popular literary and quasi-literary general magazine publishing are not as great as they would at first appear from a casual recognition of New York's leading place as the literary publishing center of the country, and the advantages for success in publishing with a view to the western part of the national market are numerous and effective.

The *10 Story Book*, whose early profits led the owners of the *Red Book* to start that magazine, sprang up, almost by accident, out of a syndicate for supplying fifty newspapers of the country with short stories daily. This syndicate, the Daily Story Publishing Co., was organized by Mr. Dwight Allyn, with whom was associated Mr. James S. Evans, another Chicago newspaper-man, now an editorial writer, in December, 1899. They accumulated a large collection of "cracking good stories," which Mr. Allyn, the secretary and manager of the company, says were too good for the newspapers, since the editors of newspapers, with a view to family fireside reading, want principally "sissy" stories. So the proprietors of the Daily Story Publishing Co. conceived the idea of getting rid of some of these surplus stories by putting out ten of them at a time in a small-sized, thin, paper-covered book. The first issue of 10,000 was tried on the Chicago public exclusively.

The story-books were placed in the hands of sixty boys fitted out in striking red coats and white trousers. The boys hawked them from the street corners in the loop district until stopped by the police. But that was not until sales had proved Chicago to have in its population a large class of people interested in smart stories. The Western News Co. called on the publishers for further issues, a post-office entry was made, and the Daily Story Publishing Co. began the periodic publishing of the *10 Story Book* for the general fiction magazine market.

The choice of the word "book" for a part of the name indicates an influence of the bibelot publishing movement begun with the *Chap Book* six years before. In its attention to the unique, weird, and bizarre subjects and the mystery in detective tales the *10 Story Book* was at first regarded as an imitation of that periodical "devoted exclusively to original, unusual, fascinating stories" published in Boston—the *Black Cat*. But through the years it has budded some offshoots from the main branch of studied originality. "An emotion with every story" is one of the mottoes of those directing the periodical. While the stories are not indecent, the manager frankly says that he is not squeamish. Although the stories are not positively risqué, in many of them sexual passion provides the theme for "human interest." Both accredited and unknown writers are the authors of the manuscripts used, many of them coming from men who dream and write in the South. Stories by Chicago writers have been used freely, among others those of the late H. H. S. Canfield, an author skilful in the satirical vein. The editor, Mr. Henry L. Blaisdell, a University of Wisconsin graduate, formerly in newspaper work at Rockford, Ill., says he judges manuscripts more for action than for literary form. Most of the stories, however, are not badly written. They are illustrated by Ike Morgan and other local newspaper artists, the illustrations being printed with good effects, from zinc etchings, which are one-fourth as expensive as half-tones.

The magazine has a constituency of 50,000. Its readers are found exclusively in cities. Country people are not interested in it. There is a big demand from people in hotels, and also from



commuters. Mr. Allyn is of the opinion that the development of suburban train service has helped his sales immensely.

When the State Street merchants withdrew their investment and influence from the *10 Story Book*, it lost the advertising they could command. But Mr. P. H. Grimes, the proprietor of a Chicago saloon, invested capital in it, becoming president of the Daily Story Publishing Co., and the magazine has gradually secured a fair amount of advertising patronage, although the manager has considered moving to New York for position in the competition for advertising. However, the cost of producing the *10 Story Book* in Chicago is, comparatively, so low that there is a profit on sales, and removal is not likely. Its permanence is assured as long as large parts of city populations retain a taste for incidents drawn from spiced imagination.

The *Sunday Magazine* of the *Sunday Record-Herald*, a creditable magazine of popular literature not the least journalistic in tone, was originated chiefly from the desire of the publisher of a metropolitan daily to secure the advertising containing half-tones and other illustrations which do not show up well on newspaper prints, despite the high development of the process for illustrating the general and Sunday supplement sections of the papers. This kind of advertising cannot be secured for the ordinary pages of a newspaper. Sunday supplements of excellent hard-finish paper, their contents profusely illustrated with excellent half-tones, had been issued with the *Chicago Chronicle*, the *New York Tribune*, and other papers. Newspaper publishers were feeling after plans to convert their magazine supplements, printed on regulation-size newspaper pages, into genuine magazines. In 1903 Mr. Frank B. Noyes, publisher of the *Chicago Record-Herald*, worked into definite form a plan to bring out such a magazine, to be on the order of the *Saturday Evening Post*, published at Philadelphia, and *Collier's Weekly*, of New York, its pages to be of the weekly journal size,  $14\frac{1}{4}$  by  $10\frac{1}{4}$  inches, as contrasted with the larger pages of a newspaper and the smaller,  $9\frac{3}{4}$  by  $6\frac{1}{2}$  inch pages, of the standard-size monthly magazine such as the *World To-Day* and the *Red Book*. It was estimated that the expense of producing such a magazine, to be

circulated with the newspaper as a bonus, without extra charge, would be heavy. To lighten the burden, Mr. Noyes and Mr. Charles W. Knapp, proprietor of the *St. Louis Republic*, associated with him in developing the scheme, turned to the prevailing industrial idea of co-operation and syndicating. If copies of the magazine, alike except for the name on the title-page, could be circulated with one Sunday paper in each of the non-competing centers of Sunday newspaper circulation, their publishers acting in combination and sharing the expense, this could easily be met. An organization called the Associated Sunday Magazines was incorporated. In November, 1903, the *Sunday Magazine* of the *Sunday Record-Herald*, Chicago, and of the Sunday editions of five other papers—the *St. Louis Republic*, the *Pittsburgh Post*, the *Philadelphia Press*, the *New York Tribune*, and the *Boston Post*—began to appear regularly. Since then, the *Washington Post*, the *Baltimore Herald*, and the *Minneapolis Journal* have been added to the list. The combined circulation is over 1,000,000 copies a Sunday. Further, the publishers point out that, unlike the ordinary parts of a Sunday newspaper, the copies of the magazine are kept on reading-tables during the week. The magazine advertising sought has been secured at profitable rates.

The range of taste appealed to in the *Sunday Magazine* is wide. It is that of the average newspaper reader. First there is the city circulation. The geographical extent of the magazine's constituency is dependent on the schedules of the Saturday night and Sunday morning trains carrying newspaper mail to the towns along railroads, no copies to speak of going to the rural districts where papers are received in wrappers. From Chicago it goes mainly to Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, southern Wisconsin, southwestern Michigan, and northern Indiana. To supply the desires of this clientele, stories and articles by accepted authors, written in their less serious manner, are published in the magazine, which contains no news features. Many of the short stories and poems are of the sentimental type. Recently a serial, "Sir Nigel," a historical romance of knightly adventure by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, attracted attention to the periodical. The titles of the stories and articles are printed in large light-faced type, like that used in the *Saturday Evening Post*, and extend across the three

columns of each page. The magazine is well illustrated with original work by artists in New York. The editorial office is in that city, and the editor is Mr. William A. Taylor, formerly in Chicago, the Sunday editor of the *Record-Herald*.

*Wayside Tales* is a ten-cent monthly which proclaims itself to be "the western short-story magazine." On account of a somewhat belated emphasis on the western interests, and more on account of insufficient business backing in the past, this magazine, though now somewhat rejuvenated, has had a struggling existence. *Wayside Tales* is one of the periodicals drawn to Chicago by this center's attractive power as a metropolis. It was started at Detroit, Mich., in 1899, for its first year was largely local in character, and bore the name *Detroit Monthly*. Its original publishers continued it until May, 1903. Three months later the Sampson-Hodges Co., an organization for the syndicating of Sunday "feature" articles for newspapers, of which Mr. Lewis D. Sampson, a former tutor at the Northern Indiana Normal School and newspaper-man, was the president and manager, revived the magazine. They brought out one number at Detroit, and then moved the office of publication to Chicago. For a year and two months they published the magazine here. It contained a heterogeneous display of tales—some good, some inferior—chiefly by western writers. The owners were so inadequately supplied with capital that they could not always pay for even second-rate manuscripts, could not afford illustrations or attractive covers, and had difficulty in paying the bills for printing, not of the best quality. They found the Western News Co. rule of holding back the cash returns on three full issues—a rule made by the distributing monopoly because of losses from ephemeral magazine ventures—to be specially hard. Further, uncertainty as to permanent name caused embarrassment. Mr. Sampson planned to change the name to *Wayside Magazine* and to insert a sprinkling of serious articles. This inconstancy as to title was in contrast with the permanent attractive power of the name of the *Red Book*, selected after twenty others had been considered, but chosen to stand as final. For all these reasons, in January, 1906, the *Wayside Tales* company went into involuntary bankruptcy. The tying-up of manuscripts in the hands of a

receiver caused a scathing editorial of the magazine's editor, Miss Gertrude M. Murdock, a Chicago review-writer, to appear in a contributors' organ called *The Editor*. Mrs. Warren Springer, a club woman of means and friend of Miss Murdock, then invested several thousand dollars in a new company which bought the magazine at a receiver's sale.

This was the M.-S. Co., the present publishers. Mr. Murray S. Schloss, who had been a student of various philosophies at Middle West universities, backed by his father, a wealthy retired merchant, was the heaviest investor. In three months he became sole owner and also manager and editor. Mr. Schloss had been ambitious to participate in social reform through the medium of a magazine, and for a month or so had been managing editor of *Tomorrow*, "a magazine of the changing order," which had been started with Oscar Lovell Triggs as editor-in-chief. Mr. Schloss has made signed editorials, by the editor, such as one in the May, 1906, number, in which he declared John Alexander Dowie a modern prophet and Zion City an expression of the times through garbing industry in religion, a leading feature. But as the result of high prices paid for story-writers' manuscripts, for plentiful illustrations, and for printing the pages with all the lines in large, clear, black letters extending their full width, the magazine has become popular. Large sales are reported. Within the last few months a circulation manager came on from New York to push the sales. In June, 1906, the editor suffered nervous prostration, and it was announced that the July number would be published at New York, whither other interests called the circulation manager for attention during a part of his time. It is possible, therefore, that the magazine no longer will be proclaimed a western publication.

The newest expression of unqualified though enlarged westernism in the form of a magazine is the *Greater West*, a monthly periodical of which Vol. I, No. 1, appeared in October, 1905. The first object sought in this magazine is to portray, by articles expressing glowing sentiment, and set off with illustrations, particularly of mountain scenery, the physical nature and life of the vast region between the Mississippi Valley and the Pacific

coast. The second object is to stimulate the mutual interests between the lovers of the fine arts in this region and artists wherever they may be. The editor and publisher is Mrs. Marian A. White, and the office of publication at her residence, in Chicago, "the Gateway of the Greater West." Mrs. White is a lecturer who has delivered a popular discourse entitled "The Greater West." She had been for five years editor of the *Fine Arts Journal*, another Chicago magazine in which, by somewhat flowery writing, she has earnestly worked "to promote and foster," as she says, "a love for art American in type and the work of the American artist in particular." From that magazine she resigned on the ground that it had degenerated into a "write-up periodical."

Several dilettante magazines have been started in Chicago during the present decade. One rather inclined to this order is *Events*, devoted to scattered fiction, the stage, society, and woman's clubs. This was begun in 1901, with Mrs. Frances Armstrong Woods as editor. Miss Murdock, formerly of *Wayside Tales*, recently took part in editing it.

With an office of publication in the Fine Arts Building, where there is an upper floor teeming with a type of life whose mixture of serious fine-arts effort and dilettantism has been portrayed with whimsical satire by Henry B. Fuller in "Under the Skylights," the *Sketch Book* was created in 1902. This is a well-illustrated monthly devoted to art. Through a series of changing editorships it has improved in quality and secured some influence. It is still published at the Fine Arts Building.

Quite a number of the periodicals bordering on the dilettante grade have been typically ephemeral. *Rubric*, the beautiful monthly magazine, containing poems, short stories, and the work of young artists, into which the *Blue Sky* was merged, was begun in October, 1901, and faded away December, 1902. It was published at the Studio Building, another of the artists' headquarters.

Among the dusty fragments, the monuments to this sort of effort to be found in the Chicago Public Library, is a file of a few numbers of the *Muse*. This magazine, comprehensively avowing devotion to "Literature, Music, Art and the Drama," contained soulful versicles, stories, and articles, and was artis-

tically illustrated. Its mechanical execution was of such an order that the price was put at 20 cents a copy and \$2 a year. Mr. Charles E. Nixon was the editor. While the main office of the Muse Publishing Co. was in the Fine Arts Building, Chicago, the periodical advertised New York, Boston, and Paris offices. The *Muse*, as such, appears to have been more than a dream for three months. The last number filed was that of April, 1903. On the cover of this number a female figure, in pictorial bas-relief, hovered over the following statement: "*The Muse*, a Consolidation of *The Philharmonic*, *Werner's Magazine of Expression and Literature*, *Music and Four O'Clock*." *Philharmonic* was begun in January, 1901. In 1903 the name *Muse* was chosen. *Werner's Magazine* was absorbed in February, 1903, and *Four O'Clock* in March. But despite its varied strands of publishing poesy, the *Muse* ceased.

"*The Princess*, robed in modest violet (ink), greets you, gentle reader, in the charming month of April that poetic natures love, and on the threshold of a century destined to be the most wonderful in the world's progress." So an introduction to No. 1, of a magazine appearing in 1901, and now on file in the Chicago Historical Society's museum, began. It continued in part:

Representative of the highest ideals as embraced in "Fine Arts," synonymous with Literature, Sculpture, Painting, Architecture, Music, Drama and Handicraft, *The Princess* will endeavor to please the cosmopolitan taste of a public broad and progressive, by means of short stories, special articles, timely and novel, signed by talented writers, with illustrations by capable artists and snap shots of human interest.

This gently æsthetic promise was carried out, but the delicately tinted magazine withered and died in December, 1902. Incidentally the periodical was used to announce that the "time was at hand for bookings" with the Princess Lecture, Lyric, and Dramatic Bureau. of which Giselle D'Unger, the publisher, was proprietor.

Ephemeral bibelots, for which there was a craze in the early nineties, have appeared sporadically since then. The phenomenon of the budding of short-lived periodicals of this type, and other varieties, is so constant and general that since January, 1901, the *Bulletin of Bibliography*, Boston, has maintained a department

headed "Births and Deaths." In this record there have appeared the names of several publications attempted at Chicago in the present decade.

The little magazine glinting most of the literati's cleverness launched at Chicago in the last few years was the *Bachelor Book*. Some "bachelor girls"—Page Waller Sampson and Marion Thornton Egbert—created it. In the story of the *Bachelor Book*, published in the *Blue Sky Magazine*, January, 1902, Thomas Wood Stevens, of the Blue Sky Press, at which it was printed, says of it: "*The Bachelor* in his real life was dainty, unthrift, ready of purse, and blade, a beau." Its contents were essentially the "non-essential," "meteoric tinsel." William Ellis, philosophically inclined, and bent on converting the *Bachelor Book* into a young men's home journal, acquired it after eight appearances, took it to Wausau, Wis., and brought out a ninth number, which was "a ponderous corpse in a green cloak."

At Evanston, the so-called classic suburb, three clever bibelots were published briefly by Mr. William S. Lord. One was *Noon*, appearing monthly from October, 1900, to October, 1902, and containing in its October, 1901, number a collection of "the best nonsense verse," chosen by Josephine Dodge Daskam. Another was the *Book-Booster*, "a periodical of puff," of which there was one number, December, 1901. The third was the *Bilioustine*, "a periodical of knock," two numbers, May, 1901, and October, 1901. Its contents were written by B. L. Taylor, now connected with *Puck*, and reproduced from the *Chicago Daily Tribune*. They were exclusively satire directed at Elbert Hubbard's *Philistine*.

Other bibelots, since dead, were: the *Goose Quill*, "an Anglo-American magazine," February, 1900, to February, 1903; the *Jester*, January, 1901; *Two Penny Classics*, April, 1901; the *Ycllow Dog*, "a monthly short-story magazine," April, 1901; *Items*, "the twentieth-century pocket journal," a weekly, March, 17, 1902; and the *Gauntlet*, "a magazine for the honest," March, 1903.

Two little periodicals, started recently, have not yet passed away. One, the *Pageant*, was begun in June, 1905, and is published by A. L. Langworthy, the craftsman now at the head of

the Blue Sky Press. It contains reprints of archaic literature. The other is the *O. P. Magazine*—a minute monstrosity, which appeared first July 1, 1905. The title is explained as follows: "The Orinthorhynchus Paradoxus is the most different of animals. This magazine is the most different of magazines. Hence its name."

In the list of extant periodicals begun since 1900 is one of the type in which home study is popularized by means of the literary flavor and illustrations. This is the *People's Magazine and Home University*, published at Oak Park, a suburb of Chicago. The publishers designate themselves as "The Home University Association." Inexpensive reprints of classic fiction and poetry, and studies in literature, are the leading features of this journal, which was started in 1901. Its circulation is chiefly in country towns.

A boy's story paper, the *Star Monthly*, started in 1894 and now very prosperous, has a circulation of 150,000. It is filled for the most part with stories of adventure, and in literary quality grades between the *Youth's Companion* of Boston and the "nickle library thrillers." It appears in small journal form, and bound, the cover design usually suggesting active boy life. It is published by the Hunter Publishing Co., at Oak Park, the home of Colonel Hunter, secretary of the W. D. Boyce Co., Chicago, publishers of money-making "family-story" periodicals. Its large advertising patronage is mainly of the mail-order variety.

Among the prosperous current publications issued from Chicago are many "family-story" journals, begun in the nineties and 1900's, as well as the *Chicago Ledger*, established in the seventies, and others established in past decades and already mentioned. They have enormous circulations. Some of the typical periodicals of this class as the *Household Guest*, begun in 1891, circulation at present, 250,000; *Homefolks*, 1896, 300,000; *Facts and Fiction*, 1896, 78,000; the *Homemaker*, 1903, with which is consolidated *Information*, 1904, 150,000; and *Home Life*, begun at Cairo and Pontiac, Mich., 1892, moved to Chicago, 1900, 300,000. All told, at least nineteen of the family-story genus were begun in the nineties, and six in the present decade. Only a few have failed,



though many have been merged with others, some published elsewhere. Among such was *Conkey's Home Journal*, which was run for a year in 1897, as the *American Home Journal*, then taken over by the large printing firm of W. B. Conkey & Co., and ostensibly published for the so-called American Musical Association. A collection of early numbers at the Chicago Historical Society library shows it was at first a rather high-grade mail-order paper in contents, but it became one of the ordinary kind, secured a circulation of 200,000, and in 1905 was merged in the *Woman's Magazine*, of St. Louis, which at ten cents a year has the biggest mail-order circulation in the country—1,592,000. The price of most of the Chicago "family story" monthlies is fifty cents a year, and at that their lists are large enough.

Chicago readers, including the poorer people, never see them. They circulate in the country. Because of pressure from the Post-Office Department, their literary quality has recently been raised a notch. For instance, Mr. Howard I. Shaw, editor of *Home Life*, has published some of "The Final Adventures of Sherlock Holmes," by Sir A. Conan Doyle, in his paper. But it is the advertising columns that are read most faithfully by the country people. In them every kind of goods, from buggies to hairpins, is described, in advertisements for mail-order concerns large and small. These are goods to be purchased on orders by mail. Because of Chicago's advantages as a distributing center, the city has become a center for mail-order houses. In the last twelve years, particularly, several of these houses have built up an enormous business along the lines laid out by Montgomery Ward & Co. For example, Sears, Roebuck & Co. have gone to the front with a plant covering two square blocks. These houses do but little business in the South, because the colored people and "crackers" are negligent about paying. The bulk of mail-order sales are in the Middle West. The bulk of mail-order paper circulation is in the same territory. Mr. Shaw says that for country people who cannot get to the city for shopping, the advertising columns of mail-order papers, and the catalogues of mail-order firms, are almost literally department stores in which wares are spread out before them. With Chicago's development as a mail-

order house center, the city has also achieved the doubtful honor of becoming a leading "family-story" paper center. Such papers are almost a caricature of the commercialization of the literary interest.

#### VII. SUMMARY OF GENERAL CONCLUSIONS, INCLUDING STATISTICS OF THE PERIODICALS

"If so soon I was done for  
I wonder what I was begun for."

—O'd Rhyme.

The deductions from the facts collected for these papers have been stated and discussed in generalizations interspersed through the series of stories of the efforts to establish the various literary periodicals of Chicago. Some answers to the questions put at the outset have been presented. A summary of the conclusions which stand out most conspicuously is offered in the following paragraphs.

##### FROM THE STATISTICS

1. There has been a constant manifestation of the general æsthetic interest, on its creative side, in the up-springing of literary magazines and periodicals at Chicago in every stage of the city's history. All told, 306 periodicals with some sort of literary interest dominant in their pages have been attempted. The following table shows the constancy of the phenomenon:

Decadal Period of Origin	Number	Per cent. of Total
Forties and fifties (prairie days to panic) . . . . .	27	0.09
Sixties to fire (to 1871 inclusive) . . . . .	46	.15
Seventies (after the fire) . . . . .	47	.15
Eighties . . . . .	68	.22
Nineties . . . . .	70	.23
1900 to 1906 . . . . .	48	.16
Total . . . . .	306	1.00

2. In character, these periodicals, broadly classed as literary, are of fifteen types, ranging from the genuinely literary, with chief interest in form according to the standard derived from classic literature, down to the "family-story" paper, with rather crude expression of the mere interest in story. The "western"

interest, or some modification of it, is common to all, this being the general variation in the universal literary interest here. The following statistical table, for which classifications are necessarily more or less arbitrary, indicates the variety:

TYPE	DECADE OF ORIGIN							Per cent. of Total
	Forties and Fifties	Sixties to Fire (incl. 1871)	Seventies after Fire	Eighties	Nineties	1900 to 1906	Totals	
Literary .....	12	8	12	14	13	14	73	0.24
Literary-miscellany .....	9	3	1	..	1	..	14	.05
Literary-information .....	3	3	3	9	5	10	33	.11
Literary-news .....	..	1	2	2	3	..	8	.03
Literary-fashions .....	1	1	1	..	1	..	4	.01
Literary-society .....	..	..	2	3	2	..	7	.02
Juvenile literature .....	2	10	3	1	7	1	24	.08
Juvenile-family story .....	..	5	2	2	3	1	13	.04
Family story .....	..	10	14	17	16	5	62	.20
Illustrated .....	2	6	7	12	16	17	60	.20*
Fine arts .....	2	3	1	4	8	5	23	.08
Humor .....	..	..	4	6	6	5	21	.07
Quaint literature .....	..	..	..	1	6	8	15	.05
Literary criticism .....	1	2	2	5	3	2	15	.05
Literature of sport .....	..	..	1	3	..	..	4	.01
Duplicates .....	5	6	8	11	20	20	70	.23
Net total .....	27	46	47	68	70	48	306	1.00

\* Five per cent, illustrations sole æsthetic characteristic.

In the character given by form of make-up and binding variety is also shown:

Form	DECADE OF ORIGIN							Per cent. of Total
	Forties and Fifties	Sixties to Fire (incl. 1871)	Seventies after Fire	Eighties	Nineties	1900 to 1906	Total	
Magazine .....	7	11	11	12	20	19	80	0.26
Journal .....	6	24	23	45	47	11	156	.51
Newspaper .....	13	11	11	10	3	1	40	.16
Bibelot .....	..	..	..	..	3	17	20	.05
Pamphlet .....	..	..	2	1	..	..	3	.01
Unknown .....	2	..	..	..	..	..	2	.01
Duplicates .....	1	..	..	..	3	..	4	.01
Net total .....	27	46	47	68	70	48	306	1.00

Sixty-eight per cent. of the total were monthly magazines and periodicals. The periodicity of the total list is shown in the following tabulation:

Periodicity	Forties and Fifties	Sixties to Fire (incl. 1871)	Seventies after Fire	Eighties	Nineties	1900 to 1906	Total	Per cent of Total
Quarterly.....	1	3	1	1	1	1	8	0.03
Bi-monthly .....	..	..	..	1	2	1	4	.01
Monthly .....	14	33	27	41	56	38	209	.68
Semi-monthly.....	..	3	1	3	4	1	12	.04
Weekly.....	10	12	17	25	9	8	81	.26
Daily.....	1	..	..	..	..	..	1	....
Unknown.....	3	..	1	..	..	..	4	.01
Duplicates .....	2	5	..	3	2	1	13	.04
Net total .....	27	46	47	68	70	48	306	1.00

3. The duration of most of the periodicals has been brief. The great majority were ephemerals. About one-half (49 per cent.) of the 306 lived but a year or less. Many of the 103 which are listed below as appearing for less than a year probably came out only once—just enough to get into a the “newspaper directories.” There is definite information that 9 never had more than a No. 1. Nearly three-fourths (72 per cent.) survived less than five years. Of all those started, 270, or 88 per cent., have ceased publication. Of the 36 extant, 15 have been established since January, 1900. Among those which are still published, 11 are “mail-order” or “family-story” periodicals. The only high-grade magazine which has had a long career and still survives is a journal of literary criticism, the *Dial*. The following statistics are offered:

#### DURATION (BY DECADEAL PERIODS OF ORIGIN)

Number of Years....	- 1 Year	1 Year	2 Years	3 Years	4 Years	5 Years	6 Years	7 Years	8 Years	9 Years	10 Years	11 Years	12 Years	13 Years	14 Years	15 Years	15 Years + *	Total	Extant
Forties and fifties....	20	2	1	1	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	27	1
Sixties to fire (incl. 1871).....	12	10	7	3	2	3	1	..	1	..	1	..	1	1	..	2	2	46	2
Seventies after fire...	8	10	8	2	1	4	1	1	1	2	..	1	..	..	..	2	8	47	4
Eighties .....	10	7	9	0	5	4	1	3	..	2	2	..	..	..	1	2	4	68	6
Nineties .....	17	10	3	0	5	0	2	2	..	4	..	3	..	3	..	..	..	70	9
1900 to date.....	27	6	6	2	3	4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	48	15
Total .....	103	45	34	26	16	25	5	6	5	8	3	4	1	4	2	15	15	306	36
Per cent. ....	.34	.15	.10	.08	.05	.08	.02	.02	.02	.03	.01	.01	..	.01	.01	.05	..		

\* Those over 15 years: 16 years, 1; 17, 1; 18, 1; 19, 2; 20, 2; 23, 2; 26, 1; 31, 2; 33, 1; 36, 1; 64, 1.

## FROM THE HISTORY

1. *Origins.*—The detailed stories of the typical attempts to found literary periodicals in Chicago show the ever constant importance of the individual element, the distinctly personal factor. The most tangible element in the origin of the majority is the ambition of authors, amateur literati, and young newspaper men to establish personal organs for their genius. Many are merely significant of the "individual itch to write in an 'age of print.'" But social factors have been constantly manifest, as repeatedly indicated in the comments offered throughout the papers here submitted. The periodicals have been attempted in response to more or less intangible stimulus of environment. The physical environment called, for example, in the pioneer days, for prairie periodicals, and in World's Fair days for pictorial periodicals. The spritual environment, more complex and difficult to see, has had a greater influence on the origin of magazines. The changing, growing character of the local social environment has been reflected in the typical periodical attempts of each decade. Through them all there has been the clearly voiced social demand: "Why can we not have a truly western literary magazine in Chicago?" With changes of emphasis in the western interest, Chicago, successively as pioneer western town, as phoenix city, as market metropolis, as world's historic exposition city, and as a center of inner cosmopolitanism, has been reflected in the repeated efforts to start new magazines with new characteristics. The city's centripetal power as a metropolis has drawn literary men and periodicals. The growth and prospective increase in both population and culture in the upper Mississippi Valley, the territory which is the immediate sphere of Chicago's metropolitan influence, have stimulated corresponding increase in efforts to found magazines in Chicago. The gradual tightening of the strings of the national and world-wide social environments of Chicago has constantly quickened the stimuli from older centers, leading to imitation and adaptation in the undertaking of Chicago periodicals.

2. *Struggles for permanence.*—Attention to the steps taken in the attempts to make these periodicals enduring has brought

out one social fact more than any other—namely, the interrelation of interests. In sociological analysis the various interests have been marked off sharply, notably by Dr. Albion W. Small, as the sixfold interests—those of health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness. But in the satisfaction of any one set of these six fundamental desires on the part of human beings in association, the interdependence of interests is essential. The history of Chicago periodicals, at least, shows that the literary phase of the æsthetic interest will not work out, to the satisfaction point, in a vacuum. The expression of the creative literary interest through periodicals is necessarily social. The process is not merely that of writers getting their literary forms printed for their own gratification, but it is getting them printed for the satisfaction of the desires of readers, the social group appealed to by the publisher. Hence the standing opinion, or taste, of a large body of people is a controlling factor. The author or literary publisher, like the leader of political opinion, can neither lag behind nor yet run too far ahead of his public. Still more to the point, successful and continuous display of the art of letters through periodicals has to depend on the business, or wealth-interest activities—a rather materialistic fact which literary artists attempting periodicals in Chicago have found repulsive, but a fact none the less. Satisfaction of the taste for literary goods has been shown to be dependent on methods of satisfying taste for material goods much advertised. The extreme extension of the dependence of interests has been shown in at least fifteen instances, where the literary publishing interest has originated in, or been built up on, an agency for the satisfaction of some other phase of the literary interest, or some interest altogether foreign to the æsthetic interest. For a general term to characterize such activities, a word has been here adapted and used repeatedly. It is the term “engraftment.” It connotes nothing necessarily invidious like the epithet “graft,” current in political writing. It is possible that in descriptions of the general interrelations of interests in the social process, outside the comparatively narrow field of literary periodical-publishing, a general and constant phenomenon would be accurately characterized by the term “engraftment.”

3. *Measures of success attained.*—One result of the long series of periodicals in Chicago has been the recording, in decade after decade, of the literature of locality. This was notably true of the periodicals in the early decades, when a larger percentage of the total was of the purely literary type. The success of the *Lakeside Monthly*, in literary quality, was the result of conspicuous ability by its editor and publisher, and to a degree other such personal achievements have been realized. Also authors and illustrators have been discovered through many of the short-lived magazines of Chicago. But for an effort at periodical producing to be a genuine success, a long duration is essential, because of the enduring desire for satisfaction of the literary interest on the part of readers. Those Chicago periodicals which have enjoyed a degree of permanence have been conducted by publishers who paid attention primarily to the business of publishing according to the principles of trade. The lowest order of periodical that is literary, broadly speaking—the “family-story” or “mail-order” paper—has had the most enduring success of all attempted in Chicago. The current popular magazines have become established as commercial enterprises. The permanence of the *Red Book* seems assured because, with an effective appeal to the popular interest in the short story, it is engrafted on a wealthy firm’s interests in other lines. The continuance of the *World To-Day* is predicted because its presentation of an æstheticized knowledge-interest, looked at from the point of view of cosmopolitan westernism, is popular, and because the magazine is published on a business basis. In attention to business, account is taken of competition with the magazines published elsewhere. The limitations of the western field are realized, and it is recognized that, since two-thirds of the reading done in the country is by people east of Ohio, magazines published at New York, the developed publishing center of the country, will easily lead there, and, since New York is the metropolis of the nation, will indefinitely have a wide following in all sections of the national market.

4. *The many failures.*—The most general cause for the shortness of life for the great majority of the periodicals attempted in Chicago has been disregard of their commercialization. In detail,

the reason why so many have been ephemerals is that they were merely outbursts showing personal aspirations of ambitious writers—this being conspicuously so with the *bibelots*. Further, the degree of potency in the sentimental demand of western people for a western magazine—an often expressed demand whose validity is diminishing with the closer contacts of the nation—has been constantly overestimated. Incidentally, business malpractice, in converting magazines that started out with dignity and promise into “write-up” sheets, has caused some failures. These are some of the reasons why Chicago is sometimes called “the graveyard of magazines.”

In fine, the history of efforts to establish various kinds of magazines, or “storehouses” of literature, and literary periodicals in Chicago up to 1906 indicates that, for the successful socialization of the literary phase of the æsthetic interest through periodicals, the material interest must first be assured. This implies that, if taste in reading is to be elevated, the points of attack are in the educational channels, through which a demand for periodicals of genuine literary merit can be made so widespread and strong as to make possible their continuous publishing as a profitable or at least self-supporting business.



## REVIEWS

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### *La Sociologia: Carácter científico de su Enseñanza.*

The above is the title of a notable address delivered by Sr. Ernesto Quesada, April 1, 1905, on the occasion of his installation as titled professor of the Department of Sociology, established in 1898, in the University of Buenos Aires. The address is republished from Vol. III of the *Review* of said university, and is supplied with notes and notices showing the extensive literary activity of the author during the last thirty years.

At the time of Professor Quesada's appointment the outgoing dean of the faculty had declared, on a solemn academic occasion, that sociology, far from being a science, was little more than empty verbiage; that the domain of science is one in which there live only established truths and laws; that if twenty professors, all familiar with the work of modern sociologists, were assigned the task of preparing a program for its study, they would prepare twenty different programs, each in keeping with the individual spirit of its author. At the same time, twenty professors of geometry would never dare to meddle with the known properties of the hypotenuse. In short, sociology has no such claims to be called a science as algebra or mechanics have.

This statement, coming from the source it did, made it all the more necessary for the chosen leader in this study to define and justify his position, to point out the problems to be solved, and the method to be followed in their solution. His argument is substantially as follows:

Every theory derived from incomplete data must be imperfect; but this is no reason for rejecting it, any more than the tailor should cast aside a garment, that he is making to measure, because it does not exactly fit at the first trial. The ex-dean invokes the sciences, and Dr. Quesada proves him wrong from those very sciences.

The progress of the physico-natural sciences is due to the verifiable and verified hypotheses, one giving rise to another and this to still another, till at last the true solution is found. The old geocentric system and its immense service to the advancement of astronomy, Newton's corpuscular theory of light, the wave theory, all clearly prove this. Moreover, scientific errors often lead

to scientific truth; hence there is no so-called intangible region of truths and laws, that have been proved, as the ex-dean claims; for the sciences are ever developing, ever changing. This being so, their laws must do likewise. This is clearly confirmed by the mathematical and exact sciences. The doctor prefers to cite astronomy as an example, because, like sociology, it is incapable of experimenting and relies solely on observation and induction, whereas mathematical sciences can and do experiment; but not even they can boast of a region of absolute truths, because they, too, are undergoing changes, the latest being the addition of the dimension  $n$  in geometry.

It is also confirmed by rational mechanics, with its real and virtual movements. The study of the former, which are actually produced, is descriptive; that of the latter, which may be produced in certain hypotheses, essentially theoretical. Here abstraction is carried to the extreme, whereas applied mechanics is less abstract and considers other properties of bodies. Where, then, is the antithesis between the sciences and sociology? The latter studies its phenomena in the same way as the former study theirs. The question rests exclusively on the *method*, because, in the exact sciences, we can experiment, but in sociology we cannot. There is no philosophic difference between the mathematical and the sociological method. Geometry and astronomy began in a small way. So does sociology, by beginning with the simple social phenomena—the family, the state, etc. But the classification in sociology will be much more difficult than in mathematics, and not any easier than in botany or in zoölogy; for these are still classifying and forming new branches: vegetable and animal physiology, respectively. It must, however, be remembered that the essence of a science does not lie in its method, but in its laws, which are the results of the method.

The mission of sociology is to synthesize the social phenomena into one whole, and thus formulate laws of the orientation of its different phases. The universe is developing according to regular laws; so, by knowing the past, we can foresee the future. All the phenomena were at first recorded in history. Subsequently each science selected its own proper phenomena, leaving the rest. Sociology, the last to spring forth, has all the experience of the other sciences, and will, accordingly, make giant strides. Its object is to give an account of man's social life, be it in the family or in the state, explaining the bonds of union between them, their contact and reciprocal actions. How it should study these phenomena belongs entirely to its methodology.

The mind must, perforce, separate a phenomenon into its parts and study these successively to get a synthetic concept of it. Therefore the various studies are independent, though their results may be studied by sociology. The individual sciences treat of the social facts according to their aspects. Sociology does not antagonize them, but presupposes and synthesizes them, leaving to each its own *raison d'être* and original field of investigation. Therefore there is no antithesis between the physico-natural and the social and philosophical. The former are facts, studied by the intelligence of the latter,

and the origin of a certain class of these facts is even found in the psychological element of the latter, the one being as real as the other.

The definition which sociology imposes upon itself therefore is, the investigation of social life in the light of philosophy; and if it is desired to make the definition more precise, it is sufficient to say that it proposes to itself the investigation of the natural actions and reactions of human masses in their relational life and under the influence of their common existence. Such a mission of sociology permits one to see how, as a consequence of its doctrinal character, it exerts its practical influence in social politics and in a solution of the problems which must occupy the attention of statisticians. This practical importance of the new science is that which imparts to its study the most flattering hopes that its influence in social politics will be as decisive and fundamental in the technical working out of the world's civilization as natural sciences have been in the discovery of great forces.

The social sciences collect the material, and sociology, their crowning point, shows them how to investigate the details. The latter is the old social science, corrected and purified, having adopted the *a posteriori* processes instead of the *a priori*. The reasons why it has been transformed before the natural sciences are: (1) the latter deal without the will, the former has to take it into consideration; (2) the latter show the *how only*, the former shows also the *why*; (3) in the latter the process is objective, in the former, subjective; (4) in the latter a phenomenon can be repeated in the form of an experiment, in the former, not. Hence the application of the inductive method in sociology presents greater difficulties, but, for that very reason, the sociological laws are by far more discriminating. Yet sociology is a perfect science, because (1) it determines facts that serve as a basis for induction; (2) it verifies them; (3) it induces general rules, and (4) it proves these rules by experience, using the inductive method, and, therefore, conforms to the exigencies of logic.

Dr. Quesada then takes up the objection, that sociology has no true laws, because those that it has admit of exceptions, and laws with exceptions are not laws as such. This he cleverly refutes by ethics, and by the fact that scientific investigation is itself a sort of legislative process; but, as sciences are always developing, their laws must also develop, and therefore change. Besides, the apparent exceptions to laws are not always exceptions as such, but interferences of various laws; e. g., the real movement of the moon is the result of the interference of the centrifugal movement with the centripetal. The former can not, therefore, be said to be an exception to the latter.

Some have objected to the name of sociology, but it would be a loss of time to argue this, when we are to study, not the mere name, but the phenomena. While constituting the definitive synthesis of all social sciences, sociology animates them, enlightens them, and gives them new life. It is perhaps the noblest of the philosophic sciences also, by its mode of investiga-

tion, its classification, its regularity, the infinite number of problems, that are of vital interest to civilization and the community; the influence of the will on the social development, the antithesis between individualism and socialism. No society exists independent of the individual forces. This doctrine is as old as philosophy itself, being the very essence of nominalism and realism. The solution of the social question depends on the sociological orientation and on the laws that may be formulated in regard to human development, so that all the members of the society may move in a satisfactory equilibrium.

This study is vast and of greater transcendency than any other science. The principal thing is the social phenomenon, the political form and legislation being but secondary. Sociology works on the data accumulated by all the other sciences and is the center toward which they tend. Even if it and the other sociological sciences are not sciences as such, the importance of their study here in democratic America, where every citizen has a voice in the government by voting or even governing, is evident. Therefore, their teaching is equally important.

Here Dr. Quesada strikes his only discordant note, when he advises his hearers to *oppose "the universal principle of the division of labor, which tends to specialize all the principal and secondary ramifications of human activity."* He seems to ignore the fact, borne out by statistics, that the truly wonderful progress made in the arts as well as in the sciences, is due to this very division and specializing.

The other sciences, he continues, were no more in their early stages than our science is now, and it, like those others, will soon be recognized as a principal study.

He concludes by mapping out his program for the study of this science, according to the divisions into which it naturally falls: its history, its doctrine, and finally its application to the social problems of America, the social process being the continual advancement, which the development; correlation and satisfaction of the interests of health, wealth, sociability, learning, beauty, and rectitude exact.

Dr. Ernesto Quesada's views are sound, his logic strict and irrefutable, his exposition concise, clear and masterly, and the University of Buenos Aires is certainly to be congratulated on having secured so able and so enthusiastic a defender of the science of sociology.

A. J. STEELMAN

JOLIET, ILL.

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*Sociology and Social Progress: A Hand-book for Students of Sociology.* By THOMAS NIXON CARVER. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906. Pp. iv+810.

A book on sociology compiled and introduced by a professor of political economy would be noteworthy, even if it did not omit all

mention of men like Ratzenhofer, Simmel, Giddings, Small, and Cooley, merely refer incidentally to Ross, and give considerable space to Kidd, Drummond, and Nordau. The volume belongs to the valuable series of "Selections and Documents in Economics" designed to make easily available for college classes well-chosen collateral references. The general purpose is admirable, and Professor Carver's book will be welcomed by sociologists as a distinct enlargement of library facilities.

It is only fair to judge a piece of work like this by the criteria which the author himself sets up. The compiler disavows any attempt to make the selections an expression of his own views, or to assume responsibility for the soundness and accuracy of the ideas presented. "The fact that a passage has proved brilliantly suggestive and provocative of serious inquiry has, in several cases, been the chief reason for including it." It would be easy to raise questions as to why this passage or that was given a place to the exclusion of another, but in the circumstances any considerable criticism of this sort would be captious. As a whole the selections made by Professor Carver will be accepted by any judicial mind as informing, suggestive, and stimulating to students of the social processes.

But the compiler, however unobtrusive his service, does not wholly conceal his own working theories. In introduction, notes, and grouping of materials the personal philosophy is revealed. Professor Carver frankly owns to having little interest in the formalities of sociology. He is inclined to the belief that economists, biologists, philosophers, and moralists have done more for social science than many of the professed sociologists who "have been largely concerned with matters more formal than vital." Hence, one is not surprised to learn that the brightest hope for sociology lies in the extension of the methods of political economy into the wider field of the general social process. But the author makes it quite clear that the economists must not attempt to interpret social phenomena wholly in terms of economic motives and industrial activities—an error into which Loria Seligman, and others seem to have fallen. The essential nature of the economic method is said to be the analysis of existing phenomena and the tracing of their causal connections, although why this universal scientific procedure should have an exclusively economic label is not made convincingly clear.

Professor Carver makes much of the thesis that "every great

historical epoch and every variety of social organization must be explained on the basis of factors and forces now at work, and which the student may study at first hand." Thus he raises the old question as to whether we interpret the present in terms of the past or *vice versa*. Of course, the two procedures are reciprocal and supplementary. The mind shuttles back and forth, reading today's motives and activities into the concrete situations of historical epochs, thence returning to find new meaning in contemporary life. But Professor Carver is right in insisting that the starting-point is the present, with its vivid impressions of the actual forces at work. In this he recognizes the contention of all sociologists, be they never so "formal," that sociology must study the underlying principles of human association, which may then be read into concrete social situations past or present. The author expresses the idea by asserting that the relation of sociology to history is, like that of biology to paleontology.

Again, sociology must be teleological, although Professor Carver is careful to avoid a term so methodological. "Social improvement," he says, "is the only worthy aim of the student." Technically, it is true, progress ought not to be defined anthropocentrically, but even if Spencer's law be accepted, this actually resolves itself into "adaptation," which in the long run is coincident with well-being. Thus runs the argument that identifies sociology with the study of the processes by which society is passively and actively adapted to its life-conditions; i. e., by which progressive well-being is attained.

Progress, then, is the clue to the classification of the selections in this compilation. Part I, "The Nature, Scope, and Method of Sociology," includes readings from Comte and Stuckenberg; Part II, "Sociology as a Study of Social Progress," offers selections by Comte, Ward, Patten, and Edward Van Dyke Robinson; Part III, dealing with "The Factors of Social Progress," falls into four subdivisions: (A) "Physical and Biological," (B) "Psychical," (C) "Social and Economic," (D) "Political and Legal." It seems unfortunate that under A a hundred pages should be given to Buckle, when an extract from Demolin's *Social Geography* or from Professor Shaler's *Nature and Man in America*, or Miss Semple's recent volume, would have been so "brilliantly suggestive." Nor can one refrain from saying that James, Ross, and Cooley could offer illuminating material under both B and C. It is hard to understand Professor Carver's slighting of the "conflict" or "struggle" school.

True, the selections from Lapouge, Ripley, and Pearson involve certain kinds of social selection, but surely Gumpłowicz, Novicow, Ratzenhofer, have weighty things to say about the "social and economic" factors of progress.

Professor Carver in his introduction deplores the fact that sociologists have practically neglected the tendency of social groups to "make believe" that useful but repulsive things like war and labor are really glorious and dignified. Can it be that he has forgotten Ross's *Social Control*—e. g., the chapters on "Personal Ideals," "Illusion," and "Social Valuations," which deal with this very thesis—which is, by the way, fast becoming a commonplace of group psychology? It is hard to suppress the conviction that Professor Carver has neglected a little the social psychology of Lewes, James, Tarde, Baldwin, Ross, Cooley, *et al*; which seems just now one of the most promising fields of sociological study. To point out that some of the selections might be quite as plausibly classified under one division as under another—e. g., Godkin's *Talk* and Bagehot's *Age of Discussion* are as much "social" as political—is simply to emphasize the fact that all classification is more or less arbitrary.

Sociologists will welcome *Sociology and Social Progress* in their libraries and classrooms, and they will greet its compiler as a fellow-sociologist who, in spite of a reluctance to speak the language of the guild, gives promise of making sound and sane contributions to a science in the making.

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*Gabriel Tarde: An Essay in Sociological Theory.* By MICHAEL M. DAVIS, JR. Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University: New York, 1906. Pp. 117.

Three notable merits are evident in this monograph. It is, first, a piece of clean critical workmanship. It is, second, an assuring sign that the threatened Tardean obsession is no longer a menace to the immediate progress of sociology. It is, third, a gratifying evidence that sociological thought is passing out of its provincial stage and accumulating a body of common tradition.

Mr. Davis shows no symptoms of timidity in analyzing M. Tarde's

system. His judgments are steadily objective. There is no lack of confidence in the conclusion that Tarde has overworked a factor among social influences when he attempts to make that element the essential social principle. At the same time, Mr. Davis seems to me to have expressed himself somewhat too leniently. His evident respect for the author, and his admiration for certain phases of his work, lead him almost to discount the faults which he exposes. There is fine courtesy, but to my mind a slight defect of scientific rigor, in partially disguising the results of the inquiry under the *obiter dictum*: "Tarde's books are always good reading; their style makes them works of literature as few scientific books can be" (p. 102). The essential question is: Did Tarde carry the strategic position in sociology which was his objective point? Mr. Davis finds that he did not. He should have said so with less reserve. Whether a "scientific" book that is not scientific enough to sustain its own thesis can still be good literature, is a question upon which sociologists are not bound to commit themselves. There should, at all events, be no uncertain sound in their verdict that such a book is not good science.

Mr. Davis is to be congratulated upon the catholicity of his discussion. While it is easy to read between the lines immediate influences of the particular university in which he worked, it is credible both to him and to his preceptors that there is nothing in the monograph which the author might not have written from the view-point of Paris or Berlin. I believe this is a symptom, not merely of the breadth of a single writer or of one university, but of progressing maturity in sociology. There has been an outgrowing of the bizarre and the provincial. Students now find that sociological thought moves within certain established lines of consensus. The last eight pages of Mr. Davis' paper could not have been written a dozen years ago. They contain insight that had not then been focalized. The writer's conclusions are expressed in terms of judgments now rather generally accepted among sociologists about relations which not long ago were much more vaguely apprehended. It is a pleasure for older sociologists to welcome into their ranks recruits so well equipped to continue the campaign.

ALBION W. SMALL



*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.* By EDWARD WESTERMARCK. London: Macmillan & Co. In 2 vols. Vol. I, 1906. Pp. xxi+716.

Westermarck and two of his associates at the University of Finland have already produced three very notable contributions to the history of early society. Indeed, I think it may be fairly said that Wallaschek's *Primitive Music*, Hirn's *Origins of Art*, and Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* are the best studies of primitive society yet produced in the particular lines which they represent. It would almost seem that the Finns, like the Germans after the battle of Jena, have been stimulated by political misfortune to turn their attention to scholarship and to become great in the field of scientific research.

Westermarck is certainly a model of scholarship in the thorough-going away in which he goes about the assembling of his materials, and the fairness and clearness with which he handles them. His earlier work on marriage represented an astonishing amount of study and dogged patience, together with a notable boldness and naïveté in his generalizations. The present volume has all these characteristics and at the same time bids fair to be a sounder volume than its predecessor—if, indeed, it is safe to make any prediction on the basis of the first volume. For the subject of marriage is perhaps the most obscure and difficult which the student of early society has to handle, and Westermarck made some serious errors in this field. On the other hand, the history of moral ideas not only presents fewer difficulties, and consequently lends itself better to Westermarck's method, but I venture to think that the work of Westermarck's predecessors in this field—particularly Steinmetz' *Ethnologische Studien zur Entwicklung der ersten Strafe*, and Nieboer's *Slavery as an Industrial System*—was sounder and more scholarly than the work of Westermarck's predecessors in the field of human marriage.

Westermarck's great strength, however, consists in his ability to assemble materials, and if he has a weakness, it is on the psychological side. We shall await with interest, therefore, the appearance of the second volume in which doubtless his general conclusions will appear, and the work will then be given a more extended notice.

W. I. THOMAS

*A Decade of Civic Development.* By CHARLES ZUEBLIN. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Pp. 200, 12mo. Net, \$1.25; postpaid, \$1.38.

That "the making of the new city will mean the making of a new citizen" is convincingly stated in *A Decade of Civic Development*. Indeed, the quotation may be offered as the keynote of this composite picturing of hopeful effort and actual achievement. As was the White City of 1893, so is this stimulating volume, "an epitome of the best we have done, and a prophecy of what we could do, if we were content with nothing but the best, and added to individual excellence a common purpose." Possible allies for the common good as they may be, yet the view-points of the "muck-raker" of current newspaper fame and the seeker after golden news of civic accomplishment are as far apart as pole from pole. Mr. Zueblin uncovers rich pockets of nuggets and unbroken veins of free gold, as well as much admixture of the baser elements of faulty purpose and imperfect practice.

The spirit of prophecy which dominates the book is the more assuring because of the clear-cut and satisfying perspective which leads from past to present and into future decades. The facts recorded are not generally unfamiliar, but much of their essential significance as herein revealed has been hidden by their seemingly unrelated nature. The well-founded optimism of the book, the attractive record of fact, the revelation of correlation and co-ordination, and the fascinating glimpses of realizable possibility give this little volume a place of unusual value.

On replying to the request of a public librarian for the "best book to give to an awakening community," the writer made prompt reference to *A Decade of Civic Development*, and this recommendation is now repeated for the sake of the many who "are tired of polluted air and water, dirty streets, grimy buildings, and disordered cities," and the lesser number of those who reckon that consideration of the physical may well precede the political in the "training of the citizen" and the growth of the "new civic spirit" so appealingly set forth in this volume.

E. G. ROUTZAHN

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## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

**The Development of the American Proletariat.**—The United States is a country especially adapted to the development of capitalism. It is rich in gold, in silver, in fertile land, in minerals. It offers to capitalism the weapons with which to conquer the world: opportunity for the development of anorganic technique and of transportation and commerce, and a market as much more important than a European state as the latter is than a mediæval city with its territory. It is, in short, the ideal land for capitalistic development.

The people, too, leaving behind them their Old World traditions, were by no means opposed to the rise of capitalism.

For centuries labor was scarce, and therefore dear. This fact compelled employers to give particular attention to the use of labor, and to supplant it so far as possible, by labor-saving machinery. Thus the necessity for the highest technical perfection existed to a greater extent than it could ever do in an older country. And then, when the highest economic and technical organization had been achieved, great crowds of immigrants poured into the country—half a million a year for the last decade. And, indeed, nowhere else is capitalistic economy (*Wirtschaft*) so greatly developed as in America.

Nowhere else is the desire for gain, for the making of money for its own sake, so entirely the starting-point and the goal, alike, of all undertakings; and in all this, capitalistic interests are served.

In the amount of accumulated capital the United States is, in spite of its proclaimed "youth," ahead of all other countries. The banking power of the United States (capital, surplus profits, deposits, and money in circulation) is \$13,826,000,000 as compared with \$19,781,000,000 for all other countries. In 1900, \$9,831,486,000 was, according to the census, invested in manufactures. The concentration of capital has, in fact, reached a degree which Karl Marx, in the next to the last chapter of his *Capital*, has designated as very near to the *Götterdämmerung* of the capitalistic world. There are, according to Moody (*The Truth about the Trusts*), seven large trusts, whose combined capital amounts to \$2,662,700,000. These seven trusts, moreover, control 8,664 concerns, so that the control of \$20,379,000,000 is in the hands of a few men. The power of money is best seen, perhaps, in the composition of society. There is no feudal aristocracy, but in place of it are found the great magnates. The growth of capitalism is shown, further, in the growth of trade and commerce, at the expense of farming. From 1880 to 1900 the proportion of the population of the United States engaged in agriculture sank from 44.3 per cent. to 35.7 per cent. (Germany, 36.12 per cent.); whereas the proportion engaged in trade and commerce rose from 10.8 per cent. to 16.4 per cent. (Germany 11.39 per cent.).

The United States is a land of cities—more correctly speaking, of large cities. Nearly one-fifth of the total population—18.7 per cent.—live in cities of 100,000 or over. This percentage is larger than in any other country in the world, with the single exception of England. It is a city-land in a deeper sense, too. The European city is usually an organic growth—is only a large village. The American city, on the other hand, is an artificial product, which knows no organic growth. It is a real "city," in which, as Tönnies would say, all traces of community (*Gemeinschaft*) have disappeared and pure society (*Gesellschaft*) is crushed. In Europe the city is a reproduction of the country, with the character of the country; but in the United States, on the contrary, the country is, at bottom, only an urban settlement which is lacking in cities.

A further characteristic of the capitalistic basis of society in the United States is the great contrast between wealth and poverty. In 1890 (according to

Spahr, Brooks, and Hunter) 54.8 per cent. of the entire private wealth of the nation was in the hands of 1 per cent. of the families of the nation, whereas 50 per cent. had no property.

There is a peculiar "American spirit" which indicates the high development of capitalism in the United States. It is expressed in the tendency to take money value as the standard in evaluation of either people or things. The idea of purely qualitative value seems to die away; so that there is a lack of appreciation of that which is merely beautiful or artistic, which is never quantitatively definable, measurable, weighable. In order that a thing may have value, under such circumstances, it must be useful and pleasing, or else expensive. "The fifty-thousand dollar Rembrandt," or "Carnegie's hundred-thousand dollar yacht," are phrases representing ordinary means of identification. With persons it is, naturally, possessions and income that give a basis for evaluation—since personal and individual value are overlooked. This tendency to replace all ideas of quality by ideas of measurable money value leads to overestimation of quantity, as such—"a tendency to mistake bigness for greatness," as Bryce puts it—an undue regard for size, whether it be expressed in the population of a city, the rapidity of an express train, the height of a monument, the width of a river, the frequency of suicide, or what not. This "mania for bigness" is not attributable to the extent of the country of the modern American. The Chinese, the Mongols on the Asiatic highlands, the Indians of America do not have it. Their ideas of bigness have cosmic character produced by the endless, starry heavens, by the unbounded prairies, and the striking feature of these ideas is the immeasurableness represented. Evaluation by numerically measurable bigness could not have become imbedded in human thought, save by means of money in capitalistic application—not by means of money as such, as Simmel erroneously holds. Of course, the great extent of American territory has aided this peculiarity; but it was first necessary for the numerical sense to be developed. As a result of the valuation of quantity alone there must be a comparison of at least two phenomena, in order that the higher value may be given to the larger—the successful one. Thus the idea of bigness must have, as a concomitant, the high estimation of success. To be successful means to excel others, to be more important, to accomplish more, to have more, than others: to be greater. That success will be most highly esteemed which may be expressed in figures: money success, riches. This sort of estimation is noticeable in the attitude of the American toward sport. His sole interest is as to who will win. The tension of this interest is increased by betting—which reduces sport to a money basis.

The ideal of the American is not to live his life beautifully, not to develop his personality, but to achieve success. Hence the hurry and unrest, and the unscrupulous competition everywhere. This develops a demand for elbow-room which is expressed in a *laissez-faire* doctrine—not because of any abstract principle of noninterference held by the framers of the Declaration of Independence, but because it is an aid in the struggle for success.

To be successful means, to the average American, to be rich. This explains why he turns his attention especially to economic interests, rather than to political interests, as in Europe—though more in the Romance countries and England than in Germany. In no other country in the world are the masses so deeply interested in speculation; in no other country have the people enjoyed, to such a degree, the fruits of capitalism.

If it is true, as I myself have always claimed, that modern socialism follows as a natural reaction against capitalism, then the land in which capitalism has reached its highest development—the United States—should be the classical land of socialism. But it is said, in Germany and in America, by socialists as well as by their opponents, that it is a land with no socialism, in spite of its highly developed capitalism. There are, however, two socialistic parties, which are, moreover, by no means composed of a few disgruntled Germans who have no following, as has been claimed. These two parties cast 403,338 votes at the last presidential election. This means about as many

votes, in 1904, as were cast in Germany in 1878. The number of workmen of socialistic tendencies is, however, much greater than the number of votes cast, whereas in Germany the opposite is true. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the statement that the American workman is non-socialistic is, in large measure, true. The socialists cast only about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the total number of votes cast for President; and this proportion is inconstant, varying from year to year. The organized workmen do, however, undertake to influence legislation—developing an *Arbeiterpolitik*.

In saying that the American workman is not socialistic I mean that he is not a Marxist. The following points will make my meaning plain: (1) The American workingman is not dissatisfied with the existing order of things. "Live and let live," his fundamental maxim, leaves no ground for a "class-consciousness" like that of the European workingman. (2) The American workman identifies himself with his country and believes in its mission and in its greatness. The characteristic *Staatsfeindschaft* of continental socialism is lacking. (3) The American workman is not opposed to the capitalistic system, as such. The identity of the interests of capital and labor is brought forward by many labor leaders. The workingman himself, moreover, is filled with a desire to succeed, and aims to earn as much as he is able. Hence he is willing to assume the risk of accident rather than use protective devices which hinder his work. For the same reason there is little attempt to restrict output, to object to piece-work, or to oppose improvements. This intensity of work is, indeed, nothing else than an expression of the capitalistic tendency of the workingman himself.

The business spirit governs the workmen even in their organizations. The American Federation of Labor, to which more than four-fifths of all the organized laborers of the country belong, seeks to monopolize the trades included in the organization, without regard for the proletariat as a whole, nor for the lower stratum of unskilled labor. This is the exclusive tendency of a guild, and brings about a vertical division of the proletariat, thereby preventing its being united in a single effective class. The "alliances" between the monopolistic trade-union and the monopolistic employer for mutual exploitation of the public, show the most notable example of this business policy. These trade-unions, being of a piece with capitalism, may well be termed capitalistic, and set over against the socialistic unions, which though they may suffer in point of immediate success, never for a moment lose sight of the class-movement which is directed against capitalism.

The American laborer is, to be sure, opposed to the employer as long as there is any question as to the conditions of labor; but he is ready to stand shoulder to shoulder with the bourgeois who will assist him in this struggle. There is not any specifically proletarian-socialistic consciousness of opposition, as in Europe. In Germany it is the minority, and surely not the élite, of the workmen who work with bourgeois social reformers, whereas the large majority of organized labor is in strong class-opposition to all bourgeois "friends." In America the reverse holds.

It may be said, then, that in the sense of the word as here explained, there is no socialism in America.

*The political position of the workingman.*—As public life becomes more complex in modern states and the constitution becomes more democratic, it grows ever more difficult to present political ideals excepting through party organizations. This holds especially for the United States—the one great nation with a really democratic constitution. There are also a great number of elective offices, including not only the members of legislative bodies, as in European states, but also—and here is a most important point—almost all the higher administrative officials and also judges. As this is the case with national, state, and local officials, the conscientious citizen could spend a good part of his time upon elections. When, in addition to these conditions, the immense size of many of the states is taken into consideration—necessity for accord, in order to avoid utter confusion, being thus emphasized—it will be seen that

the voter cannot be left to his own devices, but that there must be persons who make it their business to seek out candidates, to organize the tickets, and to conduct the elections. The business of the politician is important and insistent, necessitating the development and organization of the election machinery, and the raising of large sums of money to keep it going. This need of large donations to the political party is a factor which adds to the difficulty of organizing a workingman's party. Another factor is this, that a new party must carry on a bitter struggle with the older parties which are in power and which have their party organizations complete. The sources of a party's funds are: (1) voluntary subscriptions by rich supporters of the party, and popular subscription—as in Germany: (2) assessments levied on office-holders; (3) collections from candidates for office. The "election uses" to which these funds are put are, frankly, the purchase of votes for the party candidates. The votes of negroes, of ignorant immigrants, and of the floating population in large cities are openly for sale and are bought openly. Naturally, the great majority of the votes even of the poorer classes are not to be bought outright thus. But there are other ways: helping the needy in time of trouble; lending a dollar here, procuring free transportation there; providing fuel in cold weather; giving chickens and turkeys at Christmas; medicine for the sick; burial expenses, or a coffin at half price, perhaps. The political "worker" bribes constituents in other ways, too: getting permission for a street stand; arranging for a saloon license; getting the building inspector to overlook some infringement of the building ordinances, and the like. These things the machine can do because it has power over the officials it has put into office. Another source of strength for the party organization is its power to punish the man who fails to support it: if he be an office-holder, he is removed; if he be a manufacturer, his factory receives especial attention from the factory inspector; if he be a saloonkeeper, he loses his license for any slight infraction of the ordinances of which he can be found guilty; or if he be a taxpayer, the tax assessor will find that his assessment is too low.

The very strength of the party is the source of greater strength. The office-seeker must belong to a party which is strong enough to win and so have offices to distribute. It would be hard to overestimate the part played by the spoils system in the development of the party system as it exists in America. It is especially noteworthy in connection with this explanation of the very slight development of the socialist movement, for the latter cannot make headway against it. It is not hard for a workingman to be a social democrat if he knows absolutely that he would never get a high office even if he belonged to the party in power, and that he will not lose his position as postman or policeman even if he is a socialist. In America even the smallest position goes to the party man, and especially to the party worker. Labor leaders, too, are won over to one party or the other by means of offices. In this way influential leaders are made "harmless." Imagine a man declaring himself a socialist and demanding "the overthrow of the existing order" when he is confronted with the possibility of getting a good position. The development of a socialist party is hindered by the loyalty to party, thus developed, and by the disappearance of possible socialist leaders into offices offered to them by one of the two great parties.

Besides these personal motives which induce men to belong to one or the other of the great parties, there are ideal interests, namely, the accomplishment of desirable reforms, or the doing away with unbearable evils. In America the people are able to affect public conditions directly—not having to wait until they can gain a majority in parliament, as is the case in European states. In European parliaments the representatives of minority parties can make fine speeches, but can accomplish nothing. The German social democrat reads the speeches of the representatives of his party, and though they have no weight whatever and might as well never have been uttered, he rejoices that "he's giving it to them again." This is because he lacks "political sense"—for the immediate winning of influence and power. This lack of political sense might,



for the sake of politeness, be called "idealism." It is most highly developed in the land of "poets and thinkers." This is why the Germans naturally develop minority parties. Just the opposite is true of the Americans. The democratic constitution, which gives all voters the power of electing judicial and administrative, as well as legislative, officials, has centered attention upon the former, so that the houses of Congress do not play nearly so great a rôle as do the parliaments of European states. Results are much quicker according to the American method. American workingmen are able to defeat a governor or a judge who has earned their disfavor, by giving their influence to his opponent. This is much more effective than is the German's power of sending an orator to parliament. The price of the power of the American is loyalty to one of the great parties, for they can accomplish something because of their size.

This very size of the great parties is, again, a factor in their favor; for the American's feeling for bigness leads him to develop a majority politics. The American cannot bear to belong to a party which never wins. The man who belongs to a minority party cannot take part in the various celebrations of election day, for he is out of it. Again, the respect for size has led the American to believe that the majority must be right—"the fatalism of the multitude," as Bryce puts it. Connected with this respect for the large voting mass, as such, is the gregariousness of the American. This disposition to go with the multitude and do as they do is bound up with a strong feeling of faithful adherence to the party when it is once selected—"fanatical party loyalty," Ostrogorski calls it. This is all the stronger when the object of loyalty is a "great" party of which one may be proud. It seems to me that Ostrogorski is right in noting, in this connection, that the American is poor in natural associations, and therefore joins the great organizations of the older parties with all the longing of an isolated person.

Thus we see that there are many factors—both material and ideal—which work for the same end, namely, to keep the great parties large and powerful, and thereby insure their political monopoly. They have this monopoly because they are the great parties; and they are the great parties because they have their political monopoly.

The leading parties do all in their power to prevent the growth of third parties—even to the extent of uniting for a short time in order to crush them. Doubtless the tragic fate of all third parties has added to the difficulties which must be met by any third party which seeks to take its place with the great parties. It may well be asked, though, whether these third parties have ever had the inherent strength of a socialist party, with a definite aim and with unified interests. The Republican party rose from the ranks of the third parties, and has become one of the two leading parties. It is true that party discipline, party organization, and the "machine" had not reached a state of development at that time which could give such strength as would afford the political monopoly now enjoyed by the leading parties. And yet, if that party won with the platform, "emancipation of the slaves," this party should be able to win, even under more difficult conditions, with the mightier and more inclusive platform, "emancipation of the proletariat." If it were possible to arouse the class-consciousness of the workingmen, it seems to me that even a complicated machine and the long-existing electoral monopoly of the great parties could not prevent its triumph.

Another point of strength of the great parties is their character, which makes it easy for the workingman to belong to them. There is little to choose between the principles advocated by them. Their only struggle is for power.

Just as the parties represent no fundamental political differences, so they represent no particular social differences—classes. The "ruling class," which in the northern states is Republican, is Democratic in the southern states. The laboring class votes according to nationality—the Irish being Democratic, as a rule, and the Germans, Republican—or according to the political bias of the neighborhood in which they live. There is no definite line of division, and so workingmen belong to either of the leading parties, and neither is more a party

for workingmen than is the other. The consequent competition between the two parties for the labor vote works advantageously for the workingman. Besides this, organized labor has adopted a system of questioning candidates who seek its support, as to their attitude toward certain policies advocated by it. The anti-socialistic partisans of this so-called Winnetka system think that they have herein a means of preventing the growth of a distinct socialist party, and yet of accomplishing reforms in the way of bettering the conditions of labor by making use of the existing parties.

There are still other reasons for the absence of socialistic tendencies. One is the "constitutional fetish-worship" of all Americans, including the laboring classes. From early childhood patriotism is instilled into the American, and in the schools he is taught respect and reverence for the constitution. The sovereign people—and it alone—has the power to alter the constitution. This idea is dominant in the public life of America. The veriest proletarian hears of the "sacred rights of the people," and shares in the sovereignty. He is the people; and the people is the state. As a consequence, there is in every individual a feeling of unlimited power; and, however imaginary this may be, it is an undoubted reality in his consciousness. The citizen has deep faith in the power and majesty of the people; and though he seldom does anything toward removing the evils of public life, he is sure that he can do so if he only wills it. This faith keeps alive a love of right and a hatred of wrong.

To this must be added another characteristic of the political life of the United States, namely, public opinion. At bottom, this is the real, sovereign power which governs the judicial as well as the legislative and executive bodies. The supreme power, then, is the will of the sovereign people, whether expressed at the ballot box or only in the form of public opinion. The efficiency of public opinion is naturally increased by the shortness of the terms of office. Thus the ordinary laborer, who is formally equal in every way to the richest trust magnate, and who is conscious of the power behind him of the mass of his fellows, has an intensive feeling of his share in the direction of public life. The poor man, since he himself forms public opinion, can readily enough imagine that he has the deciding voice in the conduct of the government. Hence public opinion has always—or at least until very lately—been sympathetic toward labor interests. Should not the workingman have joy and pride in a state where the full political and social rights of a citizen are assured him? This would not suffice, of course, if he did not also have the means of material existence.

*The economic condition of the laborer in the United States.*—It is an especially difficult task to present the economic condition, because of the lack of data on which to base conclusions. The United States has the largest number of household budgets of any land, but such budgets are not always typical and are not always comparable, class with class, with budgets of other countries. It will be easier, though still a very difficult problem, to compare wages.

A comparison of average wages in various industries in Germany and in America (1900) shows that wages in the United States are two to three times as high as in Germany. There is hardly a single instance, among the cases investigated, where the comparison shows the American wages to be less than twice those in the same trade or industry in Germany; in numerous cases they are threefold; and in certain, though probably not typical, cases they are fourfold. Probably this formulation could be made: American wages are, excepting in the South, 100 per cent. higher than in the best paid regions of Germany, and surely 150 to 200 per cent. higher than in the poorly paid districts of Germany.

In order to be able to compare *real* wages, however, it is necessary to consider differences in prices as well as differences in wages.

Prices in the United States are influenced by two chief factors: the "colonial character" of the land, and the high degree of development of capitalism. This latter is especially noticeable in the high degree of development of the technique of production and of transportation.

In the first place, the colonial character of the land is responsible for the

high value of labor, as has already been pointed out. From this it follows that all wares and products which represent much labor are dear. On the other hand, the colonial character of the country leads to cheapness of land, and of wares in the production of which land is an important factor. Cheap land means low house rent in the cities as well (save in the constricted city of New York, where conditions are peculiar)—except in so far as expensive labor is expressed in the building.

In the second place, the highly developed technique tends to make all products of industry cheap.

From this it may be deduced that living, in America, is dearer as more personal service is required and as more luxurious objects are demanded—that is to say, comparatively speaking, the higher the income is. It is difficult to compare the value of dollars and marks. A New York family with an income of \$20,000 will probably not live more luxuriously than a Berlin family with an income of an equal number of marks; one with \$10,000, than a Berlin family with 15,000 marks; and so on down to a point where a dollar will buy as much as three or even four marks—as in the case of the workingman.

In the first place, as regards the dwelling, it should be said that the German workingman, in the large cities and in industrial regions, lives, as a rule, in flat buildings—or tenements, to use the generic term; whereas the American lives, as a rule, in houses of one or two families. With the exception of New York, Boston, and Cincinnati, the tenement is hardly known even in large cities; and the population lives in one- or two-story cottages, which trace their origin directly to the log cabin, and which even today are still built of wood in most American cities. This isolation of families doubtless has an important bearing upon the development of the character of the people; and it may be argued that the slow growth of collectivistic movements in America (and in England!) is connected with this cell-like system of living.

On first sight it would seem, from the budgets of workingmen's families, that the dwelling costs more than in Europe. This is not the case, however, when one considers the far better condition of the American dwellings. To be sure, the American laborer pays three or four times as much for his dwelling as does the German, but his dwelling is notably larger and more comfortable. If one compares the cost of comparable dwellings in Germany and America—of a single room, for example—it will be found that the average rent paid is lower in America. When we introduce changes necessitated by the admission that the rooms in American houses are smaller—and perhaps other concessions—we can still maintain that for an equivalent dwelling the American pays no more than the German and, indeed, usually less.

Heating, lighting, and furnishing must be included in the cost of the dwelling. The laborer's chief illuminant, petroleum, is far cheaper than in Germany. The export price in New York is about half that in Mannheim or Breslau. Coal costs about the same in the two countries. Furnishings are probably a little cheaper in America, even when the quality is considered.

The prices of provisions are especially difficult to compare, owing to quantities, qualities, and tastes. The American eats meat, fruit, cakes, and white bread; the German eats potatoes, sausage, and coarse rye bread. Consequently a comparison of the prices of meat and potatoes in the two countries would not prove much. Moreover, the price of a given commodity in a given district is subject to great variation according to quality. This is especially noticeable in America between the cheapest and the dearest meats—with the advantage, of course, in favor of the less well-to-do among the population. The result of statistical investigation shows that necessities cost about the same in Germany and the United States. Meat is about as dear in one country as in the other; and whereas some articles, as potatoes and rice, are dearer in America, others, as flour and lard, are much cheaper. Thus the workman's family can buy about the same amount of provisions in America as in Germany for the same outlay.

Clothing presents an even more difficult problem. No one has gone

into this subject deeply enough to give us the aid we should like to have. Indeed, the price of clothes is not determinative. "A suit," even when the quality is limited to "blue cheviot," may cost 30 marks or 300 marks. In certain department stores in the large cities of Germany extremely cheap clothing is to be had. Nothing so cheap can be bought in America; but then no one in America, not even a laborer, would buy such trash and shoddy. If articles of similar quality are compared, it will be found that shoes are cheaper in America, but linen, suits, etc., are dearer. On the whole, though, if one may judge from such statistics as are available, it may be said that the American laborer does not have to pay much more for clothing than does the German.

If, then, the American workman receives twice or three times as much in wages as does the German, and has to pay about the same as does the latter for the necessities of life, what does he do with his surplus? There are three possibilities: (1) saving, (2) living better by devoting proportionately more to the necessities of life (dwelling, food, and clothing), or (3) spending more on luxuries. The American seems to make use of all three of these possibilities, but especially of the second. He lives much better than does the German. He has, on an average, four rooms to his dwelling, whereas the average for the German is less than two rooms. Moreover, the furnishings of the American laborer's house are much better than the German's, giving, indeed, the appearance of a middle-class dwelling in Germany. The American consumes almost three times as much meat, three times as much flour, and four times as much sugar as the German. In short, the American workingman, as regards consumption of provisions, is more nearly comparable to the better middle classes in Germany than to the working man. The same is true as regards clothing. Expenditures for clothing are absolutely, and also relatively as regards income, much higher than in Germany—being, absolutely, three times as much, or, relatively, one and one-half times more, than the German.

After these increased expenses for food, clothing, and dwelling, the American workingman does not have much of his income left—about one-fifth, as compared with one-fourth for the German. This extra saving goes for drink to a much larger extent in Germany than in America.

The American laborer is thus seen to be in good circumstances. As his dwelling is a home, and not merely a room in a tenement, he is not *compelled* to go to the saloon. He is well fed, not depending upon potatoes and alcohol for nourishment. He is well dressed, and so is not distinguished by his clothes from the ruling classes. What wonder that discontent with the "existing order of society" finds no place in his heart—especially as his high standard of living is seemingly assured and, on account of the economic advance of the last two generations, seems lasting. The number of workingmen has steadily increased, as have average wages.

Year	No. Laborers	Av. Wages
1850.....	957,059	\$247
1870.....	2,053,906	387
1890.....	4,251,535	445

As the material position of the workingman has improved, not in spite of capitalism, but by means of it, he has come to admire the wonderful power, and to be influenced by the idea of its greatness. To this was added the consciousness that the United States was outstripping all other countries in the progress—the capitalistic progress—it was making. This materialism has made him the cold, calculating business man, lacking in ideals, that we know today. Roast beef and apple pie are fatal to any socialistic utopia.

*The social position of the workingman.*—Herein the American is again greatly superior to the German. Freedom and equality are in large part realities, and not mere empty phrases, in social as well as in political relations. This is

not so easily shown by statistics, but the statement must rest upon impressions and ideas that do not admit of exactness; though we must not underestimate little things. To see the workmen on the street is to realize immediately that they are a different sort from the German workmen. They are citizens. There is no class stigma recognizable, as in almost all European workmen. They meet other men as equals. The cringing and fawning to the "upper classes," as seen in Europe, is utterly unknown. The workman is not everywhere reminded that he belongs to a "lower" class. Not what a man is, and still less what his parents were, but what he is able to accomplish, is what fixes his worth. From this it follows that work, in its abstract form as work, is honored; and the worker is respected, although, or better, because, he is a worker. Naturally the laborer feels quite differently, under these circumstances, from what his fellow does in a land where one does not count as a *Mensch* unless he be a baron, or at least a doctor or an *Assessor*.

This air of equality is to be noted, not only in political and social life, but also in the relations between employer and employee. The former is not master of the latter. As workmen were scarce in the early days, it was necessary for the employer to have a courteous, obliging attitude toward his men, and this was further aided by the democratic atmosphere of the country. It is a peculiarity of the American manufacturers that they neglect to furnish even the most simple protective devices, that they take no trouble whatever about good appliances and conditions which are objective, external; but are quite ready to do anything which the workman could regard subjectively as desirable—such as supplying baths and lockers, regulating the temperature in workrooms; in short, arrangements for the comfort and well-being of the employees. This pleases the men and gains their support for the capitalistic system, though it, at the same time, is exploiting them mercilessly.

Furthermore, the workingman has been brought to have a direct desire for the success of capitalism through identification of his interests with the interests of capital—not so much through profit-sharing, though this is to be found in every form in the United States, as in many smaller ways. In the first place, the employer does not reduce wages when a piece-wage has once been agreed upon—as usually in Europe—and, consequently, the workman is eager to work, and, because of the possibility of very high earnings, is well disposed. A second means lies in the system of "suggestions and complaints," by which the workman is led to take an interest in possible improvement in the work because the employer gives him a share in the resultant gain. In the third place, the interest of the workmen is attracted by having them hold stock in the company. This brings them into the business, attaching them to the system, awakening in them the desire for gain and the fever of speculation; and, secondly, provides a market for stocks, sometimes thereby staving off a drop in prices, and sometimes effecting a rise in the stock market. "The multitude of petty shareholders are led more and more to consider economic questions from the employers' standpoint" (Ghent).

Nevertheless, capitalism, even in America, circumscribes the workman closely and holds him in slavery. What has made his lot easy however, has been the possibility of his leaving at any time. The possibilities of rising in the world have been far greater than in Europe, owing to the newness of the society, its democracy, the slight differentiation between employer and employee, and many other factors. A further possibility, however, which was embraced by hundreds of thousands and millions in the past century, was the emancipation from the restraints of capitalism made possible by the distribution of free homesteads in the West. I believe that the explanation of the peculiarly satisfied attitude of the American workman lies above all in the fact that men with sound bodies could become independent farmers with little or no capital, by taking up free land. In two decades, 1870 to 1890, a new region, twice as large as the German Empire, came under cultivation. This is due to migrations of the population from more thickly populated regions of an industrial character toward the unpopulated free land; whereas in Europe the movement is from

agricultural toward urban and industrial districts—as is, indeed, the case in the eastern states of America to an ever-increasing extent. That this movement toward the free homesteads of the West is closely connected with the development of capitalism, and not with immigration, is shown by the statistics of the increased number of homesteads taken up in years of economic depression—evidently by the “industrial reserve army.” For example, the number of acres in homesteads taken up in 1877 was something over two millions; but rose to six and eight millions in 1878 and 1879, the years of an industrial crisis, although the immigration in 1878 was less than it had been since 1863.

Besides this actual migration, there was the consciousness that he could, at any time, become an independent farmer, which must have given the American laborer a feeling of security and calm which the European laborer does not know. It is easier to bear a burden if one feels that he could be free if he wished it. The possibility of this choice between capitalism and non-capitalism deprives all anti-capitalistic agitation of its weapons. With the disappearance of free land, however, this possibility disappears.

In conclusion, I would point out that all the factors, which have prevented the growth of socialism in the United States up to the present are on the point of disappearing, or of being changed into factors exerting their power in the opposite direction; and that consequently socialism will, according to all indications, reach its full development in the United States within the next generation.—Werner Sombart, “Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des nord-amerikanischen Proletariats,” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. XXI, Nos. 1, 2, and 3. H. W.

**Labor Legislation in France.**—In 1901 M. Millerand, the minister of commerce, appointed a commission to codify all the French laws relating to labor, specifically charging it to make no changes in the existing laws except where needed to eliminate conflicts. The collection of laws thus made was to be submitted for approval by Parliament. This work required minute and painstaking research, in order that it might be known exactly what the law had to say on the subject of labor. Private compilations of these laws were in existence, and these in a way seemed better adapted for general use, because they could be modified as new legislation was promulgated, which could not be done with a public document. Some could see no reason for a re-enactment of existing laws, and others were suspicious. But the work was intended to show also that the labor laws were merely an incoherent mass without any of the unity pertaining to a code.

The French Revolution enacted no labor legislation. All men were alike to have perfect freedom of contract, and the laws that were passed against the rich were not for the benefit of the workmen as such, but in order to abolish class distinctions. The spirit of the age opposed association, and at that time there was in France little manufacturing and but few persons engaged in any one industry.

The nineteenth century witnessed four periods of labor legislation in France, viz.:

1. The law of 1804 provided chiefly for workmen's certificates or pass-books containing particulars of the laborer's life, occupations, etc.—police measure, useful also for masters to retain in their service debtor workmen. This law was repealed in 1892. In 1806 were created skilled artisans' councils (*conseils de prud'hommes*), then regarded as solving all possible labor difficulties. This law was frequently amended.

2. The revolution of 1848 undertook radical changes. Under the influence of Louis Blanc, one decree fixed the hours of labor at eight in a day, changed four months later to twelve; another decree forbade subleasing labor, on the ground that man is not to be exploited by man and labor is not a commodity. Until the commission of 1901 found that these decrees were still in force, their validity was questioned.

3. Under Louis Napoleon, there was enacted, in 1850, a law regulating apprenticeship, which comes first in the new code; and a law for regulating con-

ditions in spinning and weaving factories, extended in 1856 to velvet manufacture. In 1864 the strike, up to that time criminal, was legalized.

4. The Syndicate Law of 1884 is the workmen's charter. Workmen in association are enabled to direct their own industry, and to take the risks and share the gains of enterprise, if they study the conditions of production. Later, because of the dangerous character of the work, and the presence of public opinion on the subject, special laws were passed for the protection of miners. In 1892 and 1900 work for women and children—and where these were employed with men, for the latter also—was limited to ten hours per day. In 1904 private employment offices were abolished—an echo of 1848, that labor should not be a commodity. In 1895 wages were declared exempt from attachment—a recognition of "the right to live." The law of 1898 provides that in all cases of accident—except when gross negligence is proved—damages and responsibility are divided evenly between workmen and employer.

In the opinion of the commission, all these laws were but fragmentary and did not constitute a code. In its report it therefore suggested needed legislation on subjects for which there was no law as yet voted. A completed code would include the following parts:

I. Agreements in regard to work—the apprentice law of 1851, and labor contracts (decrees of 1848 and selections from the Civil Code). Co-operation in shops is needed, for differences over mistreatment of employees have caused more trouble and strikes than wages or hours of labor. A law in regard to collective agreements, which have worked successfully in some instances tried. The law of 1895 on attachment of wages should be supplemented by provisions in regard to privileges, detention, and fines, as also for participation in profits. The law of 1904 abolishing employment bureaus is included in this part.

II. The regulation of hours of labor, hygiene, and safety is regarded as almost complete in the present laws, to which details may be added as needed. In 1890 mining delegates were appointed from among the workmen themselves to watch over the safety of the work.

III. This division is incomplete, containing as yet only the Syndicate Law of 1884. Legislation is desired in regard to strikes, *bourses du travail*, and workmen's productive societies. The employers protest against arbitration because it would necessitate exposing the details of their business; but this is often done in ordinary suits.

IV. Professional jurisdiction and representation, comprising the modified law of 1806, should be regulated. Millerand's decree of September, 1900, for professional representation showed the need of more syndicates.

V. Insurance. All cases of loss of labor should be provided for—accidents (law existing), stoppage of work (no law), and old age (law has just passed the Chamber of Deputies), and death benefits for widow and children. The French system tends to make this a joint charge on the state, the employer, and the workman.

VI. Precautionary measures (*la prévoyance*) and mutual aid, cheap dwellings, credit societies (already partly voted).

VII. Assistance, although not altogether a labor measure, is chiefly an outcome of labor conditions, and should find a place in the code.

Throughout the whole work the principle of protection of workmen by the state is assumed, in opposition to the Civil Code. Hours of labor, hygienic conditions, compensation for accidents—all is regulated by law; and a person injured cannot, as under ordinary law, settle for a specific amount. He will merely receive an income corresponding to one-half the earning power lost. The individual's liberty is restricted for the sake of the beneficiary. When the first five parts were adopted by the Chamber, April 16, 1905, only one deputy objected to the principle of state interference, which shows that the orthodox school of economics, though strong in the Collège de France, has no representation in Parliament.

English investigations have aroused French interest in the condition of their own working-classes. It is recognized that hygiene is the final authority on the

conditions of work, hours of labor, etc., while statistics, though imperfect, must be followed, e.g., in adjusting the age of retirement. No one can escape the dictates of science. Hence the unanimity with which protection of the workers is approved. But other measures—e. g., syndicates, *bourses du travail*, profit-sharing, strikes, etc.—arouse violent opposition as interferences with the liberty of the employer, who alone, it is claimed, can direct a business effectively; while the workers regard it as their function to participate in the conditions imposed on them. Herein is to be seen the opposition of parties in the future.—Etienne Fournol, "Le code francais du travail," *Revue du Mois*, January, 1906.

A. H. N. BARON, Clark University

**Trial and Error as a Factor in Evolution.**—Since Darwin, it has been a habit to advance general formulæ intended to cover all forms of development. The value of these formulations is that they show the points of view of the different ages giving statement to the formulæ. The last decade seems to have developed a new formula, viz.: all progress is the result of chance trials, and of a selection from these trials of those that are successful in attaining some end. It seems that man must advance in this way, by repeated trials, and selecting the movements found to accomplish the end in view, feeling about for a favorable condition, and then by continued motion in the most favored condition, or quiescence in the most favored position, the environment determining which of the forms and functions shall survive. Or, to generalize, chance is at the basis of all learning, all advancement, all adaptation.

At the lowest stage, within the animal, there is adaptation from time to time on the basis of successful chance adjustment; there is no learning at this stage. In the next stage comes the retention of successful trials. Advance upward is based on variation in the complexity of the movements. On this theory the essential factor in all development is the selecting agent and the rewards which serve to make one rather than another thing permanent. The selecting agent in the race is environment. If the variation is favorable, it lives; if not, it dies. The experiments of Professor Jennings with the paramecium and Professor Holmes with the blow-fly larva disclose variations and movements that are mechanical equivalents of pain and pleasure. Pain and pleasure as selecting agents are the result of many factors. In the second stage of animal learning the deciding factors are conscious as opposed to the natural forces in the environment; this is the justification of setting off the selecting agent as belonging to a special class or group. To generalize for all groups, we would have: Racial progress is due to the chance variations in the animal structures and have as the selecting agent the environment. There is no learning in the first stage of animal development; in the second stage there is a permanent effect left—hence there is learning.

In the higher animals and man we have the same general process, but added to pain and pleasure are new elements, due to men's living in groups. Some of these are subtle, but their selecting process is in the same way as the cruder selecting agents. If a person departs from the established norm he is either a hero or the opposite. It is not evident what determines the selection: it may be survival or æsthetic appreciation. One thing is quite evident; imitation does not play the important rôle in learning that has been supposed. To be explained in the higher forms is not the persistence of conduct, but the determining factors which select some methods of action and eliminates others; not that the child finally comes to the standard of society, but the method of his approach to this standard. Learning by trial and error differs from learning by imitation in that it makes individual appreciation of results of a movement the essential element, rather than the presence of a similar movement in a neighbor.

The social factors do not primarily initiate, but serve to select factors otherwise initiated. The enforcement of the social law depends, not on precept or example, but upon these vague social forces that are constantly repressing and rewarding departures from the social standards. What is the value of this modern formulation? It enables us to bring the accepted facts of development under a single phrase. The lack of the formula is our inability to analyze and define all



the selecting agents; i. e., the physico-chemical constitution of the organism and the intimate nature of social pressure effective in man. —W. B. Pillsbury, in *Popular Science Monthly*, March, 1906 S. E. W. B.

### **The Problem of the Unemployed and Suggestions for its Solution.**—

This problem, hard enough already, is made more difficult by inexact nomenclature. "Unemployed" applies to a heterogeneous mass of men; the only thing in common is that they are out of employment. In other respects they are of infinite variety. Under this term are included the honest artisan thrown out of employment, the casual laborer, the idle loafer, the drunkard, the petty criminal, the tramp, and the sturdy beggar. It is clear that a large portion is composed of those who do not wish to work, and the uselessness, for them, of the ordinary methods of relief must be recognized.

One main object pursued by the Church Army during the last fifteen years has been the reclamation of individuals belonging to the criminal and idle loafing classes—the most difficult of all to deal with; and my experience gained as honorary chief secretary of that society leads me to venture these suggestions. I do not condemn the honest poor. The wilful unemployed is my concern now. We must recognize that he is no monster, but a man with passions like our own. He is not to be treated as one of a mass or herd, but as a person.

Our system of reclamation is carried on by a network of labor homes, each holding no more than twenty-five men, this being a sufficient number for one man to handle. This man is called "father." Personal influence and sympathy are the main points. There is no lack of raw material to fill these homes. Upon arrival at the home the man is given a hot bath, change of clothing, a good meal, and work to do. He signs a formal contract, promising to stay at least two months. The work done does not require skilled labor. The surroundings are kept scrupulously clean; he has a bed of his own. The rules are few, the two main ones being hard work and total abstinence. All attend a simple, short service daily. Work, wages, personal sympathy, and friendship are the main factors, and they are effective. There is no fast line as to how long a man shall stay in the home. When he does leave, the point is to find him employment.

For the temporary relief of unemployed married men we provide work at special dépôts in London and the provinces. Many find employment through the homes who do not enter. Thousands of women find employment through a separate department. We do not lay stress on figures, but to show the extent of operations we give these. In 1904 we dealt with 215,000 cases; 43 per cent. of the inmates left the home with permanent positions; 45 per cent. had good prospects; only 12 per cent. were dismissed as unsatisfactory. It is safe to say that 50 per cent. of the inmates are reclaimed from outcasts. Emigration as a remedy for unemployment is used by us carefully.—Wilson Carlisle, in *Fortnightly Review*, December, 1905. S. E. W. B.

**The Unions versus Higher Wages**—The unions have (1) stimulated rather than attempted to remove the feeling between the employer and employee; (2) encouraged the theory of a right to ownership in the product made by labor, capital, and management; (3) fed their members chiefly on socialistic and un-American literature; (4) approved the policy of making work; (5) based their whole action on the principle of a monopoly of the labor supply.

The result has been (1) a series of acts which have shocked the civilized world; (2) a growth of unwise and brutal leaders, demanded by the futile policy of an indefensible monopoly.

The time has come to appeal to public opinion for a raise in wages. In behalf of higher wages is submitted: (1) productivity or efficiency is the reason for higher wages; (2) this is the basis for urging an increase in wages as agreed to by all scientific investigators of the subject; (3) the labor supply can never be monopolized; let the workmen and unions adopt the principle of efficiency and

improve their work; (4) the sympathetic interdependence of laborer and employer must be recognized by each—it is essential to productivity; (5) the employer must recognize this principle of pay for efficiency or fail in the sharp competition. The man at the bottom of the ladder needs tolerance and help in seeing the true bearings of this question, as much as he needs higher wages.—J. Lawrence Laughlin in *Journal of Political Economy*, March, 1906. S. E. W. B.

**The Social Question: A Plea for More Scientific Methods.**—The plea would include: (1) a greater agitation against the number of licensed houses in the slum district; (2) a closer supervision of the public houses; (3) a more careful examination of the quality of the drink they sell; (4) thorough organization of the charities to examine minutely the circumstances of those asking aid; (5) education of the people in the elements of citizenship; (6) mental and moral training to appreciate improved conditions by means of women and men who understand the peculiarities of those in the slums who are taught.

The great need is to relieve the monotony of their lives. They are bad in economic conditions, worse in morals, horrible in mental life. Neither contact with nature nor literature and art relieves the monotony of their lives. However, they are not hopeless.—Robert Gunn Davis, in *Westminster Review*, March, 1906. S. E. W. B.

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## OWEN'S TOPOLOBAMPO COLONY, MEXICO

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From time to time attempts are made, mostly in America, to found artificial states, or communities, which are designated "model" colonies, and are intended to illustrate on a small scale the social future as, according to the founders' scheme, it ought to shape itself. Wherever these artificial structures continue to exist, they do so only when they depart to a considerable degree from their original socialistic or communistic forms. Even in the latter case they do not always maintain their position.

Among the most interesting of the socialistic settlements that have arisen and perished in our days is the noteworthy and unique creation of Colonel Albert Kimsey Owen, a Pennsylvanian engineer. Despite long-continued ill-luck of all kinds, this man fought for his cause with the greatest perseverance. Much of what was important and interesting in Edward Bellamy's famous *Looking Backward* had already, years before the appearance of that book, been frequently repeated in a different form by Owen. The latter had evidently provided much material for the Boston romance-writer, but he himself caused far less stir with his literary propaganda, because he did not, like the former writer, clothe it in a striking literary form.

### I

One need not be a visionary dreamer to allow that the possession of a comfortable little house, in every respect agreeable

and sanitary, is something extremely desirable, and one need not as yet by any means belong to the radicals to admit that the payment of taxes, house and farm rents, and interest on capital is the cause of a great part of the seamy side of the present economic order of things, because it swallows up a great part of the income of very many persons. Could these payments be abolished, very much would have been done toward the solution of the social question, and especially would the possession of an excellent little house of one's own be made easier. Henry George merely aspires to do away with interest on capital; Hertzka, in his "Freeland" abolishes decisively all the above-mentioned kinds of taxes. Colonel Owen wished to do the same, but in a less radical manner. He did not, like Hertzka, place the usufruct of unowned land at the disposal of every man free of charge, but desired to see each state or town organized as a joint-stock-company, to which the ground should belong and which should sell it to the stockholders, but at the same time the purchaser should have usufruct of the land only so long as he really made use of it. If he or his heir wished to give it up, he received back from the company the earnest money, while in "Freeland," where no earnest money is actually paid, anyone can make use of the abandoned land. The chief principles from which A. K. Owen proceeded were: "With united forces" and "integral co-operation;" that is to say, complete social fellowship. What he comprehends under this is stated in a large number of volumes and pamphlets; I have myself, for example, read through three volumes of *Integral Co-operation* (1884, 1887, 1891); the pamphlets *Homes, and How to Obtain Them*, *A Co-operative City*, *The Credit Foncier Company*, etc.; as well as several years' numbers of the journals which embody Owen's theory and practice, *The Integral Co-operation* (Enterprise), *The New City* (New York), and *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa* (Topolobampo); and in addition to these also numerous prospectuses, circulars, and pamphlets.

His studies in social politics forced on Owen's observation, a quarter of a century ago, the fact that under the rule of the present competitive order those commercial and manufacturing

businesses are most profitable which depend on the joint action of a large number of leaders of industry; i. e., the great railways, water-works, gas-works, and such like. With united forces, trusts and other many-headed associations monopolize whole branches of business with enormous profit. How would it be if every town, and later on perhaps every country, monopolized under its own administration the public means of communication, the arrangements for heating, lighting, and water, school and educational affairs—in short, all concerns that might be considered the especial business of the community, and paid the large profits into its own pocket, thus not benefiting individual entrepreneurs, but the community itself! The following words of Owen are very significant as regards his own aspirations:

There can be no commonwealth perfectly co-operative in form which is not in possession of its soil, its manufactures, its means of communication, and its medium of exchange. These four things are just as necessary to a community as the muscles, bones, sinews, and the heart are to the human body.

Starting from this co-operative thought, Owen, by the aid of his experiences gathered on world-wide journeys, and from the results of his economic inquiries, built up in the course of years a system of "complete social fellowship" which he called "integral co-operation." He was always saying:

If a dozen companies, independent of each other or competing with each other, perform a dozen different services for a town and are able to pay high dividends to their share-holders at the cost of the population, a commonwealth, working in like manner on its own account, must be able to perform the same services better, more cheaply, and to the advantage of all.

He saw a complete state of social co-operation a means of remedy for the evils of the modern order of things, and he was not content with theoretical statements, but proceeded by degrees to attempt the carrying-out of his teaching into practice, while for this purpose he founded a settlement in a place in which he found the necessary conditions fairly united: the country around the harbor of Topolobampo, distinguished for its size, depth, geographical situation, etc. The first settlers entered it in 1886, and at the same time he called into existence a co-operative business, in accordance with his projects, which received the name of the

"Credit Foncier Company of Sinaloa." At that time the outside world knew almost nothing of the Topolobampo creek and the Mexican province of Sinaloa. Owen had become acquainted with both when he conducted the building of the Central Mexican Railway. The highly valuable characteristics, from a commercial point of view, of the natural harbors, the extraordinary rural beauty of the country, the rare productiveness of the soil, and the mineral wealth of the region, produced in him the conviction that there could be no more propitious field for his experiment. Add to this the favorable circumstances that the Mexican government presented to him extensive territories for the community, placed other lands very cheaply at his disposal, and granted to him, along with a considerable government subsidy, the concession for the building of a railway (Mexican Western Railway), almost a thousand miles long, from Topolobampo to Texas—from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean. The government did all this in the interest of the country itself; for the very well-to-do population of that flourishing province was not in a position, for want of means of communication, to produce more than they used for their own needs. The government, therefore, welcomed the North American settlers as forerunners of economic progress and heralds of a future prosperous development of Mexico, and offered them enthusiastic hospitality. What our engineer really desired in founding his colony will be clearly seen by the following extracts from the "Constitution of the Credit Foncier Company," drawn up in 1886:

OUR PRINCIPLES. We believe:

1. That the usefulness and happiness of mankind depend upon their physical, intellectual, and moral development.
2. That the moral depends upon the intellectual, the intellectual upon the physical, the physical upon the purity of the atmosphere, the purity of the atmosphere upon the intelligent, comprehensive, and thorough control of the land, and of all which within and upon it rests, and that, therefore, the land and all which it implies—the atmosphere, metal, mineral (water), timber, grass, electricity, etc.—must be held in trust by the corporation, for the use of its members.
3. That the principles which should underlie the corporation are interdependence, duty, and equity, and that in proportion as the members of the corporation understand the interdependence of each with the other and all

with the one, to the extent that they feel the duty that the strong should assist the weak, and in the ratio that they come to the practice of equity—in the affairs of the individual, the family, the municipality, and the state—will they become useful, happy, and progressive.

4. That there cannot be dignity and strength of character in the individual without home life, and that, therefore, it is the duty of the corporation, by offsetting services, to provide a substantial and permanent home for every family; and as there cannot be independent thought, which is the basis of correct action, without the individual being a holder of a whole or part interest in the home right, that therefore, a voice in the corporation belongs only to those who hold such possession.

5. That the highest ambition for man and woman is to have a permanent, substantial, and beautiful home; constant, remunerative and agreeable employment; varied instruction; approved facilities and attractive amusements; that the ability to possess and enjoy should keep pace with their culture and desires.

6. That every individual is different from every other individual; that these individualities demand diverse occupations, and that the wealth and influence of the corporation depend upon the diversity, multiplicity, and intelligence of the individualities of its members, and upon the diversification and perfection of their home industries, constantly and remuneratively kept in operation.

7. That all wealth is created by labor intelligently co-operating with the land and the natural elements; that everything produced belongs to the person who produces it; that the storage, handling, and exchange are the possessions of the corporation.

8. That there is no such thing as originality of thought and inventions, and that every idea and mechanical combination is the result of centuries of thought and toil by thousands of persons, and that the benefits resulting from their application to the practical affairs of life belong, in most part, to the descendants and heirs of those who have been the means of giving these ideas and inventions to society, and not absolutely, at any time, to the author and inventor who frames the closing sentence and adjusts the last screw.

9. As it is the duty of the corporation to provide occupation or employment for every one of its members, it is also the duty of the members to undertake that occupation or those employments which he and she are best fitted to do.

10. That official trusts are duties which the members best fitted for executive business owe to the corporation and to themselves.

So much for the theoretical principles. Passing on to their practical application, the Constitution further says:

11. We believe that the association should be a company; that it should be incorporated to attend to everything of a public character for the preserva-

tion and advancement of the common weal; that the basis of these functions is to preserve and utilize the land, and all which it implies; to take measures for sanitation; to furnish power and implements for production, manufacture, and fashioning; and to attend to distribution, transportation, construction, education, amusement, entertainment, exchange, and commerce.

12. That there should not be a company or a partnership inside of the corporation except the municipal corporation (or corporations), which should be incorporated to systematize and operate, in the interests of its members, utilities which belong to, and are part of, every distinct community; and that the more important of these are its atmosphere, thoroughfares, areas, powers, lights, heat, water, buildings, street cars, telephones, sewers, etc.

13. That it is the duty of the corporation to furnish insurance in case of accident to person and property; to provide for sickness, for the aged, for the orphan, and for the widow; that it is the duty of the municipality to furnish, free of charge, and upon attractive plans, kindergarten, school, and industrial education for all minors who are children of members of the corporation.

14, 15. That gambling, lotteries, etc., are contrary to correct purpose, and that occupations of questionable propriety should be prohibited.

16-21. That a member should not vote for himself or herself for any office within the corporation, and that for a member to ask another member to vote for him or her should be an act of self-exile.

22. That no member may claim any privilege for himself.

23, 24. That not under any circumstances should the corporation be a borrower of money from any person, private or legal, other than from its own members.

25-27. That in no case should a member borrow credits or money from other body than the corporation.

28, 29. That "popular suffrage" is right in principle, but that it has been and is pernicious as practiced; that it cannot be beneficent to the individual and to society until all persons enjoying the suffrage can read the laws submitted, and can be free in thought and actions to vote in accordance with their best judgments; and that the best of the civilization of a corporation is in the usefulness, the happiness, and the distinct and intellectual individualities of its members.

30. That "party politics" and caucus rule in our corporation would result as they have resulted wherever and whenever they have been tried, and that they would, by legal enactments, make the producers "hewers of wood and drawers of water" to cunning tricksters and to the non-producing, non-essential classes.

31-33. That "secret societies . . . clubs," etc., etc., are the result of, and belong to, disorganized communities; and that, with co-operation systematized, will come free libraries, free lectures, and free diversions in physical games.



34. That the principle underlying religious thought is correct; and that religion is not a truth possessed, but a result sought; that the sentiment of religion is good in the proportion that it inspires a feeling of duty to every creature within the sphere of one's life—a duty in thought and a duty in action—and that religion is sacred and belongs strictly to the individual, and not to the state, to a municipality, to a society, or to an association.

35. That marriage is the foundation of the home and of the corporation, and that its contract should be encouraged and witnessed, free of charge, by the corporation; and that every man should have one wife, and every woman one husband, and no more.

36. That our mission is peace and useful example to mankind; that our wish is to be courteous to all, to be plain but artistic in dress, correct in speech, modest in conduct; that if we should presume to teach in anything, it should be in the deportment of our everyday life one with the other.

At the end of the Constitution there followed a solemn "Pledge" which each associate was obliged to sign:

I, the undersigned, of . . . , and of the United States of North America, do hereby agree to abide by "Our Principles," as above written; and to live in accordance with the by-laws which may from time to time be made by the directors of the Credit Foncier Company; and, in case that I break the said rules, I will submit peaceably to the fines, penalties, etc., which may be imposed by the said by-laws, waiving all rights to appeal before the courts of the United States, Mexico, or elsewhere, from the judgment of the members of the Credit Foncier Company.

The following passage from the paper *Integral Co-operation* will show that in Topolobampo it was not by any means a question of an outburst of communistic feeling:

We desire evolution, not revolution; co-operation, not isolation; fellowship, not communism; concord, not antagonism; emulation, not competition; equity, not equality; freedom, not licence; employment, not alms; the full use of goods, not wastefulness; religion, not the existence of sects; counsel, not preaching of sermons; duties, not ceremonies; deeds, not confessions of faith; examples, not precepts; laws, not formalities; order, not anarchy; universally binding rules, not class legislation; systematic organization, not chance results; the joint rule of comrades, not partisan administration. We demand that those aids to cultivation upon which the usefulness, the progress, and the happiness of the citizens depend—air, soil, water, light, the forces of nature, exchange, advancement, buildings, care of health, instruction, amusement, insurance, production, trade, etc.—should be administered in the interest of the community by the latter alone, and that, on the contrary, the private life, the property, the opinions, and the individuality of the individual be held sacred.

And in the pamphlet *Pacific City* (1892) we read:

Man is not destined to a solitary state. No one can make himself happy or useful alone. . . . Certainly no one has himself produced his own gifts, or himself provided himself with dwelling-place, food, clothing, and protection. Ideas, talents, knowledge, culture, skill are the fruits of living in the community in which they have arisen and in which they have been called forth, just as the unearned income from ground property is the result of the growth of the urban population.

Integral Co-operation teaches us that the individual is able to do nothing alone, that all that we are and shall become depends upon the advantages which society offers us. Only when many think, work and rest together under the rule of a certain measure of discipline is the divine spark in man able to redeem and ennoble him. He who lives alone retrogrades in civilization.

## II

The chief management of the new corporation rested in the hands of ten directors, whose election took place in the same manner as in every other joint-stock company, but no one was permitted to vote for himself. No one was allowed to have more than forty-eight shares at ten dollars a share, because no one was allowed to own more than forty-eight lots. Of this more will be said later on. The body of directors was to choose the president, the treasurer, etc., from their own number, and to divide among themselves the control of the ten departments of government. The directors were to be elected for five years and to receive salaries of one hundred dollars per month; they had to be members of the company and had to dwell in the territory of the latter. The manager of each department appointed the officials and workmen necessary for the service of that department, but only in the name of the company. There was no other employer of labor but the company in Owen's ideal state. Now, as the directors were to be active "rather as counselors and helpers than as superintendents, it was to the interest of the shareholders," as the president and founder of the state wrote, "to choose from their number such persons as they thought possessed of the greatest business ability and in whose character they had perfect confidence. . . . Party politics must have nothing to do with the administration."

The ten branches of government were the following: (1) mat-

ters of banking, insurance, and accounts; (2) public buildings and highroads; (3) fire and sanitary police; (4) administration of justice and registration of professions; (5) matters concerning the means of communication and transportation, and all that would promote the advancement of the colony; (6) natural forces; (7) industry and trade; (8) instruction, education, and amusements; (9) agriculture and forestry, cattle-breeding, and fisheries, (10) doctors, apothecaries, and the commissariat.

In this list we miss a department for religious worship, a minister for spiritual concerns. The people did not need one, for they made no sacrifices for the objects of church-building, etc., and looked upon religion, as we already know from the above "principles," not as something public, but as a private, individual matter. With reference to this point, the American clergyman Hogeland, who visited the settlement in August, 1890, remarked in a Californian journal:

The settlers have never pretended to be saints; rather they have always declared that they wished to do without priests and churches. Nevertheless, they are pious and devout. Their moral views are lofty, and their course of life is worthy of imitation. They have no police and no prisons, yet they know nothing of brawls, seduction, theft, and drunkenness. They are opposed to strong drinks, tobacco, cruelty to animals, and all improper, coarse modes of expression.

Owen writes:

We are religious, but no theologians. With us, as in every other joint-stock company, every shareholder can hold any creed he please. . . . As in all other things, so also in the matter of religion we are eclectics; that is to say, we take the beautiful, the good, and the true wherever we find them: from Christians, Theosophists, Greeks, etc.; without being Anglicans, Catholics, and Theosophists. . . . We wish to lead a God-fearing life, whilst in all things we are noble-minded, and in our life and in our intercourse with one another we try always to act rightly and in a kindly manner.

In John W. Lovell's pamphlet *A Co-operative City* we read:

We acknowledge in all religions a common conception of God . . . , but for the rest we only consider religion useful in so far as it is fitted to urge us in thought and deed to the fulfilment of duty. . . . Our religion consists in the endeavor to raise man's condition and to have consideration for all creatures with whom we come in contact; in striving to observe the precept to do to no one what we do not wish them to do to us, in the avoidance of sectarianism, in work, investigation, and progress.

The colonists, therefore, did not think much of church. They thought that "we must not do good for the sake of expected recompense here below or in the world to come," but merely for the sake of goodness itself. "We wish to lead a moral, religious life, in conformity with the best teaching and deeds of antiquity and of modern times, of heathendom as also of Christianity. We do not aim at impressing upon our youth the belief that any one church alone knows the truth necessary for salvation." And in another place Owen remarks :

We believe right and justice ought to be understood in so strict a sense that the adulteration of a single article of use must cast a slur on the whole community. What is the object of a creed that does not restrain its followers from deceit, stealing, etc? True religion does not consist in simply saying that we believe in this or that; no, we desire also that a man should *direct his life according to what he holds to be right*. A religion of words and not of deeds inspires us with no confidence.

As for the rest, every associate was permitted to belong to any form of religion he pleased. "For all these reasons," declared Lovell, "we shall erect no buildings for divine service." Everybody could become a member of the "Credit Foncier" who signed the vow already mentioned and bought at least one share at ten dollars. In the regulations it is enjoined that "before an associate sets out for the colony (that is to say, before he receives the permit entitling him to migrate and settle in the colony), he must have come to an agreement in writing with the secretary of the Council of Directors, referring to the nature of the work to be performed and the wages to be guaranteed." If an associate wished to withdraw, he was obliged to give at least three months' notice; then his account was made up and the balance in his favor paid out to him at short intervals by instalments. The same thing applied to expelled members. Expulsion necessarily followed—but only through the directors—when anyone materially violated the principles, etc., of the community, yet an appeal could be made to an extraordinary general meeting within thirty days. The chief grounds of expulsion were: gambling, canvassing, and improper occupations. The definitions of the transgressions in question were, however, as so many other things in Owen's program, of a misty nature.

The Credit Foncier Company was entitled and authorized: to buy and sell land and ground; to lay out streets and lanes; to build houses; to fit them up and sell them; to build and manage tramways and railways; also steam- and other ships, electric-lighting and other works, aqueducts, etc.; schools, markets, theaters, inns, warehouses, docks, bazaars, factories, etc.; further, their duties included agricultural affairs and trade, bank and insurance business, as well as all that is connected with the occupations and commercial intercourse of a great community. Every "associate" was obliged to possess at least one share, and might at most possess only forty-eight shares, but had always only one vote—in order to prevent the making of artificial majorities. The shares might not be transferred privately, but could only be sold to the company, and indeed only at their nominal value. As soon as the company should have succeeded in possessing sufficient means, it was to have been allowed to purchase from each stockholder who possessed more than one share, the extra shares. Moreover, only true settlers were to be admitted as shareholders, while originally, when the procuring of money was the chief thing, shares could be sold to outsiders.

To the conditions of settlement in the Owen colony already mentioned must be added these: That every associate (meaning every family), in case he desired to have land, should pay into the land and improvement fund at the lowest 20 and at the most 500 dollars; one-half of this cash was destined for improvements, the other half for the purchase of land. Further, each associate was obliged to pay his own traveling expenses and bring with him by way of preliminary what was necessary in bedding, clothes, furniture, etc. "To secure occupation to all colonists and to protect the original capital from waste, but at the same time to make monopolies or private accumulation of capital impossible," Owen adopted a modification of nationalization of the land which stood midway between the proposals of Henry George and those of Hertzka. "The ground shall belong to the body collectively and be administered in such a manner that everybody should be in a position to acquire a home which should be free

from rent and taxes." Accordingly the ground was sold cheaply in lots of from 400 to 18,000 square yards.

The company was willing to build the necessary houses on these pieces of ground according to suitable plans; yet the houses might not be either let or sold by the possessors, or be burdened with debt or otherwise transferred.

As to trade, it remained, as was the case in Bellamy's book, exclusively in the hands of the corporation. Owen pointed out as the chief advantages of this: the impossibility of the adulteration of goods, the saving of labor power, and the doing-away with the immense cost of the present horrible and common method of advertising. John W. Lovell writes in his pamphlet, *A Co-operative City*:

The shops will be situated in different quarters of the town for the convenience of the public. All articles of use and luxury ought to be found under a man's own roof. . . . With the exception of the drug department, the shops will be open only six hours a day; people should manage to make all purchases in this time in order that the woman assistants, as in other callings, need not work longer than six hours.

The work time of men in trade and in industrial labor is fixed at eight hours: "in this time enough can be produced to satisfy all wants."

If anyone should have a product of his industry to sell, he was to have brought it to the public warehouses for a price agreed on, and the amount of this price to be entered to his credit in the books of the corporation bank just in the same way as were the wages due for any work done for the company. The sale took place on the basis of the purchaser's selection from the shops of the corporation. The customers were to have had a collection of samples in each block of houses, and the delivery to the houses was to have been worked by means of pneumatic tubes, the collection of the payments from the customers to be effected by placing these payments to their debit in the company's accounts.

Thus the purchasers save having to pay for the enormous expenses of advertising, and run no risk of receiving adulterated goods, without taking into account the saving of labor power caused by doing without middlemen or jobbers. . . . Trade will also be carried on with foreign countries, but only after all settlers have been provided with all necessary commodities. . . .

The trade in alcoholic drinks is limited to the general shops, there are no public houses and drinking-palaces.

Money matters were arranged in such a way that the only bank that was allowed—i. e., that of the company—carried on the total business of exchange, payments, loans, savings deposits, etc. The work done by labor was not paid in cash, but in "credit notes" (hourly wages). The working-day had at first a value of two dollars. These certificates of work, which could be exchanged in the colony for every necessary commodity, were lithographed like money notes, and Owen hoped that in case the colony he had created ever attained to prosperity and played a part in the world, these notes would be taken everywhere as a medium of exchange, just as the Venetian notes were between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries. What anyone spent or what he needed for journeys was placed to his debit in the company's accounts. Hertzka proposed a similar extensive clearing-house method of procedure for his "Freeland" settlement. "Do we eat or drink paper money? Do we sleep or dwell on gold or silver coinage?" asks Owen. "No, all we need are the services of others in exchange for our own." Thereby work was proclaimed to be the real money standard, and he who did not work had nothing to eat. "Can anything be simpler and juster?" And since "credit notes" could not be stolen, a stop was put to the embezzlements of cashiers wishful to abscond, and of administrative councils. Thus, cash in the form of coin was not quite discarded in Topolobampo—when requisite it was employed, for example in foreign trade—but its use, in truth, appeared restricted to a very trifling amount. Hertzka declared the replacement of coin by "credit notes"—proposed also by Bellamy—to be just as unnecessary as it was impracticable. In a public letter to the body of directors of Topolobampo, Hertzka wrote (May, 1892):

. . . . Unnecessary, because money in itself is just as harmless as any other instrument, for money is nothing but an instrument designed to perform certain services in the exchange and preservation of wealth. It has, of course, become a tool of oppression and plunder—but what acquisition of the human intellect has not become that in the same degree? . . . . Impossible, because the human industrial organization cannot even be imagined without a measure of value; and money, though not indeed an absolutely perfect one, is yet the

most perfect of all measures of value actually existing. Human labor power would indeed be the worst imaginable of all measures of value, for a measure, to be universally useful, must itself be something fixed, capable of being laid hold of, as unchangeable as possible, whereas human labor power changes its value incessantly.

But Owen believed that money could be almost entirely set aside. Thus interest on capital would disappear of its own accord, and with it also its mischievous drawbacks. From the fact that the carrying-on of the public works (means of transportation and communication, lighting, theaters, etc.) would bring into the community rich profits which would suffice to cover public expenditure, the raising of taxes would be superfluous. Again, from the fact that the people would possess their own houses, that there would be no private shops, and that the land and all aids to production were to be used for farming free of charge, rents and leases would disappear.

And the doing away with interest would make an "unearned increment," which with justice is so much dreaded in the present economic world, an impossibility. Only work could secure the means of livelihood in Topolobampo. "With us," writes Owen in one of his numerous pamphlets (May, 1891), "everyone who is capable of work must lie under the obligation of productive labor. We will do away with drones, according to the model of the bees; gamblers, idlers, speculators, jobbers, middlemen, etc., have amongst us just as little to do as women of doubtful occupation."

The possession of a homestead was enjoined upon each settler, and also made possible, for he had no need to pay anything for it. He had only to pay ten dollars for an allotment of 400 square yards; the company provided the building and the fitting-up of the house for a man, in return for a charge placed to his debit in their books. Since everyone who did not work for himself must be provided with work, no one was without a balance in his favor in the company's books, for which, following the precedent of the co-operative consumption societies, the company supplied everything which a man needed at the cost price, and therefore a house fitted up into the bargain; this did not exclude a man from being able to follow his own taste in the choice of the building lot, the furniture, etc. Thus Owen endeavored to fulfil one of the



chief conditions of a happy, civilized life—namely, a sanitary, beautiful, and pleasant dwelling.

If, as already observed, it was forbidden to the associates to let or transfer their houses and pieces of ground, it is in accordance with Owen's principle that the ground is joint property, and the individual has only the usufruct of it. To speak accurately, he had it free of charge—for the trifle which was paid for the lots served partly for acquiring the same from the government and partly went toward defraying the laying-out expenses of the colony; but he had it only so long as he and his heirs used it. If he wished to go away, or if they declined to remain or to become settlers, the company got back everything at the price formerly received for it, in order to make it over as required to another colonist. In the same way it was arranged about the share certificates. If anyone wished to leave, the corporation paid back the ten dollars received for each share, together with the balance entered in the books for work done and dividends on the shares, and sold the paper to the newcomers; for only settlers could be stockholders.

The organization of work was half communistic, because, as already mentioned, the corporation, in all cases where people did not work for themselves, was the only employer of labor. There was nevertheless not a trace to be found of the illusive equality of real communism. Everyone was to be paid according to his work done and merit, on a scale to be agreed upon; and according to his limited possession of shares participated in the net profits of the company. Consequently there was neither the impossible equality of mind and body, nor an absolute equality of possessions; it was enough to do away with poverty and immoderate wealth, and to assure to every one a decent livelihood. Later it was hoped to be able to reduce the time of work for men to thirty hours a week and for women to twenty (five workdays at six and four hours, respectively). The corporation calculated upon being able to guarantee to every associate profitable work with a definite object. "Although work is the source of all riches, of all that is good, great, and beautiful, the workpeople till now were always and everywhere beggarly poor, hungry, badly dressed, wretchedly

housed, and at the same time were on an average only a quarter of them employed." In Topolobampo there were to be no unemployed. "If anyone does not wish to do this or that work, he is helped to another." On this account no poor would exist. "Nobody needed to claim alms," for the company insured everyone against accidents, fire, inundations, storms, just as much as for old age, and that too without any payment of premiums.

*Private property.*—"It will be of importance for our success to distinguish common possessions from private possessions. The last must be held sacred and guaranteed absolutely to the individual." Thus Owen wrote in 1889:

It requires great care and some experience to be able to make the suggested distinction. . . . All that anyone brings with him or acquires—also machines, tools, and other labor aids which he is able to use without extraneous assistance—forms his private property. Everything for which workmen must be employed belongs to the public means of production. . . . If anyone makes a good invention, justice demands that we should place at his disposal, for the perfecting of the same, a workshop with the necessary instruments, raw materials etc.; and a suitable staff; for from every useful thought the community indirectly obtains benefit. The company should then produce the perfected object under the guidance of the inventor, and should guarantee to him a fixed percentage of the value proportionally, whereby there would still remain a profit to itself.

*Individuality.*—The New York bookseller Lovell, in a report of 1886 about the colony, to which he belonged as one of its founders, and which at that time was just starting into life, observed: "We purpose to promote the free development of individuality. The products of what anyone does quite alone belong to him entirely." And Owen had already written two years before: "Why should shareholders in our future association lose their individuality sooner than the stockholders of a popular railway, gas, or water company?"

*System of schools.*—"We desire to give the children not only a general, but also an industrial education." This we read in Owen's treatise, *Lessons in Payment* (1887).

Girls and boys shall be instructed in music, etc., as well as in useful, practical occupations. The whole instruction in the schools, workshops, model schools for domestic economy, etc., shall be imparted free up to the

twentieth year. The girls shall learn sewing, bookkeeping, to make point lace, wood-carving, metal-work, to model clay, to preserve fruits, to dry seeds, to collect herbs, etc. The boys shall be carpenters, chemists, mechanical engineers, fruit cultivators, etc. Credit is given to every lad and girl for every work done. If the education continues after the years of minority, the boy or girl in question is charged with the cost of instruction, and the rest of the balance in his favor is paid to his account for his future home. . . . On leaving school, they receive one share from the Company as a present.

### *System of maintenance.—*

A certain percentage of the profits [at first fixed at 50 and later on at 10] is annually put aside for the support of persons incapable of work owing to illness or accidents, as well as for widows and children left unprovided for. The right of maintenance is one of our fundamental rights, for no one is allowed to suffer want. . . . With respect to provision for old age, we are thinking of introducing a system of insurance which would insure a pension to all members, after they have passed their fiftieth year of age, by the aid of the premiums to be paid by them. The drawing of this pension would make further labor unnecessary for them. The people then would be in a position, as they pleased, either to remain at home in idleness, or to travel abroad, in case they did not prefer to go on with their professional work from habit or for their own pleasure.<sup>1</sup>

*Administration of justice.*—"Lawyers," it is said in the same pamphlet, "will be almost unknown. Under our form of government there can be no lawsuits. Yet, if we are obliged to appoint an attorney, it is only on account of the legal assistance needful in intercourse with the outer world, as well as for superintending the drawing up of the company's precepts and books according to the spirit of the Mexican laws." The government of Mexico had conceded to the Credit Foncier Company the right of having internal lawsuits settled by arbiters. Nevertheless, according to the Mexican law, it was indeed free to everyone to have recourse to the ordinary law courts of the country; but the statutes of the colony forbade this and compelled submission to the verdict of the arbiter. "Even if it is a question of crime, no attorney may interfere. The accused persons and the witnesses say what they have to say, and the verdict follows entirely on the ground of evidence." It was open to every sentenced person to appeal to the whole body of members.

<sup>1</sup> Lovell, *A Co-Operative City*, 1886.

*Care of health.*—The physicians were to be appointed by the state, with yearly salaries. The greater the number of illnesses, the greater grew the work of the doctor without any increase of income; it must consequently have been of importance to him to keep everybody in good health. "Since his livelihood is assured him, it is easy for him to spare the time to improve himself in his profession and to be active in scientific study." The cost of medical aid and medicine was charged to the people's debit in the books of the company. To the question why medical treatment was not, as Bellamy or Hertzka proposed, free of charge, the leaders of the Topolobampo movement answered, not without reason: "The payment for this necessarily increases the cost of living, and thus it is to everybody's interest to follow as closely as possible the precepts of the science of hygiene; and, moreover, to do this is also right from the point of view of what is agreeable."

*Amusements.*—All games of chance played for money were forbidden. All public amusements (theaters, concerts, balls, etc.) and assemblies were obliged to begin early (at about 18 o'clock, Owen proposes; that is, six hours after 12 o'clock) and end at 10 o'clock in the evening,

for at 22 o'clock no one ought to be found any longer outside his house. . . . The home is destined, by its virtue, its morality, and its taste, to influence favorably the character of the rising generation, and our commonwealth is founded upon the sacredness of the home.

Our philanthropist rightly wished to have nothing in his colony of the "night life" of the great towns. But if he went so far as to forbid the formation of clubs and societies of every kind, it was altogether too strong an encroachment upon personal freedom, even although indeed such a family life as he dreamed of for his colonists might make such clubs unnecessary, and although they are perhaps inclined to prejudice the mind against a domestic life, and to lead to gambling and idleness.

*The press.*—According to Lovell, "the greatest freedom of thought and speech will reign." Since, as the leaders of the movement thought, there could only be one newspaper under the rule of "integral co-operation," "its editor will be bound to

print every communication in the order of its arrival, and that too quite unaltered. Anonymous contributions are not taken any notice of, everything else must without exception be published." That would have been a remarkably queer state newspaper!

The editor is simply limited to the rôle of a collector of news and articles, and if, as a private person he inserts a contribution from his own pen, he must put his signature to it like any other contributor. Only thus can the most absolute freedom of thought and speech be secured, and in consequence the greatest progress. Whoever thinks he has a good plan for the improvement of private or public matters writes to the newspaper, in case he does not prefer to bring the question forward in a public meeting. A suggestion ought to receive attention only when it deserves it by its own merits—not merely because some party, sect, or group supports it.

The female sex was put on a perfect equality with the male. Women could be shareholders, and could choose and fill any office. Their pay was not, as it elsewhere generally was, less than that of the men. Owen wrote:

The woman manages and spends her own property as she pleases, seeks out any occupation she likes, and depends upon the man as little as he does upon her. . . . This complete independence will at last make woman truly noble, free, and intelligent. Then she will influence society in a favorable manner. In Pacific City she will even have three more rights than man: She takes precedence in the choice of a calling, has a title to the best seats in assemblies or amusements, and she need work only six hours (later on four) five days a week, while the man must work eight hours (later on six) six days a week.

As to marriage, it was considered merely a civil contract, which could be dissolved without formality if the married couple could not agree. But only monogamy in the strictest sense was permissible. "Although the possibility of providing for themselves by their own work, and making themselves independent without the bond of marriage, will free women from the necessity of making *mariages de convenance*," Owen encouraged early marriages from motives of morality, and on this account took into consideration the taxation of bachelors, as well as especial rewards to men who married under thirty years of age.

The leaders of the Topolobampo movement asserted emphatically on every opportunity that they wished to proceed in a

strictly businesslike manner. But the conception of what is "purely businesslike" appears to have been taken rather figuratively—somewhat in the sense that the whole affair would be a good business for the shareholders; for we meet with much in the printed utterances of Owen and his fellow-workers which has nothing to do with business. For example:

The company is founded on domestic work, an indigenous currency, household virtue, household love, and family life. . . . We wish to help every member to obtain a luxurious, comfortable private family house. People who have pleasant dwellings, who are employed remuneratively in a regular and systematic manner, and are free from taxes, rents, and debts, must love order and peace, . . . must lead a life of truth, justice, and beauty.

The nationality and creed of the members were not taken into consideration, neither on their arrival nor later on; on the other hand, a person must be able to read and write, and possess the necessary means for traveling and for acquiring a share and an allotment of land—at least at first. In consequence, those persons most in need of aid, the disinherited, the absolutely poor, whose work is the worst paid, were the very persons who could not benefit in the beginning from the advantages expected from the settlement.

Our reformer was especially proud of his extraordinarily detailed and elaborate plan for his future chief town, "Pacific City." This was to have been a model of municipal architecture and administrative art. In its design Owen's profession of engineer was very useful to him, and also the studies of almost twenty years' duration which he and his fellow-workers had devoted to the subject of the characteristics of European and American towns. He had undertaken to create an ideal town like none other in existence. The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa already possessed, as its own property, the necessary territory, and the plans were approved by the Mexican government. Pacific City was to have the same area as New York—29 square miles. A hundred thousand acres were destined for buildings and house gardens, 200,000 for parks and farms. The company wished to sell the pieces of land to its members by allotments in ten groups. The first eight groups were to comprise 500 lots at \$10, \$20,

\$40, \$80, \$100, \$320, \$640, and \$1,280; the two last groups, 48,000 lots at prices to be fixed later on. The price of the allotments in the first group was purposely fixed low, because it was a question of smoothing the difficulties of the beginning of the work of colonizing, while the later comers, who would already enjoy the fruits of the previous work of the first comers, would be obliged to pay more. The smallest lots had an area of about 400 square yards; the largest (forty-eight times as much), about 20,000 square yards. Anyone could choose, according to his own pleasure, the lots he wished to buy, but of course only from among the lots not yet appropriated, and not before he was really proceeding to build.

Owen expected, from the sale of allotments, a total return of 200 million dollars, half of which was to have been spent on building, and the maintenance of the streets, quays, and parks; on the erection of electric municipal railways, aqueducts, theaters, lighting-works, baths, market-places, hotels, dining-rooms, places of assembly, etc.; and finally on the paying-off of the debts that at first were unavoidable; while the greater part of the remainder would have served for the business of insurance, the support of free education, free lectures, libraries, musical performances, flowers, etc.; and lastly the erection of hospitals. Since it was not proposed that the use of the water, the lighting, the theaters, the hotels, the municipal railways, etc., was to be free of charge, the town treasury would always contain sufficient money to make all taxes, mortgages, and such like, superfluous. Whereas elsewhere the incomes from those very necessary buildings and institutions flow, in most cases, into the pocket of private companies or individual managers, in Pacific City they would benefit the town treasury—that is, the community itself—and thus could always be used for embellishing and improving the town.

We find much interesting information concerning the laying-out of Pacific City in Lovell's pamphlet, already mentioned, *A Co-operative City*. The streets were to be broad, since this is an advantage for the traffic, more healthy, and also lessens the danger of fire. Avenues from all the parks would cut the streets at right angles. The parks were to divide the streets at intervals of a

mile, and were to comprise about twenty-six acres. The breadth of the streets was designed to be 35 to 55, that of the avenues, 65 to 75 yards. In every street or avenue it was intended to have four to six rows of trees—for the sake of purifying the air and giving plentiful shade. The streets running north and south were to be 100 yards distant from each other; the streets running west and east, 200 yards; so that each block of houses, consisting of forty-eight lots, was reckoned to cover 20,000 square yards. The factories, shops, etc., were to be confined to isolated parts of the town between avenues. Each block was to be built in a style of architecture symmetrical with itself, but different from the other blocks. The interior fitting-up of each dwelling was reserved for private taste. The following three kinds of dwellings were planned:

1. *Separate dwelling-houses with garden.*—These would have been joined together in groups of fours, so as to save labor in the following manner: Where the four lots met, a common kitchen with a scullery would have been built separately. Thus the house-keeping could have been considerably simplified and improved by the joint application of professional labor.

2. *Terraces or "company dwelling-houses."*—These were to have consisted of twelve or twenty-four or forty-eight houses, as was necessary. Their inhabitants could carry out in great measure the above-mentioned principles of the simplification and improvement of housekeeping by means of the joint employment of experts, and by means of joint kitchen and scullery management. Each house of both these kinds was to be 30 yards in depth, was to have a yard containing a well, and be bordered with a flower garden 30 yards long, which would be managed by a common gardener; and at the end of the garden a common library with reception and recreation rooms could be erected.

3. *The great palaces for single persons*, on the pattern of the "company palace" in Godin's well-known *Familistère* at Guise. Each of such buildings was to have occupied a complete block of 20,000 square yards, and was to have consisted of dwellings of one to ten rooms for 400 to 500 single persons; also of large reception rooms, reading-rooms, bathrooms, dining-rooms,



kitchens, etc. Thus the drawbacks of the single life would be effectually obviated, and the least well-to-do persons would have no need to live without luxury. Everything was to be arranged in the most modern, most practical, most sanitary, and most comfortable fashion. As each family was obliged to possess its house or its larger dwelling, so each single person was obliged to be in possession of his or her appointed rooms in the palaces.

From considerations of health and cleanliness, all animals were to be banished from the neighborhood of human dwellings; on this point Owen's views were excessively strict. Every vehicle was to be driven by electricity, to the exclusion of horses; thus the streets remained clean, and it was not necessary to renew the pavement so frequently. In the factories and places of trade the greatest attention was to have been paid to the requirements of convenience and health. Since it was also intended to cook by means of electricity, there would have been no smoke. The noise in the streets would have been very slight. The delivery of goods bought in the shops was to have been carried on by means of pneumatic tubes, after the customers had made their selection from the patterns present in each block.

It is deplorable that the rather extravagant picture of the future which Owen sketches in the following words could not be realized, at least in part:

Through "integral co-operation," such as will be practiced in Pacific City, we can enjoy everything good, useful and lofty. We can in architecture restore all that is elementary, beautiful, and magnificent. Oil-paintings can adorn the walls of the simplest people; bronze and marble groups can stand in every garden. We can hear music every hour; bells can call us to our public duties, or to our assemblies and recreations. The newest inventions can be made use of at once. Each member can have at his disposal every newspaper in the world. The most renowned of orators can give us, if we please, the best discourses. Each citizen with very little trouble can have the best of meals; and that kind of peace which is possible only when one feels oneself perfectly secure, and knows that every fellow-man is raised above all want, will be experienced in a higher degree in Pacific City than anywhere else on earth.

### III

The community which Owen wished to form for the embodiment of "integral co-operation" lay in the country of Topolo-

Lampo Bay, in the Mexican province of Sinaloa, and chiefly embraced the magnificent valley of the Fuerte.

Had the Credit Foncier Company been in a pecuniary position to push forward its irrigation canal more quickly and to start upon the railway as soon as possible, it would have had indeed the most splendid prospects in agricultural and mercantile undertakings, as the natural advantages which it enjoyed were very great. An extraordinary mineral wealth, grand natural beauties, and the most desirable alternations of valleys and mountain, wild woods and wide rivers rich in fish, go hand in hand with a luxurious vegetation which embraces the products of all zones, and is also combined with an extremely healthful and equable climate. From the circumstances that Topolobampo lies much nearer to the great trade emporiums of the United States, and those of China and Australia, than San Francisco or any other harbor on the coast of the Pacific, Owen's co-operative state might have had a splendid future before it.

But the Credit Foncier Company had to fight incessantly with pecuniary difficulties, which hindered it to a great extent, and which the otherwise favorable conditions were not able to counter-balance. Many calls for money were published in vain, making it impossible to commence building the 1,000-mile railway. Yet at last in 1893 it was possible to start on the construction of the irrigation canal, which was four yards deep, nine yards wide, and seven miles long. The blame for the delay in the development of the settlement was ascribed by Owen to the prejudice and want of trust that made itself felt in consequence of the overhasty commencement of the colony. This is indeed almost always fatal in such undertakings. On this point, one of the leaders of the movement, C. B. Hoffmann, remarked:

When the company was organized in 1886, we published a call in which we sought a hundred pioneers who should build the first houses and the water-works. Instead of a hundred capable men, many men, women, and children hastened hither, among them members without certificates, and even some who were not members at all. In their mad eagerness to obtain an earthly paradise for nothing, these people disregarded the warnings and protests of the directors. What was the consequence? Disillusion and privation. Those who were themselves to blame then attacked us in the papers.

Many paid heavily for their precipitation and were obliged to return again to the United States. Only 100 to 150 remained behind as pioneers. Later on, every year about a hundred certificates were disposed of. By the middle of 1892 about 500 persons were to be found in the place, partly occupied in cultivating the soil, partly in the building of the irrigation canal which was to increase the fruitfulness of the ground, enabling it to produce the fruits of all zones, and which was the first great public undertaking of the company on its own account. According to various reports, the settlers led indeed a severe, but healthy and agreeable, sort of life near the canal and in the villages of La Logia, Topolobampo, etc. They had a library, consisting of 3,000 volumes, thousands of pamphlets, and many periodicals. They had schools, dance entertainments, musical performances, readings and discourses for themselves and the natives. At weekly assemblies all manner of subjects were debated. Neither entertainment nor instruction was wanting. Considerable progress was visibly made in the supply of food, as also in respect of dwellings. But discord and difference of opinion made its appearance among the colonists, who at first were chiefly occupied with agriculture. The fundamental principles (constitution), partly on account of this and partly owing to want of money, remained a dead letter. In the end the state of things demanded a remedy, and so Owen, who on account of his profession lived mostly in Pennsylvania, determined, in March, 1892, to go for two weeks to Topolobampo in order to make peace. Regarding this we read in the *Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*:

The masterly manner in which Owen by his clear explanation of principles which had been thoroughly misunderstood, prepared a peaceful end for all factions, will never be forgotten in the history of our colony. Since 1888 there has been no such return of confidence, of happiness, and of brotherly love.

The chief results of the consultations between the president (Owen) and the delegates of the company was the acceptance of a new and considerably shorter constitution, or "New Definition of the Principles." Everything which was not of an essentially business character was simply struck out, for, as one of the directors remarked,

it is questionable whether the company would have been able to overcome the thousand inner and outer difficulties which obstruct every undertaking of this kind, if it were burdened with questions of morals, religion, charity, marriage, and protective duties. . . . We do well to leave such questions to the individual. At first purely business matters will completely claim our attention. . . . If the company succeeds in peacefully solving the questions of land, trade, and means of communication, it will have done everything which, generally speaking, it can do, and more than has been done for long elsewhere.

It was resolved as soon as possible to change decisively the constitution of the Credit Foncier Company on the basis of the following principles: The soil and the remaining natural resources are to be administered by the company for the benefit of the members under the authority of statutes to be established by these latter. Neither the company nor its members may sell the land, pledge, or otherwise alienate it. The standard of value shall consist of services. It is left to the common-sense of the members themselves, and to the working of the economic laws of supply, demand, and cost of production, to fix the value of several products. All works carried on for the common benefit (i. e., means of communication, gas and electric-lighting works, aqueducts, etc.) are the property of the company and are at the disposal of the members. The producers have an absolute control over the income arising from their products, so that a monopoly and a business in profits are impossible. A. K. Owen bound himself never to agree to a plan which does not place the chiefs of every department under the supervision of the actual members. At the most, 10 per cent. of the sums resulting from the sale of allotments to members is to be put aside for paying the dividends on the shares; the rest is, in so far as not otherwise appropriated, to be expended on improvements, insurance, and objects of common utility. Owen bound himself to waive his claim upon the company, which amounts to \$15,000, to take share certificates for it, and also to satisfy the other creditors.

Already in the autumn of 1891 Owen had placed himself in connection with Theodore Hertzka and begged him to transport "Freeland," the colony planned by him, not to Africa, but to Mexico, and to merge it in the Credit Foncier Company. The leader of the Freeland movement, however, found the difference of

opinion on some important points too great to be able to admit the possibility of a union. Apart from the matter of money (compare what was said above), he chiefly found fault with the constitution of Topolobampo as the antithesis of true freedom:

It does not abolish completely the servile institutions of the past and does not set up even a kind of imperfect communism. . . . I do not comprehend how, in the face of such statutes, full pay for the workers can be even mentioned. . . . These definitions have clearly arisen from purely practical considerations. Money was needed. . . . If one despairs of collecting the requisite capital by means of disinterested contributions, I always consider it better to apply to the money market and to promise fixed interest for it. But with the inner organization the interest on capital and the profits of the capitalist (*entrepreneur*) have nothing at all to do; not the shareholders, but the workers as such, must be the masters of the whole concern and all the income remaining over after liquidation of the outside debts must be distributed among the members, and that, too, in proportion to the different amounts of work done by them. . . . All the publications of the company show the best and purest aims, yet without giving evidence of a clear consciousness of what is necessary for the attainment of the same.

Hertzka delayed the final decision concerning Owen's proposal of uniting the two undertakings until after the carrying-through of the proposed change of constitution. But before it came to this, something occurred which clearly ought to have helped the Credit Foncier of Sinaloa out of all its difficulties and made it prosperous; but in reality was destined to bring about its fall. Already some time before, Michael Flürscheim, Henry George's well-known principal follower in Germany, a leader of the later movement for land reform, had put himself on very good terms with Owen, and in February, 1892, had sent \$1,000 dollars to Topolobampo and had made known his wish to join him, as, on the whole, the statutes of the joint-stock state pleased him.

At the beginning of 1893 he agreed on a place and spot for holding consultations about the intended union. And at this time the two schemes were brought under one management. With reference to this Franz Pätow remarked:

For the purposes of general business activity within the limits of the company itself, the following statutes in the ordering of the business are provided: Private business is permitted, if carried on either by individuals or associations who can make their own agreements with

the workmen employed by them, whether they allow to these workmen wages or a share in the profits, or both. But there is the condition that they conclude with the trade department of the company a binding agreement to let all their purchases, sales, and exchanges be effected through that department, and in consequence they must neither sell direct to anyone nor buy direct from anyone, whether within or without the colony; thus such business will go through the books of that department and be ratified by it. The price for all products delivered to the department is fixed by the producers themselves. The cost price for wares produced by the productive associations of the company is to be settled by the directors on their own responsibility; these persons are responsible if they, after the returns of one year, permit the further carrying-on of such associations as cannot compete in price with the private businesses, it being presupposed that the private businesses bind themselves to maintain the cheaper price for at least five years. The general assembly can indeed resolve on the competition of the individual businesses.

At the beginning everything appeared to be full of promise, and Flürsheim invested a pretty little sum in the undertaking; but very soon important differences of opinion made their appearance, which, in a short time—even before the transformed commonwealth was in a position to place itself, as a joint concern, under the protection of the Mexican law for companies—led to hot feuds and the most uncomfortable mutual suspicions. Flürsheim said that Owen might have the choice of being called an irresponsible fool or a rascal.

The fundamental views of both these social reformers clearly did not well allow of union. The German rejected the new statutes of the Credit Foncier Company, though shortly before he had approved of them, and in the summer of 1893 he induced a great part of Owen's associates to revolt. With this following he forthwith called another settlement into existence—*Libertad*, also in the state of Sinaloa. But the statutes of *Libertad* were still more confused and mistaken than those of Topolobampo. The consequence of the friction, the revolt, and the thereby increased want of money was the ruin of Owen's state in 1895, and indeed the state founded by Flürsheim was not able to last long. With reference to the constitution of the latter, Hertzka wrote, the end of August, 1893:

Flürsheim has justly reproached Owen with the fact that it would not suffice to proclaim the principles of freedom and justice; one must also care-

fully guard oneself from wishing to force men to especial kinds of freedom and justice. He pointed out to Owen the example of the earlier Topolobampo constitution, that it would have been a worse despotism than the most cruel and most reckless of those of the so-called "bourgeois" world. But in truth the tyranny to which the Flürscheim constitution must lead is more unbearable by far and certainly more absurd.

The ideas of the Pennsylvania engineer, in our judgment, contained much that is good, many a great truth and an excellent practical kernel, if also not a little that is intricate and worthless, useless and impracticable. His joint-stock state was in truth too artificially planned. On paper it certainly looked very enticing, and in any case Owen's efforts, and also the unusual capacity of his pioneers for enthusiasm and self-sacrifice, deserved warm admiration.

Flürscheim was not alone in attacking Owen violently. In 1894 Robert H. Cowdrey,<sup>2</sup> who was long a member of the Credit Foncier Company, said :

I am firmly convinced that C. B. Hoffmann, M. Flürscheim, and the settlers are seriously and honestly striving for the successful development of the colony, but they are powerless because they are in the hands of Owen, whom, from his own utterances and actions, I must hold to be a mere adventurer who makes a profit out of the necessities of others in order to enrich himself. I am convinced that the colonists have not succeeded in freeing themselves from landowners, but rather have in Owen a landowner who will drain them to the last drop of blood and then will laugh in his sleeve. Still, it is possible that he will not succeed in doing this, for he may not be in a position to raise the necessary money for the fulfilment of his obligations to the Mexican government, etc. In this case the settlement could still be saved by true reformation, and its constitution might be suitably changed.

Since I do not know Owen personally, I can form no judgment as to the justice or injustice of Cowdrey's severe verdict. I also know nothing of what has taken place in Topolobampo since 1895, for since then I have been left without any signs of its continued existence. A letter from Owen dated April 24, 1898, brought me the first news. The more important passages of this report are as follows :

The Topolobampo Colony, as a co-operative colony, has been broken up by an organized set of speculators who came in as colonists and waited the

<sup>2</sup> Author of the novel *A Tramp in Society*; in 1888 the Labor Party's candidate for the presidency.

first opportunity to put their plans into execution. It took them four years to accomplish the overthrow of the plans I laid down, and they are now fighting among themselves, for they have lost all the money and time they put into the venture, and I have succeeded in defeating every plan they made public; but after the victory there is nothing left of the former great movement. However, I am going forward again now. I have colony concessions and railroad concessions, but have to go forward with business arrangements with business persons; cannot depend upon the colonists standing up and doing anything for themselves. Any speculator can break up a colony when it rests entirely upon the people themselves, for the people themselves are always to be misled and to be entertained and fooled to do everything against their own interests, when they are not held strictly in hand by a man who dares to do right even against their own protests. Our colonists, whom I had led into a place and into conditions which could have made them free and given them the resources of an empire, absolutely *resolved* themselves out of every advantage and back into serfdom again, and even into a worse serfdom than they left the United States to free themselves from. There are no papers published now on the movement.

This letter gave little information concerning the events of the last years, but it proved that the tenacious man was still thinking of his scheme. That his hopes were crushed I gathered from the following passages of a letter, dated Baldwinsville, March 27, 1899:

Mexico will *not* allow me to go forward with co-operation there. So I am just about to try and make a *model city* in these states—in the New South. . . . There's big work to be done here, and I will give every effort to bring about a new condition of affairs, *without which this people as a nation will perish*.

He does not, however, seem to have succeeded in this plan, for a year and a half later I received from him a letter (dated Baldwinsville, N. Y., September 22, 1900) containing the following:

I go to Mexico City next week to get a concession once more to begin the colonization of Topolobampo. I cannot make a model city such as should be made, owing to Mexican opposition to such new ideas; but I can make a better city than now exists on the earth, if the people who go in with me will have backbone enough to do one or two things that are good and permanent. I send you my new plan for a model city, as prepared by me over a year ago, and which I hope to carry into effect; but I cannot do it before I can make a part success at Topolobampo. . . . There has to be a radical change



in our affairs of city, state, and nation, or we as a nation perish as did Rome, Greece, and all others that have gone before.

Owen's next letter, dated Baldwinsville, N. Y., August 21, 1901, contained the following among the rest:

I inclose the first copy of my pamphlet on the *Home Investment Company*. This new effort to get the producers to employ themselves I will start as soon as I have made some *big money* from Pacific City lands on Topolobampo harbor. The Mexican government will not permit me to carry out the *crédit foncier* plan of colonization; so I have been forced, in order to save my property, to take up "business" methods and to try to make a regular and clean city. I am looking out for \$50,000 to be paid into the Pacific City Terminal and Contracting Company's treasury. . . . The trusts have gotten everything here that is worth having into their hands, and the producers will not be able to get upon their own lands and into their own houses and shops, before some friends with ample money lead the way. My aim is to make this money at Topolobampo, to enable me to buy lands, open farms, build factories, etc. To do this, I hope Pacific City site can be quickly made a commercial and manufacturing place of grand import. The business papers outlining this *business* enterprise I inclose herewith.

A letter of Mr. Owen of March 2, 1906, expresses the determination to press his claims and carry forward his plans.

Evidently, in spite of almost overwhelming adversities, Colonel Owen has lost none of his intrepidity and almost apostolic hopefulness. But I, for my part, am far from optimistic. At any rate, whatever colony, if any, Owen may ultimately succeed in establishing, it will never answer to his original intentions.

## INSURANCE OF INDUSTRIAL WORKING-MEN AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TUBERCULOSIS PREVENTION<sup>1</sup>

DR. ARNOLD C. KLEBS

Chicago

The moneys which set into motion and keep working the ever-growing machinery of tuberculosis prevention in this country are, with few exceptions, supplied by voluntary contributions, given with charitable intent. Some institutional provision for consumptives has been made out of government funds. These, of course, are preventive measures, but the tendency is to class them also as charitable institutions. This holds good for almost all our public hospitals and relief service; and, as Duclaux expressed it, "we have remained anchored to that idea of charity—a very noble, very beautiful idea, looked at from the view-point of the one who follows it, but a false, almost absurd idea, when one contemplates the benefits society can possibly derive from it."

That this is the case with us, renowned as we are for our practical sense, is particularly astonishing, because we have learned to recognize tuberculosis as a social and economic problem, probably the greatest of all problems, which by a systematic and sustained effort is eminently preventable. Such an effort must be planned; it must look forward—which charity never does. The latter cares and provides for the poor and the sick out of pure sympathy. It does signal service to suffering humanity; but here is where its legitimate field, its noble mission, ought to stop. Its services applied to fields of prevention, or to any problem needing a concentrated, sustained effort for the benefit of society, are altogether misplaced. It is wrong, and it disturbs the directness and efficiency of our actions against infectious, communicable diseases, to base them on the idea of charity. We must do away with it and put in its place the right of self-defense; which, how-

<sup>1</sup> A paper read before the Sociological Section of the annual meeting of the National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis, Washington, D. C., May 18, 1906.

ever, we can and must exercise with the highest humanitarian spirit.

The problem of tuberculosis, however, cannot be attacked by the same comparatively simple measures which are successfully employed against the acute infectious diseases. Here antiseptic precautions and quarantine generally suffice. Tuberculosis also, for so long considered an incurable disease, has up to very recent times called forth antiseptic measures to the exclusion of any others. The destruction of infectious sputum and disinfection were the principal methods recommended, and more or less enforced. Convincing evidence, however, has taught us that, although tuberculosis is undoubtedly caused by an infectious microbe, it is only conditionally communicable. The natural powers of resistance against its invasion are very great, and the causes which lower this resisting power are well known to us. They are numerous and intimately related to our mode of life, our habits, our bringing-up, our housing, our occupation; in one word, to the customs and exigencies of modern civilization.

Given the facts of its communicability and the opportunity for infection, together with the knowledge that the consumptive individual is the only source of the infectious material, the necessity and the direction of antiseptic measures are clearly indicated, and we have only to determine which methods are the most efficient. But given also the facts that we are naturally very resistant to this infecting agent, and that we can therefore regard it with a certain degree of complacency, we must, in view of the tremendous prevalence of the disease and its great economic importance, concentrate our principal efforts against the evil effects of certain conditions in our civilized life, which we know lower the naturally high resistance which our race possesses against the disease.

All this means, therefore, efforts against long-established and deeply rooted prejudices, against unhealthy habits and practices, against pauperizing agencies; in short, against all those factors which undermine the health and strength of individuals and the nation. Education—specific, popular, well-directed education—is the watchword and the promising remedy for these evils in

our times. In the matter of tuberculosis an educational campaign is well under way in this country, but it needs focusing, concentrating. The task is bewildering by its endless exigencies, but it can and will be fulfilled. If, as we ought, we place education in the front rank of our campaign, we must have the proper instruments to apply it; we must have schools wherein to teach; we must have teachers who know their subject thoroughly and how to teach it effectively; we must have the means for objective practical demonstration. But all this requires money, much money; we may have to call on the voluntary giver to help us in the building, but for the maintenance we need steady, reliable resources—resources which will naturally meet the exigencies and which need not be made available by spasmodic appeals. It might be said that such a plan is vague and fantastic, that it dreams of world-reform and the eradication of all evils, and that because it attempts too much it will accomplish nothing. That this is not so can be proved by examples of eminently successful efforts in the direction of such a plan. The fact that of necessity we must go step by step to come to the perfection must not discourage.

If the right and the duty of self-defense is to be the basis of our efforts, it is the one most attacked who ought to bear the largest share of the burden. To make him who is attacked, though he has not succumbed yet, an object of charity, is demoralizing, pauperizing practice. To show him how to help himself, to look forward for possible trouble on account of his exposed position, is the soundest and a perfectly practicable method. In the case of tuberculosis, who is the most attacked, most exposed one? There can be no doubt that it is the working-man, and especially the one employed in industrial enterprises. He is an asset, a very valuable asset, in society; and society has a duty, an interest, to show him, if he does not see it himself, how he can preserve his economic integrity. His sole capital is his sound body, and if that becomes defective, his income ceases.

Let a disease come to him—one which kills outright, as does pneumonia or a grave injury; the very suddenness of the catastrophe, after the shock has passed, carries in itself the stimulus for readjustment; the family will rise to it, they will adjust them-

selves, finding ready helpers, affected by the tragic and awful element in the calamity. But let another disease come to this same worker—one which will gradually but continuously sap his vitality, reducing his earnings, progressing all the time very slowly, but surely; he sees before him, not death, because next week he will be better, but hunger, distress, poverty, for himself, for his wife and the little ones. And so he borrows, hoping all along for the next week when he will be better; and this hope sees him soon in bed, from which he never will get up until he is carried out. And this has gone on through years; he has not paid his creditors; they are his enemies; his old friends he has lost; they gave him up long ago when he began to earn less and less out of "pure laziness." Such is the story of the consumptive working-man; and when death has ended his misery, his family belong to the pauper class, robbed of all courage, diseased in body and mind, not able any more to readjust themselves—a tax on society. All this misery slowly creeping over a happy, self-supporting, and self-respecting family, barred from all the tragic elements of the sudden catastrophe and the help it brings, all the possibilities of a spread of this awful disease which it fosters in the bosom of the family, all this stupendous though unappreciated tax on society—all this is preventable.

It is well that we bring before our eyes this sad picture, because we usually see only the end of a long sequence of events, and accept it with fatalistic resignation as the inevitable. In trying to find out what tuberculosis means, we count up the fatalities and are astonished at the great numbers; we do not think of the casualties in this great battle, which make the disease the greatest of all problems. And what have we done so far to help the working-man against this his greatest foe? We give him nicely printed rules of how to lead a healthy life and so prevent consumption; we invite him to our expositions and show him that people can be cured of the disease by sleeping out of doors and by being treated in sanatoria; but before all we tell him he must not spit, or he will infect everybody around him. Some professional philanthropists are very strong in this sort of education and expect wonders from it, and forget entirely that in a

problem of such stupendous dimensions these laudable efforts are but drops in an ocean. It is a slow and wholly inadequate method, but one not to be discouraged as long as we have nothing better.

We have an example of how the problem is met with signal success, and it is worth while to analyze it. I think of the system of obligatory insurance for working-men in Germany. It has become the most powerful factor in tuberculosis prevention in that country. Every working-man of a certain wage scale is obliged by law to insure himself and his family against sickness, invalidity, and old age. His employer deducts one-half of a certain proportion of the employee's wages, and, after adding the other half to it himself, remits the total to the insurance authorities who are in charge of the funds. The contributions to this fund are a very trifling tax on the working-man, but the benefits are very great. In case of disabling sickness the insured gets for twenty-six weeks a sick benefit, one-half of the customary or day wages; his relatives, if he is taken care of in a hospital, get a sum of at least one-half of the sick benefit. At death or during confinement premiums are also paid. The invalidity insurance provides for those whose disability exceeds twenty-six weeks, also assisting a family during the treatment of the patient. This latter, particularly, has been utilized to give the working-men the benefit of a systematic and practical method of tuberculosis prevention.<sup>2</sup> This opportunity was given by paragraphs of the invalidity insurance law which make it a duty of the insurance office to provide at its expense proper treatment for the purpose

<sup>2</sup> The German sickness insurance and the invalidity and old-age insurance must not be confounded. They are different, though they supplement each other.

The insurance offices against sickness are regulated by the law of June 15, 1883. They are supported by weekly premiums the total amount of which depends on the wages, the maximum being 15½ cents, corresponding to daily wages of at least 82½ cents. In return the office has to provide the sick with medical care, medicines, sick-benefit; and in case of death a death benefit dependent on the amount of the wages is paid. The obligatory subscribers to the sickness insurance funds are the same whom the law of February 22, 1889, requires to insure against invalidity or old age.

The latter obligation is extended to every person, older than sixteen years, earning wages or salary of less than \$500, and which can be enumerated as follows: working-men, laborers, apprentices, domestics, commercial and clerical

of preventing disabling invalidity. This law thus provided the working-man, out of the funds which he himself supplied, with most excellently equipped and managed institutions, which were established by the insurance office. The tremendous expenditure necessary for this has been amply justified by the results. Since it was found that in certain industries 50 per cent. and more of the working-men were suffering from tuberculosis, and would sooner or later have their earning capacity reduced and finally become disabled, thus taxing very heavily the insurance funds, preventive measures had to be instituted as a matter of self-defense pure and simple.

The vastness of the undertaking may be gathered from a few figures. Under the law for sickness insurance there have been paid for the benefit of the insured from 1885 to 1903 nearly 300 million dollars and from the invalidity insurance funds from 1891 to 1903 200 million dollars; and during the last eight years the invalidity insurance offices took care (for an average of three months for each case) of 101,806 tuberculous patients, at a total expenditure of about 9 million dollars. Ninety thousand of these patients were taken care of in sanatoria established by the insurance office.

The protective machinery was started with the establishment of sanatoria. There are now in the neighborhood of a hundred throughout the empire. This was done because the treatment of consumptives in properly equipped and managed sanatoria had given the best results in the hands of private individuals. To return the insured as soon as possible to earning capacity, to prevent invalidism, was the business proposition.

employees, sailors on ships on sea or rivers. The premium, the amount of which is regulated by the wage scale, does not exceed  $7\frac{1}{2}$  cents per week, and is paid in equal shares by the working-man and by the employer. Every insured who has paid his premiums regularly during a minimum time (about 200 weeks) has a right to a pension if he has lost his working capacity (not through accident), or when he reaches the age of seventy. This pension is composed of a fixed contribution, supplied by the state, of a fixed compensation furnished by the insurance office, and by an extra payment depending on the number and value of subscriptions made by the working-man—that is, on the duration of affiliation with the office and his value as a wage-earner. This pension, however, does under no circumstances exceed \$47.80 per year. The average amount of the contributions by the insured of which the employer pays one half is about \$5 per year. (Duclaux.)

This the sanatoria accomplished in from 70 to 80 per cent. of the patients treated, and by the saving of dividends justified the initial expenditure for these costly institutions.

Needless to say, with German thoroughness exact data were kept and statistics compiled. From these it soon became evident that better results were obtained the earlier the patient's disease was recognized and sanatorium treatment instituted. The sanatorium had trained a great number of physicians to a thorough understanding of this fact and its fundamental importance, and with their help the insurance office was put in a position where it could properly classify the patients whom it was obliged to take care of. It restricted the use of the sanatorium more and more to the earliest cases, thus improving the results achieved and insuring their permanency. This meant, however, provision for those patients who could not be considered appropriate subjects for sanatorium treatment, and in the last years this fact has been the impetus for the creation of other institutional provisions, in a sense even more important for the prevention of tuberculosis, than the sanatorium.

Again this was dealt with on business principles, with the underlying thought that prevention pays best, and that therefore the maximum effort had to be given to the curable, preventable case, the minimum to the incurable one. By making contracts with hospitals, and by also establishing such out of the funds, the incurable case was provided for in a way much less expensive than in sanatoria. For those cases on the borderline curability, observation stations were created—simple open-air day camps where the patient could spend his day in the open air, well fed and properly supervised. These camps—*Genesungsheime*, "convalescent stations"—of late have been also utilized for patients dismissed from the sanatoria. In the sanatorium the patient had gone through a régime of rest in the open air; here he is held to occupation in order to fit him better and more permanently for work, and if his former occupation was such as to expose him seriously to the probability of a relapse, a chance was given him to learn other pursuits, in which he could not only earn a living, but improve his bodily condition and make permanent the benefit



derived from the sanatorium régime. Similar camps, but with a somewhat different purpose, have sprung up at the same time for those cases in which for some reason or other tuberculous trouble was anticipated, though no definite diagnosis could be made. I refer to the *Erholungsstätten*; "open-air rest camps" this term can be translated. Situated near cities or great industrial centers, they offer to "run-down" working-men a vacation, a rest in the open air with good food and no care, since his family is also provided for—a luxury which thus far only the man with capital could indulge in, but a very important factor in the prevention of a disease which is so insidious in its beginning that it will often be impossible to make a diagnosis until conditions are irremediable.

All this does not yet cover all the details of this admirable preventive machinery. The connecting link is provided for by the most important institution of the *Fürsorgestelle*. "Information and advice station" it might be called, though this describes only one phase of its activity. They correspond in some ways to the French *dispensaires*, inaugurated by Calmette, but they are simpler, more compact, and their effect more far-reaching because they work in intimate association with the factors above described. They primarily give information to patients, but they give no relief themselves; they direct and advise appropriate relief and treatment, as the exigencies of the given case may demand, the insurance agencies providing the same. But they do a great deal more: they exert a hygienic and sanitary supervision over the patient's family and his home. They employ for this splendidly trained and experienced nurses. The physical condition of each member of the family is determined and supervised. Children in defective health, so discovered, are taken out of city schools and sent to the country or seashore; or, if that is not needed, they continue their studies in the so-called forest schools, where the classroom is a forest or a simple open shelter in it, where they are properly fed and their bodily and mental welfare looked after.

I have dwelt at length on the details of these provisions, because it seems to me necessary to emphasize that it is not the

insurance principle, as such alone, which is important as an instrument of tuberculosis prevention. The payment of sick benefits and premiums alone can never accomplish what properly conceived, planned, and managed provisions, as described, can do. Through the latter is brought about the appropriate and effective juxtaposition of muscular power and brain power for the common good. There in Germany a wise government has conceived and initiated the plan; it has given to those whose health is their principal capital the opportunity to save a penny in the right time, to use it when it is sorely needed; it has made the employer contribute his share to it, for he also is interested in the good working condition of the one he employs. The employers have gladly responded to the call, and in many instances they remit the whole amount instead of the obligatory one-half. The working-men at first resented the tax and the order of the paternal government; but they soon found how much they were the gainers, and now there is pretty general satisfaction with the plan, and the utilization of its provisions has become a matter of course.

To us here, with our individualistic tendencies, with what we are pleased to call "personal liberty," anything savoring of paternalism or governmental coercion is eminently distasteful. But as our institutions grow older and more complex, we become more conscious of the wastefulness and other shortcomings of an unrestricted application of the individualistic doctrine. The necessity of individual submission to social exigencies becomes more and more appreciated. The wave of moral reform which has struck this country is a manifestation of this tendency, and is sure to be followed by one for physical betterment. In this tuberculosis must surely become the most prominent point of attack.

Mr. W. J. Bryan has recently said, very justly: "Individualism and socialism define tendencies rather than concrete systems;" so we need not become sectarians or pedants if we lean more toward one side than the other. In general, all government is more or less socialistic, and certainly the management of the German insurance plan deserves this term, for it means collective ownership and operation of all its provisions and institutions through the state for the benefit of society. By distributing insur-

ance offices throughout the empire, by respecting the personal liberty of the individual to the fullest extent as far as the interests of the common good will allow it, by permitting a voice in the management of the plan to those most interested, individual initiative is not suppressed, but furthered. The working-man simply takes what he has paid for; he owes nothing to charity; and when he goes to these institutions to regain his health, he feels at home. The promotion of this state of mind is very important; the charity system brings demoralization, loss of self-respect, pauperization of a class whose principal defect in its social struggles is lack of acquaintance with fundamental principles. It can pay for the teaching, but it needs the leaders, teachers, and schools.

The possibility of an obligatory insurance system for working-men in this country is looked at with grave doubt. The reason for this is twofold—the one a general aversion to coercion, already alluded to; the other an unfavorable comparison with existing insurance institutions. The latter shows insurance as an expensive machinery, too costly for the class under consideration for the benefits it can afford. Agencies and collections are chiefly responsible for this high cost. With a total expenditure of about 26 per cent. of the premiums, statistics show that the present-day agency system costs the policy-holders of American companies over 16 per cent. of all premiums paid—i. e., 60 millions out of 378 millions dollars of premiums in 1904.

So-called industrial insurance, small policies with weekly payments, taken chiefly by wage-earners and their families, provides from 50 to 60 per cent. of its premiums for expenses, caused by the great cost of "writing" and collecting these small amounts one at a time.

In the German obligatory system, where the moneys are simply deducted from the wages and forwarded by the employer, all this expenditure for agents and collections is saved. A private corporation also guards itself against bad risks by medical examination of applicants, thus excluding many in need of it. The obligatory system accepts everyone as long as he is capable of earning a certain sum, holding that those earning less or more

can and must in the first case be taken care of by charity, in the second case take care of themselves.<sup>3</sup>

Insurance by private corporations, however, can be so managed that it will be made economical and accessible to the wage-earner. There is a plan now being perfected for the formation of such an organization in Massachusetts, modeled after English companies which, by doing away with the agency system, selling insurance over the counter, have brought the entire expense down to 4.6 to 9 per cent. of the premiums. It is counted that such a system will bring about a reduction of 15 per cent. in premium rates, and that industrial insurance can be furnished at a saving of from 30 to 40 per cent. of the rates now charged by the present industrial companies; the latter saving to be accomplished by abolishing the collecting system, through co-operation of the employers, who are expected to attend to the solicitation and collection for the entire force of their employees.

Certain large corporations, employers of great numbers of working-men, have for some time seen the necessity of protective insurance relief or benefit provision for their employees, and have put such a system into working operation. In these relief departments the company usually provides the administrative expenses and guarantees the whole undertaking, reserving to itself the right of representation on the managing board. Some of these departments, especially those of some railroad companies, are splendidly managed and have proved immensely useful to the working-men. The subject of prevention of disease, however, has not been attacked by them, but there is no doubt that it is bound to come.

Fraternal associations, friendly and benefit societies, and trade-unions have all certain insurance features, and some of them would seem to have sufficient means to grapple with the

<sup>3</sup> Professor C. R. Henderson estimates the minimum of existence for American conditions at \$600 in a family of five persons, and considers as proper subjects of obligatory insurance the large class of working-men who earn between \$600 and \$900 per family (including earnings of wife and children). He thinks that this may be extended downward to \$400 and upward to \$1,000 in some localities, and that above \$1,000 a special provision may be made for optional use of the insurance offices up to \$1,300 or so. (The German law places the upper limit at \$500.)

problem of tuberculosis prevention. Concrete plans in this direction have, as I understand, been submitted to the National Fraternal Congress, where resolutions were passed and a committee appointed to investigate the matter. The beneficiary orders have a membership of 5,000,000; together with the purely fraternal orders, 8,000,000. At a penny per month, \$600,000 to \$960,000 could be collected, which, it is figured, will amply suffice to purchase the ground and erect a sanatorium, and one cent per member twice a year thereafter would maintain the institution. The plan is proposed principally on financial grounds, and on the estimate that \$9,000,000 has been paid yearly out of the treasuries in death benefits for those who have died from tuberculosis.

These plans have their duplicates in England. There a National Committee for the Establishment of Sanatoria for workers has been formed at the initiative of the Hospital Saturday Fund. In this committee are represented various benefit societies. A sanatorium for 200 patients, to cost not more than \$250,000 (1,000 to \$1,250 per bed), is to be established and to be made self-supporting by endowments of beds by friendly societies for use of their members (at the rate of about \$6 weekly per bed). A site of 250 acres is selected, and the plan provides for the establishment of a farm colony, where those patients whose condition allows it can learn horticulture, fruit-growing, and other desirable outdoor pursuits. The capital sum necessary for the erection of buildings is estimated at about \$250,000, which is to be raised by public subscription and with the assistance of the Friendly Societies.

This combination of benefit associations is certainly worthy of interest and should induce imitation. It may perhaps be well to outline the scheme proposed by the post-office employees by which they intend to cover the expenses for treatment of their fellow-workers in the above sanatorium. It has been figured out that a deduction of a halfpenny a week from the wages will supply ample funds to endow fifty beds, and the postmaster-general has consented to such a deduction being made by the proper officers from the wages of post-office employees who give their consent. Any employee contracting tuberculosis, and found suitable by

the physician for sanatorium treatment, can be admitted free of charge to the sanatorium, with six months' leave on full pay to enable him to provide for his family. (Latham.)

We have certainly plenty of strong associations of working-men in this country, heavily taxed by tuberculosis, who could take similar action. The Cigar-Makers' Union, for instance, as it was recently shown in an admirable address made by its president, Mr. G. W. Perkins, at a conference of the Chicago Tuberculosis Institute, expended in 1905 20 per cent. of its death benefits on account of those who died from tuberculosis, and 24 per cent. of its sick benefits for those suffering from the disease; that is, a total of about \$73,300.

All these examples show efforts in the right direction, and a realization that the problem of tuberculosis must be met by methods and measures, supported primarily by those most interested. But the question of tuberculosis prevention, it must be remembered, cannot be solved only by introducing inexpensive insurance and by building sanatoria. The insurance must be guided and utilized for appropriate provisions, and of this the sanatorium is only one, as is well exemplified by the experience in Germany. A sanatorium which is instituted only for the purpose of curing and restoring the working-men to earning capacity does not fulfil its mission. If it is not primarily used as a school for practical demonstration and teaching of principles and methods of hygiene and prevention, I for my part would rather do without it. The expensiveness of its construction in Germany, England, France, and to some extent also in this country, prevents its needed multiplication and also defeats its purpose as a school. Let us not imitate Germany in this respect by building palaces for the consumptive working-men, who cannot help but feel discontented when they return to unpretentious homes. The desired end can be accomplished by very simple, inexpensive, and equally, if not more, efficient buildings. In this direction our country is probably leading the way.

The sanatorium, however, even if built according to these principles must be regarded only as one factor in tuberculosis prevention. To become really effective, it must be supplemented

by institutions and provisions similar to those which long experience has evolved in Germany. It may stand in the center of our efforts, but we must not put all our faith in it.

In reviewing the whole subject, we cannot fail to realize the tremendous interest which the industrial workers have in this struggle. We must show them how to help themselves, how to save in time a penny to be ready to meet this greatest foe of theirs. We must do away with the false idea of charity in assisting in those features of the problem which particularly touch them. If we do it on the lines shown, either by obligatory government insurance against invalidity, or by organized interest and voluntary insurance, we put the whole struggle on the basis where it belongs—that of the right to self-defense of the attacked. Then the tuberculosis crusade will become what it ought to be, not only an effort against a disease, of which we have just become conscious, though it has long been with us, but a fight for better conditions generally, and particularly among the great mass of honest, self-respecting workmen. Let us hope that the efforts made toward giving them the means through insurance, as this is now under consideration in some states, may prove successful.

## PRACTICAL MUNICIPAL PROGRESS

CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF, ESQ.

Philadelphia, Pa.

Americans can no longer be justly charged with indifference to municipal problems and their solution, in the light of the events of the past year. Since 1894 it has been my duty and privilege to review the municipal events of each year. From time to time I have been able to report some advances, some encouraging developments; but the past twelve months have outstripped all others in practical progress. Indeed, they represent more substantial concrete achievements than all the preceding years together. From every quarter comes word as to awakened interest and patriotic endeavor.

The letter of Secretary Root to Mayor Weaver of Philadelphia, written after he had accepted the state portfolio, in which he denounced the criminal combination masquerading under the Republican name as constituted of traitors, alike to the great party whose name they had filched and to the interests of the community; the address of Secretary Taft in the Ohio campaign, in which he declared that, were he to vote in Cincinnati, he would vote against the ticket nominated by the Republican boss there; the independent attitude of Secretary Bonaparte in the Maryland campaign; the conspicuous position taken by the former Postmaster-General Smith in the Philadelphia revolution; the eminent public services of former Foreign Ministers Wayne MacVeagh and William Potter in the same connection—all have tended to reinforce the contention that national parties and national party questions have no proper connection with the determination of local issues.

The returns from the elections held on November 7, 1905, force the conviction (as has been pointed out by more than one editor) that local conditions were in the main the determining factor. Seldom, if ever, "have national policies and politics been



so little in evidence in the press and platform discussions, and of so little weight in arriving at a choice of candidates."

The independent spirit manifested by electors in their choice of candidates and the disregard of party lines in local elections constitute the most significant developments of the past year and indicate clearly the growth of public sentiment along these lines.

The November campaigns in New York and Philadelphia occupied by far the larger degree of public attention throughout the country, not only because of the issues involved, but because of their picturesque elements. District-Attorney Jerome's candidacy, practically on his own motion and without the support of any organized political body other than that afforded him by the Citizens' Union which had no other candidate in the field and no other part in the campaign, is unique in the annals of American history. At a time when the election seemed to be a foregone conclusion, and when successful opposition to the will of the bosses of the Democratic and Republican machines seemed to be hopeless, District-Attorney Jerome, who had been denied a nomination alike by the Democrats, the Republicans, and the Municipal Ownership parties, determined to give to the voters of New York County an opportunity to express their wishes as to whether or not he should be accorded another term. He frankly declared:

I desire to serve another term as district-attorney of New York County. I have served in this office for three and one-half years as faithfully as I knew how. I believe I have served efficiently. I know I have served honestly. I do not claim that I have not made mistakes. A man can insure his integrity, but not the infallibility of his judgment. I am not now, never have been, a member of any political organization, although a Democrat in national politics. It seems to me that the issues which divide the people in national political affairs have no real application to the questions which arise in state or local affairs. It seems to me that one of the greatest evils of the present time is that small groups of men have, and not infrequently a single man has, obtained control of the executive machinery of the party organization and nominating conventions and stand between the public servant and the voters. . . . In the exercise of their power, such men and groups of men are wholly selfish, and almost entirely irresponsible, and not infrequently corrupt. A man who works with such a group, and receives favor at their hands, comes under implicit obligations which cannot honorably be disregarded. He cannot take office by their favor and still be free to deal with them and their demands as obedience to his oath of office requires.

The ensuing campaign was spectacular, and full of surprises. It must be noted in all fairness that, while the re-election of Mr. Jerome was made without any formal party indorsement, he did have the Citizens' Union back of him. The campaign of Mr. Hearst on the Municipal Ownership ticket was equally spectacular, and, in spite of unpleasant stories widely circulated and generally believed, the enthusiasm for him was evidently due to the sincere and earnest belief on the part of many thousands of voters that neither of the old national parties could be trusted to protect the city's interests in the face of the inducements offered to their leaders by rich public corporations. The protest voiced by the vote for Mr. Hearst is significant and encouraging, in that it gives assurance of the honesty, if not the wisdom, of the mass of the voters of the city. Mr. Hearst had a less complete organization than Mr. Jerome, and was obliged to cover the entire city of Greater New York instead of but one county.

According to the testimony of competent observers, the proceedings on election day were most discreditable. The arrests and convictions secured are said to give an inadequate idea of the amount of the fraud committed at the polls; and it is quite generally believed that, if the ballot-boxes were opened, it would disclose that Mr. Hearst was elected. We have, therefore, the remarkable situation of having in the mayor's chair for four years a man who was very far from receiving a majority of the votes cast, and whose plurality on the face of the returns would probably not stand the verification of a recount. The fact that the people of Greater New York have quietly acquiesced in this paradoxical result speaks volumes for their spirit of obedience to the spirit and the letter of the law.

Philadelphia for twelve months has been the scene of one of the most spectacular, far-reaching, and significant municipal revolutions ever witnessed in any American city. After years of misgovernment and mismanagement, and a degree of corruption which astounded even those fairly familiar with existing municipal conditions, Mayor Weaver, who had been elected on the Republican ticket, with an independent indorsement, not only broke the shackles which had held him to the Republican organization,

but inaugurated a campaign which broke up the organization. The immediate cause of the break was the introduction of a lease providing for the extension of the existing lease of the gas-works for seventy-five years, in consideration of a lump payment of \$25,000,000, notwithstanding the fact that the existing lease (which had about twenty-two years to run) would yield the city something over \$37,000,000 before its expiration. Mayor Weaver began his campaign by dismissing his recalcitrant directors of public works and public safety, and appointing in their place two tried and true men, loyal alike to the city's best interests and to Mayor Weaver's efforts to redeem the municipality.

The two dismissed directors made a desperate effort to retain control of their offices; but the attitude of Mayor Weaver and his counsel, Elihu Root and James Gay Gordon, backed up as it was so strongly and overwhelmingly by the people of the city, irrespective of party, race, or creed, was such that they very shortly retired from the contest. The mayor's veto of the gas lease was sustained; the appointment of Messrs. Acker and Potter confirmed; certain ordinances which had been contemptuously passed over the mayor's veto to show the "Organization's" contempt of him and their control over councils, were repealed; and then began a series of administrative reforms of far-reaching importance and significance.

Director Potter began and completed the purging of the registration lists of 75,000 fraudulent names. The work on the filtration plant was suspended, and investigated to determine the extent of the corruption. While the prosecutions growing out of this investigation resulted in the acquittal of the defendants, the trials disclosed the methods that had been pursued in overcharging the city of vast sums of money, estimated to be upwards of \$5,000,000. Suits in equity have been begun, having for their object the recovery of these sums and a thorough judicial inquiry into, and investigation of, all the facts of the case.

The police of the city and the full power of the administration were, for the first time in many years, used to secure a fair election. As a consequence, when the November campaign was

closed, it resulted in an overwhelming victory for the City Party ticket, representing the administration and the people.

Following this campaign, another was inaugurated, the prospects concerning which were by no means so bright. There was a general feeling that there would be a reaction; various disputes had grown up in the ranks of those who had supported the administration; efforts were made to divert the attention of the public from the issues involved; and there was a general feeling that the results in the November election were due to a spasm of public virtue. Moreover, there was no contest over the city offices, because there were only two candidates, both sure of election of the law.

In many wards there were no candidates except for minor officers. Notwithstanding all these apparent discouragements, the people, quietly and irrespective of the conflicting claims of rival leaders, went to their polls and registered another substantial majority in favor of a new order of affairs. The February, 1906, election is generally regarded as having far more significance than that of November, because of the facts already cited. It disclosed how deeply the movement for reform has taken hold of the voters, and how completely determined they are to establish a new and better order of things.

There is one incident of the Philadelphia revolution which must not be overlooked, and cannot be too strongly emphasized. Immediately after the November election, Governor Pennypacker called the Pennsylvania Legislature together in extraordinary session to consider those question which it had neglected to consider at the regular session, and which had formed so large a part of the discussion in the campaign. Personal registration, primary reform, state treasury reform, reapportionment, civil-service reform, and the corrupt use of money in politics were included in the call. When the session met in January, 1906, it proceeded to a consideration of carefully prepared bills designed to give body to the governor's recommendations. When the session adjourned on February 15, it had passed all of these bills with the single exception of the state civil-service reform measure, in a form on the whole quite satisfactory to those who for many

years past have been advocating legislation on these subjects. If the revolution of 1905 had had no other outcome, the action of the special session of the legislature would have distinctly made it worth while, and justified all the energy and time and service expended.

An interesting feature of the February election was the choice of forty women to serve on the school board. Heretofore but very few have been able to secure election; but, thanks to the changed attitude of the voters, it was felt to be good policy to place on the tickets capable women to look after the welfare of the children in the public schools. And in this connection testimony must be borne to the efficient aid given to the independent forces, both in Philadelphia and in New York, by the women of the two cities. The zeal and earnestness contributed by the mothers, wives, and sweethearts of the Weaver and Jerome supporters contributed largely, not only to arousing enthusiasm, but to bringing the issue home directly and permanently to many an indifferent voter. I think it is generally conceded that the women are entitled to a very considerable share of the credit for the successful outcome in these two cities.

The influence of the November election in Philadelphia was largely felt in the February election in other parts of Pennsylvania. George W. Guthrie, for many years a stalwart worker in the ranks of municipal reform, was elected by a substantial majority as the representative of the independent forces to be mayor of Pittsburg. The selection of a man like Mr. Guthrie is a matter of great import, not only to his own city, but to the cause of municipal regeneration throughout the country. Able, fearless, competent, public-spirited, with a high regard for the opportunities and responsibilities of his position, he is giving to the city of Pittsburg a notable administration.

In Scranton the condition of affairs, thanks to the unremitting efforts of the local Municipal League, was such that it did not seem necessary or wise at the February election to put a reform ticket into the field; but those who had been most active in the Municipal League work, and others of like sentiments, initiated a movement that resulted in the nomination and election of J. Ben-

jamin Dimmick, who promises to be, to quote a local correspondent, "head and shoulders above any mayor or recorder that the city has ever had." The only criticism that has been offered to Mayor Dimmick's election is that he is a Republican mayor without a Republican organization behind him; and that he is attempting to operate the city government and improve existing conditions with untried men and without any political machine to back him.

The re-election of Mayor Cutler in Rochester was a well-deserved tribute to a faithful official, who had administered his office with an eye single to the best interests of the community, and without reference to political considerations. Although maintaining friendly relations with the Republican organization, he was in no sense an organization man, and his re-election was a triumph of decency and independence, although Rochester is normally a Republican city.

Buffalo, in national politics Republican, elected a Democrat to the mayoralty chair. The majority for Mayor Adam, who had served efficiently in the board of aldermen, was so large that it carried his whole party ticket, and so displaced the existing Republican régime. Mayor Adam has achieved a reputation for opposition to corruption and extravagance, and unquestionably represents the desire of Buffalo to administer its municipal affairs without regard to national parties or politics. At the same election which resulted in Mayor Adam's election the city voted in favor of owning and operating an electric lighting and power plant. An interesting feature of the election was that, out of a total vote of 65,000 for the mayoralty candidates, only 9,641 votes were cast on the last-mentioned proposition; 7,691 being in the affirmative, 1,950 in the negative. The reasons assigned for the smallness of the vote was the absorbing interest in the mayoralty contest; the consequent splitting of tickets; and the obscure position of the question on the voting machines, coming below, not only the names of the candidates, but of seven constitutional amendments; and the limited time of one minute in which to vote the whole.

In New Jersey the significant events of the past year were

the campaign of Everett Colby for the state senate on local issues and the re-election of Mayor Fagan, of Jersey City. Senator Colby made his fight within the Republican party and at a direct primary overwhelmed the forces of the boss. The district being a strongly Republican one, his election was a foregone conclusion, but he received a record-breaking majority at the general election.

For years Jersey City has been normally Democratic; but Mayor Fagan, a Republican, has been three times chosen to the mayoralty; and he owes his latest re-election to his independent action, he having openly defied the party bosses upon both sides, although he received the formal nomination of the Republican convention. His appeal, made directly to the people, was based on freedom from boss rule, equal taxation of railroad companies with that of real-estate owners, and limited franchises—it being substantially the same platform as that upon which Senator Colby had won out at the Republican primaries in his district, the Jersey City movement being in many respects similar to the Colby movement in Essex County.

Next in importance to the Philadelphia and New York campaigns of November was that successfully waged against Boss Cox in Cincinnati; indeed, there are many who believe that the Cincinnati victory was of greater importance, in that it was accomplished without any of the sensational or dramatic features that characterized those of Philadelphia and New York. The people, after a direct and forceful presentation of the facts, awoke from their apathy, went to the polls, and defeated the machine's candidates. The fight against the Republican machine, of course, was greatly helped by Secretary Taft's Akron speech (already referred to), in which he announced that he would support the Republican state ticket, but if he were voting in Cincinnati he would vote against the local Republican ticket. The success of the opposition to Cox and his candidates was largely due to the work of the local reform organization known as the Citizens' Municipal Party and to the Honest Elections Committee. The detectives of the latter disclosed the existence of a widespread conspiracy to defraud the people by false registration, and in

many other ways assisted in detecting and preventing fraud upon the ballot.

While Cleveland still retains its character as a Republican city, Tom L. Johnson, a Democrat, has been elected mayor for a third term. This is the first time a mayor has ever been elected in Cleveland for three terms; and the majority given him (12,000) is the largest ever given here, and about twice the majority secured by him in his previous campaigns. With the mayor were elected other members of the city administration in substantial agreement with his general policies of administration, and with his views in regard to lower charges and higher taxes on municipal monopolies, with eventual municipal ownership.

For the first time the Municipal Association of Cleveland indorsed Mayor Johnson. Lincoln Steffens had described him as "the best mayor in the United States" and the Association in a formal bulletin declared:

The Association has not heretofore supported Mayor Johnson because it was not at one time convinced of the sincerity of his expressed purpose to give Cleveland a clean, progressive administration. His administration has, however, demonstrated the sincerity of his statements. The character of service rendered and of officials responsible for this service have been placed upon a higher plane than at any time in the history of our city. His administration has been businesslike, free from graft, and such as to give our city a noteworthy position when compared with other municipalities in this country. The political organization created and maintained by him must be judged by the results of its activity. These have not been graft and corruption, but, as recognized by all observing citizens, the placing in office of clean, competent, and honorable officials. While the Association does not wish to be understood as in any way committing itself to Mr. Johnson's economic views, we believe that his administration deserves commendation, and we recommend him for re-election.

This declaration of the Municipal Association represents very generally the sentiment of observers concerning Mayor Johnson. He has been in office sufficiently long to show the manner of man he is and the sincerity of his views. In the face of a very general doubt upon the subject, he has convinced friends and neutrals, and quite often enemies, of his entire sincerity and of his ambition to give the people of Cleveland an honest and an efficient government; and there are strong indications that it is



not a case of spasmodic reform, but that the advances made since he began his work represents a steady growth in civic righteousness. It is an encouraging feature that in this work he has had the support of the voters of the city to an increasing degree.

Toledo has elected another non-partisan mayor in the person of Brand Whitlock, and has given him what it failed to give the late Mayor Jones—sympathetic support through the election of sympathetic candidates to the local council. As one correspondent has described the situation :

The local spasms for reform which we have had in the past were of a different quality from the advance all along the line which we have recently had. "No step backward from this" has become a deep conviction and determination.

The past year has afforded the first experience of Indiana cities (outside of Indianapolis) with a new municipal code by introducing the federal plan. This change has been marked by an extraordinary awakening of interest in municipal affairs and reform throughout the state. Communities wholly given over to the lowest forms of machine politics and corrupt government have developed a new form of public opinion, in the belief that it would find an effective instrument in the new kind of government.

Reform clubs have been organized in many of these cities. A notable illustration is Terre Haute, long given over to lawlessness and corruption. The particular issue was law enforcement. The mayor was shown to have instructed his police board to permit law violations and, on its refusal, to have removed the board from office. An organization of business men was formed, and eminent counsel were employed to impeach the mayor. The impeachment provisions were new for every city but Indianapolis. A notable trial was held and public feeling aroused to a high pitch. The result of the trial was that the requisite two-thirds vote for the removal of the mayor fell short by one vote. Such a close call has not only affected this particular mayor, but awakened a general interest in civic affairs.

The misuse of public funds by officers charged with their collection or custody has been another subject which has aroused public interests. Officials have been accustomed to lend or other-

wise use public funds, appropriating the interest or earnings to themselves. Governor Hanly astonished his partisan friends by showing the spirit of a zealous reformer. He appealed to public opinion throughout the state to abolish this abuse, and set the pace by investigating the accounts of state officers. In a short time he forced the auditor of state and the secretary of state to resign their offices; the former, an influential politician, was indicted for embezzlement and has been found guilty. The result is that city and county affairs are everywhere being investigated, with prospects that the movement will crystallize in some permanent reform. On the whole, as one observer puts it, "it has been a good year for reform in Indiana."

Chicago continues to attract a large share of public attention. Its municipal experiences have been varied and illuminating. It is difficult to form a positive conclusion as to the meaning of many of the things that have been done there.

Edward F. Dunne was elected a year ago on the issue of immediate municipal ownership. He has had a rather stormy time, being a man of sincere motives, but apparently not an experienced administrator, and many of his appointments have been severely criticized. He has managed, however, to work out a municipal-ownership plan which was recently passed by the council and on April 3 last submitted to the voters. It was adopted by about 3,000 majority; the ordinance providing for the issuance of \$75,000,000 in Müller Law certificates for the purchase of the street railways. At the same election a vote was also taken on the question of the operation of the street railways. Under the Müller Law no city can operate them unless the question is voted on separately and approved by three-fifths of those voting. This proposition, although receiving a majority of 10,000, failed to receive the requisite three-fifths vote. The city is therefore in a position where it may acquire and own street railways, but cannot operate them.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Since the above was written, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided the ninety-nine year act favorably to the city's contention, and the mayor has been able to work out a practicable plan for the eventual ownership and operation of the street railways by the city.

The results of the aldermanic election on April 3 was very satisfactory to the Municipal Voters' League. In most instances the men recommended by it as possessed of the highest order of character and ability, were elected.

The country at large is under deep obligation to Chicago for its municipal experiments and experiences. It is working out on a large scale the question of municipal democracy and of fundamental principles in a way to prove most illuminating and helpful to other communities. The success of its Municipal Voters' League has had a far-reaching effect; its contests with the street-railway corporations and its efforts to settle that problem are being followed with extreme care and breathless interest by municipal observers everywhere. Its fight for a high license and its gas contest are likewise the subjects of thoughtful consideration.

Just at present it is giving careful attention to another important problem, a Charter Convention having been recently formed to consider, prepare, and submit to the voters a new charter for the city, in harmony with the modern needs of the city. What the outcome of the convention will be it is impossible to foretell; but it is likely to be an important and suggestive contribution to the subject. In short, Chicago is justifying the designation already given to it of being a municipal laboratory, wherein are being worked out many municipal experiments of deep and abiding interest.

The most important event of the past year in Michigan has been the vote on the proposition to hold a constitutional convention. The proposition was carried by a large majority on a rather light vote at the election on April 2. The legislature at its 1907 session will have to make provision for the election of delegates and the holding of the convention. The Detroit Municipal League will make an active campaign in favor of a non-partisan convention, insisting that the candidates in each district be nominated by petition and their names placed on the ballot without any official party designations. There is likely to be considerable struggle for the control of the convention by corporation interests. The progressive elements are mainly bent

upon securing municipal home rule, and the initiative and referendum.

The election at Grand Rapids was one of very considerable interest. Mayor Sweet, who two years ago was elected as a Democrat, was not renominated by his party, but by a mass-meeting as an independent candidate. The Republican candidate was elected, although his vote was 2,211 less than a majority; but as the opposition was divided, he was elected by a large plurality, Mayor Sweet standing second in the poll. The faith in the principle of non-partisanship in local affairs is by no means shaken by Mayor Sweet's defeat. He carried the two wards representing the most intelligent and aggressive part of the community. The old party fences were completely demolished; an appeal was made by the Republican candidate to class feeling, and he received more votes in the wards which had been regarded as Democratic strongholds than the Democratic and non-partisan candidates combined. There was some feeling against Mayor Sweet because he did not try to get his party's nomination. It is quite likely that he could have had it, and, having it, could have been elected; but he did not dare to be re-elected with the feeling that he was under obligation to any party organization. The notable feature of the campaign was the friendliness which existed between the Democratic and Republican candidates. They were bitter in their attacks upon Mayor Sweet, and their friends pulled together harmoniously. The Democratic candidate has since been appointed to office by the Republican mayor.

After four successive elections, Mayor Rose, of Milwaukee, has gone down to defeat. His repeated successes tended to create a feeling that he was impregnable; but Milwaukee has felt the effect of the reform movement, and at the April election chose Alderman Becker, a young man of vigorous personality and public spirit. An interesting feature of this campaign was the praise which Mayor Rose, a Democrat, bestowed upon the Republican boss. Alderman Becker, although the Republican candidate, had won his nomination without the support of the Republican managers, who were generally believed to be interested in Mayor Rose. Here again we have an illustration similar to that which

the Grand Rapids election furnishes, the leaders of the party machines being more friendly to each other than they are to those who represent the true interests of the city.

The Milwaukee election was significant and encouraging in other directions. A considerable number of very good men were elected to the council. The Republican candidate for mayor was elected; and the previous city treasurer, a Democrat, received a large majority from the same body of voters. This tendency to split the ticket appeared on all sides. In one ward, for instance, two able aldermen were elected: one a Democrat, the other a Republican; and the former has already announced that he did not propose to be a party man in this service. The recommendations of the Milwaukee Municipal Voters' League were very generally regarded.

Minneapolis has been a center of interest. The "lid" has been the principal feature during the past six months. Last autumn Mayor Jones decided to close the saloons in Minneapolis on Sunday. The order was issued on October 31, and went into effect on the following Sunday. Since that time it has been strictly enforced, and obeyed by the saloonkeepers without much show of resistance. Two or three cases of violation were discovered; but the offenders were speedily satisfied that the best thing for them to do was to obey the order.

Mayor Jones, like Mayor Guthrie, of Pittsburg, is a fine type of public official. He is a conscientious Christian gentleman of excellent ability, with considerable experience in municipal affairs, having been a member of the city council for six years, and president of that body immediately prior to his election to the mayoralty. As president of the council it was also his duty four years ago to assume the office of mayor and fill the unexpired term of the notorious Ames, when he was driven from power by the police investigation which made Minneapolis famous, and for a time infamous.

Mayor Jones' administration has also been notable for the new standard of executive performance which he has maintained. During the first year of his administration he reorganized the police department on a non-partisan, voluntary civil-service basis;

and has vastly improved both its personnel and its discipline. The requirements for appointment to the force are good moral character, and sound physical condition as shown by a thorough examination by the health officer; with the usual height and weight requirements. Political and partisan considerations have been subordinated in making selections for the force; although, other qualifications being equal, these are not wholly ignored. Grafting, however, in any degree is punishable by dismissal from the force; while drinking on duty and brutality or any other serious infraction of the regulations is summarily punished; and thus far no amount of pull has been able to interfere with the punishment.

One thing has been clearly demonstrated by the police authorities; and that is, that it is possible to divorce completely the department from any alliance, open or covert, with the criminal or vicious classes; to secure results in the detection and punishment of criminals or minor offenders. The old-time theory that a certain class of crooks had to be protected to make possible effective work by the detectives has been thoroughly demolished by the work of the police department in the past year. The most encouraging feature of the Minneapolis situation, however, is that the present indications are that it is not a case of spasmodic reform, but that the advances made under Mayor Jones undoubtedly represent a steady growth in civic righteousness.

The situation in St. Louis continues to be fairly encouraging. While there has been no decided progress in municipal affairs during the past year, the city continues to enjoy the services of an honest mayor and an honest council. The revenues of the city have been greatly increased; the streets are kept clean, and intelligent efforts are being made to solve, in the interests of the people, the many and perplexing problems which confront the officials of every city. Governor Folk has given better boards for the local control of the police, excise, and election; and excellent work is being done by them; but there is still considerable feeling on the part of a large portion of the community that these boards should be in the hands of the local authorities, and not subject to the dictation of some future governor who may or may not be interested in securing good government.

The April election in Kansas City resulted in a great victory for the good-government forces, the choice of Henry M. Beardsley to the mayoralty being one of the most satisfactory events of the year. Mr. Beardsley is not only a lawyer of high personal character, but he has had long experience in dealing with municipal questions, having been a member of the upper branch of the council for six years, and during the last two years having served as president of the board of public works. In this latter position he had charge of the rehabilitation of the water plant, as well as other public improvements, involving the expenditure of many millions of dollars. Some idea of Mr. Beardsley's public spirit may be gathered from the fact that he accepted the nomination to the office much against his personal wishes and inclinations and the demands of his private practice, and that during his campaign he had charge of a canvass for raising \$300,000 for the erection of a new Y. M. C. A. building.

Kansas City has also benefited by Governor Folk's interest in good government, the governor himself personally supervising the administration of the police and election laws on election day. Police interference and fraudulent votings, heretofore characteristic of the local elections, were eliminated; and the governor's instructions for a rigid observance of the law were conscientiously carried out, and the city had the fairest election in its history.

The results in other directions were equally satisfactory, the voters exercising a large degree of independence, and very generally abiding by the indorsements of the Civic League.

The municipal elections of Iowa, as in former years, represent the steady growth of local independence. The elections of the last spring are without national political significance, the local issues in the majority of the cities and towns having been the determining factors. Republican cities elected Democratic officials, and Democratic cities Republican officials; and in a number of communities the citizens', or independent, tickets prevailed. Municipal ownership was the leading question in many communities; some deciding in favor of municipal ownership and operation, others against the policy. In Des Moines municipal ownership carried by a large majority. In Iowa City the question of Sunday observance was the issue involved, and the

candidate representing what were called "Christian Endeavor principles" was elected. In Burlington the conservative candidate, who received the support of the churches and the Christian Endeavor Society, received more votes than his two opponents together. At Webster City, where all public utilities are now owned by the city, aldermen favoring the granting of a franchise to a private corporation were successful; whereas in Creston a franchise for the old light company was defeated. The issue in Clinton was a moral one. In Decorah the election turned on the granting of a franchise; at Waterloo the municipal-ownership candidate for mayor was elected, but the municipal-ownership proposition was defeated by thirty-two votes.

Local issues were in most instances the determining factor in the Colorado elections of this spring, the municipal ownership and rental questions being the principal ones about which the battles were waged. In ten communities municipal-ownership candidates were successful. Glenwood Springs voted against municipal ownership; Grenada re-elected its Republican mayor for the fifth time; and Littleton its Democratic mayor for the sixth time. In two communities the anti-saloon element prevailed, and their candidates on the good government ticket were elected. In a number of cities there was only one ticket in the field. These facts are recited not so much for their intrinsic value as to indicate the extent to which the Colorado municipalities have freed themselves from partisan considerations in determining purely local questions.

Seattle has joined the ranks of cities settling local issues on a local basis, it having just elected (by a small majority, it is true) an independent mayor over the candidate of the dominant party's organization. The particular issue involved in the Seattle fight was municipal ownership; although general dissatisfaction with the existing political condition was an important factor.

Mayor Ballenger gave to Seattle a conspicuously good administration. Under his guidance the city made a material development in conditions relating to better government from the standpoint of morals as well as from that of public efficiency. Not only was the question of the introduction of transcontinental



railroads settled and the construction of a garbage-destruction plant authorized, but the completion of a municipal electric-lighting plant was undertaken, and the public service greatly extended throughout the city. Public improvements representing a very large expenditure of money were inaugurated. Notwithstanding, however, the admirable public services of Mayor Ballenger, who declined to be a candidate for re-election, the people refused to give the credit of his administration to the Republican organization. They recognized that he and not the organization was entitled to the credit, so that, when it came to the selection of his successor, they chose one because of his personal fitness and his ability to carry forward the important work inaugurated by Mayor Ballenger, and without regard to his national politics.

In Portland, Ore., the reform forces are triumphant in every direction. The present mayor is thoroughgoing in his endeavors to give a good administration; and the common council is doing well, although it and the mayor do not always work in harmony. The most marked improvement noticeable has been in the granting of franchises for public utilities. This is now being done very cautiously and prudently; and the city is getting substantial value for all of its franchises, with rights of inspection, publicity, and reversion to the city that are decidedly a marked improvement upon the loose methods of old times. Reform seems to have come to stay, and is so popular that it needs only wise guidance to effect very great improvement in public affairs. The operation of the new direct primary law is being watched with care. While it is too early to express an opinion, those who are most competent to express one are certain that the new law has destroyed the old rings and cliques.

The war on graft throughout the United States has been pressed with great vigor and spread with greater rapidity. There is practically no community, where the municipal problem is at all serious, but has had its investigations or inquiry, and consequent exposures and prosecutions. In Philadelphia an equity suit has been commenced against the firm of contractors, of which the former leaders of the now discredited organization were partners, to recover upwards of \$5,000,000 alleged upon the report of the

experts to have been corruptly diverted. The counsel for the Committee of Seventy had referred to them the testimony gathered, with a view of determining whether criminal suits, in addition to those already inaugurated for damages, should be brought; but after careful consideration reported against the institution of criminal prosecutions.

In New York the insurance disclosures have occupied the center of observation and bid fair to affect, even more generally than they already have, the political situation there.

The Ohio State Senate sent a committee to Cincinnati to investigate and expose the methods by which the machine secured and retained its power. It took the committee only one day to unearth one form of graft which yielded from \$15,000 to \$20,000 a year to the boss's lieutenants. The county commissioner testified that he collected taxes annually amounting to about \$7,000,000, mostly in the form of checks, which were deposited in the various banks. This money was allowed to remain certain definite times after collection, in return for which favor banks presented him with a gratuity, which he frankly confessed he accepted as a perquisite of the office, the city receiving nothing on the deposits in the way of interest. The treasurer maintained, while on the stand, that the checks did not constitute public funds, and that they did not become such until the banks had collected them and the cash was actually deposited in the vaults of the treasury. Under such a theory taxes so collected could be left with the banks until actually needed to pay county debts, and the interest on the balances diverted as donations from the county treasury to the treasurer's pocket.

A series of prosecutions in Allegheny has resulted in the conviction of a number of office-holders for various crimes against the public welfare. The superintendent of police was convicted of conspiracy, the charge being based on his having taken \$50 in cash and a diamond in payment for aiding and abetting the maintenance of a disorderly house. A street commissioner was convicted of a similar offense; later, a captain of police. Incident to these convictions there were several disagreements on the part of the juries; and the prosecutors, becoming suspicious that the

juries had been unduly and corruptly influenced, made careful investigation, which resulted in the verification of the suspicion and the prosecution and conviction of the jury-fixer.

Milwaukee has witnessed a long series of prosecutions and convictions. Up to a very recent date, twenty-one defendants had either been convicted or pleaded guilty, and six had been acquitted. The indictment involved the acceptance of rebates on city contracts, the payments of money to supervisors, the acceptance of cash bribes, and extortion.

At the time of the convening of the California Legislature a year ago, there was considerable newspaper gossip to the effect that certain building and loan associations were being grossly mismanaged, and special attention was called to the affairs of one. It so happened that the officers of this association had been prominent in politics and had opposed the papers' policies. Nevertheless, a legislative investigation of the association was demanded, and the senate appointed a committee of seven senators, four of whom outlined a plan by which they would investigate the association and make some money out of it. They selected a go-between to approach the officers of the concern and ascertain whether it would be willing to pay for stopping the investigation. They professed to be willing to do so, but quietly set a trap to catch the senators, the sum of \$1,400 being agreed upon as the price to be paid. In the meantime the committee proceeded to summon witnesses to hold a farce of an investigation. The officers of the association refused to respond to the subpoenas of the committee, and were cited to appear before the senate to answer for contempt. They appeared before the senate, and then and there disclosed the whole proceedings, and accused the four senators of soliciting and receiving bribes. The go-between confessed his complicity, and the senate appointed a committee, which refused to allow the accused to testify under oath, owing to the clause in the law which exempts a person who testifies in a case of bribery from further punishment. The senate reported the accused to be guilty, and recommended their expulsion from the senate, which was unanimously done. The grand jury from Sacramento County shortly afterward found an indict-

ment against the four senators, one of whom turned state's evidence, and all have since been convicted.

These instances are cited, not because they constitute all that has been accomplished along these lines during the past year, but as typical of what is being done in nearly every important community in the land.

The Central West continues to be the storm-center of municipal reform activity, with New York and Pennsylvania pressing it closely, and the western slope municipalities not far behind. During the past year there have been fewer incidents of importance or interest in the New England and southern states, the principal events having been those already mentioned herein. But there is no lack of signs of abundant life in the leading New England and southern communities. The fact that they have not been prominently to the front during the past year is no evidence that the earnest people living there are not fully alive to the situation, and of the need for earnest effort.

There have been many important improvements of far-reaching character undertaken by the municipalities of the United States. Mention must be made, if only briefly, of the project to expend \$25,000,000 for the improvement of the water supply of Los Angeles; of the publication of Daniel H. Burnham's plans for the improvement of San Francisco, called most aptly by those in charge of the matter as "San Francisco's new civic charter;" the reports for the reorganization of Denver, Colo., and Columbia, S. C.; the inauguration of Chicago's neighborhood center and outer park systems; the establishment of the municipal museum in the same city; the very remarkable progress now under way in Washington along local lines.

It is a rather curious fact that in many directions the developments in Washington have been more backward than those in any other community. While a model in many ways of honest and efficient administration, the government of our capital city has been retarded because of the inability of the people to take any real part in the matter, and because they have had to depend upon Congress, a body created for entirely different purposes and but little qualified to discharge the functions of a municipal

legislature. Thanks, however, to the intelligent leadership of the commissioners and of the public-spirited citizens who are deeply concerned in its welfare, there has been a very remarkable and satisfactory development in the way of attacking the slum districts, the extension of the park system, the improvement of the water supply and the sewage system, and along other important lines.

The question of the municipal ownership of our public utilities in many communities has overshadowed all other questions. It has been the one municipal issue in an increasing number of communities upon which the people have felt and expressed a decided opinion. In Chicago it has been the burning question ever since Mayor Dunne's nomination on an immediate-municipal-ownership platform. In Boston it has occupied a large share of attention, and the settlement of the gas and tunnel questions has been conspicuously to the front. Their settlement along lines satisfactory to the best interests of the city is due almost entirely to the public-spirited activity of the Public Franchise League, and of organizations that have co-operated with it. The Seattle election turned upon this question. The great vote cast for Mr. Hearst in the November, 1905, election in New York was due to public interest in it. In Denver, in Lincoln, Neb., in San Francisco, in Philadelphia—in fact, in a long list of cities, the question has been actively to the front.

There has been no diminution of interest in the subject of primary nomination reform. A very interesting conference on electoral reforms was held in New York City in March last, under the auspices of the National Civic Federation; and the development of public sentiment in favor of uniform direct primaries was shown to be rapidly increasing. Pennsylvania, as a result of the political revolution of the past year, has now a fairly satisfactory law, which will eliminate many of the features which have made machine domination in that state easy of accomplishment. The subject is a burning one in Oregon and Washington, as also in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Illinois; in fact, in all the central western states. The Minnesota law continues to give general satisfaction. The results in Wisconsin are too recent

to enable one to form a conclusion of any value. The Supreme Court of Illinois has declared the act of 1905 unconstitutional; but Governor Deneen called a special session of the legislature, which passed a new one, which does not seem to meet with very general approval.

Perhaps the most important development along the lines of the establishment of municipal civil service is that in Philadelphia, the special session of the legislature having passed a comprehensive measure which had the approval of the Civil Service Reform Association and the Committee of Seventy. It was vigorously and successfully championed by Mayor Weaver, who since its passage has helped to give it force and effect through the appointment of a sympathetic board of commissioners. The act is a complete and comprehensive one, providing for the appointment by the mayor of a civil-service commission of three men with a five-year term of office. It requires appointment from the four highest on the eligible list, and a probation period of five months. The exempt class is reduced to the minimum, and most of the safeguard which experience has demonstrated to be necessary has been thrown around appointment to office. Political considerations are excluded, and the old-time pull of local politicians and bosses eliminated, etc. No person can be transferred to any position subject to a competitive examination unless he shall have previously passed an open competitive examination equivalent to that required for such position.

In the matter of charter reform, an interesting bill was introduced in the Massachusetts Legislature which, when enacted into law, will mark an important step forward and furnish an interesting experiment in the effective co-ordination and organization of adjacent municipalities with common interests but separate governments. This measure, known as the Cosmopolitan District Council Bill, provides that the chief magistrates of the cities and the chairmen of the boards of selectmen of the towns that are now or may be included within the metropolitan park, water, or sewage system of Boston, shall constitute the Metropolitan District Council to which the several commissions and boards shall annually in the month of January submit reports of the work

performed and the money expended by them during the preceding year, together with detailed estimates of the amounts required for the ensuing year. This council must vote by a roll-call of municipalities and towns on the questions of approving or disapproving all proposed legislation involving appropriations of money for park, boulevard, water, or sewage purposes; but only those municipalities shall vote which have a financial interest as contributors in the proposed expenditure of money. This council must also submit to the legislature from time to time reports, with its recommendations, on the various questions of metropolitan work which have been brought before it; and in all cases where votes have been taken, such reports shall contain a full record giving the names of the municipalities which have favored and those which have disapproved of each proposition. Thirty-nine municipalities are interested in this measure and come within its scope. Their combined area about equals that of the city of Greater New York, with an approximate population of 1,400,000.

A significant feature of the recent Grand Rapids election was the vote upon the charter amendments providing for the advisory initiative on ordinances and for the recall on elective and appointive officers. The amendments were drafted by the Voters' Initiative Veto and Recall League, and were submitted on petitions signed by nearly 4,000 voters. The amendment providing for the recall upon elective officers was carried by a vote of 7,077 to 1,929. The vote on the amendment providing for the recall of appointive officers was 6,692 in favor of, to 1,755 against; and the vote for the advisory initiative on ordinances was 5,183 to 1,682.

The Galveston plan of government continues to excite general attention. It has produced such admirable results, through conscientious, faithful administration in the city of its origin, that it has been copied in other Texas cities, and has been very generally considered in other states, notably in Iowa, where, however, it has not secured sufficient support to secure enactment into law.

A movement of the greatest promise is the formation of city government clubs in our educational institutions. The Yale City

Government Club, which has done excellent work in this behalf, called a conference of similar organizations which was held in March in the city of New York, and the Intercollegiate League of College Good Government Clubs formally organized. The fact that the young college men, who are about to enter upon the discharge of their duties as citizens, realize the responsibility resting upon them and the necessity for intelligent consideration of the work before them, indicates the growth of public sentiment in the right direction along these lines, and holds out great promise for the coming generation.

Of somewhat similar import has been the interest manifested in politics by various bodies of young men, notably those banded together in the Young Men's Christian Associations of the country. The subject of the association's civic opportunity was a leading theme at the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania and the Ohio State Association. At the latter meeting the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:

1. We recognize the great civic awakening through which our country is now passing. We rejoice in the evident influence already exerted by members of our organization in fostering rational movements of reform and civic betterment.

2. We realize that as an association we have no part to play in partisan politics, but we earnestly urge our members as individuals to sustain by their personal efforts and by words of commendation and encouragement those public officers who are standing for the right.

3. We believe that a knowledge of actual conditions is essential in arriving at the true basic principles by which to govern our actions.

4. We therefore recommend to the association the formation of clubs and other agencies for the careful study and free discussion of municipal problems and urge upon our members active participation in all efforts for civic reform.

Numerous local associations are organizing good government courses, and are seeking in various ways, on the one hand, to interest their members in municipal problems, and, on the other hand, to educate them to intelligent activity.

A strikingly interesting and suggestive conference was held in January in Chicago, under the auspices of the Municipal Voters' League of that city, to consider the extent to which municipal elections should be separated from national party



politics and the control of national political parties, and the best means by which such separation as may be deemed advisable can be brought about. Sixteen organizations were represented and a series of resolutions were adopted voicing the sentiment of those who were engaged in the campaign against municipal corruption and inefficiency. The fact that the active workers of the militant forces for municipal reform were able to agree unanimously upon a declaration of principles involving so many principles for which reformers have year in and year out contended, is a striking demonstration of their soundness, and of the force and extent of the movement in behalf of their adoption.

The municipal problem in America is a great one, and one of exceeding complexity and difficulty. The fact that so large a number of men and women, and of organizations, are devoting their thought, their time, their attention, and their energy to its solution gives encouragement to the belief expressed at the beginning of this review, that the charge will no longer rest against the American people that they are indifferent to their municipal obligations. Civic patriotism is growing day by day; its manifestations during the past year have been numerous and notable. And yet, as great and as numerous as they have been, I am convinced that but few of us appreciate how thoroughly the people are aroused to the present situation and the extent to which they have resolved to free their communities of the stain of corruption and inefficiency. As Ruskin has pointed out: "Neither a great thought, nor a great man, nor a great poem, nor a great picture, nor any other great thing, can be fathomed to the bottom in a moment of time;" and the great movement in American cities for their reformation cannot be comprehended nor fathomed in a review such as this. The manifestations, however, are such as to justify the conclusion that we are upon the threshold of a day of great developments along municipal lines.

# THE ORIGINS OF LEADERSHIP

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## I. INTRODUCTION

*The relation of the function of leadership to the science of sociology.*—The primary task of sociology as a science is a description and explanation of the factors fundamental to the associate life. From this point of view the focus of the attention of the sociologist is upon the interactions or the reciprocalities of living organisms, or, in other words, upon the process of association as such. In his treatment of the scope of sociology, Professor Small says: "The point of departure which we propose for sociology is the view-point from which all human associations present certain characteristics in common."<sup>1</sup> Professor Giddings defines sociology as a general science, a science of social elements and first principles.<sup>2</sup> In harmony with these definitions, though giving a more limited scope to the science, Professor Simmel says: "I understand the task of sociology to be description and determination of the historico-psychological origin of those forms in which interactions take place between human beings."<sup>3</sup> Under "forms" he includes both "those general relations and changes which are called forth by the constant individual similarities and differences in the persons comprising every form of union," and those special forms which take place only in a limited number of combinations or determine only special phases of such."<sup>4</sup> By the term "forms" we understand that Professor Simmel means, not only the structural, but also the functional phases of the social process. Such a point of view clearly gives to sociology a distinctive task. The description and explanation of the social structures and functions

<sup>1</sup>*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, p. 324.

<sup>2</sup>*Principles of Sociology*, p. 31.

<sup>3</sup>*Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 167.

<sup>4</sup>*Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. VI, pp. 412 ff.

common to all kinds of groups, or the study of the social process as such, is a work which no special social science has undertaken, but which is necessary if a unified view of societary phenomena is to be obtained. In further illustration of what is meant here, it may be noted that there are special sciences which study economic institutions, political institutions, religious institutions, etc.; but there is no science which treats of the nature of the institutional activity as such. That there are certain common principles in accordance with which all social instincts, customs, and institutions are formed, maintained, and changed, whether the interests which they express are economic, religious, political, artistic, or what not, is one of the fundamental assumptions of the science of sociology. Again, it is clear that all the social sciences deal with phenomena that are expressed through such modal social functions as co-operation, conflict, competition, imitation, invention, obedience, leadership, etc.; but there is no science which has had for its province the interpretation of the nature of these functions as elemental factors in the method by which all societary phenomena are expressed.

The function which we shall study is that of leadership. Our attention will be centered upon its earlier and simpler expressions as found among the lower animals and especially among primitive peoples, the data used being derived chiefly from hunting groups. The study will be concerned with the relation of leadership to the more general and fundamental social forces, functions, and structures.

Each of the special social sciences has to do with leadership in its relation to a particular subject-matter, and with reference to the realization of certain purposes and ends; but none of these special social sciences have undertaken to describe and explain the function of leadership in general, and as one of the fundamental forms in the reciprocalities of all individuals and groups of individuals. One of our principal hypotheses is that there are certain principles which are to be found in the study of the development of the leadership function in association, and that these principles are applicable to all associations, whatever may be their aims or ends. It shall, therefore, be our purpose to attempt

to trace some of the early steps in the development of this function, not so much with the hope, in such a limited survey of the phenomena, of establishing the principles upon which leadership is based, but rather as prologomena to the further study of this subject.

*Leadership as a universal function of association.*—The assumptions with which we start are, first, that leadership is a function common to all the different stages of the social process, from its simplest and most primitive to its most complex and highly developed manifestations; second, that it is a function in the expression of all kinds of social interests, whether the interactions be inter-individual, inter-groupal, or infra-groupal. Leadership is one of the most primary as well as one of the most general forms of association. It arises wherever there are interactions of individuals or of groups, no matter what may be the purposes or aims of these interactions. Perhaps it is not necessary to state that we are not more concerned with political leadership than with leadership as manifested in the expression of any other social impulse or interest, though to many minds the mention of leadership usually calls up its political phase.

Beginning with the simple associations of the lower animals, it may be stated that leadership is one of the important functions in their reciprocal relations. Leadership of family and migratory groups, of the combined efforts for offense and defense and for securing food, and leadership in mating and in play, are phenomena frequently observed among animals. In the associations of children in the expression of the play tendencies the leader is a prominent factor. Again, in the more serious associative undertakings of children, in and out of school, the leader has an important place. Among primitive peoples, far enough advanced to possess traditions, there is usually found the tradition of the more or less mythical hero, who is regarded as the ancestor of the tribe and to whose leadership is ascribed the founding of the customs of the group. The fact of leadership among both primitive and civilized peoples is one of common observation, and only the most general statement of this fact need be made here. In the expression of the parental and filial impulses, the leadership at one time

may be that of the husband, at another that of the wife, and again that of both husband and wife in relation to the children, or that of the children in relation to one or both parents. In economic activity, leadership is present in all kinds of groups from the simplest form of association in the chase to the most complex modern associations under the guidance of the entrepreneur, the promoter of the largest corporation, or the president of a federation of labor; in political activity, from the temporary leadership of the horde to the complicated and well-defined functions of the leader in modern governments; in the expression of the play propensities there are leaders from the old man at the corroboree to the captain of the modern football team; political parties and schools of thought, scientific and philosophic, have their leaders; radicalism and conservatism are never without their champions, and religions are founded by prophets. There are leaders of the smallest and most temporary groups, and leaders of the largest and most permanent groups, and there are leaders natural and supernatural. Illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely to show that leadership is a universal function in association.

*Relation of leadership to the social process.*—In so far as possible we shall try to relate the study of leadership to a systematic theory of the social process. By the social process we mean the infra-groupal and inter-groupal reciprocal activities of living organisms, including also under these relationships the influence of the group upon the individual and of the individual upon the group, and the interactions of individuals. The unifying factor in the complex and innumerable diversities of social phenomena is to be found in the social activity itself, in the associating of individuals and groups of individuals. The social process, then, is to be considered as the central fact.

When we begin to analyze the social process, we find two main divisions with which the sociologist is concerned. In the first place, there are the fundamental social forces—impulses, instincts, and interests—which are organized or expressed through this process; secondly, there is the question of the method by which these forces are organized or expressed.

There are certain functions, impulses, instincts, and interests, such as the nutritive, reproductive, and protective, which are essential to the life-process and common to all organic life, plants included, and which, in so far as they are realized through associate activity, constitute the rudimentary motor forces of the social process. These forces, both innate and acquired, are tendencies to associate activity, which are set free by organic and extra-organic stimuli. In addition to those just enumerated, we may mention acquisitiveness, or the tendency to appropriate or possess, leading to the large and important group of property interests; the play impulses and aesthetic interests; and the political, educational, ethical, and religious interests.

From the point of view of method, the social process, in its most general aspects, may be stated in terms of control, through association, over the phenomena which condition the existence and development of individuals and groups. The method by which this control is attained, and the impulses, interests, or ends are realized, is fundamentally one of co-operating and conflicting, or rather it is a co-operating-conflicting process, both infra-groupal and inter-groupal. In the infra-groupal associate activity the element of co-operation is in the ascendancy, while in the inter-groupal associate activity the conflict phase of the process is in the ascendancy. This co-operating-conflicting process is mediated by such further modal social factors as imitation, suggestion, invention, and leadership.<sup>5</sup> All this activity constantly tends to assume two general forms or directions; viz., (1) an organized, and (2) an organizing. These two forms may be considered as giving the most general and inclusive statement of the modal phase of the social process. Under the organized phase is included what is meant by social structure—i. e., the social instincts, customs, institutions, and laws, or those activities which have proved to be successful in attaining social ends and values. By the organizing phase is meant the process of adaptation to the new and problematic features entering into the social process. The organizing phase of the social process is one of the most important divisions

<sup>5</sup> A discussion of this proposition can not be given here, but constitutes the material of another paper.

of social functioning, though we should not overlook the fact that social functioning also includes the activity which is already organized. Our central problem will be the relation of the evolution of leadership to that of the organized and organizing phases of the social process, or, in other words, the relation of leadership to the habitual-tensional-adaptive phases of the social process. This will involve some discussion of the more specific modal factors, such as the co-operating-conflicting process as mediated by the imitative-suggestive-inventive forces. More particularly the thesis will be concerned with the relation of the evolution of leadership to that of institutions; these constitute two of the more important representatives of the organized and organizing phases of the social process. Leadership is the pre-eminence of one or a few individuals in a group in the process of control of societary phenomena. Institutions are one phase of the organized modes of control, or, in other words, they are the social habits which have resulted from successful adjustive or organizing processes in the effort to control the conditions of associate life. The discussion will also comprise the relation of leadership to the development of personality or the consciousness of self which arises as a result of the part which the individual plays in society, and of the reactions of others to his activity.

The method of control of societary phenomena is psychophysical in character. In part, impulses and interests are expressed through automatic and instinctive action accompanied by a minimum of consciousness; and, in part, they are expressed through conscious or psychical factors. But unquestionably the most effective phase of the method by which the impulses and interests are realized is the psychical. Mind has developed with reference to the furtherance of the efficiency of the motor responses which the organism is compelled to make to its environment, and it is without doubt the most plastic and powerful agent in the control of these motor responses. In the associative responses to stimuli, on the part of individuals and groups, mind becomes increasingly important with the increase in the complexity of the conditions to which adjustments must be made.

Social psychology must form the technique for the interpre-

tation of social phenomena, if we are ever to have a scientific control of the conditions of association even approaching that degree of control of physical phenomena which is based upon the sciences of physics and chemistry. There is no social science that will not be greatly influenced by the discovery of the laws of the fundamental structures and functions common to all kinds of association. History may be an interesting collection of facts, but it can be a science only in so far as it is interpreted through social psychology and its facts stated in terms of the formation of social habits or customs and institutions through the adaptive processes, of which, on the psychological side, the attention may be taken as central and inclusive of all others. Reform without a science of sociology may now and then accidentally succeed, but any assured amelioration of social conditions can come only through a knowledge of the laws by which institutions are formed, perpetuated and changed. It is because of an interest in the effort that is now being made to gain a scientific control of societary phenomena that this investigation of the evolution of leadership has been undertaken, and if the discussion adds anything of value to a fundamental science of association, we shall feel amply rewarded for the labor involved.

## II. LEADERSHIP AS AN INNATE AND ACQUIRED MODAL SOCIETARY TENDENCY OR FORCE

In the consideration of any process, the first step logically is to inquire into the nature of the motor or driving forces which give rise to the process. Consequently, in the discussion of the relation of leadership to the social process, we shall study it first as a modal societary force, both in its innate and acquired aspects and in its connection with some of the other elemental social tendencies or forces. Both the lower animals and human beings inherit certain social potentialities—tendencies or propensities toward reciprocal relations with others. These innate propensities form the basis for the development of the acquired social tendencies. The elemental tendencies toward the associate activity are the social impulses, instincts, and interests.

The social impulses are the primary or most rudimentary



tendencies to societary activity; they are the active and propelling germs from which are developed the many highly differentiated and complex interests of human associations. On account of the different meanings attached to the word "impulse," both by the psychologists and the sociologists, we shall state the meaning adopted here. The term "social impulse," used here in a very general sense, means an inherited or acquired tendency of an organism toward interactions or reciprocal relations with other organisms; it is used in both an objective and a subjective sense; it usually has conscious concomitants, but may or may not have conscious antecedents or conditions; it denotes an associative tendency which is set free by organic or extra-organic stimuli, and which may be expressed through inherited mechanisms—i. e., instincts—or through selective and volitional processes and acquired reactions—i. e., habits, customs, and institutions.

The social instincts are those impulses to reciprocal activity with other organisms for the expression of which relatively definite mechanisms are inherited; they constitute strong and often imperious tendencies to societary activity; they are the motor forces toward the associate life which have the momentum of the whole species or race behind them.

The social interests are those impulses to interactions with others which are mediated and controlled by the volitional processes. In interest there is always an idea of the object, end, or purpose to be attained, which is not necessarily true of impulse, especially in its simplest expressions. Interest, says Professor Dewey, "is impulse functioning with reference to an idea of self-expression."<sup>6</sup> The social interests are, therefore, the more highly organized dynamic forces in the social process.

In the societies of the lower animals the social instincts constitute the chief societary forces. Association among the lower animals has been one of the principal factors in their survival and variation. In the struggle for existence, natural selection has favored those animals which have possessed the strongest tendencies to associate for the purposes of mutual aid in such activities as the securing of food, in offense and defense, and in care of off-

<sup>6</sup> "Second Supplement" to the *Herbart Yearbook* for 1895, p. 22.

spring. In the long course of animal development, the social instincts have become deeply rooted in the organism. Man as the heir of the social animals has inherited tendencies to the associate life, and, because of the great value of association to human beings in the struggle for existence, these propensities have been confirmed and strengthened.

In the lower animals the innate tendencies to social activity are expressed largely through comparatively definite hereditary co-ordinations and possess but a small degree of flexibility; but in human beings there is not only a greater variety of innate social impulses, but also, owing to the greater complexity and plasticity of the nervous system, and the resulting higher reasoning powers, there is a much wider range of adaptability and variety in the social actions arising from these innate tendencies. The child at birth, from the point of view of the associate life, may be spoken of as a bundle of innate social tendencies or impulses. It is a social being when it comes into the world, having aptitudes for activity which can find adequate and normal expression only through reciprocal relations with other individuals. These various social propensities are not disconnected or independent, but are organically related, having been evolved with reference to the whole social process. Their further definition and development in the associate life depends upon the nature of the organism and upon the character of the physical and social environment.

In this section we are concerned chiefly with the nature of leadership and its relation to the expression of some of the elemental social impulses and interests. We have designated leadership as a modal societary tendency, because it constitutes one of the principal means by which all these impulses and interests are realized.

That the tendencies to lead and to obey and follow are instinctive in the societies both of the lower animals and of human beings is demonstrated by the large amount of evidence pointing in that direction. In the section entitled "Leadership as a Universal Function in Association," attention has been called to the fact that leadership is a phenomenon frequently observed among the lower animals. A few instances may be given here in illustra-

tion of what is meant by saying that leadership is instinctive in animal societies. Brehm states that among many of the larger societies of mammals the best-qualified member gains the leadership and finally obtains absolute obedience. Among the monkeys, he says, the strongest, oldest, or most capable member of the group becomes the leader. This honor is not conferred upon him by universal suffrage, but only after a most obstinate struggle with other competitors. The longest teeth and the strongest arms decide these conflicts. To the strongest belongs the crown. The leader demands and receives unqualified obedience in every respect.<sup>7</sup> The existence of leadership among the associations of monkeys is noted by a large number of students and observers of their social relations. Espinas states that among the animals, monkeys attain the highest degree of collective organization; that, in addition to the subordination obtained through imitation and transmission of thought by means of signs, there is also subordination to a chief who both commands and directs, and by whom are established the most complex and difficult communications which the group has to sustain toward its environment.<sup>8</sup> Houzeau says that the small groups among the *Quadrupeds*, in a manner similar to those of men, are maintained solely by virtue of subordination and the principle of authority. Each group has only one chief, a male adult.<sup>9</sup> Elephants may be seen in herds ranging from five to two hundred.

The most prudent and vigilant is chosen as the chief. Generally it is a male, but sometimes it is a female; the chief is deposed when his capacities wane. He has extensive authority and is always obeyed.<sup>10</sup>

In broods of chicks brought up under experimental conditions there are often one or two more active, vigorous, intelligent, and mischievous birds. These are the leaders of the brood; the others are imitators. Their presence raises the general level of intelligent activity. Remove them and the others show a less active, less inquisitive, less adventurous life. They seem to lack initiative.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *Tierleben*, Vol. I, pp. 26 and 46.

<sup>8</sup> *Des sociétés animales*, p. 505.

<sup>9</sup> *Études sur les facultés mentales des animaux, etc.*, Vol. II, "Nature du lien social."

<sup>10</sup> Topinard, *Science and Faith*, pp. 119, 120.

<sup>11</sup> Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Behavior*, p. 191.

Darwin also gives many examples of leadership in animal societies and states that it is a function common to most social animals.<sup>12</sup> Were it necessary, more illustrations might be given to show that the function of leadership among the lower animals is instinctive, as well as the tendency to follow leaders and to reward the most vigilant and efficient associates.

In passing to human beings, the instinctive character of both leadership and obedience may be noted in the associations of children, and especially in their playing. The stronger, more energetic, more masterful, or more resourceful member of the group gains the ascendancy and often exercises almost complete control over his companions. In connection with the tendency to obey a leader in children's games, Groos says:

The blind obedience accorded the leader of a little band is calculated to fill parents and teachers with envy. . . . The common fighting plays of children markedly exhibit this voluntary submission to a leader, less known, I think, in regulation games than in the many contests which a crowd of children will naturally fall into when a few belligerent spirits are present; when there is a trick to be played on schoolmates or janitor, an orchard to plunder, some unpopular person to annoy by breaking his windows or otherwise damaging his property—in these escapades the leader's word has absolute authority, and the most docile children will commit deeds in blind obedience which fill their parents with amazement and horror.<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, in the family the native tendency of the normal child to obey and to follow is, through the leadership of its parents, directed into habitual or institutional channels, and thus the child is prepared for the larger groups and wider social relations into which it is to enter.

But the instinctive tendencies to follow and to lead extend beyond the period of childhood, though they are then modified and organized to a larger extent by means of the selective and volitional processes. The conditions calling for the exercise of these functions are constantly recurring in all kinds of associations, and no group can long survive in its competition with others that does not make use of the ability of its superior few in directing and co-ordinating the activities of the many in their

<sup>12</sup> *Descent of Man*.

<sup>13</sup> Groos, *The Play of Man*, pp. 338, 339.

adaptation to the problematic conditions of the group. The variations in the innate and acquired abilities of the members of each group make it possible for those fittest to direct the activities of the group to be selected, and as there is probably no normal individual who is not at some time the best-qualified leader in some of the groups to which he belongs, the propensity to lead is always kept alive. On the other hand, the tendency to follow is always a strong one even among the most advanced societies. Habitual and customary activities predominate. Initiative, originality, and reconstructive thought are qualities exercised but rarely by the many, and by no means continuously by the gifted few. Thinking is difficult, often painful; following the lines of least resistance is a social law as well as a physical law, and in all groups the tendency is for the few to make the paths and of the many to follow therein. What Bryce asserts as true of political groups applies to all kinds of associations:

Political society has depended upon the natural inequality in the strength of individual wills and in the activity of individual intellects, so that the weaker have tended to follow the stronger, not so much because the stronger have compelled them to do so as because they themselves wished to do so.

And, in speaking of the future of political obedience, he adds: "Obedience is an instinct of human nature too strong and permanent to be got rid of."<sup>14</sup> In this connection says Professor Cooley:

We are born with what may be roughly described as a vaguely differentiated mass of mental tendency, vast and potent, but unformed and needing direction. . . . The prime condition of ascendancy is the presence of undirected energy in the person over whom it is to be exercised; it is not so much forced upon us from without as demanded from within. . . . We are born to action; and whatever is capable of suggesting and guiding action has power over us from the start.<sup>15</sup>

In speaking of the impulse to follow or obey, especially with relation to the government of primitive peoples, Ratzel says:

Arbitrary rule, though we find, no doubt, traces of it everywhere in the lower grades, even when the form of government is republican, has its basis,

<sup>14</sup>Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, pp. 467 ff.

<sup>15</sup>Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 284 ff.

not in the strength of the state or the chief, but in moral weakness of the individuals who submits almost without resistance to the domineering power.<sup>16</sup> This statement may be too strong, but it helps to illustrate one side of the situation. Ellis points out that great indolence and deficiency in energy are among the causes of the despotism of the kings, chiefs, and priests of the Ewe-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa.<sup>17</sup> While indolence may be one of the leading causes in obedience to superiors, especially in tropical climates, it is by no means the only cause, for the most vigorous, industrious, and intelligent races are followers of leaders. The instinctive character of the tendencies to lead and to follow, as manifested in the wider social circles, is expressed as follows by Professor Baldwin:

There are men so naturally born to take the lead in social reform, in executive matters, in organization, in planning our social campaigns, that we turn to them as by instinct. They have a sort of insight to which we can only bow. They gain the confidence of men, win the support of women, and excite the acclamations of children. These people are social geniuses.<sup>18</sup>

The character of leadership and obedience varies greatly, from its purely instinctive expression among the lower animals, through the scarcely less blind following of the leader of the mob of human beings, up to the highly reflective following and leadership of the great inventor, scientist, artist, philanthropist, or statesman. The primitive man follows the leadership of the mythical hero or the apotheosized ancestor with unswerving and unexamined loyalty, and his final answer to the perplexing questions of the ethnological inquirer is: "That is what our fathers said." But the primitive man is not alone in this kind of following of authority. The *ipse dixit* of the Middle Ages and the *ipse dixit* of modern political platforms and religious creeds are akin to the primitive man's reverence for authority, and all are expressions of the deep instinctive social tendency of the lower animals and of men to lead and to be led; and these tendencies are but modes of expression of the two great phases of the social process—the conserving and the innovating, the habitual and the adaptive,

<sup>16</sup> Ratzel, *The History of Mankind*, Vol. I, p. 132.

<sup>17</sup> Ellis, *The Ewe-Speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa*, p. 10.

<sup>18</sup> Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 172.

the customary and the changing—between which the social rhythm of the ages has played, emphasis at one time being upon the side of the conserving forces, at another upon the side of the innovating, and scarcely ever striking that balance so essential to ideal social organization. Tylor has expressed this tendency of the associate activity as follows:

It may be that the increasing power and range of the scientific method, with its stringency of argument and constant check of fact, may start the world on a more steady and continuous course of progress than it has moved on heretofore. But if history is to repeat itself according to precedent, we must look forward to stiffer, duller ages of traditionalists and commentators, when the great thinkers of our time will be appealed to as authorities by men who slavishly accept their tenets, yet cannot or dare not follow their methods through better evidence to higher ends.<sup>19</sup>

Leadership, then, should be classified among the most general and essential modal social tendencies or forces, since it is intimately concerned in the expression of all the social propensities. Moreover, its importance to groups in the struggle for existence has made it an instinctive tendency both in the lower animals and in human beings. This instinctive propensity, under the modification and guidance of human reason, becomes one of the central innovating and directing forces in all social groups, and instead of its influence waning in modern societies, as is sometimes asserted, the probability is that nowhere in the associational series does this function play such an important rôle as in the most highly developed and plastic social groups. Where life is constantly growing more complex and problems are multiplying, and where men reason more about the best means of attaining social values, the extraordinary insight and sound judgment of the leader will be in ever-increasing demand.

### III. RELATION OF LEADERSHIP TO THE ORGANIZED AND ORGANIZING PHASES OF THE SOCIAL PROCESS, OR TO THE HABITUAL-TENSIONAL-ADAPTIVE PHASES OF ASSOCIATING

All social activity may be stated in terms of control over the conditions by which associating organisms, or the groups which they form, are preserved and developed. Primarily and essen-

<sup>19</sup> Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II, pp. 452, 453.

tially this control is with reference to the sustentation, reproduction, and protection of the organisms composing the groups, but, in addition to this, it is with reference to the deepening and enriching of the associate life in all its phases. The conditions to be controlled are found in the physical and social environment, and in the nature of the organisms themselves. The ultimate constituent factors of the social process are the individual, and the physical and social environment. They are not independent entities, acting upon each other in an external way, but are reciprocally related factors within this process; they are functions of each other. The environment is not merely accepted, but it is selected even by the lower animals, and among human beings it is constantly being constructed and reconstructed. This building and rebuilding of the environment with reference to the attainment of social values and ends is what is meant by controlling the environment. In like manner, the individual never is, but always is becoming; he is a function of the social process, and he controls and is controlled by the physical and social environment.

The method of control, in its more general aspects, is determined, on the one hand, by the aptitude of the nervous system to select and fix, in more or less definite and permanent modes of expression, those activities which are successful in attaining the essential and developmental social values; and, on the other, by the flexibility of the nervous system through which these organized or co-ordinated modes of expression of societary activity are adapted to the new conditions entering into the social process. As a result of the first characteristic of associating organisms, we have one of the most general modal phases of the process of association, namely, the habitual or, in more social terms, instinctive activity and instinctive-custom activity, including under the latter term, institutions, laws, morals, public opinion, etc. From the second characteristic we get what may be called the adaptive phase of the social process, or the adjustment and accommodation of social instincts and customs to new and problematic conditions. The entrance of new factors into the process of association gives rise to stresses, strains, emotions—that is, tensions of some kind;



and, consequently, we may speak of another general modal phase of the social process, namely, the tensional. This really constitutes an intermediary phase between the habitual or organized and the adaptive or organizing phases. Perhaps it may be well, at the start, to emphasize the fact that these are not independent modal factors in the control of societary conditions, but that they are reciprocally related, the one presupposing the other. The tensional phase arises because of an instinct or a habit that has become inadequate in the face of a problematic situation, and the adaptive or organizing phase has meaning only in its relation to both of the preceding, for it is the conscious use of the old co-ordination, or organized phase of the social process in attaining new social ends. They are treated here merely as convenient abstractions, being in reality but *phases* of the more inclusive and unifying fact—the process of association. Leadership is intimately connected with these three phases of modal societary activity, as it is one of the principal functions in aiding the adjustments of the old co-ordinations to the new conditions. In order to bring the illustrative material of this chapter into clearer relation to these three modal processes, we shall give a more specific statement of each of them and of their connection with leadership, and shall then discuss leadership in its relation to the founding, maintaining, and changing of customs and institutions; in its relation to occupations and to some of the typical problematic social conditions and crises; and in its connection with the development of personality.

The habitual, tensional, and adaptive phases of the social process are classified among the more general modal social functions and structures because they are fundamental to the expression of all social interests. Including under the habitual or organized phase both the so-called race habits or instincts and the acquired social habits or customs, institutions, laws, etc., it may be said that all social impulses and interests are mediated through these general modes of associate activity.

By social structures we mean the relatively definite and co-ordinated phases of the social process as expressed in instinctive activity and in customs, institutions, laws, morals, etc. Social

structure is not regarded as something apart from or outside of the social process, but rather as the organized or co-ordinated phase of the process, and, in fact, as occurring within the process. It is not a static thing, but a particular kind of social activity; whereas by social function is meant the whole social process from the point of view of action in the accomplishment of social values and ends. Social function includes both the use of the social structures and their adaptation to the new and problematic conditions entering into the social process.

In discussing the relation of leadership to the more general modal social functions and structures, we naturally begin with the instinctive societary activities. They constitute the simplest and most fundamental modes of attaining social ends. The social instincts are those heredity modes of reciprocal activity of organisms which pertain to the fundamental necessities of the life-process, and which in the experience of the species or race have proved useful in providing for these necessities. By the process of natural selection, they have become deeply rooted in the species or race. Instinctive activity constitutes the chief mode of expression of the social life of the lower animals, and it forms the basis of the more highly developed structures and functions in human association. Social habits or custom activities have their sources in the instincts and impulses, but differ from instinctive activity in that they are not physically inherited, but are acquired during the lives of the individuals and are the result of social ends consciously formulated as well as of the conscious selection of the means for reaching these ends. Custom activity arises through the mediation of social instincts and impulses by the rational or volitional processes. While not inherited physically—or, if they are, they become instincts—customs and institutions are inherited socially, involving, as they do, certain established modes of activity to which each individual must conform. From customs are differentiated institutions, laws, morality, fashions, etc. To the habitual or organized phase of the social process, then, belong the purely instinctive activity of the lower animals and the instinct-custom activity of human beings, including under the latter term all of the acquired types of associate life which possess

a more or less permanent and co-ordinated mode of expression. They represent certain definite and successful ways of associating which have been consciously or unconsciously adopted by the group.

Though the *vis inertiae* of social structures and functions, even in the most advanced groups, is very great, and the changes enforced upon the group by the altered conditions of the environment or organism probably, as a rule, exceed those which are made voluntarily, yet neither the structural nor the functional phases of the social process are absolutely fixed and invariable anywhere in the associational series. In fact, one of the primal prerequisites for the survival and development of any group is that its structures and functions shall maintain a certain degree of plasticity and adaptability. Social conditions, as represented in the environment or in the organism, are constantly changing, and consequently social structures and functions must vary also in order to become adapted to the new situations. While the structures and functions are reciprocally related, the one conditioning the other, there is a sense in which functions always precede structures. The social structures are adaptations to past conditions, and so can never be completely in accord with the new circumstances. The nature of the novel situations to which adaptation of the instinctive and customary activities must be made varies from the everyday difficulties to the most dangerous crises. The inadequacy of the existing social activities in the presence of particular problematic conditions creates unrest, discontent, dissatisfaction, and various degrees of emotional instability, culminating in the greater crises, such as wars, conquests, panics, and revolutions. The process of adaptation of the social habits to the new conditions presents all phases and degrees of difficulty and danger, and thus becomes one of the crucial social functions. In general it may be said that the initiative or guidance of this process calls for superior ability or fitness of some kind—for characteristics which one individual or a small number of individuals in each group possesses in a greater degree than the other members of the group, either by virtue of native or acquired ability, or both, or by virtue of exceptional devotion of time and

energy to the problems to be met. Consequently, the problematic conditions become the nuclei of the function of leadership. It originates and centers in the difficulties of the adaptive or organizing process.

Roughly speaking, we may say that the process of adaptation takes two main directions—namely, that of maintaining and that of changing existing customs and institutions. No hard and fast distinction is to be drawn between these processes. They are rather aspects of a permanent relationship between custom and the adaptive activity, the emphasis in some cases being upon the maintenance of the custom, and in others upon its change. Both of these processes require the leadership of individuals of special qualifications, and they present problems of all degrees of difficulty and call for all degrees of ability, from the temporary leadership of the child among his companions to the powerful and permanent influence of the genius. A good example of what is meant by leadership in the maintenance of customs or institutions is found in the educator's function in molding the social activities of children into a certain degree of conformity to the habitual ways of associating. But, of course, the other aspect of the adaptive process is concerned here, too, in the modification of the educational functions and institutions to conform to new factors entering into the life-process or in the making of the educational functions more efficient. A more negative aspect of this branch of the adaptive process is found in the leadership of activities necessary for reformation or punishment of violators of custom and law. But again the other phase of the adaptive process is seen here, too, in the change of penal and reformatory institutions and laws made necessary by new conditions and new methods of punishment and reformation. Turning more specifically to the second phase of the adaptive process, we find that the making of changes in habitual ways of associating is very difficult and often irksome; and especially is this true with respect to changes in the direction of progress, and when the changes to be made are concerned with adult individuals. This difficulty is increased where the groups are primitive or isolated, and where social stimuli are comparatively few and not of an intense char-

acter, or where, paradoxically speaking, the habit of changing has not been formed. The break in habits creates a disturbance of physical and mental equilibrium. A breach of custom gives a shock to individuals and groups. Conflicts between the individual and his group, between groups or institutions, and between classes within the larger groups, cause all sorts of problematic conditions and relations which perplex and disconcert the average mind. Almost constantly there are new situations arising calling for new plans and ideals, or causing failure in the working of old plans, creating disappointments, maladjustments, and discouragements—in general, tensions of all kinds. From the tensions coming into the social process all degrees of derangement in the normal activity of associants may arise, ranging in gravity from the usual disturbances produced by everyday difficulties to the chaotic conditions growing out of the greatest crises.

The process of adaptation in both of its principal phases is often accompanied by physical and mental pain, by hesitation, doubt, perplexity, discouragement, and the most intense forms of consciousness. The tensions may be so great that there is a complete breakdown in the habits and customs and in the process of adaptation, so that individuals or groups succumb to defeat and death; but even in the less serious crises most individuals lose that rational control of their activities which is necessary to efficient adaptation. In the presence of the new, unsolved, mysterious, dangerous, or difficult, the old habits, customs, or institutions become inadequate, and emotional disturbances arise in most individuals which for a greater or less extent of time check those directive processes of consciousness required for an adequate adjustment to the changed situation. Extreme examples of this are seen in the panics caused by great conflagrations, and in mob activity resulting from the great emotional excitements caused by the violation of some cherished custom; but it holds true only in a less degree for the disturbances in all of the more regular and normal activities of society. For most associants, — confusion of ideas and hesitancy in action and a high state of suggestibility result from the introduction of new and complex factors into the customary ways of associating. In the face of such

difficulties as these, there is a demand for an initiating or guiding force to assist the associants in the attainment of the new ends made necessary by the altered conditions in organism or environment. In each group are usually found those who by virtue of a certain kind of temperament, superior ability or training, while apprehending the danger or difficulty involved in a highly problematic situation, are still able to retain the control of the rational conscious processes which give them self-control and control over others, and make them leaders in the process of adaptation. They are aggressive, resourceful, courageous, and far-sighted, with extraordinary strength and endurance, and with the ability to focus the attention upon the problem at hand, in the face of the greatest distractions, until the necessary factors in the solution are brought under control. Sustained attention is necessary in solving a difficult problem, in meeting an emergency, or in the mastery of any subject. Concentration of attention is required for seeing relations in other than habitual ways. But sustained attention calls for such qualities as originality, wide experience, exceptional energy, determined and prolonged effort—qualities which in any marked degree belong to the few in each group and which are pre-eminently the characteristics of genius. Consequently, when the customary ways of associating become inadequate, or when there are difficulties with reference to the maintenance of customs or institutions, the control of the problematic conditions involved creates a need and urgent demand for the more direct personal element than is present when the social process is running smoothly—for the individual of superior congenital and acquired ability. While all members of the group must pass through the adaptive processes, it is usually necessary that a certain individual or group of individuals, possessing greater ability or a peculiar fitness of some kind, take the initiative in making the adjustment, suggesting the various steps in the activity, and guiding the process toward a successful realization of the ends required by the new conditions. It is the difficulties of the adaptive process, then, in relation to the control of the conditions of associate life, which create the demand for the individual of special skill, insight, ingenuity, constructive

imagination, and experience to devise the means, make the plans, or construct the policies by which the more or less vaguely conceived wants or desires of the members of the group may be realized.

All social activity tends to flow between the two poles of custom and change of custom, and the two most general functions of the leader tend to conform to these two directions of the social process. As Professor James states it: "There is an everlasting struggle in every mind between the tendency to keep unchanged, and the tendency to renovate its ideas. Our education is a ceaseless compromise between the conservative and the progressive factors."<sup>20</sup> This psychological principle applies to the associate life both of individuals and of groups. The conservative tendency is stronger in some groups than in others and in some temperaments than in others, but it constitutes one of the principal forces in all associations. On the other hand, there is the desire for novelty and innovation, which, while perhaps not so continuously effective as the conservative tendency, plays just as important a rôle in the development of society and of leadership. The aggressive, domineering, ambitious type of individual, as well as the more passive, docile, and conservative type, is found in almost every group. The tendency to lead is, as we have seen, innate, and the desire for the power and social approval which come through the successful control of the activities of others is one of the strongest forces in association. The great personality is developed under the influence of powerful social stimuli, and finds expression and realization through the innovations which he makes in the customs and institutions of society, through the control of things and persons, and through the reactions of other individuals to his influence. The leader, therefore, may function as a "ferment" in the social life, as a stimulus to greater or more careful activity, as an initiator of new wants and needs, as in the cases of the inventor, investigator, discoverer, and agitator; or, on the other hand, he may function as a co-ordinator of the disturbed activities of the members of the group, as a guide and councilor, as a center of inhibition upon the more irrational and precipitate

<sup>20</sup> *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 107.

reactions to stimuli, and in the maintenance of groupal customs and traditions through education and the various forms of bringing individuals or groups into a certain required degree of conformity with accepted modes of associating.

*Leadership and occupations.*—Having considered the general nature of social habits and their adaptability in relation to the leadership function, we are now ready for a discussion of the more special phases of the social process, in so far as they are related to social habits or institutions and leadership. It has been noted that, in general, all social activity tends to become habitual, but the nature of the fundamental divisions of this habitual activity has not been discussed. By further analysis, we find that the social process, when viewed with reference to the method of expression of the social impulses, is made up of the interactions of a large number of groups possessed of specific habits and modes of adaptation to the environment, which are determined by the nature of the varied activities required to reach the numerous ends involved in the expression of the social interests. The particular activities upon which these specific habits and modes of adaptation are based are represented to a very great extent by the occupations. From this point of view, occupations may be regarded as the rudimentary social functions and as the units of social organization. Says Professor Dewey:

Occupations determine the fundamental modes of activity, and hence control the formation and use of habits. These habits, in turn, are something more than practical and overt. "Apperceptive masses" and associational tracts of necessity conform to the dominant activities. The occupations determine the chief modes of satisfaction, the standards of success and failure. Hence they furnish the working classifications and definitions of value; they control the desire processes. Moreover, they decide the sets of objects and relations that are important, and thereby provide the content or material of attention, and the qualities that are interestingly significant. The directions given to mental life thereby extend to emotional and intellectual characteristics. So fundamental and pervasive is the group of occupational activities that it affords the scheme or pattern of the structural organization of mental traits. Occupations integrate special elements into a functional whole. Because the hunting life differs from, say the agricultural, in the sort of satisfactions and ends it furnishes, in the objects to which it requires attention, in the problems it sets for reflection and deliberation, as well as in the psycho-physical co-ordi-



nations it stimulates and selects, we may well speak, and without metaphor, of the hunting psychosis or mental type. And so of the pastoral, the military, the trading, the manually productive (or manufacturing) occupations, and so on.<sup>21</sup>

Another very important illustration of the influence of occupations in the formations of habits of thought or institutions is that pointed out by Professor Veblen<sup>22</sup> in what he calls the leisure-class occupations and, in modern economic life, the industrial and pecuniary employments. Among the greatest problems of modern civilization are those which are due, in large degree, to "the divergent trend of the discipline" of the last two employments. It is through the occupations that the elemental needs of society are met. The dominant occupations represent the chief interests of society, its principal aims, ends, and ideals. They represent interests which are the centers of activity of groups of individuals not only from day to day, but also from generation to generation. It is in this persistent and almost constant form of activity that the rudimentary social habits or structures are formed.

But what is the relation of the individual, and especially of the leader, to the occupational activity? In the first place, it may be said that, from the point of view of the organization of society - in its entirety, the occupation represents the social unit. The individual cannot be considered as the unit of social organization. He is born into a society in which the general modes of interactions of occupations are already fairly well defined, and his own activities are shaped and directed by these relationships into which he is born. The occupation represents a certain definite and more or less permanent mode of activity continuing from generation to generation, whereas the individual has but a comparatively brief existence. On the other hand, the modes of activity represented in the occupations are by no means fixed or inflexible, and the individual does modify them, especially the individual of extraordinary ability. In fact, adaptations of habitual forms of occupational activity to the new conditions of

<sup>21</sup> *Psychological Review*, Vol. IX, pp. 219, 220.

<sup>22</sup> *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, and in the *Proceedings* of the thirteenth annual meeting of the American Economic Association.

the physical and social environment must be made by the individual, and, consequently, while the occupation may be considered as the social unit from the point of view of the entire social organization, the individual must be considered as the social unit from the point of view of change of social structures and functions. But the more intimate relation which the occupations sustain to leadership is found in the fact that they afford the most efficient channels for the highest development of the variations in the ability of individuals, and thereby accentuate the native qualities of initiative and inventiveness which the superior individuals may possess and upon which leadership and change in social organization depend. Through the variations in the nature of occupational activity, the individual may find the employment which gives the best expression to his inner nature, and which, therefore, develops whatever leadership qualities he may possess. The occupations, therefore, constitute the most effective forms of reciprocal activity of individuals and groups. On the one hand, they are groups of habits which have proved successful in the control of the environment for the realization of the rudimentary social interests, while, on the other hand, they provide opportunity for the greatest influence of personality in the control of the problematic conditions entering into the social process.

Not all groups can be called occupational, but it is contended here that it is on the basis of these elemental social functions that the primary groups and classes are formed, and, as the habits of thought and action determined by the dominant occupations tend to be carried over into all other forms of associational life it is evident that the occupations are the principal factors in determining the character of leadership throughout all the groups of a particular society. The occupations are instrumental in determining the leadership of non-occupational groups because they furnish the modes of activity through which the individual may best express himself; they afford the standards of success and failure, and, therefore, the means of comparing and judging individuals on the basis of their ability and their fitness for furthering the interests of other kinds of groups.

[To be continued]

## MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION: THE VALUE OF FOREIGN EXPERIENCE

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In all matters affecting municipal organization we have now reached a point at which it is possible to secure a calm, dispassionate discussion of the elements entering into the present situation, but the moment we enter upon questions connected with municipal activities, we seem unable to eliminate traditional prejudices. Whenever municipal ownership and operation are discussed, the only question in which we seem to be interested is: Does a particular argument or fact prove or disprove the desirability of this policy for American cities? We are not satisfied unless we can find some general principle applicable to all conditions and in all circumstances. It is clear that we cannot hope to arrive at any sound conclusion unless we are willing to apply the same methods that have gradually worked their way into the discussion of questions of municipal organization. We must be prepared to accept as final that there is no one general policy applicable to all the cities of the United States, and that the most we can do is to make a dispassionate analysis of the different elements that must enter into a final judgment on any local situation.

The experience of foreign countries is certainly one of the elements to which consideration should be given, but the way in which foreign experience is now being used bids fair so to confuse the public mind that, unless we are willing to deal with it in an entirely different spirit than heretofore, its use is likely to do more harm than good. The advocates as well as the opponents of the system are constantly citing European conditions, and each side is able to array a group of facts to support its position.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>While preparing this paper I received two publications which illustrate the difficulties involved in the use of foreign experience. A work entitled *Municipal Ownership in Great Britain*, by Professor Hugo Richard Meyer (340 pages; Mac-

The advocates of municipal ownership point with enthusiasm to the reduction in the burden of taxation, the lowering of charges to consumers, the greater economy of operation through lower interest rates, the improved condition of employees, and the broader social policy directly traceable to the substitution of public for private ownership and operation. They emphasize the impossibility of securing from private companies the improvements that were carried out without hesitation as soon as the cities took over these quasi-public services, and they point with much satisfaction to the better co-ordination of municipal policy directly traceable to this extension of functions as well as the record of achievement in improving the social well-being of the population.

On the other hand, the opponents of municipal ownership point to the terrific burden of local indebtedness under which the cities which have adopted this policy are now staggering. They endeavor to prove that, instead of relieving the burden of taxation, the actual effect has been to increase it; they maintain that, owing to a faulty system of accounting, the profits reported are fictitious rather than real; and finally they draw a lurid picture of the extravagant increase in municipal employees since the inauguration of this policy. No wonder that the average citizen turns wearily from this mass of conflicting testimony, convinced that no guidance can be secured from these real or supposed facts, and resolved to settle the question without reference to foreign conditions.

It seems unfortunate that the self-interest and prejudice which have obscured the real issues involved in this great question should prevent us from availing ourselves of the mass of valuable experience that both British and continental cities have accumulated during the last twenty-five years. To make this experience

millan Co., 1906), is devoted to proving the thesis that municipal ownership and operation in Great Britain have been a failure from almost every point of view. On the other hand, a monograph by Frederic C. Howe, entitled *Municipal Ownership in Great Britain*—which is the result of a special investigation conducted under the auspices of the United States Bureau of Labor—is replete with evidence pointing to exactly the opposite conclusion. This monograph is published in the Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor for January, 1906.

valuable, however, it must be used with the greatest care and discrimination. The best introduction to a proper estimate of the value of foreign experience is an analysis of the causes that have led to the present movement for municipal ownership in European countries. It is both an interesting and a significant fact that the same combination of causes is everywhere apparent. The movement for the municipal ownership of gas and electric lighting, but particularly of street railways, is directly traceable to the failure of private companies to furnish the kind of service which the inhabitants of the cities demanded and had the right to expect. Particularly in Germany the history of the relation between municipalities and public-service corporations is one long story of crimination and recrimination.

The indictment against the public-service corporations was none too strong, and fully justified the step taken by the leading municipalities in these two countries. In order, however, properly to interpret the situation, we must know something of the conditions under which these private companies were operating. The original franchise grants were made for relatively short terms, ranging from twenty-five to forty years, and were usually accompanied by the requirement for payment into the city treasury of from 3 to 8 per cent. of the gross receipts. The relatively large financial return, combined with the comparatively short franchise period, discouraged the companies from taking any large risks, especially as regards extension of the service into new and relatively sparsely settled sections of the city. This natural conservatism has been interpreted as an indication of the inability of the companies to meet the requirements of the local service.

The faith in private ownership was further weakened by the reluctance of the companies to make the change from horse to electrical power. In both Great Britain and Germany, but particularly in Germany, the introduction of electrical traction came toward the close of existing franchise grants, and it is not surprising that the companies refused to make the large capital investment which the change required, unless they were assured either of an extension of the franchise period or of adequate reimburse-

ment for the capital outlay. It is, therefore, manifestly unfair to ascribe all the shortcomings of corporate service to defects inherent in corporate management. In fact, the most important are directly traceable to the stringent conditions under which franchises were held and the unwillingness of the municipalities to make further concessions to the companies.

This experience contains a valuable lesson for American municipalities, and furnishes an indirect and somewhat unexpected argument for the advocates of municipal ownership. The universal experience of European countries has been that as the terms of franchise grants are made shorter and the financial payments for such grants are made larger, the service performed by private corporations deteriorates, while the initiative and enterprise which lead them to experiment with new methods and devices are stunted, if not totally destroyed. The willingness of American corporations to take great risks, and even to sacrifice considerable invested capital for the purpose of ultimate economy, is due very largely to the fact that until recent years they have been permitted to plan for a service upon which no time limit was placed.

If the reform in the method of franchise grants becomes general, as it bids fair to do, we are likely to experience a marked change in the policy of the public-service corporations. The short-term franchise to the highest bidder assures to the city an adequate money return for the privilege granted, but tends to discourage the companies from incurring large risks in the extension of the service. It is not unlikely that municipal ownership will come all the more quickly because of the difficulties and antagonisms that are certain to grow out of this more careful safeguarding of public franchises.

From these facts several lessons may be drawn:

First: In the adjustment of the relation between public-service corporations and municipalities there is constant danger of over-emphasizing financial considerations to the detriment of the larger social ends which all these services must, or at least should, perform. This does not mean a reckless granting of franchises, but rather a clearer perception of the fact that money payments are

not the only, and in fact not the most important, form in which the community may receive an adequate return for franchise grants. European cities have overemphasized the financial return, and the same danger confronts our American cities. It is true that most American communities have received a totally inadequate money return for the valuable privileges which they have granted, but it is equally true that the inhabitants of our cities have profited to no small degree by the spirit of enterprise and the readiness to make sweeping improvements in equipment which have characterized the policy of the larger public-service corporations in the United States.

Secondly: Inasmuch as most of our American cities are now committed to a policy of short-term franchises, the experience of every European city teaches the necessity of inserting in the grant a reserve power on the part of the municipality to require the companies to make certain definite extensions of service each year, or at least to fix the minimum requirements for such extensions.

Third: Even with all these precautions, it is more than likely that American cities will repeat the experience of European communities. The antagonism between the local authorities and the public-service corporations arising out of the interpretation of the reserved power of the municipality will develop to such a point as to make municipal ownership the only possible solution. The pending controversy between the city of New York and the Inter-Borough Metropolitan Company is but one of a multitude of instances illustrating this danger.

Another series of lessons to be drawn from European experience relates more particularly to the effect of municipal ownership on local finance. Much has been said and written on this question, and the testimony presented by the advocates and opponents of municipal ownership is of the most conflicting character. The opponents of this policy have drawn a depressing picture of the extraordinary increase in municipal indebtedness and the inordinate increase in taxation in those countries in which municipal ownership has been tried. As a matter of fact, in all the European countries in which municipal ownership has received general

recognition, but particularly in Germany and Great Britain, the increase in municipal indebtedness caused by the adoption of the policy of municipal ownership does not represent a real burden on the community, as both the interest and the sinking-fund charges of this portion of the debt are defrayed, with very few exceptions, from the receipts of the various services. The increase in taxation is traceable to public improvements, such as the betterment of school facilities, repaving of highways, improved organization of police service, etc., from which services no direct money return can be secured.

The failure to distinguish between the two types of municipal services—the financially productive and the financially non-productive—has befogged the real issue, and has in some cases prevented the consideration of the question of municipal ownership on its merits. The experience of European countries points to the necessity of distinguishing between that portion of the city's indebtedness which represents investments in reproductive enterprises, and that portion which is used for financially non-productive services. Our present constitutional limitations on local indebtedness, because of the failure to make this distinction, are hampering the normal growth of American municipalities. They served their purpose in checking that spirit of speculation and wildcat enterprise which for a time threatened the stability of our system of local finance. This danger is now happily past, but the perpetuation of the old restrictions hopelessly ties the hands of our municipalities and places them to a very large extent at the mercy of the public-service corporations. It is not at all likely that we can secure the repeal of these constitutional limitations, but it is imperative, if this question of municipal ownership is to be dealt with on its merits, that a distinction be made between productive and non-productive enterprises, and that the limitations on that portion of indebtedness incurred for reproductive enterprises be removed. This plan was proposed by the Committee on Municipal Program of the National Municipal League, and the wisdom of this proposal is making itself more apparent each day.

The most serious objection advanced against the policy of municipal ownership and operation in the United States is the lack of



an administrative organization, and particularly of a civil-service system, adequate to bear the additional burden which such extension of function would involve. The picture of extravagance, corruption, and misrule which is held up to us as the inevitable accompaniment of the extension of municipal powers has done more than anything else to check the spread of sentiment in favor of municipal ownership. On this point the experience of the municipalities of Great Britain and Germany is particularly suggestive and valuable. The first thing that is impressed upon every student of foreign municipal institutions is the small number of elective administrative officers, as well as the relative permanence of tenure of the heads of executive departments. In the United States we have proceeded on the assumption that popular government means short terms of office and, to a certain extent, rotation in office. We are but beginning to appreciate the fact that there are certain portions of our political system in which the plan of popular election and short tenure defeats rather than promotes the real intent and purpose of popular government. Considerable sections of the country have already become convinced of this fact so far as the election of judges is concerned, and in our largest cities the application of the elective principle to heads of administrative departments is being gradually restricted, although in no case have we yet reached the point at which the management of a great city department is looked upon as a career to which a man may give the best years of his life with the assurance of permanent employment. Under our present system the term of office is so short that the head of a municipal enterprise hesitates to propose large plans for improvements, because of the relative certainty that he will be unable to carry these plans to successful conclusion.

The American people must, sooner or later, develop a new concept of popular government, in which the prominent factor will not be the election of officials, but rather that control of organized public opinion over the administration of public affairs, which is, after all, the essential element of a vigorous democracy. On this point the lessons of foreign experience are clear and unmistakable. The administration of executive departments in the Ger-

man, and particularly in the English, cities shows a sensitiveness to every stirring of public opinion which is in marked contrast with the apparent indifference so often shown in similar departments in our American municipalities. The fact that a head of department is staking his career on the successful management of one branch of the public service is in itself sufficient to create in him a sensitiveness to every public demand. It is clear, therefore, that if our American municipalities are to extend their functions through the management of such quasi-public services as street railways, gas and electric-light supply, etc., we must be prepared to accept an organization of executive departments under which such heads will hold office during good behavior.

It is also evident that, if these services are to be efficiently performed, we must develop an organization of the civil service on a basis similar to that of European cities. That there is no insuperable obstacle to the attainment of this end is sufficiently attested by the rapid strides of the civil-service reform movement in most of our large cities.

It is important in this connection to examine the experience of foreign cities on one of the points most strenuously urged against municipal ownership and operation. We are told that this policy means a dangerous increase in the number of municipal employees. The danger that is pointed out is twofold. In the first place, the increase in employees introduces an element of political danger, because of the activity of these officials in the civic life of the community. Although foreign cities have suffered to a very slight extent from this cause, it must be kept in mind that the immunity has been due largely to the fact that their civil service has been organized on a permanent basis and administered under the merit system. The opponents of municipal ownership also lay much emphasis on the fact that the extension of municipal functions will mean, not only a corresponding increase in the number of offices, but that the extravagance which characterizes municipal operation will lead to the addition of a great number of unnecessary employees to the city's pay-roll. It is often charged that this has taken place in the English cities, but all the available evidence shows conclusively that this charge is unfounded.

A third and equally serious question connected with the municipal employment of labor is the influence of organized labor in securing from municipalities better conditions than they can secure from private corporations and individuals. It is pointed out that unskilled labor under municipal ownership enjoys a position of special privilege which is unfair to the great mass of the laboring population. The experience of every European city shows that the change from private to public ownership and operation has always been accompanied by a betterment of labor conditions, and that this improved condition has set a standard to which other enterprises of a similar character have been gradually forced to conform. This sensitiveness to the demands of labor organizations may place municipal industries at a certain disadvantage when in competition with private companies, but the ultimate effect on the labor situation is salutary rather than otherwise. In but few instances have unreasonable demands been complied with, and even where this has been done the situation has usually corrected itself by subsequent readjustments.

Another financial lesson of equal, if not greater, importance, and as to which foreign experience speaks with no uncertain voice, relates to the system of municipal accounting. In every British and continental city each public work is regarded as a separate industrial enterprise, and the accounts are kept accordingly. In fact, if not in law, the accounts of the municipal undertaking are kept in exactly the same way as if the enterprise were under private management. Until all the charges for repairs, depreciation, interest, and liquidation are met, there is no thought of profits. The result has been that the municipal industrial enterprises in both German and English cities have been maintained at a high point of efficiency. The besetting danger of municipal operation in the United States has been the desire to reduce the tax-rate through the profits of industrial enterprises. This temptation has been so great that in a number of instances the efficiency of the municipal plant has been destroyed by the desire to make a large part of this gross income available for general city purposes. The most notable instance is the Philadelphia gas-works, whose decline was not due so much to technical misman-

agement as to the refusal on the part of the city council to permit it to be managed on a business basis. Gross profits which should have been used for repairs and renewals were used for general city purposes, and the council persistently refused to make the appropriations necessary to keep the plant in good condition. Unless our American municipalities are prepared to make their system of accounting as businesslike as that of European cities, there is little or no hope that municipal ownership and operation can be successfully carried out.

A final financial lesson, of a negative rather than of a positive character, relates to the policy to be adopted in fixing the cost of service to the consumer. It has been pointed out time and again that the industries usually referred to as public-service industries occupy an exceptional position because of the special franchises or privileges necessary for their operation. While this is true, a far more important fact is often lost sight of—namely, that these industries are capable of subserving certain broad social purposes, and that it is within the power of the municipality so to adjust the cost of service that these larger social ends will be attained. It is one of the commonplaces of social economy that the transportation service is the best means of relieving congestion of population, and that the gas supply can be made one of the most effective means of influencing the habits and customs of the people. In the transportation service the plan adopted in most of the large European municipalities has been to adjust the fares under a zone tariff, thus increasing the cost of service with the increase in the length of ride. Although this has given satisfactory financial results, it has prevented the municipalities from performing their greatest service to the social well-being of the community, namely, to induce the population to move into outlying and less-congested sections of the city. It is true that the uniform fare of our American cities is unnecessarily high, and is no doubt a considerable tax on the short-distance passenger, but it is a tax which ultimately redounds to the social welfare of the community in contributing to that more equal distribution of population so necessary to the social advance of the community. In this matter of the adjustment of transportation rates to the attainment of

social ends, German municipalities are considerably in advance of the English, but they have all much to learn from the conditions prevailing in our American cities.

As regards the gas supply, it is evident that a reduction in the price of gas so as to permit the substitution of the gas-stove for the coal-stove is certain to have a far-reaching influence on the diet of the poorer classes. In this respect the British municipalities have done splendid service. The readiness with which food is heated on the gas-range, as compared with the effort to start a coal-fire, makes it possible to introduce a far larger proportion of warm, cooked food into the workingman's diet. The little that has been done in this direction is sufficient to show the tremendous power of the city in furthering social welfare.

These are but a few of the many instances in which the municipality, in the management of its public-service industries, is able profoundly to influence the industrial efficiency, the social welfare, and the general well-being of the community. European municipalities have all begun to appreciate the power which they can wield in this way. Although the sum-total of actual achievement is somewhat meager, the general principle involved is one of the greatest moment; the full import of which we have but begun to appreciate in the United States.

Whatever lesson may be drawn from foreign experience—and they are numerous and important—no one will contend that this experience can do more than throw an interesting sidelight on the problems that confront our American cities. The final choice between private and public ownership and operation must be made on the basis of our own peculiar conditions. In this choice, factors which are entirely absent in European countries will play an important part. We must recognize, in the first place, that the attitude of the American people toward the city is totally different from that which prevails in the countries of Europe. With us city government is a negative rather than a positive factor. We look to it for the protection of life and property, but it is with considerable reluctance that we accept any extension of function beyond this limited field. In Europe, on the other hand, the city is a far more positive factor in the life and thought of

the people. As new needs arise, the inhabitant of the European city looks to the community in its organized capacity for the performance of each service. With us in the United States the presumption is against any extension of municipal functions, and it requires considerable pressure to induce the population to accept an increase in municipal powers.

The immediate bearing of this contrast on the question under consideration is that municipal ownership in the United States is regarded as a last resort, to be used only after all efforts to secure efficient service through other channels have been exhausted. This of itself is an assurance that any experiments that may be made will be conservative. Whatever our attitude toward the question of municipal ownership and operation, the country as a whole is interested in having some experiments made. It is a grave mistake—especially on the part of the representatives of the public-service corporations—to decry such experiments as socialistic and as foredoomed to failure.

We must also bear in mind that in most of our large cities municipal ownership is practically impossible. Given the numerous constitutional restrictions, the financial resources of our cities are so limited that the repurchase of franchises belongs to the field of academic discussion rather than practical politics. It is possible that we shall find a way out of this difficulty through the Chicago plan of purchase-mortgage certificates, but it is evident that the sentiment of our American communities is still so strongly opposed to an increase in municipal indebtedness that even this plan is not likely to receive very general acceptance.

In spite of all these difficulties and dangers, there is every indication that the sentiment in favor of municipal ownership, and even of municipal ownership and operation, will acquire increasing force with each year, due primarily to the influence of one of the factors to which little attention has been given—namely, the growing opposition to monopoly. We are not concerned in this connection with the justification for this feeling. That it is an important factor in the situation is attested by the popularity of every political platform that emphasizes the opposition to monopoly. In order to gauge the strength of this feeling at its true

value, we must always bear in mind that the American inherited the opposition to special privilege upon which some of the most distinctive features of the common law rest. This feeling of opposition has been intensified in the United States by the gradual consolidation of the competing public-service corporations. Unless the signs of the times are fundamentally misleading, there is every indication that this opposition to monopoly will lead some of our American communities to override all the difficulties and dangers of municipal ownership and operation, in the hope of escaping the tyranny of local monopolies which, though not based on special legal privilege, as were the earlier monopolies that aroused the opposition of the English people, are none the less burdensome.

It is true that the experience with municipal ownership and operation in the United States has not been of the most encouraging nature, but it is also true that any experiments that may now be made will be carried on under more favorable conditions than at any previous period. Our cities are far better organized than they were fifty years ago. Their administrative system is more stable, and public opinion is far more exacting in its control over administrative departments. Municipal ownership and operation of the public-service industries involves some dangers and many new responsibilities, but it is not at all unlikely that in the effort to meet these new responsibilities we shall place the civic life of our American cities on a new and higher plane. Civic improvement in the United States has always followed in the wake of new responsibilities, and there is every indication that the experience with municipal ownership will prove no exception to the rule.

## THE SOCIAL QUESTION OF TODAY

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"To all thoughtful and discerning men," says an English writer, "it should now be clear that the solution of the social question is the great task which has been laid upon the present epoch in the history of the world."<sup>1</sup> Disraeli said: "The social question is today only a zephyr which rustles the leaves, but it will soon become a hurricane."<sup>2</sup> This prophecy seems likely to be fulfilled. The clouds of social discontent have long been gathering. It is a dull ear that cannot now hear mutterings of a coming storm. Forewarned, however, we are told is forearmed. We may therefore indulge the hope that when the storm strikes, if strike it does, the Ship of State will not be taken unawares, but will be prepared to receive it and weather it out. But if this is so, it will be because of the warnings of social barometry have been not merely noted by a few minds, but also heeded by the people generally. It will be because there has been much general study of the social question.

Although literally hundreds of books, pamphlets, and articles have been published on "The Social Question," or titles which mean the same thing, the phrase conveys to the mind of the average person no definite conception, and is used for the most part to cover vagueness or confusion of thought. A discussion, then, which aspires to be popularly helpful may as well begin at the beginning and state the question, if possible, in easily comprehensible terms.

"The social question" is a phrase that has a double meaning. It is applied first, to the general and eternal question of social well-being. So understood, the social question involves a multi-

<sup>1</sup> Kirkup, *History of Socialism*, Preface.

<sup>2</sup> See Stein, *Die sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*, French translation, p. 126.



tude of questions, political, moral, social, and industrial. Ruskin formulated it as the question of ordering the lives of the members of society so as to maintain the largest number of noble and happy human beings. Mr. John A. Hobson, a sympathetic critic of Ruskin, expands this statement into the following form: "Given a number of human beings, with a certain development of physical and mental faculties and of social institutions, in command of given natural resources, how can they best utilize these powers for the attainment of the most complete satisfaction?"<sup>3</sup>

Conceived in this general way, it is inept, of course, to talk of solving the social question. A solution can only be approximated. Ferdinand Lassalle said that he never made use of the expression "solution of the social problem;" for, said he, "the transformation of society will be the work of centuries and of a series of measures and reforms which will grow out of each other organically."<sup>4</sup> Lassalle was evidently thinking of the social question in its general aspect. And so when it is said, as it sometimes is said, that the social question can never be settled until human nature is transformed, or until the principles of Christianity have taken their rightful place as the basis for all human relationships, it is the general social question that is before the mind.

There is, however, another and a specific meaning sometimes ascribed to the social question which makes it possible to speak of a solution, and rational to expect it. The question generally considered is, as we have just suggested, a whole congeries of problems, administrative, economic, judiciary, political, educational, scientific, industrial, agricultural, hygienic, philanthropic, aesthetic, and moral. But there is almost always some special social question that is to the fore. Some special obstacle blocks social progress, giving rise to the question of its removal. This question is, for the time, the important question. Further social progress demands and requires its solution. It is *the* social question. The general social question is a question for all time; the special social question is for one time only, and human intelligence may settle it forever. In this sense there need be no hesitancy in

<sup>3</sup> *The Social Problem*, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> See Waurin, *La question sociale*, p. 17.

speaking of a solution of the social question. We propose to discuss this question as it presents itself today.

The social question is always a question of removing some obstacle to progress. Now, the obstacles in the way of social advancement are of two kinds, natural and artificial—those which nature places in the way, and those which arise from the ignorance and selfishness of man. When the Pilgrims landed on the bleak and inhospitable shores of New England, fell upon their knees, and, as Evarts said, got up and fell upon the aborigines, the chief obstacles before them were those presented by the topographic and climatic features of the country. Today, however, the wilderness has been subdued, desert regions have been reclaimed, and steam and electricity harnessed to the car of Progress. The most serious obstacles remaining are those due to the ignorance and selfishness of individuals and social institutions. It is among these artificial obstacles that we must look for the occasion of the social question of today.

Ignorance and selfishness are, of course, as old as the race. Selfishness, however, manifests itself in domination and in privilege, and these are supported by ignorance. Once get a privilege established and the conservatism of ignorance will tend to uphold it. "It is truly wonderful to a philosophic mind," says an anonymous writer, "what unanimity of speech and action can be evoked from mankind in favor of what is. No matter how irrational, how inconvenient, how injurious, how flagrantly monstrous even a thing may be, if it is actually existent, and can boast of antiquity, however limited, the whole world will rush to its defense."<sup>5</sup> History illustrates the truth of this. Its course has been about as follows: The selfishness of the strong or the cunning takes the earliest opportunity to organize and intrench itself in the most available institution. Here the few flourish and, for a time, perform a valuable social function. They luxuriate, grow corrupt, and, drunk with power, indulge in excesses which arouse the many to a sense of injustice. A struggle ensues, ending in the popular conquest of the oppressive institution. Selfishness is driven out, to reintrench itself on other vantage ground; and the

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in *The Social Horizon*, p. 80.

same process is repeated. The social question is always a question of the many against the few, and manifests itself invariably in a struggle over some form of institution; that is to say, a class-struggle.

To illustrate the truth of this, as well as to show how the social question changes its aspect from time to time, let us look a little more closely at the history of the past.

In the early stages of social development man was extremely superstitious. His ideas were almost wholly theological. He was, as Huxley says, "a prey to blind impulses, and a victim of endless illusions which made his mental existence a terror and a burden and filled his physical life with barren toil and battle." He was consequently most easily ruled through his fear of the gods. The Church, therefore, became the most powerful of institutions. It held the keys of heaven and hell. It had the power to bind and to loose. What more natural than that the exercise of such power should lead to selfishness, or that the supremely selfish and ambitious should gain control of the institution? This, as everybody knows, is precisely what happened. The Church became grossly corrupt and oppressive. Heresy—that is to say, independent thinking—was the unpardonable sin. The people, slowly increasing in intelligence, grew restive, and here and there broke out in open revolt. The interests and influences of the ecclesiastics were inimical to change, hence they blocked the pathway of progress. For centuries the most urgent demand of the people was for religious freedom, freedom from the palsying hand of the Church. The social question was a religious question. When Luther, Zwingli, and their associates inaugurated the Reformation of the sixteenth century, they began the closing act of the great historical drama of the struggle for religious liberty. Even yet men are not altogether free from ecclesiastical domination, but the power of the Church is broken, and the social question is no longer primarily religious.

The conquest of religious freedom, however, did not destroy human selfishness. Driven from one stronghold, it sought refuge and opportunity in another. That other was the Government, also a necessary institution with a great historic mission, but

affording the next best opportunity for domination and the enjoyment of privilege. The people soon found that the power formerly wielded by the ecclesiastic was now lodged in the hands of the political potentate. The crozier had but transformed itself into the scepter. Hence the battle had to be fought over again. A social movement, more or less conscious, and manifesting itself spasmodically in uprisings and revolutions, took place, culminating in a modification of the power of the ruling class, as in England and Germany, or in a nominal democracy, as in France and the United States. During all this period the dominant interest of the people was in matters pertaining to political control. Their greatest need was political freedom. The social question was a political question.

Of course, it cannot be said that there is even yet anywhere complete political freedom. Kings and emperors still claim to rule by the grace of God and talk of "my people." Fully half of mankind, the "better half," are still in a condition of political subserviency; and even where democracy is most vaunted men are still dominated by "the boss," or are the subjects of their own blind partisanship. Still, for all that, the more civilized nations have passed out of the shadow of political oppression. It is not true of Russia, and it is but partially true of other European countries, but it is practically true of the United States. From the political situation of the time of Frederick the Great, who looked upon the people as upon the deer of his park; or the days of Bonaparte, who regarded men as food for powder, down to the democracy of Jefferson who demanded "equal privileges for all and special privileges to none;" or of Lincoln, who declared that God must love the common people because he made so many of them, is a long journey, but it has been made. Opening out before us there lies still the long and steep pathway leading to ideal political conditions in which there will be no common people, because there will be no invidious distinctions. But the main question with us is not one of political liberty. The social question is no longer primarily a political question.

Religious and political freedom having been practically achieved by the close of the eighteenth century, so far at least as

the more advanced nations are concerned, we should expect to find the dominating spirit and selfishness of men next manifesting themselves in the most available institution. The power of the Church was weakened, and that of the State distributed. But there had been growing up during the second half of the eighteenth century an institution which, as a means of control, and privilege, was to become more potent than Church or State. That institution was Capitalism, or, speaking generally, the industrial institution. Hitherto privilege had relied on the religious fears and beliefs of men, and on the repression of political opinion. It now found at its hand an instrument whereby it could maintain itself by controlling men through their material means of existence. Nothing more natural than that it should be used. The evolution of our modern industrial system has been accompanied by increasing despotic use of the power it has placed in the hands of those who control it. John Stuart Mill saw the drift of things, and foretold the resultant character of the social problem. "The social problem of the future," he said, "we considered to be how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labor."<sup>6</sup> He realized that the social problem was to become an economic question. The event justifies his prediction. "The social question," says Professor Adolph Wagner, in an oft-quoted passage, "comes of the consciousness of a contradiction between economic development and the social ideal of liberty and equality which is being realized in political life."<sup>7</sup> That is, the social question is no longer political, but economic. We read today that one man controls this, that, or the other industry, or that a few men are masters of half the railroads in the country. This is but to say that power has concentrated in the hands of those who have secured possession of the instruments of production, and in some cases that power is greater than that formerly wielded by kings and emperors. It would be a miracle if this power were not abused. That it has been, no one will deny. In many cases the new rulers are

<sup>6</sup> *Autobiography* (London, 1873), p. 232.

<sup>7</sup> *Lehrbuch der politischen Oekonomie* (second edition, 1876), p. 36.

only shrewd manipulators of economic distribution. They regard their own interests as primary, their immediate welfare as superior to the public weal. Hence "soulless corporation" and "greedy trust" have become common phrases. Corporations, trusts, and combinations, whatever may be said of their inherent social possibilities, are the instruments laid hold of to maintain and augment the power of a few men. They are social factors of great potentiality, but they are today employed primarily for private advantage. The benefits which accrue to society are considerable, but they are incidental. Their main purpose is to promote the power of the few by skilful manipulation of the industrial and business forces. Says Professor Ward:

Those engaged in the distribution of wealth come in contact with such large amounts that they cannot resist the inclination to absorb into their own possession a proportion greater than is sufficient to constitute a just compensation for their labor. Neither have the means been yet devised to prevent this. To do so is the problem of social economy. The combinations, co-operations, and monopolies already established by shrewd distributors of wealth have become so extensive and complicated that it may require a general social revolution to overthrow them. These industries have absorbed the most acute minds of the world, because they were the levers of power which intellectual force could lay hold of. They have maintained their grasp by dint of every available form of deception, misrepresentation, and strategy, which is all within the legitimate sphere of natural law. The most potent of all the influences wielded by them is that of securing the acquiescence of the victims—for it is a thankless task to labor for the emancipation of a willing slave. This object the distributors of wealth have accomplished by the manufacture of a public sentiment favorable to their interests. This has been done so successfully that, in this age of pretended practical life, any remark bearing upon the greatest economic problem of society—viz., the equitable remuneration of labor and distribution of wealth—is at once branded as "socialistic" and "visionary," as well by those who suffer as by those who profit by this state of things.<sup>8</sup>

The seat of power, then, the opportunity for selfish domination, and the source of oppression are today in our industrial institutions. These institutions themselves, like the Church and the State, have performed a great mission. Those in control of them, the capitalist class, have rendered the world a great service by developing and organizing the material forces of production. But here, as in the preceding dominant institutions, the tempta-

<sup>8</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 577, 578.

tion to the misuse of power were too great. Oppression has resulted, followed by agitation. There is in all lands a social movement in the direction of securing popular control of industry, manifesting itself in either a demand for public regulation of great industries or for public management, or in the more extreme form of socialism, that is, a demand for the social ownership and control of all the material means of production. The social question has become an economic question, a question of economic freedom. It is the question of securing the management of our industrial institutions in the interest of the people as a whole.

The social question, then, has passed through two phases, the religious and the political, and is now in a third, namely, the economic.<sup>9</sup> It is today, as it has always been, a question of popular freedom, a question of democracy. Many of the struggles of the past for religious and political power have borne no conscious relation to the social question. They were merely attempts at settling disputes which had arisen between rival factions of the dominant class that were of no particular interest to the people, because to them they meant at most only a change of masters. The freedom, which is the immediate object of the social movement, is today, as it has always been, freedom from selfish domination.

Now, it is not to be denied that domination, even class domination, is sometimes beneficial. It has been a factor in social progress. "The whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of the primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership)," says the famous Manifesto of 1848, "has been a history of class-struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes."<sup>10</sup> There is truth in this. The struggle of classes, like the conflicts between contiguous tribes or races, has contributed to progress. Says Herbert Spencer:

<sup>9</sup> Ferri mentions another phase, the civil. See his *Socialism and Science*, p. 39.

<sup>10</sup> *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels; authorized English translation, Preface.

We must recognize the truth that the struggles for existence between societies have been instrumental to their evolution. Neither the consolidation and reconsolidation of small groups into large ones; nor the organization of such compound and doubly compound groups; nor the concomitant developments of those 'aids to a higher life which civilization has brought; would have been possible without inter-tribal and inter-national conflicts. Social co-operation is initiated by joint defense and offense; and from the co-operation thus initiated all kinds of co-operations have arisen. Inconceivable as have been the horrors caused by this universal antagonism which, beginning with the chronic hostilities of small hordes tens of thousands of years ago, has ended in the occasional vast battles of immense nations, we must nevertheless admit that without it the world would still have been inhabited only by men of feeble types, sheltering in caves and living on wild food.<sup>11</sup>

And so class struggle and class-domination have been means of social development. In certain critical periods of society, say in war, it is an advantage to have the reins of power in the hands of a class that will organize the society for military purposes. Such organization implies the subordination of the many, and their obedience to the ruling authority. The great danger comes, however, after the crisis is passed, and when social existence and advancement no longer require the dominance of a particular class, or the exercise by it of exclusive privileges. This danger manifests itself in an undue conservatism on the part of those who profit by the existing condition of affairs, and by the oppression of the lower classes as soon as they begin to manifest indications of a revolt against the injustices practiced upon them. This disposition of the ruling class to maintain itself in its dominant position follows not so much from its superior selfishness as from the instinct of self-preservation. It is an illusion to suppose that one class in society is animated by the spirit of selfishness and greed, while another class alone is virtuous and heroic. Selfishness is a principle of human nature, due to the circumstances and exigencies under which man has developed, and this principle will manifest itself whenever and wherever there is irresponsible power and privilege. Selfishness becomes more assertive and conspicuous in a class the power and privilege of which are challenged. In such a class the temptation to employ unjust methods in its own behalf becomes unusually strong. And

<sup>11</sup> *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 241.



when we look back over history, we find that in almost every instance it has yielded to the temptation.

Among the methods employed by the ruling classes in history to preserve their exclusive privileges and to maintain themselves in their dominant position is, in the first place, the awakening of the fear of the lower orders by punishment for the violation of codes, which codes are always consciously or unconsciously inspired in the interests of the social classes which direct the State.<sup>12</sup> Armies have been organized ostensibly for the purpose of defending the society against a foreign foe, but they have been used to prevent a rising of the people. Even the religious element in the nature of man has been made to play an important part in preserving the relative position of the classes; for the people were led to believe that for any attempt to secure a share of the privileges of the dominant class they would be punished, not only in this life, but also in the life to come.

Again, the dominant classes have always endeavored to pervert the egoism of the lower classes and thus make them believe that it was to their advantage to be ruled. "Kings bestride the necks of their people," said Abraham Lincoln, "not because they want to do it, but because the people are better off for being ridden." Naturally the agencies for molding public opinion have been in the hands of the dominant classes, and they have not failed to employ them. A public sentiment favorable to their interests has been developed and maintained. This is why the idea of divine right has been so long-lived. The idea that God looks with peculiar favor upon a monarchy in comparison with other forms of government, and that accession by primogeniture is peculiarly sacred, antedates both the Christian and the Mosaic dispensations. This idea that some men are born to lord it over others has always been an effective instrument for maintaining the domination of the ruling class. Even today the intelligent citizen must carefully examine all appeals to his patriotism to see whether there is not lurking behind the appeal the mere desire to utilize his patriotism in maintaining the position of those in power—that is to say, for partisan instead of patriotic purposes.

<sup>12</sup> See Loria, *Economic Foundations of Society*, p. 135.

Finally, the dominant classes have naturally enough opposed the advancement of knowledge among the lower classes. Knowledge is the foe of privilege. The instinct of self-preservation led even the Church to oppose education in science, or to direct it into "safe" channels. From the dawn of history when, according to the story, our first parents were prohibited from eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, down to the time when the attitude of the ecclesiastics provoked the saying that "ignorance is the mother of devotion," the Church was hostile to scientific knowledge. Even in recent times a bishop of the English church could declare, in the presence of a large assemblage, that he could find nothing in either the Old or the New Testament which warranted him in paying deference to mere intellect. Galileo was compelled to bow the knee before the Inquisitorial Court at Rome and solemnly recant his teaching that the sun is the center of our system and the earth revolves around it; and Professor Huxley, for his sincere advocacy of the evolutionary hypothesis, was publicly ridiculed by a bishop of the Church and taunted with being the descendant of a monkey. Professor Huxley, however, had the wit to hurl back the deserved and withering retort that he would rather be the descendant of an animal of low intelligence and of stooping gait, that grins and chatters as you pass, than to be the descendant of a man, endowed with great eloquence and occupying a splendid position, who would prostitute these gifts in a skilful appeal to religious prejudice for the purpose of obscuring the truth.<sup>13</sup> There is something of this same spirit manifested today when a man, by giving honest utterance to well-established results of modern biblical criticism, calls down upon himself the scathing denunciation of those whose love of truth is outweighed by their fear that certain interests supposed by them to be sacred and important may be jeopardized by the advancement of knowledge. Ecclesiastical or political, the dominant class has opposed the advancement of knowledge when such advancement threatened its privileges. History records the tardiness of the political authorities in providing

<sup>13</sup> See *Life and Letters of Thomas H. Huxley*, Vol. I, chap. 14, in which several reports of Huxley's famous reply to Bishop Wilberforce are given.

opportunity for the education of the common people. No serious attempt was made in England by the ruling classes until 1832 to facilitate the education of the people, and education was not made national and compulsory until 1867.<sup>14</sup> It would not have been made so then, perhaps, had it not been for the fact that the power of the people began to be feared, and, as Lord Sherbrooke expressed it in 1870, the ruling class felt that they "must educate their masters."

These are some of the methods which have been employed in the past to preserve the dominant class in its position of dominance. It cannot be denied that the temptation to employ similar methods for similar purposes presents itself now to the class occupying the dominant position. Will it continue to yield to this temptation and provoke a struggle such as has hitherto almost invariably accompanied the transfer of power from the few to the many? The experience of the past suggests that in all probability it will. Privilege is dear, and is not often willingly sacrificed. "I do not believe," said Wendell Phillips, "that the upper classes—education, wealth, aristocracy, conservatism—the men that are in, ever yielded except to fear. I think the history of the race shows that the upper classes never granted a privilege to the lower out of love. As Jeremy Bentham says: 'the upper classes never yielded a privilege without being bullied out of it.'"<sup>15</sup> But there is no excuse for the obstinate selfishness of any class today. Justice may be reached by mutual concessions. The method employed in solving the social questions of the past is one to which we need not necessarily resort. Society has arrived at a stage of development in which we have a right to expect that the questions which were formerly fought out may now be thought out. Whatever part physical class-struggle has played in past history, it is not necessary that it continue the same rôle in the future. Intelligence and mutual forbearance will obviate it.

We have now seen that the social question of today is a question arising from a fundamental principle in human nature—namely, selfishness—and taking its form from the character of

<sup>14</sup> See Graham, *The Social Problem* (London, 1886), p. 24.

<sup>15</sup> *Speeches, Lectures and Addresses*, Second Series, p. 121.

the institution through which privilege is acquired and a dominant class established. Eliminate undue selfishness and the question is solved. Destroy all opportunities for selfish domination and we have the same result. There are, then, two objects of attack in every rational attempt to solve the social question—the selfishness of human nature, and our social and industrial organization. Education and religion aim primarily at one; radical social reconstructionists, at the other. Both must be considered. Each may be considered as end or means of the other. But inasmuch as all efforts to transform the character of men must consist in some modification of their environment, it would seem that industrial change is the initial means. Says Hobson:

There are those who seek to retard all social progress by a false and mischievous dilemma which takes the following shape: No radical improvement in industrial organization, no work of social reconstruction, can be of any real value unless it is preceded by such moral and intellectual improvement in the condition of the mass of workers as shall render the new machinery effective; unless the change in human nature comes first, a change in external conditions will be useless. On the other hand, it is evident that no moral or intellectual education can be brought effectively to bear upon the mass of human beings, whose whole energies are necessarily absorbed by the effort to secure the means of bare physical support. Thus it is made to appear as if industrial and moral progress must precede each other, which is impossible. The falsehood in the above dilemma consists in the assumption that industrial reformers wish to proceed by a sudden leap from an old industrial order to a new one. Such sudden movements are not in accordance with the gradual growth which nature insists upon as the condition of wise change. But it is equally in accordance with nature that natural growth precedes the moral. Not that the work of reconstruction can lag far behind. Each step in this industrial advancement of the poor should, and must if the gain is to be permanent, be followed closely, and secured by a corresponding advance in moral and intellectual character and habits. But the moral and religious reformer should never forget that in order of time material reform comes first.<sup>10</sup>

This view of Mr. Hobson we believe is correct. Permanent reform, individual or social, must rest upon an economic basis. The social question of today is in a very true sense a question of the stomach. As Amiel said: "The animal in us must be satisfied first, and we must banish from us all suffering which is

<sup>10</sup> *Problems of Poverty*, p. 181.

superfluous and has its origin in social arrangements, before we can return to spiritual goods."<sup>17</sup> It is as true today as it has ever been that man lives not by bread alone. But it is also true that without bread man cannot live at all, and without a fair share of material comforts he is retarded in his development, and oftentimes prevented from attaining that culture of mind and soul, that sweetness and dignity and happiness of life, which it is his God-given right to enjoy, and for the maintenance and furtherance of which society itself exists.

This, then, is the social question of today: How are the economic institutions of society, in which so much power and privilege are concentrated, and which are essential to the well-being of all, to be organized and conducted so that their benefits may be justly shared by all members of society, and thus the last refuge of the spirit of selfish domination be, like the Church and the State, in the hands of the people? If those now in control of these institutions—that is, the capitalist class—profit by the experience of former institutions that have become dominant and oppressive, they will concede all that justice demands, and the social question will solve itself. If they do not, and set up the present industrial system, capitalism, as an unyielding opponent to change, then they need not be surprised if others manifest toward capitalism the spirit of Cato the Censor, when he cried *Delenda est Carthago!* But then we should no longer have a question, but an issue. Now, while as yet the temper of all classes is comparatively dispassionate, is the time to organize and concentrate the intelligence of all classes upon a rational solution.

Are we in these days of boasted intelligence and prosperity to declare that the question here proposed is unanswerable? Are we to admit that an essential element of our civilization is the inequitable distribution of wealth, and that a great body of people must be forever sunk in degradation and in misery? Are we to assume, as some tacitly and others even openly do, that that part of our population known to the student of social science as the submerged tenth, or the social residuum, is a necessary part of our civilization? If we do, then we must agree with William

<sup>17</sup> *Journal intime*, translation by Mrs. Humphry Ward, p. 18.

Morris who declared that, if this is so, then our civilization carries with it the poison which is ultimately to destroy it. "If," said he, "society does not aim at getting rid of this misery and giving some share in the happiness and dignity of life to *all* the people it has created, and which it spends such unwearied energy in creating, it is simply an organized injustice, a mere instrument for oppression, so much the worse than that which has gone before it, as its pretensions are higher, its slavery subtler, its mastery harder to overthrow, because supported by such a dense mass of commonplace well-being and comfort." But we are not reduced to the necessity of making this admission. Intelligence is able to solve all social questions. There is only the matter of its application. The forces which have brought society to its present degree of civilization will in the future, if aided by higher and higher degrees of individual and social intelligence, carry us onward and upward to heights of civilization yet undreamed of.

## REVIEWS

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*Criminalité et conditions économiques.* Par W. A. BONGER, Docteur en Droit. Amsterdam: G. P. Tierie, 1905. Pp. 750.

The plan of this large work leads the reader through abstracts of the arguments on the subject found in the discussions of eminent students of crime. Here is brought together a vast amount of useful material from a wide range of literature; early writers like More, Rousseau, and Beccaria; statisticians like Quetelet, Ducpetiaux, von Oettingen, and Mayr; representative Italians, like Lombroso, Garofalo, and Niceforo; Tarde and Manouvrier in France; "bio-sociologists" like Prins, Morrison, and Wright; "spiritualists" like Proal and Joly; men of the *terza scuola*, like Colajanni; and socialists like Bebel. All these statements are subjected to criticism from the standpoint of the author, and illustrated with tables of statistics published by all modern nations.

In the second part we find an elaborate discussion on the basis of socialistic philosophy or "scientific socialism." In the phrases and modes of thought made familiar in the classics of socialism we have the Marxian categories, the materialistic explanation of history and community life, the bourgeoisie and proletariat, the criticism of marriage, alcoholism, and militarism, and all the evil consequences of capitalism. Finally the phenomena of crime are treated elaborately in many aspects. At the close the author sums up his conclusions. Economic conditions occupy a larger place in the causation of crime than most authors who have studied the question have attributed to them. The capitalistic system retards the development of the social sentiments. The basis of our present economic system being exchange, the interests of men are necessarily in antagonism. Most men are deprived of the means of production, and thus are made dependents of those who control capital. This enables employers to use up the very lives of the working-people and to hold them at the margin of subsistence. This condition destroys the human sympathy of the rich, creates in them tyranny, and in the poor jealousy and servility. Avarice and luxury tend further to deaden social sympathy in the leisure class. Poverty depresses the

physical and intellectual state of the wage-earners. Children are exploited by profit-mongers and made immoral by the degrading contacts of premature factory labor. Habitations are unfit for decent living, and ignorance is the heritage of poverty. The inferior economic position of women tends to lower her character and perpetuate prostitution. The family is charged with the responsibility of educating the children—a task for which many parents have neither means nor preparation. Prostitution, militarism, and alcoholism have their primary sources in economic conditions. The analysis goes into the economic explanation of each particular kind of crime.

The conclusion, the author thinks, is encouraging; for if crime were the result of atavism or direct heredity, nothing could be done to prevent it; but since it is the result of social arrangements, it can be removed by improvements within the power of man to make. Of course, the only redemption lies in socializing the instruments of production. With socialism there will be no more extreme misery to drive men to violence and fraud, and women to vice. Monopoly would not oppress, and the contrasts of misery and insolent riches would not madden those whose destitution robs them of all share in intellectual pleasure, and leaves only alcohol and animal satisfactions. No longer would children be left to be spoiled by incompetent parents, for the educational resources of the nation would be at the service of all. War and armies would be unknown, and political crimes would disappear with politics. Such is the argument and conclusion of a very learned work, which deserves attention even from those who expect from the coming socialism slavery and stagnation rather than paradise and universal sympathy.

There is one representation (p. 435) which calls for remark. It is the suggestion that the criminal law is made by the ruling class and for their own benefit. Admitting that class legislation has not yet been entirely abolished, it might be pertinent to ask those who make such insinuations what crimes they would omit from the list of punishable acts in civilized countries. Certainly all those acts which injure person, property, reputation, order, security, and morality are quite as important to the so-called proletariat as to the millionaires. Even in the cases the author cites relating to restrictions of disturbances by trades-unions, it might be shown that wage-earners themselves are most injured by violence and misrule, and also by the needless suspension of production. It is doubtful if any



reasonable socialist would, in exercising the powers of a censor in his republic of dreamland, omit many pages from the penal code of modern countries. If he insisted on the more thorough application of this code to men who buy immunity with stolen wealth and count on the magnitude of their crimes to secure respect where the common jail would be most appropriate, they would find sympathizers enough outside their ranks.

C. R. HENDERSON

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*Report of the Commissioner of Education for the Year Ending June 30, 1904.* Washington, 1906.

There is occasionally a suggestion that these reports are tardy and of secondary value; and it is true that they must compete with swift rivals. But the students of social pedagogics would have great difficulty in securing the tabulated material here periodically brought together, and many worthy discussions are made widely accessible in this form. In this report one finds the usual tables of statistics of elementary, secondary, and higher education in the United States. Brief statements are made of the educational exhibits at the St. Louis Exposition. Among the special articles on education are a digest of school laws, the work and influence of Hampton, papers by Dr. Harris on various themes, the length of teachers' service, chronology of universities, and the statutes of the Nobel Foundation. The information about schools for defective and abnormal persons is particularly acceptable to students of charity. It is to be regretted that there could not be given in connection with the account of juvenile delinquency and the compulsory training law in Germany, some information in regard to the remarkable new laws, akin to those governing our juvenile courts, introduced since 1900 in Prussia and other German states. But the necessity for the improved methods is clearly set forth in the Loening discussion. Very keen is the paper of Mr. F. Dupré La Tour, who made an extended study of the American customs in regard to alcoholic drinks and our methods of reform. Dr. Harris well says: "Mr. La Tour displays throughout a keen insight into and a ready grasp of the conditions prevailing in this country, which, together with his friendly criticisms from the point of view of an outside observer, render his paper a valuable contribution to the literature of the subject."

C. R. HENDERSON

*Premier Congrès du Groupe Français de l' Union Internationale de Droit Pénal, Paris, 1905.*

The French Branch of the International Union of Penal Law held its first congress in Paris in 1905. The discussions of most direct interest to sociologists were the address of President Garçon and the discussions on the topic of professional instruction of magistrates and of lawyers. But throughout the congress the value of criminal anthropology and of sociology was placed in the true light. The contributions of Tarde to criminology were liberally recognized in connection with the eulogy pronounced in the session. Other topics were significant in the same direction: the substitution of the idea of the dangerous nature of the delinquent for that of the act prosecuted; practical measures for securing the repression of international crimes; and a brief statement by the present writer on the American principle underlying the "indeterminate sentence" and the reformatory system.

C. R. HENDERSON

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*Die Hauptstadt Budapest im Jahre 1901.* Resultate der Volkszählung und Volksbeschreibung. VON DR. JOSEF V. KÓRÖSY und DR. GUSTAV THIRING. 2. Bd. Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, 1905.

During a long period students of social statistics have looked for the solid results of the Budapest bureau with expectations which have not been disappointed. Recently the news of Dr. Kórösy's death brought pain to many who never saw him, but who have been instructed by his investigations. The beautiful and artistic tables and charts, with the fine explanatory text, will be his monument. In the volume here noticed we have the statistics of population: increase, sex, birthplace, citizenship, age, religious confession, nationality, language, education, domestic conditions, defects, and occupations in the charming and interesting city where vices and cultures mingle on the borderland between Occident and Orient. The tables themselves have German and Hungarian rubrics.

On the card which accompanies the volume are printed the words which now have such pathetic significance: "affectueuses salutations de la part du Dr. Joseph de Kórösy." The inner life of the genial people, the ambitious young Magyars who admire the better things in America, pulse in the serried ranks of the figures which so simply, honestly, and accurately tell us what Hungary is achieving and becoming.

C. R. HENDERSON

*Labor Documents of the State of New York.* Eighteenth Annual Report on Factory Inspection, 1903. Twenty-first and Twenty-second Annual Reports of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1903 and 1904. Seventeenth Annual Report on Arbitration, 1903, and reports on Arbitration and Factory Inspection, 1904.

These volumes are mentioned together as an example of the activity of a great commonwealth in placing before a rich and energetic people the consequences of its conduct in the economic field and the results of its legal efforts to regulate co-operative action for the common good. The training of the universities and of close contact with industry and with industrials is evident in every part. Not only are tables of statistics furnished, but they are intelligently interpreted in the text, and the discussions of competent economists and legislators are added to give the setting of the facts.

Only a few topics can here be mentioned. Materials are supplied for an understanding of the policies and fortunes of trades-unions; the open vs. closed shop controversy is ably presented and references to literature supplied; the facts of unemployment are so given as to lay the foundation for a future remedy in some scheme of out-of-work insurance; the causes and results of strikes and lock-outs, and the success of methods of conciliation and arbitration; new legislation affecting labor and the decisions of state courts; the methods and results of inspection of workplaces. An embarrassing wealth of materials is offered to the student and reformer.

C. R. HENDERSON

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*The Life Stories of Undistinguished Americans as Told by Themselves.* Edited by HAMILTON HOLT. With an Introduction by EDWIN E. SLOSSON. New York: James Potter & Co., 1906. Pp. vii+299.

This volume contains an interesting series of human documents, representing in the main American conditions as seen by foreign immigrants, and presented also for the most part in their own words. The narrators are a Lithuanian Stock Yards worker, a Polish sweatshop girl, an Italian bootblack, a Greek peddler, a Swedish farmer, a French dressmaker, a German nurse girl, an Irish cook, an Iowa farmer's wife, a southern itinerant minister, a negro peon, a Syrian

editor, an Indian trained nurse, an Igorrote chief, a Japanese servant, and a Chinese laundryman.

The stories are simply told, with evident sincerity, are most fascinating reading, and afford the American an excellent opportunity to see himself as others see him.

Perhaps the most striking and instructive feature of the narratives is the disclosure of the conditions which make for content and discontent. No matter how hard the conditions of life are found by the immigrant in America, they are milder and present better opportunities for the improvement of his condition than those at home, and the foreigners in America are uniformly happy, successful, and enthusiastic. Aside from the negro peon, the only unhappy person in the book is a native American woman, the wife of an Iowa farmer, who in spite of prosperous conditions is bitterly unhappy because she aspires to be a literary woman; while the young Swedish farmer and his sisters, under harder conditions in the Northwest, are in possession of an enviable and solid happiness. We are impressed also with the fact that it is environment almost altogether, and not blood, which makes the American, and these stories of foreigners who have become ardent Americans by leaps and bounds do much to modify our prejudice against indiscriminate foreign immigration.

W. I. THOMAS

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*The Negro and the Nation: A History of American Slavery and Enfranchisement.* By GEORGE S. MERRIAM. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1906. Pp. iv+436.

This book, as its subtitle indicates, is a brief history of slavery in the United States and of the negro since emancipation, chiefly from the political side. It is written in a sane and judicious spirit with, at times, admirable insight into the moral forces which have shaped the life of the American people, both north and south, during the past hundred years. Though written from the northern point of view, the book is distinctly fair and even conciliatory toward southern views. The writer frequently quotes from southern sources, and is always careful to give the southern side of any argument.

As a history, however, the present reviewer must disclaim any intention to judge the work, as to its accuracy or inaccuracy, completeness or incompleteness, as he does not feel qualified to pass such a judgment. But its implied bearings upon the negro question of the present he feels better able to evaluate justly. Only the last

three chapters of the book are taken up with discussing the present condition of the negro in the South and his future. Judging from these chapters and from implications throughout the book, it must be said that the author's view of negro character is decidedly too optimistic. That tendency to idealize the negro which has been the bane of almost every northern writer on the negro question since the publication of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, is not wholly absent from this book, in spite of its sane and judicious spirit. This seems to me unfortunate; for it is only through the full recognition that the average negro is still a savage child of nature that the North and the South can be brought to unite in work to uplift the race.

On the whole, however, the book is to be commended as another evidence that the time has arrived when the negro question can be approached by writers in both sections in an impartial and scientific spirit; and as such it can be heartily recommended, with the reservation noticed, to readers both north and south.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

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*La Constitucion de 1857 y las Leyes de Reforma en Mexico.* A historico-sociological study. BY RICHARDO GRENADOS, deputy of the Federal Congress and member of the Academy of Social Sciences of Mexico. City of Mexico. 1906.

This work formed part of a series of publications celebrating the centenary of Juarez, and was awarded the first prize in its department.

The discussion covers the formation of political parties, the adoption of the constitution, and the important political, economical, and moral results of the separation of church and state, by which property valued at five hundred millions of dollars was taken from the ecclesiastical authorities and disposed of by the political leaders of the country.

A paragraph selected from the close of chapter vii declares:

On the face of it, the nationalization of church property from the point of view of the National Treasury was a complete failure, but it was, in reality, by no means such, in so far as it related to the public and economic interests of the nation in general. . . . Notwithstanding the fact that at the beginning the capitalists received the greatest advantage from the distribution of these properties, they were afterwards broken up and distributed among a large number of small holders, thus creating a new class, which

would be more numerous if the plutocracy which rules in some of the states had not partially neutralized the beneficent effects of the reform laws.

Señor Granados proceeds to show that the intellectual and moral results have kept pace with economic advancement, as is demonstrated by the fact that at a period when the clergy absolutely dominated Mexico and were provided with enormous funds they had sustained only twenty-one schools with 2,000 pupils, whereas now, under the influence of healthy competition, thirty thousand pupils are taught in their hundreds of schools sustained by voluntary gifts of the faithful.

Señor Granados does not mean to underestimate the primary importance of religion: Rather, he declares:

In opposition to the disciples of Comte and others, who predict the early end of religion, and consequently of the church, in civilized countries, I adhere to the opinion of those who hold that religion and science, being obliged by their very nature to occupy separate fields and each responding to radically distinct needs, ought to continue to exist side by side; and that all the conflicts which arise between the two, disturbing the social order, come always from the fact that one of these invades the field of action which belongs to the other. The sociologist, different from the reformer or the prophet, must take things as they are, and not as in his judgment they ought to be; and consequently he cannot escape the perception that there is in human nature an irresistible aspiration to give a metaphysical sanction to moral ideals. The object of religions has been to satisfy these aspirations by means of dogmas and precepts. While these aspirations exist, that is, while men remain as they are and have been in historic times, religions will have to exist also. Moreover, who doubts that altruistic aspirations toward the ideal and toward righteousness constitute so many more elements that contribute to make man a social being, without which there could be no civilization? It cannot escape the observation of the true sociologist that religion being the product of sentiment and tradition, no authority can roughly change its fundamental dogmas without great danger to the people. In view of that fact, all evolution should avoid as far as possible violent movements.

The Mexican people in large part profess the Catholic religion, whose mission it is to give satisfaction to those noble ends which men propose to themselves in their vague but not unreal aspirations toward the ideal and the infinite. The Catholic church will prosper, or the reverse, according to its ability to comprehend the spirit of the people of this epoch. But it is certain that if the majority of the Mexican people ever abandon this religion, it will not be to substitute science in place of it, but to adopt some other religion which may accord better with their sentiments and aspirations to rise to a world more perfect than ours.

Reflections of this character naturally raise the question whether our legislators have acted with good judgment in basing education exclusively upon science, or whether it would not be better to take into consideration the importance of religious education in the public schools as soon as the church loyally desists from its attitude of hostility to the state.

Celebrated sociologists free from all dogmatic influence, as Taine and Benjamin Kidd, think that altruism in its purest manifestations has a religious base, and Christianity is the principal element of our civilization.

Today, after eighteen centuries, on both continents, from the Ural mountains to the Rockies, among the Russian peasants and among the American colonists, it works as at the beginning among the artisans of Galilee, substituting the love of one's neighbor for the love of self. It is still for four hundred millions of human beings, the spiritual organ, the indispensable motive power by which man may raise himself above the miseries of life and its narrow horizon.

What system of scientific morals [asks Señor Granados] could be advantageously substituted for Christian morals? Could the evolutionary moral system be substituted, or neo-Kantianism, or utilitarianism? All these, however diverse may be their structure, have for their base a substitution of the sentiment of social solidarity in place of the fear of God. By this system the duty of man consists in adjusting his actions to the interests of all, so that he who works most effectively for the universal evolution is morally the greatest and most worthy. In order that such moral instruction may have practical value, the persons who receive it must have a conscience attuned to the most lofty sentiments—a thing which is rarely taken into account, with the result that the labor of the moralists is futile.

If positive moral philosophy should be developed at some future day, what shall be done meanwhile for the instruction of the youths who always lack mental development? Shall we teach them a moral system notoriously defective? Such a solution of the problem is inadmissible. While the wise ones are discussing it, the moral crisis becomes acute. Men live in constant doubt. Ideas of right and wrong are turned upside down. A plutocratic cynicism and devastating anarchism prevail. The criminality of the lower classes is frightful, and no less so the moral degradation of the young among the more favored. So that parents, frightened by the prospect, if they are able to do so, prefer to send their children to the schools of the church, rather than to those of the government.

If the Church should maintain itself within its own proper limits, as in Protestant countries, both it and the government would be able to co-operate with common accord for the moral elevation of the people. Meanwhile the government takes the precaution to give an exclusively scientific instruction to its youths, and prohibits the church from acquiring property. The question is grave both for the church and for the state. While a real reconciliation is not effected on the basis of modern principles the Roman Catholic

countries will be hindered in their development and the ascendancy of Protestant countries will become more pronounced.

Such is the nature of the problem, and we have only indicated it for the purpose of showing the reader that, while we are satisfied with the material and intellectual progress made since the promulgation of the Laws of Reform, we are yet far from having obtained a favorable result with reference to moral questions.

A. J. STEELMAN

JOLIET, ILL.

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*Patologia Social Española.* Por Pedro Martinez Baselga. Zaragoza. 1903.

This book is the first work of its class published on the peninsula. The author sets out to find the cause of social maladies, and, if possible, their cure. Every phase of industry, commerce, government, education, and religion claims his attention, including every social condition. We live badly. Man is the victim of suffering and evil. No one is content with his lot. This is social pathology.

The foundations of this science rest on our knowledge of man. Man, considered as a social cell, is intelligent, knows his sufferings, and makes them known. "Whoever, therefore, gives himself to the study of these may arrive at results as exact as mathematics or physics."

The author does not claim to invent anything, but believes that he "has the courage and skill to diagnose social infirmities, employing different standards from those of political and moral science, of religion, of Hegelian psychology, of Kantian morals, or of other schools more or less philosophical, whose advocates struggle in vain, having no true idea of progress or improvement."

In order to understand social pathology we must point out the laws to which it is subject. Society as an organism suffers on account of something. That something is the cause of its sufferings. The cause is material and susceptible of analysis.

"There can be no causes other than material ones, since only material can modify material." Since this is so, and to show that it is so, it is necessary to establish a mechanics of cause and effect subject to number and measure.

The greatest enemy of mankind is man. Society is so constituted that it appears to be a complex artificial classification of species within the species, from which result aristocracies, theocracies,



democracies, poor, rich, laborers, employers. All of these classifications may be resolved into the elementary one of the strong and the weak: since in the past, as is now the case in the present, and will be the case in the future, society has been ruled by the strongest.

When the human organism is imperfectly nourished it becomes sick; and "hunger in human society produces a long list of infirmities—pauperism, beggary, prostitution, suicide, clericalism, tyranny, wars, inquisition, alcoholism, etc., etc."

In order to understand the intimate relations of this long list of infirmities its author thinks best to make an analysis of the expense account of a Spanish family having an annual income of one thousand dollars; and finds, with many other defects, that the food is dear and insufficient and often poisonous, the meat, perhaps, being that of animals which died of contagious diseases, while the bread has been mixed with many deleterious mineral substances; and although there are laws and a department of public hygiene, the officers in charge are unable to perform the high duties of their office.

One is surprised at his classifications. His complaint against clericalism is fundamental and historic.

"At the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Napoleon invaded the Peninsula, one of his brigadier-generals, among the first to cross the line, said to him, 'Sire, I will go no farther into a country of friars, gentlemen, and beggars.'" This was a complete definition of the existing social state. Spain was clerical and warlike. There was no possibility of more than an existence except for the priest or the soldier. Clericalism was exterminating the middle class by gathering all of the wealth into the convents. The army's only business was to defend the priestly orders. The gentleman class was the product of the army. The rest of the nation were beggars who passed their lives at the gates of the convents waiting for their ration that would relieve their hunger for a few hours. Seventy-five thousand persons—men and women—were dedicated to the various offices of the Church. Their gross income amounted to a billion reales. The expenses of their journeys were borne by the people. They had two million, nine hundred and forty thousand, eight hundred and eighty-nine domestic animals, while the whole nation had twelve million, three hundred and seventy thousand. All the industry of Spain was at the service of the friarocracy. Spain had become petrified. Progress was impossible. The French

revolution, whose doctrines were extended to the Peninsula, led the poor classes and many Spanish gentlemen to see the need of a radical change of régime.

This led to the revolutionary movement of the nineteenth century, resulting in the secularization of a large amount of church property, a suppression of the tithing system, and the declaration of the biological law: "He that does not labor shall not eat, and he that does not eat shall die." The makers of candles and other objects for religious uses, who were the only persons who had gold coin hid away, bought the nationalized properties, thus separating themselves from the clerical party, and joining the ranks of the revolutionists, and inflicted a heavy wound upon clericalism. This revolution occupied a century. "The glorious revolution of 1863 crowned all the revolutions of the century, giving to Spain municipal and provincial law and a constitution." This was followed by the constitution of 1869 and by that of 1876 which is now in force.

Sociology, which is the finality of all the sciences, since everything that is studied is for the advantage of man and of humanity, must progress with the unification of the people, since society is an organic unit, however complex it may appear. Confining our particular attention to Spanish social pathology, it is clear that our misfortunes arise from lack of unity in the direction of public businesses and from an exaggerated individualism among different classes and persons. Spain has not yet become a nation. In Spanish territory there are as many nations as there are regions, provinces, peoples. These are the conditions most favorable to self-extinction, especially in a period so critical as the present.

The Christian spirit, whose roots are so deeply imbedded in the human conscience, and the elements contributed by the modern sciences give us an unshaken faith in the future, in the redemption of man and the salvation of Spain.

The old surgery gave very few good results, because it was generally more occupied with the member that was to be amputated than with the general health of the patient. Fire and steel were the only instruments of the operator. But Lister has come; asepsis and antisepsis, together with chloroform, bacteriology, vaccination, therapeutic serums; the sick man is often treated without pain; and the cures are more numerous and radical.

Spain has great energies and must not and will not die. She

is certainly sick ; but her infirmity is curable. Everything employed for her relief should be used with the utmost skill.

The author does not undertake to treat of therapeutics or social hygiene ; but he is convinced that in society bonds of love are stronger than chains of iron ; and concludes his brilliant discussion by prescribing for Spain's ills a medicament which he intends shall serve as "a type of the kind of remedies" which he would employ. For the harmonizing of all social classes and the establishment of national unity, the indispensable remedy upon which he insists is that of "obligatory military service." In support of this he presents twenty-four propositions, which we briefly summarize :

Obligatory military service answers to the sentiment of justice and equality. It would cause all classes to take an active interest in politics. It would vastly improve the condition of the army, in which every family would have a personal interest. Civil wars would become impossible. Peaceable means would be found for settling difficulties. When difficulties arise, involving the army, the rich man, instead of making his own safety secure, will make his first contribution for the soldiers, among whom his own sons are enlisted. Nothing could more effectually awaken patriotic sentiment and loyalty to the flag. Military discipline, placing all men on the same footing, establishes fraternity of feeling between the aristocrat and the laborer. The army itself would be raised in public esteem and military service be considered honorable. The private soldier would be treated with respect instead of contempt. When the rich man's son is compelled to enter military service, the government will promptly see that the soldier is properly housed, clothed, and fed.

All this, Señor Baselga claims, will be advantageous in every way, to the country, to the army itself, and to all classes of society.

A. J. STEELMAN

JOLIET, ILL.

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*Tratado de Sociologia.* Por Eugenio M. DE HOSTOS. Madrid. 1904.

This volume contains an outline of the courses in sociology given by the lamented Professor Eugenio M. de Hostos in the Normal School for Teachers in the Dominican republic. The book presents the outline only, as gathered from the notes of his students. The learned and eloquent instructor was in the habit of dictating his

definitions, which show the skill of his dialectic. But in working out his themes he spoke with great freedom, often carried away by his improvisations from the analysis which his pupils had carefully recorded. Those who heard him felt the superior force of his mentality, and have sought to express their appreciation of his genius.

His monument, however, is not to be found in the closely articulated skeleton of his thoughts which the book reveals, but in the profound impression which he has made on the minds of his pupils and of his professional associates in the schools of Santo Domingo, and in the University of Chile.

A. J. STEELMAN

JOLIET, ILL.

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## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

**Societies for Co-operative Agriculture:** A new law which bids fair to cause something of an economic revolution in certain respects in France is that relating to the financing of co-operative agricultural societies. The small farmer is always seriously hampered if he lacks the fixed capital which makes possible the most advantageous production, storing, and sale of his commodity. Hence the organization of local agricultural credit societies which extend loans for long terms at a low rate of interest to their members. Now the source of this credit is an advance of forty million francs authorized by law, and the annual dues of the Bank of France; from this source sums are advanced to local treasuries, which hold them subject to loans by the co-operating cultivators.

The operation of this system of credit extension is safeguarded by many precautions. The ministry of agriculture, in the first place, determines the distribution of the funds among the several local depositories; the loans, moreover, are secured by all desirable guarantees, and are made only to bona fide co-operatives, who are entirely free from collective commercial designs in applying the loan.

Although these co-operative societies will avail themselves of this aid only in productive operations and not in connection with any scheme of co-operative consumption, there is nevertheless considerable alarm expressed by the merchants, whose relations to the agricultural producers will be materially altered; for co-operation in production will lead naturally to greater co-operation in the marketing of their products. All that the commercial interests may justly demand is that these co-operative societies shall not be in any sense mere commercial rivals, competing at an unjust advantage due to the special concessions open to them under the terms of the law.

While the sums put at the disposal of the co-operative agricultural societies are not sufficient to provoke a vast national co-operative movement in the immediate future, yet their educative value is very significant; some such evident allurements is needed to break down the deep-seated distrust and the obstinate individualism of our peasants. The success of co-operative agricultural societies under the favorable concessions of the present law will repeal the possibilities of co-operation even upon a commercial basis without reduction in the rate of interest for the funds employed.

A secondary advantage which may be expected is the improved situation of French agricultural, stock-raising, and dairy industries with regard to exportation. At present the Danish co-operative societies have driven Norman butter out of the English market. The strength of these Danish societies may be seen in the fact that they control four-fifths of the milk, and three-fourths of the pork, beef, butter, and eggs, produced in Denmark.

The field open to this new movement is a vast one, and the only suffering which is likely to result will be borne by the useless and even pernicious group of speculating middlemen, whose elimination will not be the least of the benefits conferred by the operation of the law.—Marcel Plessix, "Les coopératives agricoles," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, June 10, 1906. E. B. W.

**The Traglodytes of the Matmata.**—In southern Tunis there live the little-known cave-dwellers of Matmata. After a long ride across the desert, the traveler is greatly surprised, upon his approach to the settlement, at being unable to discover either inhabitants or dwellings. At the time of my visit to this interesting place, in 1903, the first indication of human life which we had was the sudden emergence from numerous shafts, which dropped perpendicularly from the somewhat broken surface, of a crowd of shrieking women and barking dogs. Gradually the form of the village became clear: Wherever we were able to distinguish the outlines of these broad pits or shafts, there we knew was a habitation. Altogether the settlement contained more than two hundred houses sheltering some twelve hundred inhabitants.

A small limestone hill, sometimes augmented artificially, usually forms the

basis for the construction of the dwelling. A broad shaft is then sunk, and leading into this central court other smaller excavations are made. A passageway from twelve to fifteen meters in length leads from the central shaft through the hill to the outer air, and serves as an entrance. The central shaft, which measures possibly ten or twelve meters in depth, is primarily for the purpose of light. The smaller grottoes or apartments which lead into the light shaft are often quite spacious. In one of them I observed an oilmill driven by a camel. Others are used for store-rooms, stalls, sleeping-rooms, and the like. The purpose for which these laborious dwellings were constructed, doubtless, in very early times, seems to have been defense. The dwellings are almost inaccessible except through the single passage leading out to the foot of the hill, and this was of course easily defended or barricaded.

The garments worn by these troglodytes are not different from those ordinarily worn by the Bedouins. Tattoo-marks, chains, and amulets, among which a small hand made out of silver is the most common, form a part of their personal adornment.

Arabic is the only language spoken in the village I have described. Ethnically considered, however, these people are not Arab but Berber in their antecedents, and there is reason to think that until recently their language also was Berber. This is the more probable inasmuch as Arabic has not even yet penetrated very widely in the Matmata mountains.

An old man with whom I conversed gave me some interesting information regarding the Berbers of the Matmata. Individual ownership of ground is customary, although formerly this was not the case. With regard to marriage, the bride is bought, and may belong to the same tribe as her husband or to a different one. A murder demands revenge, and the avenger is held blameless, but he must leave the place for three or four years or longer.—P. Traeger, "Die Troglodyten des Matmata," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, 1906, Heft 1 and 2.

E. B. W.

**The Eight Hour Day in the Collieries of the United Kingdom.**—Our law on the duration of labor in the French collieries seems to have exercised an influence upon the British Parliament. It is even probable that the principle of legal limitation to eight hours for adults will be admitted next year. The actual length of the working-day in the British coal-mines is from nine to ten hours, except in the Northern District, where there is considerable variation as between the different classes of mine-workers.

Last year the advocates of an eight-hour day to be fixed by law, presented a bill (1) calling for the placing of boys sixteen to eighteen upon the same basis as boys thirteen to sixteen years of age who are limited at present to ten hours a day, and (2) reducing this time from ten to eight hours, thus attacking the situation from the side of limitation both in age and in duration of labor.

This year another eight-hour bill has been urged in Parliament upon the French plan of stages in the reduction of hours; thus the limitation to nine hours would go into effect January 1, 1907; to eight hours and a half, January 1, 1908; and to eight hours, January 1, 1909.

In the Northern District of Durham and Northumberland this proposition is not favorably received by the miners proper, who are able in the six or seven hours a day which they work to keep their assistants busy during a ten- or eleven-hour day. Consequently they fear that the reduction of hours for these assistants to eight will entail an excessive limitation of their own day. At the International Congress of Miners held at London in June, 1906, the delegates from Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, America, and Great Britain, with the exception of those from the Northern District, voted favorably upon resolutions looking toward the reduction of hours to eight per day.

The bill before the British Parliament is more extreme than the French law in that the eight hours must include not only the time consumed in going down and coming up from the mines, but also that required in rest or refreshment during the day. The principle of non-intervention, in the labor of adults, hitherto considered by our neighbors as inviolable, does not seem to have been able to resist the assaults made upon it.

The question of duration of the working-day for British miners concerns 670,000 working-men; of whom some 6,000 are children of less than fourteen



years of age, and many more are youths who ought not to be deprived of the opportunities which a shorter day would offer for better physical development and for instruction in the technical and professional schools which have been established; and the working-day of adults depends upon that of these "boys."

The question of wages does not seem to be affected by the reform, for that depends upon the production, which, it is thought, will not be reduced. During recent years the average number of days of work each week has ranged from four to five and a half.

In the discussion it has been proposed to constitute a departmental or a select committee whose duty shall be to examine thoroughly the technical and economic aspects of the question and to arrive at a solution acceptable to the miners of the Northern District. It is probable that a satisfactory measure will be adopted next year upon the report of this committee. It is interesting to note this significant piece of legislation in a country which, due to its non-interventionist past, has been able more than any other to resist such changes.—Ed. Lozé, "La journée de huit heures dans les heuillères du Royaume-Uni," *L'Economiste français*, July 7, 1906.

E. B. W.

**Complexity of Economic Phenomena.**—I wish to try to refute, by means of very simple considerations, the principal objections which have been made to the possibility of arriving at certitude in political economy. These objections are based upon the great complexity of economic phenomena which are held to be so variable that they escape all certain prevision.

Comte and Spencer agreed in giving sociology, which includes political economy, a degree of complexity much greater than that of the sciences which figured earlier in their classifications. Thus Spencer writes: The study of social science is the study of evolution under its most complex form. But, as a matter of fact, the phenomena presented by all the sciences are complex. All phenomena are the result of many simultaneous causes. The century and more of investigation which was required to establish the leading principles of gravitation furnishes evidence of the complexity of physical science.

But the skeptic will reply that the physicist has at least a laboratory, and many make use of experimental methods, while the economist may not. But this is attaching too much importance to words; for legislation, while often anti-scientific in its methods, nevertheless furnishes important experimental indications, and the physicist, on the other hand, finds himself confronted by many problems to which it is as impossible to apply strictly laboratory methods as it is to social phenomena, as, for example, in the determination of the figure of the earth. Moreover, one can never construct instruments which yield results absolutely identical with those called for by theory. For example, the laws of vibration apply only to the theoretical cord or string.

The scientific method consists principally in finding phenomena whose analysis is not too difficult and in creating theoretically, by experiment or observation, and by abstraction, typical phenomena, which have never existed, and cannot exist, but which one may relate to the phenomena which resemble them. And in the use of this method there are no profound differences between the sciences.

The objection drawn from the variability of phenomena which is one of the forms of complexity, is more specious. Economic facts are born of human acts, and two men may do different things under the same circumstances. Froude has even said: "If there is a science of man, there is no more freedom of the will." But without going into the vexed question of determination, I think it can be shown that the variability of economic facts is not such as to preclude all analysis and all prevision. Indeed variability of behavior enters all physical problems as well. No physicist can tell the number of seconds required for the fall of each of a dozen pieces of paper thrown out of a window, and it is well known that the force of gravity is not exactly the same in any two places on the globe. The length of the life of a given organism is a matter of the greatest uncertainty, yet it does not militate against the incontestable truth that all living beings are mortal.

Similarly, the variability of human acts is limited in numerous ways; the number of births, cases of insanity, suicide, asceticism, while variable in a sense, yet manifest conspicuous uniformities. Thus one may observe the facts

of monetary circulation without reflecting that the stock of gold would be diminished if some fool threw his purse into the river. One may occupy himself with the phenomena of production without thinking that an unknown conqueror may come to lay waste the country, or that the producers may die of the cholera.

We may say, in general, that men seek constantly to satisfy their needs with the least effort possible; and this is no more audacious than abstractions drawn from the study and description of the movements of the heavenly bodies. That a certain degree of prevision has been reached by political economy is seen in such events as the prediction of the consequences of the multiplication of assignats, and in very many financial operations. But, as John Stuart Mill has said, "it is not necessary, for the wise administration of the affairs of society, any more than for those of our private affairs, to be able to foresee infallibly the result of our actions."—A. Schelle, "Complexité des phénomènes économiques," *Journal des économistes*, June, 1906. E. B. W.

**Lamprecht's Philosophy of History.**—Under the significant title, "Modern Historical Science," Karl Lamprecht has recently published the results of his many years of investigations in the philosophy of history. Three subjects stand out from among the rich contents as the most significant: the types of culture epochs in German history, the psychical mechanics of eras of transition between two such culture epochs, and finally the universal psychical mechanism of the course of the culture epochs themselves.

Although Lamprecht may somewhat overestimate the value of the types of epochs which he discovers in German history, it seems to me that his investigations regarding the psychical mechanics of transitional eras and of the course of single periods can hardly be estimated too highly.

In general, he regards historical periods as characterized in their initial phase by psychic fluidity or plasticity, a strong feeling for the future, and a dawning of new relationships. Enthusiasm and phantasy gradually give place to less emotional characteristics, and in the final stage a condition of rationalistic rigidity and immobility ensues.

The characteristics of the process of historical development as a whole closely resemble those of the separate epochs. In the early periods, plasticity of mind and the active play of phantasy predominates, while rationalistic crystallization of culture is little evident; in the later periods of historical development the prominent characteristics are found to be reversed, and the incidents which mark the close of individual epochs are most abundant. The series forms, on one side at least, a transition from blind enthusiasm to sober reason. The general evolution of a people always begins with the most intensive and unstable and isolated incidents of consciousness and of movement, and ends with the feeblest and most stable, yet always much more unified, incidents.

Social phenomena are conditioned sometimes more clearly by psychological factors and sometimes by physiological. The most important phenomena of the first sort are language, religion, art, science, custom, law, and morals; of the second sort, political, social, and economic products. During the development of these latter, increasing differentiations and integrations are of special significance. At every single stage of integration the synthetic unification must be preceded by a stage of unregulated hostility and followed by a stage marked by a relatively crystallized *modus vivendi*. Inner relations are thus regulated earlier than external relations with other group-unities. Sympathy grows up as the psychological result of physiological integrations. Similar stages are distinguished in the economic evolution of peoples.

The stages which mark the development of social relations within a people find their parallel in the general social development of humanity. Integration and the transference of emphasis from feeling and impulse to reason here too furnish the chief clue. The history of religion and of art are conspicuous examples of this tendency.

History is thus a process of change from eras of fluidity to eras of crystallization, from periods of youth to periods of old age; and just as separate races and individual epochs exhibit this transition, so the stiffening, stereotyping phase must inevitably set in, at last, in the case of humanity as a whole.—Berthold Weiss, "Lamprechts Geschichtsphilosophie," *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, June 2, 1906. E. B. W.

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## THE NEWSPAPER AS A JUDICIARY

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Said President Roosevelt in his message transmitting the Garfield Report to Congress: "A lawsuit is often a necessary method; but by itself it is an utterly inadequate method." A perfectly just statement. But the assertion is one that belongs to what Oliver Wendell Holmes used to speak of as "the rhetoric of understatement." That really tremendous moral revolution which during the past year has been sweeping over the country, in the interests of justice and "the square deal all round," could never have been brought about by the courts alone. And nobody knows this better than Theodore Roosevelt.

The hope of the world's peace and general welfare is in the promotion of justice among men. The growing popular outcry among all the awakening nations and peoples is not for pity, sweet as that may be; it is for justice. More and more the ruling passion, with love at the root of it, is the passion for justice. It is therefore worth while to consider in what way the modern newspaper exercises the functions of a great and growing factor in the world's modern judiciary.

No doubt the newspaper is not commonly thought of as a form of judiciary. Of course, it exists for the sake of the news. It is contemporary history recorded, and edited, on the spot—"done while you wait." It is the common bureau of information. It is the right hand of trade and commerce. It is the grand

medium for advertisement. Moreover, as an educational agency for the public it has no rival. Everybody belongs to this university, and no one ever graduates from it. And yet, above all this, for the world of today the newspaper—that is to say, the periodical journal, daily, weekly, monthly—is fast becoming an integral part of the world's supreme judiciary.

Of course, it should be understood that by the term "newspaper," as here used, a great deal more is meant than merely the daily newspaper. For the weekly, monthly, and other periodical journals, religious, literary, scientific, social, and variously philanthropic, have altogether enormous circulation and influence. A single library in Chicago (the Crerar Library) has on its regular list some three thousand different magazines, representing various lands and languages, and special interests. All these, like other newspapers, are ever intent watching the way and work, the thought and the hope, of the world, and whereunto all forces and tendencies are moving, and are continually passing their several judgments on what they see.

If the history of the world, as is said, is the judgment of the world, this is most of all true of that contemporaneous history that is constantly revealing the infinite life and longing of today. Whatever is past has finality stamped upon it; but the judgment of the current time has the measureless advantage of being at hand for the righting of existing wrongs and the helping of each today in the making of the better tomorrow.

As the general awakening of the social consciousness goes on, it is less and less true that people are interested in the news merely as something new. More and more they are interested, judicially, in the meaning, the character, the ethical and social bearing, of the current happenings, doings, movements, struggles, speculations, and opinions of the day. For as the social sense widens, men look upon the world from a more sympathetic and more ethical point of view; and so, day by day, there is awakened into distinctness and power a majestic kind of world-judgment as to what is taking place. Thus, in fact, it may be said that day by day "the judgment is set and the books are opened." Every day, in a certain real sense, the newspaper as a whole represents a

"section of the day of judgment." Nor is this any the less actually the case because it is not formally so.

Of course, it is not meant that the legally constituted judicial tribunals are set aside or superseded, or that they ever will be. And yet the modern newspaper has profoundly affected the functions of the courts, as it has so essentially modified the conditions of all the other social institutions and professions. Even the religious ministry is feeling acutely its changed condition, and the necessity for some corresponding modification of itself. So also the business and methods of legislation can never again be just what they were. And by the same all-intrusive agency the scheme of international diplomacy has been forced out into the open.

One of the most awe-inspiring words of Jesus is that saying of his, that there is nothing hidden that shall not be revealed. Publicity, publicity, has of late become a popular cry as the grand cure for all moral and economic wrongs. And still, it is to be noted, mere publicity is futile except as there stands over against it the ultimate moral order of things, the recognized and inescapable conscience of the world. Publicity is futile, until it finds itself confronted by such standards of right and wrong as carry their own insistent authority. But with this, publicity comes to be invested with a resistless judicial majesty. And it is because of this, that the newspaper is ordained to embody, and go far to enforce, the final judgments of the world.

The fact is that, with all the kinds and grades of courts among us, there are constantly occurring cases innumerable which none of the courts is able to touch. The difficulty often is in making up a case, or in getting someone to take the initiative, or to back it up to an issue. A grand jury is a grand thing as part of a judicial mechanism, but the cases of wrongdoing that can be reached in this way are comparatively few.

However enlightened and pure the courts of justice may be, they can never of themselves be the adequate means for securing full justice among men, especially under the so complex conditions of modern society. Then, the courts are perpetually looking backward in search of precedents. But justice for the ever-

changing present cannot always depend upon the torch-lights of the past. Lord Bacon in his day strongly felt this. He proposed that, in addition to the other courts, there should be what he termed "censorial courts"—a kind of court that should not be in bondage to precedents, nor even in all cases to the mere letter of the law. Whether such a court, except under very peculiar circumstances, could be safely trusted, has been gravely questioned. And yet nothing is now clearer than the necessity for some form of judiciary function to meet the nameless and numberless cases that are continually arising. Some judiciary is wanted that can be instantaneous in its action, and that can be absolutely persistent until the essential ends of justice are vindicated. Men, associations of men—corporations, societies, communities, nations—must be, will yet be, boldly arraigned before the judgment seat of this new Judiciary. And the world itself will stand by to enforce the verdicts. As the intelligence of the world increases, as the social consciousness becomes more sane and more sensitive, and education more general, and the ethical conscience more enlightened and more imperative, and journalism itself more mindful of its judicial obligations, there surely begins to be new hope for a reign of justice and righteousness in the large commonwealth of mankind, alike in city and country, in America and in grim Russia even, in the midst of whatever new and testful crises are forever springing up.

As to the judicial quality of any individual journal, that is another matter. This is likely to be a matter of growth and of the cumulative evidence of its intrinsic honesty, its enlightened, judicial temper, and the completeness of its general sources of information. The newspapers which most signally possess these qualities will be the ones that will have most given over to them the functions of arbitration and practical adjudication in the midst of the insurgent controversies and turbulences of the time. And recent experiences, in our own and other countries, have shown only too strikingly the need there is, and at its highest ideal, of this really august and sovereign factor in the right estimate and governance of modern affairs.

In fact, if it were not for this day-by-day judgment of the

world, eternally going on in the midst of the overwhelming and ever-increasing craft and strenuousness of modern life, the present-day situation would be ominous indeed. It would be like letting loose all the half-crazed, speed-intoxicated automobilists in the land, with no let or hindrance to their lawless and selfish fury. There is so much in human life that the legal courts, potential as they are, can, with their more or less clumsy dalliances and delays, never get at.

Of course, it is not the editor himself as an individual who does it. It is the journal, the aggregate journalism taken as a whole. The personal journalism of a generation or two ago is now a thing of the past. Then, there are two things which have to be distinguished: on the one hand, the facts in the case, and, on the other, the outstanding contemporary conscience of the country or of the world. And it has become the true function of the newspaper to be the mirror of the one as of the other. The mood of the public conscience of the time may be as much a fact for newspaper note as the rascality of the bank-wrecker, or the brutal selfishness of the millionaire who dies as he lived. While the news-facts are being gathered, as it were instantaneously, from every part of the land, of the world, and sorted, sifted, annotated, and labeled, and with the acute skill of experts set forth in a way to be most immediately taken in by the eye of the reader, a large part of all this so-called news is in fact made up, not of mere happenings, but of opinions and moral judgments from all sides. Then, the various editorial utterances go for what they are worth, with the special advantage, however, that the man who sits at the center of the whispering gallery of the world is naturally presumed to be able to sense the spirit of the meeting, to feel the public pulse, to apprehend the drift of the popular mind, to discern what on the whole is the more matured general judgment. So that the journal, instinctively as well as from a certain self-interest, is seen striving to voice as directly as possible the thought of the world to which it specially belongs. Nor does any newspaper feel itself to be alone; it is one among many. In addition to the incessant and prodigious activity of the omnipresent agency of the Press Association, there is in each newspaper's anteroom

the clearing-house of its whole system of "exchanges." By means of this there is kept up a kind of universal system of "wireless" intercommunication among them all. And so it comes to pass that this form of judiciary is one which sits, as it were, *en banc*, in full bench, while rendering its contemporary verdicts and appeals.

M. Hanotaux, in his brilliant *History of Contemporary France*—that is to say, of the revolution following the Franco-German War which issued in the creation and consolidation of the French Republic—takes great pains to explain the part taken by the newspapers, not of Paris merely, but of France as a whole, in eliciting, gathering, maturing, and handing down the final decree of the French people. The constitution creating the republic was adopted by a majority of only one, the National Assembly being only half-hearted in favor of it. But back of all was the at first hardly more than half-conscious instinct, sentiment, conviction, will, of the people of France itself. But it was through the press of the country that the maturing public judgment discovered itself, found voice, and that judicial finality which made the republic inevitable.

This, moreover, is a court that is always open, always in session. All nations, the world itself, more and more consciously, stand at its bar. Even the Czar of all the Russias, in spite of all his inherited preternatural absolutism, has been made to feel that himself and his whole governmental policy and scheme of administration are being brought under arraignment before the more enlightened and increasingly dominant conscience of the civilized world. Last November, at perhaps the most crucial moment in recent Russian history, when the Russian government had at last to break with absolutism and the traditional autocracy, Count Witte is reported to have bluntly told the Czar that what he had to consider was, "not local opinion, but the opinion of the world outside." The civilized world, he declared, had its eye on his majesty. Moved by Witte's impassioned speech, it is said, the Czar exclaimed: "If I make the concession you advise, I am no longer a ruler worth ruling." "Pardon me," Count Witte replied, "you will begin to be a ruler worthy of the twentieth century." That ended it; rather that began it, the new moment



in Russian history. And it was the judgment of the world, which had been irresistibly voiced through the press of the civilized world, that did it. And while the crude floundering of the blind and obstinate spirit of Absolutism reminds one of the old classic fable,

Horrid monster, huge and stout,  
With but one eye and that put out,

and while one organ after another of the local Russian press has been ruthlessly suppressed, nothing on the whole is plainer than that, at last, all Russia is beginning to be profoundly affected by this form of the new and really ecumenical judiciary. And it is certain that from this time on the power of it will be increasingly manifest.

In the more recent international conference over the Moroccan situation, which threatened the peace of Europe, it was this new judiciary of the world, the incipient Parliament of Man, which held the scales even and made the pacific result possible. The new international diplomacy has found out that it is worth while to be honest and in the open, and make frank appeal to what is already come to be a true and puissant world-judiciary.

Then, consider what has been taking place in our country the past few months—nothing short of a tremendously effective ethical, as well as politico-economical, revolution. However lawless and insolent the great corporations and other associations had been known to be, the ordinary courts, acting alone, had seemed to be totally inept and incompetent to cope with the situation. In a special report made to the New York Chamber of Commerce it was declared that the fundamental cause of the maladministration of great trusts had evidently been the lost ideal of what such trusts involve. Publicity, it was affirmed, was necessary in order to impress those who hold fiduciary positions with a realizing sense of their obligation. In other words, there had to be unrelenting arraignment of them before the supreme judiciary of an awakened public conscience through the press of the country.

But, it has to be borne in mind, the public opinion which has such dynamic efficiency is something more, is a great deal more, than the mere quiescent thought or opinion of the outside world. The fact is, even public opinion amounts to but little until it has

had given to it, by some means, the kind of publicity which arrests general attention, and is kept concentrated and focused upon the facts and persons in the case, in presence of the awakened, persistent judgment, day by day, week by week, if need be month after month, until it is made to wear the aspect of an "eternal judgment" on the part of the aroused moral sense of the whole community.

Again, take the vast empire of China, with its quarter-section of the human family, just now in the initial throes of one of the great world-crises of history. Exactly coincident with this is the springing-up in China of the popular newspaper, ordained to be for the people there a wholly new and surprisingly effective form of national judiciary. The entire old order of things is being subject to a new kind of imperial tribunal. With the coming-in of the free, democratic, imperial newspaper, there is being awakened into life and unsuspected power a new imperial consciousness, new standards of national and international aspiration and demand. It is as though some new court-crier were being sent out into every city and every highway proclaiming a new day of judgment.

Late enough, indeed, in arriving, this new Chinese judiciary has, during the past year or two, come forward in a way to signalize a national renaissance of enormous proportions. And, beginning with America, it will be a stolid occidental power that does not recognize the fact of this portentous new judiciary before which the existing total order of things throughout the empire is about to be put on trial. And this new imperial judiciary—new, that is, for China—may be ill-informed, may blunder blindly at times through ignorance and barbaric prejudice; yet it will voice potentially the national instinct, sentiment, and popular conscience as to national rights and international righteousness. And all the world will see that a new sort of judiciary in the Orient has arisen and has got to be reckoned with.

But, it may be said—perhaps with a hint of impatience in the saying of it—this great new force in the world of today, in the interest of personal and social justice among men, is still as far off as other dreams are apt to be. And one may ask: But what of its own standards of self-judgment? What of its own sense

of honor and of responsibility in the use of its unique power? What if, when short-sighted self-interest intervenes, it show itself to be narrow, partial, and blindly partisan, or otherwise wanting in poise and moral sensibility? Or, what if the business department, having its eye on the advertising income, should compel the paper to slump mutely into moral cowardice and decline to speak out against wrong however atrocious? Or, what, again, if in the passion for larger circulation there should spring up a competitive craze for putting forth the yellow-sheet monstrosities, especially in the Sunday issues of city dailies, with all their insanely distorted squibs and pictorials meant to catch the juvenile fancy, flinging into the faces of thousands of susceptible children and youth such idiotic abortions, as much in contempt of pure art as of pure morality; and all this as if the men chiefly responsible for it were wholly dead to every sense of reverence for childhood?

There is, no doubt, much that might be said, and that ought to be said, and that needs to be said in burning abhorrence, as to these essentially criminal journalistic offenses. But the case is not hopeless, especially as there are no persons who abhor more sensitively these vicious excrescences of the modern newspaper than do the multitudes of high-minded men and women now active in the ranks of journalism.

Nevertheless, it should be said, this is but a partial view of the case, and not without hope for radical reform. For, though the newspaper always "has the floor," and the people cannot so easily "talk back," they can, if they will, turn and sit in judgment on the press itself.

To this general consideration of "the newspaper as a judiciary," omitting many other points that crowd for expression, I add only this remark: That, in fact, however slow we may have been to realize it, the long-dreamed-of Parliament of Man is already here. The International Court at The Hague, august and beneficent as that is in its sublime scope and intent, is only a symbol of that far more august world-judgment which, in face of the eternal law of Christ, is forever in session as represented by this Perpetual Judiciary, faulty as it may be and powerful as it already is—this many-voiced journalism of the world.

## HOSPITAL EFFICIENCY

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"Hospitals must not only know themselves what each item of service costs, but they must show the public that they know, and they must enable the public also to know. It is our judgment that the hospitals themselves have it in their power, by moving along this line, to tap sources of popular support that will be adequate to any need."

These are not the words of carping critics, dreaming theorists, "statistical fiends," nor the superficial judgment of men with only a passing interest in hospital needs. On the contrary, they are two sentences from the final report to the hospitals of Greater New York by a committee<sup>1</sup> appointed March 23, 1905, by a conference of over twoscore hospitals, to consider means of increasing hospital support.

For months the hospitals of New York City had been advertising deficits of from \$1,000 to \$9,000 aggregating nearly \$750,000; for lack of funds, wards were being closed, out-patient work curtailed or postponed, obvious needs neglected; charges of extravagance and abuse were given wholesale currency, even though emanating from untrustworthy sources; certain physicians who were denied the privilege of practicing in hospitals attributed deficit and censure to the monopoly enjoyed by certain other physicians charged with running the hospitals for the benefit of

<sup>1</sup> Committee on Hospital Needs and Hospital Finances: chairman, John E. Parsons, president of General Memorial and Woman's Hospitals; John Winters Brannan, M.D., president of Bellevue and Allied Hospitals; T. O. Callender, representing Brooklyn hospitals; Professor Frederick A. Cleveland, expert on finance; ex-Mayor Seth Low; Hoffman Miller, secretary of St. Luke's Hospital; Thomas N. Mulry, representing Roman Catholic hospitals; Leonard E. Opdycke, Sea Breeze Hospital; Frederick Sturges, president of the Hospital for the Ruptured and Crippled; Frank Tucker, finance expert; John A. Wyeth, M.D., president of the Polyclinic Hospital; secretary, William H. Allen, general agent of the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor.

their private practice; one newspaper attack followed another, editorial strictures supporting letters and interviews with patients and contributors. Instead of the convincing reply that the beneficent work of the hospitals justified, there was silent disdain, reference to the respectability and self-sacrifice of hospital managers, or appeals for more funds. Hospital reports lacked uniformity and clearness as to receipts and expenses, hence threw little light upon the real situation, and furnished shaky ground for meeting public criticism. One writer, exasperated by the hospitals' supine helplessness, asked: "If these hospitals have right on their side, why do they not show it?"

To divert the attention of press and contributor from minor defects to inestimable service and urgent need, a conference was called by the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, on the ground that the city's poor suffer most from hospital deficits. Over forty hospitals were officially represented by managers, superintendents, and auxiliary committees. In addition were delegates from relief societies, dispensaries, churches, and social settlements. The published programme directed discussion to the following methods that various hospital presidents had suggested for improving the financial condition of private hospitals:

*To increase revenues.*—Educate the public to give more; arouse the public by personal rather than formal appeals; induce pastors of all denominations to speak more freely and more frequently of giving; strengthen the central appealing body; create for each hospital a roll of regular annual contributors; let the city increase the rate for free patients; undertake by common action to raise an adequate endowment.

*To decrease expenditures.*—Secure future enlargement of facilities through inexpensive house-to-house treatment rather than through additional hospitals or additional wards; prove that present revenues are economically expended; find out how much hospital work ought to cost, and keep within the standard.

*To make information available.*—Exchange freely experiences as to expenses and revenues.

Before adjourning, the conference asked its chairman to ap-

point a committee to consider hospital needs and hospital finances. This committee of hospital officers, contributors, finance experts, worked for fifteen months; studied the hospital experience of American and European cities; submitted in November, 1905, tentative suggestions as to practicable economies, accounting, and support that elicited helpful comment from a large number of hospital officers and physicians; and finally, June 1, 1906, recommended unanimously but one remedy for deficits, extravagance, obsolete methods, or lack of public interest—*more light*.

Many managers looked askance at the proposed remedy—viz.: uniform, up-to-date system of accounts and reports. "What! remove a deficit by expending more money on statistics?" One manager condensed into a paradox the doubt, and opposition, and fatalism that pervaded many boards: "Few hospitals can afford to keep competent bookkeepers." Fortunately, there were other hospital managers able to answer from their own hospital experience: "*No hospital is rich enough to afford an incompetent bookkeeper;*" "*No hospital is too poor to afford proof that it is run on an economical basis consistent with efficiency in treatment;*" "*No hospital is too poor to spend \$5 in saving \$10 or in making out a case that will secure a gift of \$100;*" "*The methods and needs of our hospitals are misunderstood. The only way to remove misunderstanding is to produce understanding.*" The arguments for more light gained weight from the fact that managers were willing to admit the extravagant tendencies of physicians who "seem to think that materials do not cost anything," and that their "gratuitous service gives them license to throw economy to the winds." During the discussion physicians of high rank in several hospitals admitted that they used two, four, or eight times the material in hospitals that they did in their private practice, and vied with each other in telling stories of mismanagement. The defense of such volunteer supervision as is possible where there is no proper accounting was answered by a hospital president: "Our American system is all right from the point of view of training physicians and nurses, but all wrong from the point of view of hospital management."

Managers who feared that more light would cost too much, or

would lead to unfair comparison, were told by others of savings and earnings effected by improved accounting: "cost of fence reduced 50 per cent.;" "saving of coal, \$6,000;" "\$150 a week on linen bandages alone;" "13 per cent. saved on provisions by checking storeroom;" "thousands saved on drug bill;" "regained the confidence of our benevolent people, lost because of former extravagance and inability to prove effort to economize."

Editorial comment in medical and hospital journals, as well as in the secular press, showed a general conviction throughout the country that hospitals ought to tell the public more—ought first to want to know more themselves—about the efficiency and economy of their physicians, their superintendents, their nurses, and the managers themselves. "A general impression is gaining ground that the funds invested by a community in social betterment should be more carefully husbanded and more efficiently applied." "If a dozen hospitals should unite in submitting themselves to professional advice regarding their accounts, and should publish such certification of methods and results, every presumption would favor those so acting in comparison with those neglecting such simple means of fortifying themselves in public esteem." "Where there is no accounting, there is no responsibility and no contentment." "Managers should maintain their positions, not because they are estimable gentlemen, but because of their efficiency in the performance of the duties they are expected to perform."

It is made extremely difficult to discuss the efficiency of volunteer hospital boards, because their service is voluntary, and because it is true that hospitals managed by them have been more efficient, as a rule, than hospitals managed by paid (political) superintendents. It is intended to contrast here, not a noble-minded philanthropist with a political appointee, a well-managed private hospital with a badly managed public office; but rather is it hoped to indicate that among philanthropists and political appointees the main distinguishing difference of value is not salary or no salary, or moral character, but efficiency.

The reluctance to adopt at once the remedy *more light* is traceable partly to inertia, partly to the goodness fallacy, and

partly to the estimable-gentlemen-men-of-affairs tradition in hospital management. What more should the public need to know than that "hospital boards are under the direction of managers recruited by natural selection from our best citizens?" To challenge the efficiency of these naturally (mutually) selected best citizens, to insinuate that any shortcomings could offset their benevolent inattention, or gratuitous and self-sacrificing service, seems almost ungrateful. Are not hospital boards made up mainly of men who have won great success in their own business, "men to whom you would gladly intrust your fortune for investment"? It certainly seems strange that a man who has been able in law or business to gain foremost rank in his community should not be thoroughly efficient in managing a small affair like a hospital. If you add to this man's business prowess that of his fifteen fellow-directors, you have, indeed, a strong combination of intelligence, and interest, and efficiency. They give lavishly of experience, judgment, time, and study that in the world of commerce would be worth thousands and hundreds of thousands of dollars. Is not, therefore, the mere suggestion of inefficiency in their management of hospitals an indictment of their own business integrity or acumen?

Fortunately it is not. The successful lawyer does not expect every man he meets to approve his golf-playing, or his singing, or his choice of ties. To say that a man swims badly, is a poor tennis player, talks too much, laughs too often, jokes too freely, works too hard, is never accepted as an indictment of his business ability. Few bankers or lawyers would accept responsibility for the successful management, during their spare hours, of a department store or a theater. But for some reason the man who knows the stock market from *A* to *Z* expects his colleagues and the world at large to believe that because he is a director he must know from *A* to *Z* the business of running a hospital, school, charitable society, or church. It is not sufficiently appreciated that this lawyer, or broker, or merchant is applying entirely different methods and tests in his hospital work—methods that would wreck his own business and lose him every client over night. Men whose affairs are organized on the principle that a



\$100 clerk should never be permitted to do the work of a \$30 messenger will go into a hospital and spend their time on routine inspection, making estimates, counting details. The serious aspect of this situation is not so much that the directors' energy is wasted, as that the work itself is poorly done. Because many directors do not apply the efficiency test to their own connection with hospital management, or because so many have a false and misleading standard of trusteeship, false and misleading standards are applied to the work of the various departments of a particular hospital, to the hospital as a whole, and to all of the hospitals in a community viewed as one group that ought to be disclosing and attacking the conditions that make for sickness and depleted vitality.

The director has a ticker in his office, showing changes of the market; keeps a double-entry set of books with indexes galore to enable him to tell instantly where his business stands today as compared with yesterday and the day before, and never dreams of trusting the memory of a clerk or a colleague as to the result of the year's business. So eager is the efficient business man to learn from his own mistakes and from the success of his competitors that patents and copyrights are granted to protect initiative and originality. Yet this same efficient business man metamorphosed into recognized success as director loses his avidity; governs the hospital without analyzing his own and his colleagues' experience; accepts from a hospital superintendent or treasurer a summary of the year's work that does not show where the hospital stood at the beginning of the year, how far it has traveled, what direction it is going, what needs it has met, what needs it has failed to meet. He feels toward himself and associates as one hospital president felt toward his superintendent: "It is enough for me to know that Mr. X is there.

Mr. A is officer of two hospitals. He would be unwilling to say that he is more interested in one than in the other; that he has been more intelligent or more efficient in one than in the other. Hospital A is successful, hospital B is unsuccessful in securing donations, though the work of the latter has the stronger appealing power. Hospital A is celebrated for its efficient management;

hospital B has not the same reputation; in fact, it is not long since serious difficulties, involving both waste and infidelity, were discovered. What is the difference? It just happens that in hospital A there is an up-to-date mechanism for applying the efficiency test to the work of every department and of every officer, including the directors themselves; in hospital B there is no such test. The difference is not due to the character of the trustees, for in hospital A, prior to the adoption of the statistical method, the same conditions existed as in hospital B.

A similar discrepancy exists in the case of another prominent officer of hospital B, who happens also to be officer of a charitable institution that always obtains support and—is it by chance?—uses methods that would be creditable to a railroad.

A superintendent who is not able to control the dietary of his hospital maintains that the waste would support a ward of forty beds. Another says that “barrels of good food” are thrown away every day. A celebrated surgeon admits that for every towel used by him in private practice he uses eight when operating in a hospital. Another surgeon recently ordered instruments costing \$500; he had checked from a catalogue all the things that he thought would be “nice” to have. An officer of a hospital that protests indignantly against the insinuation that its business methods need revision, visited a western hospital and now regales his friends with the story of how “the ideas I brought back with me save thousands of dollars annually for my hospital.” A secretary becomes interested in the drug supply, and by insisting upon a monthly report saves enough to maintain one ward. A ventilating apparatus, costing enough to build a ward, is found too late to be extravagant. One storeroom saves \$150 a week on linen bandages without the surgeons having noticed any reduction in the supply. Even conservative directors protest against the G. P. fetish—the domination of the grateful patient whose generosity imposes costly burdens.

That such things should occur in hospitals is not at all surprising, and is not at all occasion for criticism; but for them to exist without being detected by the directors or superintendents, or by a prospective giver wishing to make sure that his gift will

be well invested, is reason for disquietude. On my desk are a number of hospital reports. In one a giver can find the number, age, and sex of cases treated, and whether care was given in the hospital or at home, for sixty-two different diseases; all about operations on one hundred different parts of the body; number cured, improved, unimproved, and died. Of expense he finds just one item: "hospital expenditures, \$100,000." Not a word as to how the money was spent; how the total compares with last year; what work it was impossible to do; what new needs were disclosed; how much went for care of the buildings; how much for care of patients, for annual report, etc. The giver has learned, however, that a considerable percentage of the cost was met by consuming endowment. Scores of millions and unsurpassed executive ability are represented on the board of managers, whose principal officers happen also to be officers of other societies that publish excellent reports.

The second report gives nearly one hundred pages to tabulation of details regarding every conceivable disease; the dietary is given; in the list of contributions in kind are cut flowers, ice, crockery, toys, and magazines. But nowhere does this report show the number of beds; what it costs to maintain a bed in the surgical department, in the general ward, or in the babies' ward; or the cost of kitchen or laboratory. It does not explain how beds may be endowed in perpetuity for \$5,000, yielding \$225 annually, when it costs four times that sum to keep a patient in that bed. One cannot learn what proportion of provisions went to the attendants, who number 30 per cent. more per day than patients; what it costs to keep a private patient; how much money the hospital needs next year; the total of the endowment fund; what efforts were made to obtain from current donations enough to keep the hospital open eighteen out of 365 days. There is no asset or liability account, no showing of work done and funds disbursed in the different months. Yet this hospital is widely known for its excellent service, as well as for its deficits and closed wards.

Two other reports tell all about fasciotomies, carcinoma, ventriculi, as well as nationality and dress of patients, distribution of provisions, etc.; but neither tells how much it costs to support a

patient a day or a week; what endowment is required to pay the entire expense of supporting a bed in perpetuity; what proportion of maintaining the cost of free beds is borne by public subsidy; what fraction of the day's treatment given is wholly free; how much certain or pledged income the hospital has. Not one summarizes the facts published so as to show the direction in which it is going with respect to classes of patient or of expense. Yet these reports are vastly superior to the average hospital report, and the hospitals for which they plead are among the foremost of their kind in the world. Each reports current expenses in excess of current income by many thousands of dollars. Each consumes endowment and legacy, whereas it is supposed to use only the interest on those funds. In this respect, too, they are typical of private hospitals throughout the world.

For the Hospital Conference above referred to a comparative digest was prepared, showing, so far as was possible from the reports of twenty-six general hospitals, fifteen special hospitals, and ten women's and children's hospitals, what degree of uniformity existed as to 120 items. This number, 120, consists of facts that one hospital or another found it of importance to record. Many of them failed to give even the total patient beds, few even the percentage of free days and the endowed bed days; several of the important hospitals did not give even the number of patients; only a half-dozen gave the largest number of patients at one time, and not half the average number of patients per day; eleven of the fifty-one gave the gross cost per patient per day, one the cost of food per patient per day; five, the number of days' board given employees; two, the cost of private patients. A half-dozen analyzed receipts to show the relative importance of different sources of income. Few broke up the item of income into its component parts to show of contributions how much was due to donations, membership dues, subscriptions, entertainments and fairs, church collection boxes, auxiliary collections; how much of hospital receipts came from ward patients, private-room patients, special nursing, board of non-patients, use of operating-room, etc.; of dispensary receipts, how much from fees, and sales of drugs; how much from ambulance, or from out patients for services and supplies;

how much from the city or from the Saturday and Sunday Hospital Association; how much of permanent investment was wiped out for current uses.

But, however detailed and satisfactory the report of any individual hospital, it can tell but part of its story unless given in the same language as that of other hospitals doing similar work. It is said that we learn most by imitation. At least it is true that we learn much by observing our colleagues, whether in the factory doing piece work, in the shop buying silk, in business selling goods, or as trustees administering a hospital. Having learned what we can by examining carefully our own hospitals, it is important to learn whether or not our house physician, our superintendent, our building, our situation are bringing results comparable with those of hospitals that appeal to the same public to support the same kind of work.

Entirely apart from the importance of learning how to reduce expenditure so as to keep pace with the best thought in the hospital world, it is also necessary to be able to explain differences in expense, showing that they are due to differences in kind of work or in quality of material rather than in spirit or practice of economy. An Italian patient coming to a hospital is helped if he can speak English, or if there is an Italian-speaking person in connection with the hospital, or if a friendly Italian happens to be there at the time, or perhaps by signs. In any event, the only way the hospital and the Italian patient can work together to aid that patient is to discover somewhere a common language. Is it not quite as important that ten hospitals discussing their experience should use the same language?

The first step in what bids fair to become a revolution in the attitude of American hospitals toward actual and potential givers was taken in New York in June, 1906, when four of the leading hospitals<sup>2</sup> agreed upon a common form of recording and publishing important facts as to efficiency and needs.

Because this plan furnishes the basis for a publicity campaign in behalf of all American hospitals, and because it is the

<sup>2</sup> New York, Presbyterian, Roosevelt, St. Luke's.

Big Four's response to the agitation of the past two years, it is published here in full.

There is not a hospital in the country that could not describe its experience and its needs in the language provided by the foregoing schedules. Wherever managers want to answer questions not here asked, it is easy to insert a new sub-heading. It is quite conceivable that many managers will not care to distinguish medical from surgical supplies, or milk and cream from butter and eggs; in this case the general headings may still be used and should be used, as should the comparative tables. Uniformity would still exist if hospitals having few patients, needing little public help, and desiring to learn little from their own or others' experience, should put all expenditures under the general heads.

	1905	1906	Inc.	Dec.	Per cent.
Administration expenses.....					
Professional care of patients.....					
Department expenses.....					
General house and property expenses..					
Corporation or other expenses.....					

The cost of making this separation is a trifle, because it is quite as easy to post an expenditure of \$10 on one sheet as on another, and infinitely more valuable to have it posted where it answers an important question.

Two additions will undoubtedly be made as time tests this uniform schedule—viz.: a column showing *increase* or *decrease*, and a column for *percentages*. The purpose of reports is to *inform*; the purpose of uniformity is to enable the public to use one language in studying the needs of different hospitals and to enable each hospital to learn from others' experience; the comparison of this year with last shows whether each department of each hospital is going forward or backward, or standing still. But even directors seldom make the actual subtraction necessary to see that \$22,418 is \$2,545 greater than \$19,873. When that is done, still fewer would discover that the increase is 11 per cent. We deem it of great importance to know that a poor family pays 25 per cent. for rent and 45 per cent. for food; it is quite as valid to ask what proportion of hospital income goes directly to pro-

fessional care of patients, and what to central offices. Is it worth while to make sure that every reader has the result of the subtraction and percentage? The benefits would outweigh the cost, if only managers themselves were given truth that does not mislead.

An annual report cannot be prepared without great expense and greater error, unless the record of each day's work is taken with a view to answering the questions propounded in the annual report. As one hospital officer wrote recently: "*Yearly* statistics are only *interesting*. For practical purposes, such as checking extravagancy, locating a leak or loss, discovering inferior supplies, and for locating any new condition that may arise, *monthly* and sometimes *weekly* statistics are necessary." As business men know, weekly and daily blanks may be purchased to order, with instructions for their use, if once a hospital decides what information it will call for from its various officers. Many hospitals are having the experience thus described by an officer of a Worcester, Mass., hospital: "We have on our board two very successful manufacturers who have made a thorough study of reducing expenses in their business. They thought they could apply the same methods to the hospital accounts. They have adopted an entirely new system never before used in any hospital, from which we expect notable results."

The first effect of a uniform system of reporting and accounting will be comparison of two hospitals whose effort is differently distributed among various kinds of work. For example: You read in a comparative statement that Hospital A spends \$2.75 a day for each ward patient, where Hospital B spends but \$1.90 per day. Without knowing more of the work of these two hospitals, it appears that Hospital A is extravagant. Upon inquiry it may develop that Hospital A has a much larger proportion of cases requiring surgical attention, operation, use of bandages, special diet, extra nursing; whereas most of the work of Hospital B is for protracted diseases requiring little special attention and little extra nursing or diet. Obviously there are two ways of preventing misunderstanding. One is by failing to take part in a plan for uniform accounting for fear that one's hospital will be misrepresented; the

other is to use the same language as the other hospital and explain what seem to be discrepancies. The trouble with the first plan—evasion—is that it does not succeed. An uninformed public is a fickle friend. The Committee on Hospital Needs and Finances strongly recommended that the hospitals of New York combine in making a study of the different hospitals, showing exactly how each one is organized, what work it undertakes, what mechanism it uses to accomplish this result; and then compare hospitals only so far as they are doing a similar work. Such a compendium would work as follows: Two hospital superintendents compare notes. One is using thirty tons of coal a month, the other is using fifty. These facts in themselves tell nothing as to the economy of the first hospital. When we know that they treat exactly the same number of patients, the difference in coal comes to mean a difference either in stoking, in character of building, in method of ventilation or in coal. The superintendent who uses fifty tons a month will want to know how the other's building is constructed, what furnace and what ventilating apparatus are in use, what kind of coal is purchased. If they find that the same apparatus is in use; if the buildings are constructed in practically the same way; if the same quality of coal is used, then there is reason to believe that either his stoker or his engineer is careless in the use of coal; that the coal is pea when it should be buckwheat; that there is theft; that coal fails to reach the bunkers; that his apparatus is out of order; or that *the difference must be explained by the failure of the economical hospital to give its patients proper heat and ventilation*. In any event, to separate each hospital into its component parts makes it possible to arrange eighty hospitals so that each can learn from the others' experience.

In the absence of such compendium, no language exists to express in clearness and fairness the experience of hospitals without misrepresenting one or the other. Some hospitals are small, some isolated, some in congested districts; some exist for surgical cases only, others for maternity cases, some for convalescent rather than acute cases. It is obvious that it is as impossible, without knowing more than the term "hospital," to class together twenty such institutions, as to attempt by the word "man" to bring



within one class twenty men of different nationalities, different ages, different walks of life.

This last year a conference was organized of the New York City hospital superintendents to meet regularly to compare notes as to hospital management. The National Association of Hospital Superintendents has accomplished much in stimulating interest and impressing upon hospitals throughout the country that they have much to learn from each other's experience. The measure of its success, however, as the measure of profit from verbal exchange of experience, is in a published statement shorn of personal elements, putting in black and white points of difference and points of agreement. The hospitals and the public should have an annual digest of hospital data such as that which has helped the British hospitals so much during the past ten years. When this manual is published—an American Burdette—it is to be hoped that it will be adequately supported so as to emphasize over and over again the highest mission of the hospital—to conduct an active, progressive, educational campaign, informing the public regularly and repeatedly as to the causes that make for preventable mortality, sickness, and misery. When the selected men of our communities can tell at a glance what now requires hours of stumbling in committee, their valuable services and business talent will be released for the statesmenlike work they are in position to do. It will not then be necessary for crusades like the tuberculosis crusade to originate outside the hospital, nor for laymen to sound the alarm for impure milk, unsanitary bakeshops, filthy streets, and overcrowded tenements. It will not be true that eighty hospitals spend \$4,000,000 without the community's learning anything from their experience to make tomorrow better than today.

#### SCHEDULE I

##### DETAILED STATEMENT OF OPERATING, CORPORATION, AND OTHER CURRENT EXPENSES

	ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES	
	1906	1905
Salaries, officers, and clerks.....	.....	.....
Office expenses.....	.....	.....
Stationery, printing, and postage.....	.....	.....
Telephone and telegraph.....	.....	.....
Legal expenses.....	.....	.....
Miscellaneous.....	.....	.....
Total administration expenses.....	.....	.....

## SCHEDULE I—Continued

## PROFESSIONAL CARE OF PATIENTS

	1906	1905
<i>Salaries and wages:</i>		
Physicians.....	.....	.....
Superintendent of nurses, assistant, and instructors.....	.....	.....
Nurses.....	.....	.....
Special nurses.....	.....	.....
Orderlies.....	.....	.....
Special orderlies.....	.....	.....
Ward employees.....	.....	.....
<i>Equipment for nurses:</i>		
Uniforms.....	.....	.....
Books.....	.....	.....
Instruments.....	.....	.....
<i>Medical and surgical supplies:</i>		
Apparatus and instruments.....	.....	.....
Medical supplies.....	.....	.....
Surgical supplies.....	.....	.....
Alcohol, liquors, wines, etc.....	.....	.....
<i>Dispensary:</i>		
Salaries and labor.....	.....	.....
Supplies.....	.....	.....
<i>Emergency ward:</i>		
Salaries and labor.....	.....	.....
Supplies.....	.....	.....
<i>Visiting and home (district) nursing</i>		
Salaries.....	.....	.....
Supplies.....	.....	.....
Total professional care of patients.....	.....	.....

## DEPARTMENT EXPENSES

<i>Ambulance:</i>	Labor.....	.....	.....
	Supplies.....	.....	.....
<i>Pathological laboratory:</i>	Salaries and labor.....	.....	.....
	Supplies.....	.....	.....
<i>Training school:</i>	Salaries and labor.....	.....	.....
	Supplies.....	.....	.....
<i>Housekeeping:</i>	Labor.....	.....	.....
	Supplies.....	.....	.....
<i>Kitchen:</i>	Labor.....	.....	.....
	Supplies.....	.....	.....
<i>Laundry:</i>	Labor.....	.....	.....
	Supplies.....	.....	.....
<i>Steward's department:</i>			
	Labor.....	.....	.....
	Provisions:		
	Bread.....	.....	.....
	Milk and cream.....	.....	.....
	Groceries.....	.....	.....
	Butter and eggs.....	.....	.....
	Fruits and vegetables.....	.....	.....
	Meat, poultry, and fish.....	.....	.....
	Total steward's department.....	.....	.....
	Total department expenses.....	.....	.....

## GENERAL HOUSE AND PROPERTY EXPENSES

Electric lighting.....	.....	.....
Fuel, oil, and waste.....	.....	.....
Gas.....	.....	.....

## SCHEDULE I—Continued

	1906	1905
Ice.....	.....	.....
Insurance.....	.....	.....
Maintenance, real estate and buildings.....	.....	.....
Maintenance, machinery and tools.....	.....	.....
Plumbing and steam-fitting.....	.....	.....
Photography.....	.....	.....
Rent.....	.....	.....
Miscellaneous.....	.....	.....
Total general house and property expenses..	.....	.....
Total operating expenses.....	.....	.....
CORPORATION OR OTHER CURRENT EXPENSES		
Salaries, officers and clerks.....	.....	.....
Stationery, printing, and postage.....	.....	.....
Legal expenses.....	.....	.....
Interest on mortgages or loans payable.....	.....	.....
Taxes.....	.....	.....
Miscellaneous.....	.....	.....
Total corporation expenses.....	.....	.....
Current expenses from special funds for stated purposes:		
(Show expenditure from each fund separately)		
.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....
Grand total current expenses.....	.....	.....
Excess of current revenue over current expenses	.....	.....
Total.....	.....	.....

## SCHEDULE II

DETAILED STATEMENT OF CURRENT REVENUE  
HOSPITAL RECEIPTS (OR OPERATING RECEIPTS)

	1906	1905
Private room patients.....	.....	.....
Board of friends of patients.....	.....	.....
Ward pay patients.....	.....	.....
Special nursing.....	.....	.....
Dispensary.....	.....	.....
Emergency ward.....	.....	.....
Ambulance fees.....	.....	.....
Miscellaneous.....	.....	.....
Total hospital receipts.....	.....	.....
OTHER REVENUE OR INCOME		
From the public treasury.....	.....	.....
Donations from individuals to meet current expenses.....	.....	.....
Donations from churches to meet current expenses.....	.....	.....
From Hospital Saturday and Sunday Association	.....	.....
Net receipts from entertainments, fairs, fêtes, etc.	.....	.....
Legacies, unrestricted.....	.....	.....
Profits on investments sold.....	.....	.....
Revenue from investments or funds for current use.....	.....	.....
Miscellaneous.....	.....	.....
Total other revenue or income.....	.....	.....

## SCHEDULE II—Continued

	1906	1905
<i>Income from special funds for current expenses:</i>		
(Show income account each fund separately)		
.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....
<i>Grand total current revenue</i> .....	.....	.....
Excess current expenses over current revenue..	.....	.....
<i>Total</i> .....	.....	.....

## SCHEDULE III

## SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1906

## CAPITAL EXPENDITURES

	1906	1905
Additions to sites and grounds.....	.....	.....
Additions and betterments, buildings.....	.....	.....
Furniture and fixtures (if charged to capital account).....	.....	.....
New machinery (if charged to capital account)..	.....	.....
Apparatus and instruments (if charged to capital account).....	.....	.....
Ambulances, live stock, etc. (if charged to capital account).....	.....	.....
Miscellaneous.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....
.....	.....	.....
<i>Total capital expenditures</i> .....	.....	.....

## SURPLUS ACCOUNT

Grand total current expenses, Schedule I.....	.....	.....
Loss and depreciation.....	.....	.....
(Show items separately if desired)		
<i>Total</i> .....	.....	.....
Surplus for the year.....	.....	.....
<i>Total</i> .....	.....	.....

## SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS FOR YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1906

## CAPITAL RECEIPTS

Fully endowed beds.....	.....	.....
Partly endowed beds.....	.....	.....
General or special funds or gifts for other than current expenses.....	.....	.....
(Show receipts account each fund or gift separately).....	.....	.....
<i>Total capital receipts</i> .....	.....	.....

## DEFICIT ACCOUNT

Grand total current revenue, Schedule II.....	.....	.....
Amount charged off endowed bed fund or other fund reserves account liability of hospital having ceased.....	.....	.....
<i>Total</i> .....	.....	.....
Deficit for the year.....	.....	.....
<i>Total</i> .....	.....	.....

## SCHEDULE IV

## COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET FOR YEARS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1906 AND 1905

## CAPITAL ASSETS

*Hospital properties and equipments:*

	1906	1905	Increase	Decrease
Sites and grounds.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Buildings.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Furniture and fixtures.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Machinery and tools.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Apparatus and instruments.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ambulances, live stock, etc.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Miscellaneous.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

*Investments:*

Mortgages receivable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bonds.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Stocks.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Other investments.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

<i>Total capital assets.....</i>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>
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## CURRENT ASSETS

Loans and notes receivable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Accounts receivable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Accounts receivable from public treasury.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
General material on hand.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cash in hands of treasurer.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Cash in hands of superintendent.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

*Advances:*

Prepaid insurance.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Other prepaid expenses.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

<i>Total current assets.....</i>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>
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<i>Grand total assets.....</i>	.....	.....	.....	.....
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Deficit.....	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>
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Total.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
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## COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET FOR YEARS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1906 AND 1905

## CAPITAL LIABILITIES

Capital account (hospital properties and equipments).....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Endowed bed fund reserves.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Partly endowed bed fund reserves.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Other fund reserves.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
(List each separately).....	.....	.....	.....	.....

.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
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Bonds, outstanding on hospital property.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
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Mortgages payable.....	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>
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<i>Total capital liabilities.....</i>	.....	.....	.....	.....
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## CURRENT LIABILITIES

Loans and notes payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Audited vouchers unpaid or accounts payable.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

<i>Total current liabilities.....</i>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>
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<i>Grand total liabilities.....</i>	.....	.....	.....	.....
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Surplus.....	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>	<u>.....</u>
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Total.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
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## SCHEDULE VI—Continued

	1906	1905
<i>Total patients treated in hospital wards and private rooms during year:</i>		
Male.....	.....	.....
Female.....	.....	.....
<i>Patients discharged during year:</i>		
Cured.....	.....	.....
Improved.....	.....	.....
Unimproved.....	.....	.....
Transferred to other institutions.....	.....	.....
Died.....	.....	.....
Total.....	.....	.....
<i>Patients in hospital end of year:</i>		
In medical wards: Male.....	.....	.....
Female.....	.....	.....
In surgical wards: Male.....	.....	.....
Female.....	.....	.....
In private rooms: Male.....	.....	.....
Female.....	.....	.....
Total.....	.....	.....
<i>Total patient days treatment:</i>		
Free ward.....	.....	.....
Endowed bed.....	.....	.....
Pay ward.....	.....	.....
Private room.....	.....	.....
Total.....	.....	.....
<i>Percentage</i>		
Free ward days.....	.....	.....
Endowed bed days.....	.....	.....
Pay ward days.....	.....	.....
Private room days.....	.....	.....
<i>Average patients per day:</i>		
Free ward.....	.....	.....
Endowed bed.....	.....	.....
Pay ward.....	.....	.....
Private room.....	.....	.....
Total.....	.....	.....
Average time per patient in hospital.....	.....	.....
Daily average cost per private room patient.....	.....	.....
Daily average cost per ward patient.....	.....	.....

## EMERGENCY WARD

Patients under treatment first of year: Male....	.....	.....
Female..	.....	.....
Patients admitted during year: Male....	.....	.....
Female..	.....	.....
Total patients treated during year: Male....	.....	.....
Female..	.....	.....
Patients discharged during year:.....	.....	.....
Patients under treatment end of year: Male....	.....	.....
Female..	.....	.....
Visits made to emergency ward during year....	.....	.....
Average visits made per day.....	.....	.....
Average visits per patient.....	.....	.....
Daily average cost per emergency ward patient....	.....	.....

SCHEDULE VI—*Continued*

DISPENSARY		1906	1905
Patients under treatment first of year:	Male....	.....	.....
	Female..	.....	.....
Patients admitted during year:	Male....	.....	.....
	Female..	.....	.....
Total patients treated during year:	Male....	.....	.....
	Female..	.....	.....
Patients discharged during year.....		.....	.....
Patients under treatment end of year:	Male....	.....	.....
	Female..	.....	.....
Visits made to dispensary during year.....		.....	.....
Average visits per day.....		.....	.....
Average visits per patient.....		.....	.....
Daily average cost per dispensary patient.....		.....	.....
AMBULANCE			
Ambulance calls during year.....		.....	.....
Average calls per day.....		.....	.....
Average cost per ambulance call.....		.....	.....
Patients treated by ambulance surgeon in emergency ward and transferred.....		.....	.....
Patients treated by ambulance surgeon and left at place of call or transferred direct to other institutions.....		.....	.....
VISITING OF HOME (DISTRICT) NURSING			
Number of patients visited.....		.....	.....
Number of visits made.....		.....	.....
Average visits per day.....		.....	.....
Average cost per visit.....		.....	.....
SUMMARY			
Total patients treated during year in all departments.....		.....	.....
Average patients per day in all departments.....		.....	.....
Daily average number of employees boarded in hospital.....		.....	.....
Daily cost per capita for provisions for all persons supported.....		.....	.....



## PROPOSED STERILIZATION OF CERTAIN MENTAL DEGENERATES<sup>1</sup>

ROBERT R. RENTOUL, M.D.  
Liverpool

My chief reason for bringing forward this proposal in 1903 was that I failed to see any other plan by which we could prevent the present large total of mental degenerates from begetting degenerates, and so handing on their degeneracy to their offspring. A study of the Annual Lunacy Reports and the census returns present us with heart-breaking statistics. Thus, according to the English Lunacy Commissioners' Report, there were, on January 1, 1905, 119,829 officially certified insane, or 1 in every 285 of the population was insane. In 1896, 1 in 319 was insane. On the same day there were in Scotland 17,241 certified insane, and in Ireland 22,966. In Ireland there was 1 insane person to 178 of the population; in 1851, 1 in 657. During the last fifty years the Irish population *decreased* by 31.9 per cent. while the insane rate increased by 198 per cent. A study of the statistics presented by the 1901 census of the United Kingdom shows that there were 484,507 mental degenerates, or 1 in 85 of the population. I think a more accurate proportion would be 1 in 50. If we are to possess reliable statistics, I beg to suggest that there should be compulsory notification by physicians and others called in of every case of insanity, mental degeneracy, suicide, and attempted suicide to the Lunacy Commissioners. In no other way can reliable statistics be secured; for it is to be noted that the number given by the census and by the Lunacy Commissioners varies by some 23,000, and on one given day.

The studies of Down, Beach, Tuke, Shuttleworth, Barr, and others show that there is a deeper depth than that of ordinary lunacy. They have called attention, not to the idiot, imbecile, and lunatic, but to the "feeble-minded," "mentally backward," and

<sup>1</sup> A paper read before the Section of Psychology, at the Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association, at Toronto, August, 1906.

"defective" child. It is calculated that in England at least 1 per 1,000 of the population between the ages of five and fourteen is feeble-minded; that is, 88,346. Others have placed the total at 105,000, of whom only one-third could be made self-supporting.

I would ask you to emphasize the fact that these "defective" persons are the most dangerous citizens, and especially from the procreation standpoint. They are a "faked" class of humanity: "faked" by the "specializing physician," "faked" by the school-teacher, and "faked" by the tailor. But they mislead the public. The so-called education of "defectives" is one of the most difficult and most dangerous points with which we deal. With us it is not a question of *curing* their defect, because their defect is congenital, and it is more than misleading to speak of "schools" for these defectives. They cannot be schooled in the sense understood by the public. Physicians know that it is the slightly masked cases of *infectious* diseases which cause the widest-spread havoc. And so it is with this faked "defective" class, who present only the outward symptoms of sanity. Who of us would, however, wish to be joined in marriage to such a defective, or to see our children marry? This is the test. These, and the many "borderland" cases—and among these I would include the markedly neurotic—drive one to the conclusion that we are compelled to adopt my proposal of sterilization. One cannot drive home with too much energy the fact that there is a wide difference between the medical and legal views as to what constitutes degeneracy. No doubt, those who are not *legally* insane, but in whom insanity is latent and only requires some shock or stimulant to bring it to the surface, do beget degenerate children. But the legal mind ignores this fact, and fails to recognize that national sanity and national well-being are of more importance than is the "liberty of the subject," when considered with the question of procreation by insane persons. With the lawyer "liberty of the subject" is here synonymous with liberty to breed lunatics and to curse the offspring with indelible blemishes.

That insanity is on the increase few honest thinkers will question. The English Lunacy Commissioners, in their Annual Report, say: "No sustained advance has taken place in the

average recovery rate in the last thirty years." Dr. J. F. Smith says: "Anatomical research and neurological inferences tend to show that recovery from lunacy is not, and cannot be, complete." The English commissioners, in their Report, state that the number of insane under their supervision has, for some time past, been steadily increasing at a greater rate than the growth of the population. Thus, the rate of increase of the population during 1891 to 1901 was 12.2 per cent., while the insane community, known to the commissioners increased by 24.4 per cent. The Scottish commissioners report that since 1858 the number of insane under their care has increased by 190 per cent., and the population by only 52 per cent.

WHAT DO I MEAN BY MY PROPOSAL TO STERILIZE CERTAIN  
DEGENERATES?

I do not propose to remove the testes, or ovaries, and I object to the terms "mutilation," "castration," and "asexualization," as I do not propose to destroy either the primary or the secondary sexual characters of either male or female, even when these are insane or mutilated by the gross errors of their progenitors. In the female I propose that part of the fallopian tubes be excised and ligatured—a simple operation. In the male degenerate I have proposed two operations: in one of these part of the vasa deferentia shall be excised and ligatured (vasectomy); in the other, a portion of the spermatic cords should be excised and ligatured (spermectomy). My reasons for so proposing are: Experiments upon animals have shown that when the vasa deferentia have been divided and ligatured, the testes do not atrophy, and there is sexual desire, sexual power, but no power to impregnate. This is the little operation which should be undertaken in what I term voluntary sterilization. In the other operation—spermectomy—the testes do neither, and there is no sexual desire, no sexual power, and no power to impregnate. This operation would come under my division of compulsory sterilization, and would apply to lunatics, epileptics, idiots, confirmed criminals and inebriates, and habitual vagrants. Either operation should be undertaken at as early an age as is possible.

No surgeon should be allowed to operate without the written permission of the Lunacy Commissioners, nor should any surgeons operate unless specially licensed by the commissioners. A full annual report should be laid before Parliament. If any person operate without special authority and without the written consent of patients' parents or guardian; or if any person use a sterilized person for unlawful purpose; or if any sterilized person marry or join in marriage any sterilized person to any non-sterilized person without first notifying the fact to the latter, then a penalty of fifteen years' penal servitude should be imposed for each offense. At present in England *all* surgical operations are legally an "assault," and so consent must usually be obtained.

I would here call attention to the experiments of Albers-Schönberg, which show that the action of the X-rays so alter the texture of the testes of rabbits and guinea pigs that, although these animals have sexual desire and sexual power, they have no power to impregnate. Such action would do away with the necessity of a surgical operation.

#### HAS MY PROPOSAL SECURED SUPPORT?

Dr. J. F. Smith (London) partly supports it. He suggests that where a woman becomes insane after confinement and kills her child she should be sterilized. But why wait until she kills her child? Also, that when insanity is due to alcohol or drugs, and the habitué commits a murder, such person should be sterilized. But again, I ask, why wait until a sane person has been murdered, or until the degenerate has, perhaps, impregnated several other females? Dr. Barnardo—one who fully understood the degenerate side of life—wrote to me as follows: "Some step will have to be taken in the near future if we are to protect the nation from large additions of the most enfeebled, vicious, and degenerate type." He advocated enforced segregation, and sterilization for the few. Mr. Wells, author of *Man in the Making*, said: "It is in the sterilization of failures, and not in the selection of successes for breeding, that the possibility of improvement of the human stock lies." Dr. Lydson, of Chicago, in his work, *Diseases of Society*, strongly supports "asexualiza-

tion." Dr. Barr, in his book *Mental Defectives*, gives strong support. In 1905 the legislature of the state of Pennsylvania adopted a bill legalizing sterilization, but, unfortunately, the governor refused to sign it. Dr. Craddock, medical superintendent of the County of Gloucester Asylums (England), in his last Annual Report, says: "The sooner this day arrives [for legalizing sterilization], the better for the welfare of the nation." It is encouraging, further, to state that many of those who gave evidence before the Royal Commission on the feeble-minded—now sitting in London, and to which I presented evidence—have supported this proposal to sterilize degenerates. Correspondence from Canada, America, and Australia show me that many—who did not wish to take a place in the fighting line—are in favor of a well-guarded system of sterilization. In an old country like England the pioneer thinker runs the grave risk of being denounced as a "crank," or a "disturber of the minds of the people." It is for this reason I have taken the opportunity of laying my proposal before the receptive minds of Canada and America. When I say that no less than ten—apparently respectable—firms refused to publish my monograph on the *Proposed Sterilization of Certain Degenerates*,<sup>2</sup> and severely lectured me for my audacity, you can understand in a small degree the risks run by advanced thinkers.

#### WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES TO STERILIZATION?

The *first* is the usual one of *laissez faire*—leave things alone to right themselves: a degenerate proposal, the product of degenerate minds.

The *second* is the murder of degenerates. This is another degenerate proposal. I contend that every *human* being has the right to live; that the law, "Thou shalt do no murder," is still in force; and that we must not resort to the methods of the savage and of Sparta. I would ask: Is there any practitioner so ill-begotten a cur as to take the job of a public murderer? God help our country if we make infanticide and murder a Christian

<sup>2</sup> *Proposed Sterilization of Certain Mental Degenerates* (Walter Scott Publishing Co., London). 2s.

law. To me, one of the saddest reflections upon our present Christianity, when I first wrote upon this subject, was the large number of persons who wrote to me suggesting the murder of degenerates. Murder by request will not solve the question of degeneracy.

The *third* alternative is, the supplying of degenerates with the means to prevent conception. Is it likely that lunatics, idiots, epileptics, confirmed criminals, habitual inebriates, and footpads would use such methods?

The *fourth* alternative is lifelong incarceration. Such a plan would not effect a real cure, as, judging from existing conditions, many would be discharged as "cured" who were not cured. The Lunacy Commissioners always seem anxious to release the insane at the earliest possible moment. Their statistics relating to those who "recover" are a public laughing-stock, and constitute a grave public scandal. Of 10,285 insane persons discharged as "recovered" from the London County Council Asylums no less than 2,646 had to be readmitted within twelve months of their alleged "recovery." Again, Parliament is not likely—and rightly, too—to provide for the lifelong imprisonment of the high-grade degenerate and for mental defectives. With these the risk of begetting degenerate offspring is frequently accomplished long before the physician can certify that the person is legally insane. My definition of a mental degenerate is: one that has the power of transmitting an *incurable* mental disease to the offspring. Further, few physicians, in putting forward lifelong incarceration, seem to have studied the taxpayer. In one year only over £18,000,000 were expended in the upkeep of degenerates in the United Kingdom, and, if *all* degenerates were immured, I have calculated that at least £50,000,000 annually would be required. Such a sum would cause a public revolt of the already overburdened taxpayers.

My proposal has been made with the view of also protecting the liberty of the degenerates. They have a right to live, to enjoy life, and, if possible, to become useful workers. But they must be plainly told that they must not curse an offspring with insanity or degeneracy, or some foul mental stain. I plead on behalf of the unborn, of the infants and children of the

future—"the coming race"—and against our present Christian custom of stamping the unoffending child with a mental defect which will prevent it from being a useful citizen. What right have we to ruin absolutely the children's chances in life? None whatever.

The *fifth* alternative to sterilization is the *encouraging of suicide*. The number of suicides and of attempts at suicide is on the increase, and, further, the attempted suicide is showing a greater tendency to murder his children before ending his or her own life. About 25 per cent. of those admitted into asylums in England have a strong suicidal desire. In the United Kingdom during 1902 there were 3,829 suicides. If this number has occurred during the last twenty years, this would give a total of 76,580. But the statistics are grossly misleading, as they do not include attempted suicide, or the 6,205 who died from "drowning," (?) "poison," (?) "suffocation," (?) and "not certified" by physician or coroner. I would estimate the number of suicides in the United Kingdom at 13,000 yearly. The total number, however, will never be known until we have compulsory notification to the Lunacy Commissioners of all suicides and attempted suicide. An increase of suicide cannot, however, be looked to as a means of eradicating degenerates; for if today every insane person suicided, and we refused to attack the causes of degeneracy, there would still be as great a number of degenerates as now existing.

The *sixth* alternative to sterilization is forced abortion. Criminal abortion is now very prevalent among Christian communities, and it would be dangerous to extend its scope. I regret to find that Clouston, in his work *Mental Diseases*, recommends that abortion be resorted to when marked insanity comes on during pregnancy. This proposal to murder the child in the womb is a cowardly proposal, and is in keeping with the present British law of attacking the person least able to defend itself: the child. Moreover, the proposal would require to be carried out as often as the woman became pregnant and insane. Clouston's proposal, to be complete, should also include murdering all infants where the mother has become insane after her confinement. My proposal is to kill neither the mothers nor the

infants, but to make it impossible for the woman to conceive. I ask: Which is the more humane proposal?

The *seventh* alternative is, making it illegal for anyone to marry until they produce a certificate of good mental and physical health. Although I have put forward this proposal as necessary, it would not meet the present conditions unless it were associated with sterilization. We must recollect that a great many infants are begotten and born out of wedlock. During the years 1892 to 1902 no less than 425,958 children were registered in England as illegitimate births.

The *eighth*, and last, alternative to sterilization is the plan adopted by some American states, where it is illegal for certain degenerates to marry or to be joined in marriage by a cleric or registrar. I have tried to find out if any convictions have taken place under these laws, and have failed to find any record. How could we? Is not the insane person free from punishment for his or her actions? The law of non-responsibility comes in and applies to lunatics, idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded—in fact, to all likely to beget degenerate offsprings; and if we refuse such persons marriage, they will live in concubinage or prostitution.

It is, no doubt, an appalling and humiliating fact, as shown by the 1901 census returns, that on one day in the United Kingdom there were 60,721 idiots, imbeciles, and feeble-minded, and of the number 18,900 were married or widowed. Here we have—under clerical blessing—a veritable manufactory for degenerates. Would not even a breeder of pigs sneer at intelligent beings for permitting so gross and indecent a system? The same census also shows that of 117,274 lunatics, 46,800 were married or widowed. Therefore it appears proven that on one day we had 65,700 *married* and widowed idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded, and lunatics, all encouraged by us in fouling the stream of human happiness and in adding to the grand total of insanity, disease, remorse, pain, and increased taxation. And yet we physicians wish to be looked upon as a class of educated men, working for the health and welfare of a nation.

We must recollect that it is not only the *married* degenerates who beget. Dr. Craddock has referred to the disgusting case where a half-idiot left the asylum to be married, and who gave



birth to nine idiot children in a few years. Mr. Bagnall, local government board inspector, has called attention to a woeful state of affairs where, in Yorkshire, five unmarried and feeble-minded females had been confined of no less than fifteen children. And yet the medical profession stands still, and foolishly cries "Crank!" at anyone who attempts to rectify these disgusting conditions. I would seriously ask physicians to remember that the hand that *wrecks* the cradle *wrecks* the nation, and that it is their duty to call the attention of the public to the present conditions.

To what goal will a policy of inaction and drift lead us? The legacy of degeneracy which has been handed down to us, and which we are wilfully preparing for the next generation, is too vast, too deep, and too far-reaching to be met by mere platitudes and mere palliations. Society has an insane fashion of stating that because it has built large asylums and spent large sums of money upon degenerates, all that can be done has been done. Unless we adopt the cowardly idea that the existing conditions are beyond our control, and that all that can be done has been done, we should recognize that anyone who brings forward a new proposal deserves an attentive and honest hearing. Fortunately, surgery comes to our aid. At present the *diseased* ovaries, tubes, uteri, and testes are removed when these organs are diseased. Last year over 2,000 women were so sterilized in the hospitals of the United Kingdom. No one objects. Next, surgery has taken a second step forward by removing *healthy* ovaries because some neighboring organ is diseased, because of deformed pelvis, caesarean section, ovarian hernia, mollities osseum, and enlarged prostate. Here, again, no one objects. I now ask that surgery take a third and chief step forward, and that, as we agree to operate for physical diseases, we shall agree to perform a trivial operation which will tend greatly to lessen and prevent mental degeneracy. Breeding from degenerates must fail. It is Carlyle who cheers all pioneers of thought by saying: "The strong thing is the just thing."

For the above and many other reasons I would earnestly ask all sociologists, and all those engaged in the care and prevention of mental degeneracy, to give a patient consideration to the proposal now laid before you.

## PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT

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The growing sentiment in favor of public ownership and operation of industrial enterprises appears to be due mainly to two causes: first, dissatisfaction with the manner in which such enterprises, or those of them conducted under public franchises or privileges, are operated under private ownership; second, resentment against large aggregations of private capital, whether its employment in such enterprises is advantageous to the public or not.

The first cause appears to predominate in American municipalities. The second is no doubt the moving sentiment of the majority of those in the United States who would have the federal government own and operate the railways and telegraphs, although other reasons are commonly assigned.

The term "industrial enterprises" is used in the broadest sense, with a knowledge of the distinction observed in the securities market between manufacturing and mercantile business commonly termed industrial, and the transportation, lighting, and other business usually carried on under public franchises. Yet as a fact all are industries—departments of business employing capital and labor. The separation of those departments of enterprise, or business, which are commonly conducted under public franchises or subject to public regulation in certain respects, from other departments as properly and naturally those which should be owned and operated by government, either municipal or federal, is purely arbitrary. When it is asserted by advocates of public ownership and operation that there is such a distinction which they desire government to observe, they at once admit the doubtfulness of their proposition, and the necessity of placing close bounds upon their innovation. In European countries no such distinction is insisted on. Municipalities there own abattoirs

and distilleries, and engage in many other enterprises. Therefore, if it is a proper function of government, municipal, state, or federal, to engage in the railroad or gas-making business, it is likewise proper for it to go into many other kinds of business.

The municipality exercises control over and grants special privileges in greater or less degree to the omnibus carrying business, house-wrecking, the building business, the advertising-sign business, not to quote too long a list. It does not seem to be any stretch of logic to analogize that, if a municipality may properly engage in the telephone business, because it permits the stringing of wires in alleys and under the streets, it may as properly engage in the construction business, on the ground that in the erecting of buildings contractors are specially permitted to monopolize half the street about the premises during such operations. Besides, building is under strict municipal regulation as to materials used, sanitary appliances, etc., and is controlled by the city inspectors.

If we are to admit it to be the logical function of government to turn merchant, manufacturer, and speculator, with the money of the taxpayers, it is of first importance to find out whether we are to place any limitations upon it, and, if we are, for what reason. If we are going to fix an arbitrary rule of limitation, without sound reasons therefor, we may as well expect those who follow after us to throw it over. So it would seem to be of first importance to ascertain and bear in mind what the province of the government under free institutions really is. Under an absolutism the problem is exceedingly simple. The nearer we arrive at popular freedom, the more disputed it becomes.

It is undeniable that in the United States from the earliest times the people have been firm in the faith that government was for the purpose of conducting purely public business, and should interfere as little as possible with the occupations of the citizens. In early years this feeling was so strong that it threatened disruption of the government as organized under the federal constitution. People denied its authority to declare embargoes or to impose internal revenue taxes. The whole body of the people wanted the least government necessary to preserve order locally and to conduct interstate and foreign affairs, and they wanted

that at the least possible cost. This was the sentiment which Mr. Jefferson coined into his epigram: "That government is best which governs least."

The theory was, of course, that the people should be permitted the widest latitude in conducting their commerce and in regulating their private actions not inconsistent with the general welfare. There should be no sumptuary laws; no state interference with religion; no laws permitting monopolies; no favoritism; no recognition of class distinctions; nothing, in fact, that would in any way deny perfect equality or interfere with the exercise of commercial and individual liberty; always, of course, recognizing the universal code of morality. In general, this has been admitted by every writer of recognized authority on governmental science as the true basis of popular representative government, both in England and in America. From Franklin and Jefferson and Madison, to Bryce and Lecky, it will be found as a recognized principle, even among those writers who hold less faith in democracy than others. It is simply a recognition that the day for anything like a paternal government for an intelligent people is past.

A real democracy is adapted only to simple forms of government; for government, being an institution of business, cannot be successfully conducted through many ramifications by the popular will. The popular understanding is not equal to coping with intricate business propositions. The more complicated the government of a municipality becomes, the greater the number of departments; and the more responsibilities involved, the less is success likely to attend management by boards of unskilled minds subject to popular influence or guided by partisan interests. The more and weightier the business undertaken, the greater the requirement for centralized authority and specialized skill; and consequently the less can be permitted of popular dictation. This is merely the principle that applies to business consolidation, where the most intricate problems are concentrated in a few executive heads.

How can we square this sentiment, this fundamental principle of a minimum of governmental interference, with the theory

that the people, either individually or organized together in companies, are not to be intrusted with the conduct of commercial enterprises, and that government shall deprive the people of their business opportunities, and monopolize such enterprises under its arbitrary power? The question cannot be answered by any shifting rules of limitation—that has already been shown. Under the assumption that all commerce or enterprise carried on under a public franchise or privilege is proper business for government to engage in, the principal departments of commercial enterprise would be included. It is merely a question of degree, at the most; and it matters little as to the difference between packing-houses operating under municipal license, and under guard of municipal and government inspectors, and an electric company with a franchise. It resolves itself at once into a question of whether, if government is more competent and better entitled to conduct one-fourth of the business of the country—that is, to deprive the people of one-fourth of their worldly opportunities—it should not take over and conduct one-half, or three-fourths, or all, and leave the people with no opportunities whatever. Otherwise stated, if it is the proper function of government to take from the people and operate a part of the business enterprises within its jurisdiction, it is not the proper function of the people to say it may not also assume and monopolize other enterprises.

To be sure, municipal-ownership advocates will declare that it is not proposed to deprive the people of anything; that, on the contrary, it is proposed to take from the corporations that have robbed the public and give to the people that which rightfully belongs to them. This has a very seductive sound, but it is sophistry. The people own the businesses which it is proposed government shall take over and conduct. There are perhaps several millions of shareholders in the various corporations of the United States. In addition, the savings banks hold over three billion dollars of deposits, the life-insurance companies have nearly as much, a very large percentage of all being invested in corporate securities, really held with the people's money. It is intended to pay them for their properties, of course. But has government the money to do this? No, it intends either to bor-

row the money on the properties or to go in debt to the owners for them. Now we have arrived at this situation: The people who are actually in the business which the government, local or federal, will take over, must retire from such business. They must enter other business, become idle capitalists living on their incomes, or seek salaried positions. They cannot enter other lines of trade without displacing some who are already in them, for practically all avenues of trade are as full as reasonable profits will permit; otherwise there would be an increase of competition as things now are. The municipalization or government ownership of industries will not create new business. It will, in fact, tend to narrow the volume of exchanges, for the reason that, on the average, public operation will not be as enterprising or as ably conducted as private operation. This will be disputed, but it appeals to reason that the citizens who have created the country's industries, who are conversant throughout with their technicalities, and who now successfully manage them, are more competent to do so than any others are. The people who have shown the greatest ability in building up businesses are surely the ablest in managing them.

The government, after thus having displaced the most competent business skill of the land, greatly disturbing the equilibrium of trade in so doing, and destroying the choicest avenues of money-making investments, holds out to the people thus dispossessed the alternative of accepting its low-rate bonds for the amount of their holdings—for we are not considering now the radical scheme of confiscation. Thus all, so far, except wage-earners, have had their incomes reduced, their possibilities for advancement curtailed, with large numbers forced into idleness; while the overcrowding of other business channels and lines of endeavor have reduced profits and caused business demoralization. Government, meanwhile, has become shopkeeper, trader, speculator, carrier, exclusively with hired help, much of which is engaged because of political influence or partisan activity. It has promised higher wages, and is attempting to pay them with impaired efficiency in operation and against a condition of industrial disturbance. At the same time, its income from taxes has

fallen greatly, not because the rate of taxes is less—it is, in fact, higher—but because all the property which it has taken over now pays no taxes, and the bonds with which it paid for them are, as a rule, not productive of taxes.

Something must be done to forefend disaster. An attempt is made to reduce wages, which have been in many instances raised through influences other than consideration for the best interests of the enterprises; and strikes and tumults follow. Whatever deficiencies occur in returns must be made up from the general fund. New taxes are imposed—stamp taxes, increases in the excise, a modification of the tariff—which of course always means a raise. And then a revulsion of feeling in regard to government trading.

Now, it is just as easy to deny that these results would occur under an extensive experiment in public ownership and operation as it is to outline them as probable. No government has entered upon the scheme far enough, and tried it long enough, to establish a criterion which may be used as indisputable evidence. Lacking sufficient statistics of actual results necessarily leaves the subject in a degree open to conjecture; but only as any proposition in conflict with logic and the known results of human actions are conjectural. And we have incomplete data which show the trend of municipalization experiments in the direction indicated.

It is more than inconsistent, it is paradoxical, for a people who have for generations maintained the doctrine of the widest possible freedom in all departments of human endeavor, and particularly for that portion of the people which has supported that doctrine to extremes, now to appear as the sponsor for a system of governmental interference with such freedom so radical that it is nothing short of paternalism. This strange paradox is not relieved by the excuse that the common people are being despoiled by defiant corporations which enjoy and abuse special public privileges. The corporations are a part of the people. They are creatures of the same governmental power which it is proposed shall supersede them in proprietorship, and are supposed to be subject to the control of that power.

If government has created institutions that are harmful to

the country and the people, it is a governmental fault. The people created the government, and maintain it. They elect, by universal suffrage, the officials who administer the affairs of the government. If these affairs are inefficiently or dishonestly administered, it reflects directly upon the intelligence and the watchfulness of the electors. Administrators as well as legislators hold their offices by short tenures. It is the business of the people—not their privilege, but their business—to keep their government in clean and able hands. Just so far as they do this do they demonstrate their fitness for self-government. Just so far as they fail or neglect to do this do they show their unfitness. Under our system bad government must be the result of the incapacity or indifference—which is the most hopeless kind of incapacity—of the citizens.

This is so manifest as to be not debatable; yet we know government has created corporations that have imposed on the public, and that it has failed to exercise adequate control over them. States have shown unwise liberality in granting charter powers without adequate safeguards, and American municipalities are notorious, not only for their prodigality in granting franchises, but in the worse than incompetent manner in which they manage their business affairs generally. It is a frequent comment that our governmental system has shown its weakness more in the government of large cities than in any other respect. Demagoguism, graft, and political trickery find in them their most profitable fields, and it is in them that reform works the slowest.

Even where rank dishonesty does not appear in the conduct of municipal business, there has been much to condemn. We can see on every hand in practically all of our cities things that have been done wrong or entirely neglected. Cities have grown with great strides, problems have developed rapidly, and our system of rotation in office, to forestall building up an office-holding class, has had the effect of keeping, too much of the time, inexperienced men in the management of them. In some instances, also, there have been inadequate systems imposed by state constitutions or legislatures. But in all cases the shortcomings are primarily those of the people. Franchises have been corruptly bartered



by councils and boards; yet we know that members who have been notorious in such treachery to the public's interests have been returned again and again to their offices by the votes of the people. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the officials who have been most recreant to their trust have, as a rule, been able, through their machinations, to hold their places for the longest periods. Whenever municipal ownership abroad is cited, it should be remembered that in European cities, as a rule, the executive officers are not elected by the people, and are free from political pressure. This is true even of the chief cities of England and France.

Many other facts of common knowledge might be quoted to expose the errors of government and its defects in business management. The real difficulties have been great. Legislative bodies and executives have lacked foresight in providing for adequate control over public corporations. Entanglements and litigation have resulted in many instances; and if we freely allow that corporate greed has overstepped itself and brought on a storm of popular resentment, it must be remembered that in few instances has public management—that is, the officials of all classes—been competent successfully to cope with it. And, in the final summing-up, it will be found that two causes are at the bottom of the whole trouble: our political system, which insists on short tenures of office and selects public servants for other reasons than their superior ability; and the carelessness or lack of judgment of the people themselves.

There is to be taken account of the arguments that the task of government in properly controlling public utility, or other commercial enterprises operating under public privileges, is greater than it would be in conducting those enterprises itself; and that the removal of such businesses from private hands to government proprietorship would at the same time remove the principal source of political corruption.

The former contention is a necessary one for the advocates of government trading, for at the outset they are met with the indisputable facts given above concerning the weakness, even to failure, in the conduct of purely official business. The very first step

in the logic of the case is that, if our officials, as they average, have failed in the conduct of affairs purely public in their nature, they would fail yet worse in conducting the largest business enterprises of the country added thereto in one vast complication. If they have been found wanting in some things, there is not the slightest warrant founded on human experience for the belief that they would prove more efficient in many and weightier things. Such an assumption is not only contrary to experience, but is repugnant to common-sense. It does not matter that municipalities are operating some public-service plants with a degree of success. They might conduct them with a still greater degree of success without affecting the argument.

As to the second claim, while it might prove true in some instances, there are records that show it cannot be depended on. Human nature is not changed by merely shifting the temptation. Years ago Philadelphia owned and operated her gas-works. On the theory of municipalization advocates, that should have prevented tampering with the officials, so far as the gas business was concerned, and the business should have been a blessing to the people. But the results were contrary. The works were allowed to run down, the quality of the product was low, the price for it high. All this was laid to the machinations of capitalists who were alleged to have bribed and conspired with the officials, where the capitalists themselves were not the officials. Finally a change was made. The works and business were turned over to a private corporation by lease on terms alleged by the corporation baiters to be rank robbery of the people. For years the transaction was pointed to as a horrible example of corporation outrage and spoliation of the people—not, of course, through the fault of the people, but because of corporate greed.

Finally it was discovered that the bargain had proved an excellent one; that the quality of gas had been improved, the price cheapened, the works rebuilt and extended, while the city received nearly half a million a year in cash payments. What is the moral? Why, the municipality, not having managed its own affairs as ably and honestly as the much-maligned gas company had conducted the gas business, sought to raise a vast sum of

needed cash in lump payment for a further extension of its valuable privileges, thus discounting its rentals for many years; and that is how one government demonstrated its fitness for higher things. The country is studded with towns that have had unsatisfactory experience with ownership and operation of water and electric-light plants, and have turned them over, or are seeking to turn them over, to private companies; and in almost every instance there has been a faction that complained of the alleged conspiracy of certain of their officials with capitalists.

While reliable statistics are yet lacking to demonstrate the results of extensive government ownership and operation which I have predicted, there are enough, not only to destroy faith in the roseate claims of the public-ownership apostles, but to point a distinct warning of the danger. The statistics are in too many instances discovered to be deceptive in the favorable results they show. In several particulars is this true. They are given to omitting proper charges for depreciation. This especially in respect to electric-lighting plants, where depreciation and obsolescence have been very costly. They frequently fail to show the true cost of operation by neglecting to state the services given the works by other departments of the city government, and the sums that are lost in taxes that would be paid under private ownership; also the quality of service rendered. And, besides, the scheme has been tested on too limited a scale to permit of jumping at enthusiastic conclusions. There have been, if nothing else, too large a percentage of known failures, so far as the test has gone.

But against this warning we are handed a flowery statement of results in Europe, and especially in England and Scotland. This is carrying the argument away from our conditions, and even if the known facts over there were more favorable than they are, it would not warrant our attempting to follow their example. As to results in Great Britain, however, the game has not been played through, and the final score will not be shown for years to come. It may be conceded that, if any country possesses a system and character of government capable of engaging successfully in government trading, Britain is that country. Yet we

have reports of antiquated instruments in municipal telephone systems, of lack of enterprise in perfecting and extending the service which would be borne with sour grace in American cities. Not only has the service been poor, but in some instances the operation has been at a loss. The same may be said of municipal electric lighting in Great Britain. The service is complained of, and in a number of cities, including Glasgow, Edinburgh, Bath, and Bristol, has been operated at a loss. As for the municipal tramways in England and Scotland, American travelers are practically a unit in declaring that most of the systems, and the methods of operating them, would not be tolerated in America, even those often quoted as examples of municipalization success, such as Glasgow and Edinburgh.

Of most vital importance is the problem of municipal indebtedness which the experiment has created. More than two thousand million of bonds have been issued in England to extend municipal trading, and the investments have in some instances already affected municipal credit. Some lines about London are already a charge to taxpayers, and the leading newspapers are sounding the alarm as to what may be the ultimate result. There has also been observed an effect on the industrial system of the country, and the subject of the displacement of private enterprise and responsibility by government is awakening much serious thought.

The day has not arrived when we may point to England's example as one which America may safely follow.

Patient, disinterested examination of the subject in its various phases does not discover any warrant in experience, political conditions, or the purpose of government, as viewed by the clearest intelligence of recent times, for the assumption that public trading would prove the public blessing so confidently claimed for it by its advocates. This will apply either in the case of municipal or federal government engaging extensively in business. It is characteristic of propagandists to indulge in positive assertions—not merely to believe and prophesy, but to declare future results. That it is the true purpose of government to conduct the chief commercial enterprises of this country, or any considerable por-

tion of them, no man—no American, at least—has any right to declare. That the results of municipal trading in America, so far as it has been tried, have been entirely successful, as has been frequently asserted, statistics so far obtainable do not prove. It cannot truthfully be stated, without qualification, that experience so far in municipal ownership and operation has, as a whole, been of greater benefit to the people than private ownership and operation in the same instances would have been.

A hopeful theory is that by imposing ownership and operation of industrial enterprises on city governments the quality of citizenship will be raised, because citizens will then take greater interest in city affairs. It would not be difficult to prove by history that, the more paternalistic governments have become, the less responsibility has been shown by their citizens or subjects. But it is not necessary to enter such an argument. For the accepted doctrine of free government is, that it should protect the people and guard their interests by reasonable regulation and control, and not that it should conduct the business of the people.

The plea that government cannot properly control corporate operations, or that it will not do so, is a pitiful one. It must be conceded that in a good many things government has not done so. But that being the natural function of government, there can be no question that it should first demonstrate its efficiency in that duty before engaging in commercial experiments, even if the latter should be admitted a proper course for it to take in any event. Let the protests of the people against corporate derelictions be directed to enforcing adequate control. Let the errors that have been made in the past through wasted franchises, excessive privileges, inadequate laws and charters, be remedied as fast as the nature of the various cases will permit. Clean the administration offices. Keep able men in office longer, the delinquents not so long. Perfect the merit system, not in a way that it will help shirking inefficients to retain their places, but so that it will more surely encourage merit. Deal with corporate interests with a view to the greatest public advantage, not merely with the view of carrying out arbitrary ideas of short-term franchises or municipal purchase.

Government control and regulation are natural functions. If they be properly exercised, they must prove more beneficial to the people than government trading. They will insure improved service of public utilities, which municipalization does not. They will increase the public revenues by compensation, without the danger of increased public burdens. Strict government control is more likely to decrease political corruption than is government trading, as the management would not be swayed by political considerations; this with special reference to traction properties employing large numbers of men.

What may be effected through wise control and regulation is exemplified in the street and elevated railway service at Boston, concise explanation of which has recently been given to the reading public by Mr. Hayes Robbins. It is not too much to say that Massachusetts and Boston have, in fact, fairly solved the problem of public control and regulation. In quality of service; in mileage of track in proportion to population; in benefits to the public treasury, and in all things that constitute satisfactory urban transportation, we have the highest testimony that this system is superior to any in Europe; while the uniform five-cent rate of fare, compared with the zone rates there, is no higher, and wages of employees average twice as high.

Now, what has been done in Massachusetts may be repeated in every state in the Union, not only with respect to tramways, but also as to lighting, telephone service, and water supply. It was observed as far back as Aristotle that community of property was not a practicable scheme for populous communities. How true that observation was is attested by the fact that, while it has frequently been attempted, by almost every character of people and under almost every social condition, it has failed in every instance. The more extensive the municipalization ideas are put into experiment, the nearer we approach the community of property system, and, according to all human experience, the nearer to governmental and industrial chaos.

# THE RELATIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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## I

Political science, as defined by Paul Janet, the learned author of the *Histoire de la science politique dans ses rapports avec le meral*, is "that part of social science which treats of the foundations of the state and the principles of government." "It is," he says, "closely connected with political economy, or the science of wealth; with law either natural or positive, which occupies itself principally with the relations of citizens one to another; to history, which furnishes the facts of which it has need; to philosophy, and especially to morals, which gives to it a part of its principles."<sup>1</sup> Other modern political writers, like Theodore Dwight Woolsey, Sir James McIntosh, and Sir Frederick Pollock, treat the science of the state as a branch of ethics or moral science, which deals with man as an intelligent being, as opposed to natural science, which is concerned with the phenomena of organic life irrespective of mental or moral qualities. Still others, like von Mohl, von Holtzendorff, George Cornwall Lewis, Alexander Bain, and Professor Giddings, recognize not a single science of the state, but a group of "political sciences," such as sociology, economics, history, statistics, jurisprudence, ethics, and all others, which are concerned with any particular one of the various relations of the state.<sup>2</sup> There is much

<sup>1</sup> Art. "Politique," in Block's *Dictionnaire de la politique*, Vol. II, p. 576.

<sup>2</sup> Von Mohl, *Geschichte und Litteratur der Staatswissenschaften*, Vol. I, p. 126; also his *Encyclopädie der Staatswissenschaften*, p. 59; Holtzendorff, *Principien der Politik*, pp. 4-6; Lewis, *Treatise of the Methods and Observation of Politics*; Bain, *Deductive and Inductive Logic*, p. 549; Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 27. Von Mohl in his *Encyclopädie* classified the "political sciences" (1) as general political theory (*allgemeine Staatslehre*); (2) as the dogmatic political sciences, including public law, science of political morality (*Staatssittenlehre*), and the art of politics (*Staatskunst*); and (3) the historical political sciences, including constitutional history and statistics. Holtzendorff later followed in all essential particulars von Mohl's classification, *Principien der Politik*, pp. 1-6.

authority, however, in favor of the singular form—that is, in favor of treating that science which deals alone and exclusively with the phenomena of the state, in its manifold relations, as political science; and those which are concerned only with particular relations of the state, along with various other unrelated social phenomena, as disciplines of political science.<sup>3</sup> Common usage and practice sanction the employment of the singular form, although perhaps the plural term more nearly corresponds with the real facts.<sup>4</sup> Those other branches of knowledge like constitutional law, administrative law, international law, diplomacy, constitutional history, public finance, etc., which are concerned exclusively with the phenomena of the state are also treated as separate and independent political sciences by some writers, and with much better reason than in the case of the others. Probably, however, the weight of authority is in favor of regarding them as branches or sections of a single science—political science. The various relations in which the state may be conceived can be subdivided and treated separately, but their connection is too intimate and their purpose too similar to justify their erection into different sciences.<sup>5</sup>

The various conflicting opinions on these points, however, represent mere differences of terminology rather than of sub-

<sup>3</sup> Among those who prefer the singular form are Jellinek, Sidgwick, Seeley, Woolsey, Lieber, Burgess, and Willoughby.

<sup>4</sup> Compare on this point Dunning's review of Jellinek's "L'etat moderne et ses droits," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XX, p. 728; see also Jellinek's *Recht des modernen Staates*, chap. iv.

<sup>5</sup> Munroe Smith, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, p. 5. Contrary views on this point are held by Giddings and Dunning. "Whenever," says Giddings, "phenomena belonging to a single class and therefore properly the subject-matter of a single science, are so numerous and complicated that no one investigator can hope to become acquainted with them all, they will be divided up among many particular sciences" (*Principles of Sociology*, p. 31). Of the same opinion is Dunning, who maintains that what I have called the "branches" of political science have "sloughed off and expanded until each has a history and dogma quite too comprehensive for any but special treatment" (*Political Theories Ancient and Mediaeval*, p. xxii). "There is but one political science," says Munroe Smith; "the other so-called 'political sciences' are really co-ordinate social sciences (e. g., economics, jurisprudence and ethics), or auxiliaries to the social sciences (e. g., statistics). ("The Scope of Political Science," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, p. 5.)



stance. The authorities are all agreed that a close relationship exists between that branch or branches of knowledge concerned exclusively with the phenomena of the state and certain other sciences or disciplines which deal only incidentally with particular relations of the state; and that this primary science is in a sense conditioned upon the said disciplines and cannot be fully comprehended without a wide knowledge of their underlying principles.<sup>6</sup> As Professor Small well observes: "A political science that is moving along in harmony with the whole progressive gain of out-look and in-look about the meaning of life must be, not a permanent abstraction, but sooner or later a working partner with all other types of investigation that are together closing in on the total meaning of life."<sup>7</sup> Moreover, few will dissent from the view of Professor Sidgwick that it is for the true good of any department of knowledge or inquiry to understand as thoroughly as may be its relation to other sciences and studies, to see clearly what elements of its reasonings it has to take from them and what in its turn it may claim to give them.<sup>8</sup> The practical value of such insight must necessarily increase in proportion as the steady growth of human knowledge, with its extended range of human inquiry, creates a more urgent need for a clear, definite, and rational division of intellectual labor. Formerly there was a disposition to emphasize and exaggerate, to their common detriment, the independence of each branch of knowledge which put forward a claim to be considered as a separate science; but the tendency of modern thought has been to accentuate the relations instead of the differences. It will be the purpose of this paper to discuss, from the point of view indicated above, the interrelations of political science, sociology, economics, statistics, psychology,

<sup>6</sup> Von Mohl, *Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften*, Vol. I, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> "Relation between Sociology and Other Sciences," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1906, p. 20.

<sup>8</sup> "The Relation of Ethics to Sociology," *Int. Jour. of Ethics*, Vol. X, p. 8. "The Spirit of the Age," says McKenzie, "insists upon an exact differentiation of all spheres of investigation" (*Introduction to Social Philosophy*, p. 41). "A high degree of differentiation, in the field of human knowledge," says Dunning, "is a characteristic mark of every advanced civilization." *Op. cit.*, p. xix.

geography, and ethnology. Of jurisprudence and its various divisions and of diplomacy, public finance, etc., which I have described not as related social sciences but as branches of political science, it is not my purpose to speak.

## II

First of all, political science intimately touches at many points sociology, which has been described as the "fundamental social science."<sup>9</sup> As a thoughtful writer has observed, the political is embedded in the social, and if political science remains distinct from sociology, it will be because the breadth of the field calls for the specialist, and not because there are any well-defined natural boundaries marking it off from sociology.<sup>10</sup> While, however, the two sciences touch at many points, so that, as Professor Ross remarks, there are no natural boundaries between them their spheres have been pretty definitely differentiated for the purposes of scientific investigation. It is well, therefore, to recognize that the domains and the problems of the two sciences are by no means the same. "The greatest step forward," says Professor Giddings, "that political science has made in recent years has been its discovery that its province is not coextensive with the investigation of society, but that the lines of demarkation can be definitely drawn."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Seligman, *Principles of Economics*, p. 6. Giddings says there is one group of sciences that we may denominate the "political sciences," including economics, theory of the state, and the philosophy of law ("Province of Sociology," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. I, p. 66). The *Century Dictionary* enumerates the "branches" of political science as (1) natural law, (2) abstract politics, (3) political economy, (4) science of police, (5) practical politics, (6) history of politics, (7) history of foreign political institutions, (8) statistics, (9) positive law, (10) international law and diplomacy, (11) technical science of politics. Bain, in his *Deductive and Inductive Logic* (p. 549), says the "entire department of political science at the present day" (1870) includes jurisprudence, international law, political economy, and statistics.

<sup>10</sup> Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 22. For an illuminating discussion of the relations between sociology and other sciences, particularly politics and economics, see Small, *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1906, pp. 11-31; for the relation of political science to other sciences, see Jellinek, *Recht des modernen Staates*, chap iv.

<sup>11</sup> *Principles of Sociology*, p. 35.

In general, we may say that sociology is concerned with the scientific study of society viewed as an aggregate of individuals (the social aggregate) or, as Professor Small says, the "science of men in their associated processes;"<sup>12</sup> while political science concerns itself with the various relations of a particular portion of society viewed as a politically organized unit. Political science is concerned with one form only of human association, namely, the political; it has, therefore, a narrow and more restricted field, and begins much later with the life of the race, than does sociology. In sociology the unit of investigation is the *socius*, that is, the individual viewed not merely as an animal and a conscious being, but also as a neighbor, a citizen, a co-worker; in short, a man among men, a social creature.<sup>13</sup> In political science the unit of study is the state as distinct from the nation, the tribe, the clan, the family, or the individual, though not unconnected with them; that is, its primary subject is a definite portion of society which manifests, in a comparatively high degree, a political self-consciousness.<sup>14</sup> Its fundamental prob-

<sup>12</sup> *General Sociology*, p. 7.

<sup>13</sup> Compare Giddings, *Elements*, p. 11; Small, *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1900; Ward, *Popular Science Monthly*, June, 1902. Gumpłowicz, an Austrian economist and sociologist, maintains that the group instead of the individual is the unit of sociological investigation. He has worked out an interesting sociological theory of the state which considers social groups instead of "free and equal" individuals to be the constituent elements of the state. See his *Die sociologische Staatsidee*, p. 52; also *Sociologie und Politik*, pp. 53-58. Gumpłowicz thus begins a stage later in the evolution of society than do those who consider the individual to be the unit. Whether the sociologist is justified in jumping over the individual and assuming the existence of the group without inquiring into its genesis and development may well be doubted. A less radical view is that of Simmel, who maintains that the subject of sociological investigation is not so much the groups themselves as the modes and forms of association into groups ("Problems of Sociology," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1895). Along the same line is the view of Professor Small, who describes the subject-matter of sociology as the "process of human association" (*General Sociology*, p. 3).

<sup>14</sup> Seeley, *Introduction to Political Science*, p. 17. Burgess, *Political Science and Constitutional Law*, Vol. I, p. 50; Dunning, *Political Theories*, p. xvi. "Comte conceived sociology to represent the whole human race, past, present, and future, as constituting a vast and eternal social unit where the different organs, individual and national, concur in their various modes and degrees, in the evolution of humanity" (quoted by Henry Sidgwick, *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. X, p. 8).

lems relate to sovereignty, liberty, government, and independence. In ancient times, when the city-state represented the highest form of political organization, political science was little more than the science of cities, to use an expression of Professor Seeley; that is, it was mainly the science of municipal government.<sup>15</sup> With the development of national states in modern times—that is to say, states whose geographic boundaries coincide with the lines of political and ethnic unity—political science came to be the science of national country states. Then, as the movement toward world-federation increases, it will tend to become more and more the science of the world-state.<sup>16</sup> Finally, with the formation of clearer and more definite conceptions of sovereignty and liberty, and the embodiment of those conceptions in constitutional law, we may say that political science is also the science of sovereignty and of liberty.<sup>17</sup> It is with the state as organized within the constitution that political science is concerned. The state behind the constitution—that is, natural society which has not yet received the impress of political organization—is for political science a datum.<sup>18</sup> Back of the constitution we find political consciousness lacking; in short, we are brought into the domain of primitive political institutions—institutions which are so shrouded with conjecture and controversy that we may safely leave this field to the exploitation of the historian and the socioogist.<sup>19</sup> Possibly it is a realm from which

<sup>15</sup> *Introduction to Political Science*, p. 32.

<sup>16</sup> Burgess, "Relation of Political Science to History," *Annual Report*, American Historical Association, 1896, Vol. I, p. 212.

<sup>17</sup> This view was first clearly brought out by Burgess in his volume on *Sovereignty and Liberty*; see also Lieber, *Civil Liberty and Self-Government*, Vol. I, p. 137.

<sup>18</sup> Giddings, *Principles*, p. 36. Compare also Burgess, "The American Commonwealth," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, p. 13.

<sup>19</sup> Compare on this point Dunning, *Political Theories Ancient and Mediaeval*, p. xvi. "Of all the multifarious projects," says Dunning, "for fixing the boundary which marks off political from the more general social science, that seems most satisfactory which bases the distinction on the existence of a political self-consciousness. Without stopping to inquire too curiously into the precise connotation of this term, it may be safely said that, as a rule, primitive communities do not, and advanced communities do, manifest the political consciousness. Hence, the opportunity to leave to sociology the entire field of primitive institu-

the political philosopher should not be rigorously excluded, but certainly it offers no attractions for the political scientist.<sup>20</sup> Sociology is concerned with the organization and activities of the state only in so far as they exert an influence on social phenomena. Likewise with the questions as to what the state ought to be, or how it has come to be what it is, sociology has little or no concern. It is content to leave the answer to the former question to political philosophy and the latter to history. Political science deals with the state as an accomplished fact both in its static and dynamical relations, caring little for primitive origins and social transitions. Yet it cannot ignore the fact that its premises are laid in human nature, and that the mainsprings of political action are the desires of individuals massed in groups.<sup>21</sup> tions, and to regard as truly political only those institutions and those theories which are closely associated with such manifestations."

<sup>20</sup> There is a generally recognized distinction between political science and political philosophy, although a precise differentiation of their spheres is difficult, if not impossible. Perhaps we may say that political science furnishes us with the results of logical thinking upon the nature and life of concrete political institutions, while political philosophy inquires into the foundations of the first principles which underlie them. Compare on this point Huxley's distinction between a science and a philosophy in his *Object and Scope of Philosophy*, Essays, VI. p. 57. The essential difference, according to Sidgwick, consists in the fact that political philosophy concerns itself directly with the right or best form of government, while political science does not (*Development of European Polity*, p. 2). The correctness of this view, however, may be seriously questioned, and indeed seems to be inconsistent with Sidgwick's earlier view that political science endeavors "to determine what *ought* to be so far as the constitution and government are concerned" (*Elements of Politics*, p. 7). A more satisfactory distinction is that formulated by Willoughby, who seems to regard political philosophy as that part of political science which is concerned with a theoretical discussion of the essential characteristics of the material and phenomena with which political science has to deal. Political philosophy he conceives to be concerned with generalizations instead of particulars predicated essential and fundamental qualities rather than accidental or unessential characteristics ("Political Philosophy" in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. V, p. 161). Compare also Dunning's distinction between political science and political theory, *op. cit.*, p. xvii.

<sup>21</sup> Thus, says Giddings, political science "assumes for every nation a national character, and is content that the political constitution of the state can be scientifically deduced from the character assumed. It takes the fact of sovereignty and builds upon it, and does not speculate how sovereignty came to be, as did Hobbes and Locke and Rousseau. It starts exactly where Aristotle started, with the dictum that man is a political animal." (*Principles of Sociology*, p. 37.)

Thus a true political science must have its roots embedded in the science of social phenomena, and the same is equally true of politics as an art of government. There is much truth in the remark of an able writer that "social or governmental failures are almost exclusively due to ignorance of social laws," and that "government is becoming more and more the organ of social consciousness and more and more the servant of the social will."<sup>22</sup>

### III

Few, if any, of the so-called disciplines contribute so much to political science as does *history*, since it furnishes, in a great measure, the materials for comparison and induction. It has been well called, by an eminent French scholar, the master-science of the nineteenth century, in the domain of the moral and political sciences.<sup>23</sup> It constitutes a sort of third dimension to the social sciences.<sup>24</sup> The relation was tersely expressed by the late Professor Seeley, who said that political science without history was hollow and baseless; or, to put it in rhyme: "History without political science has no fruit; political science without history has no root."<sup>25</sup> While history furnishes many of the data for the construction of a political science, and is therefore inseparable from the study of the state, it is not true, as Freeman declared, that history is past politics and politics present history—a view, however, in which Sidgwick concurs, and one which he says, we should constantly keep before our minds in order to conceive the unity of the process by which political society develops from primitive to advanced stages.<sup>26</sup> Equally erroneous is the dictum of Lord Acton that "the student of history is a politician with

<sup>22</sup> Lester F. Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, pp. 302, 304.

<sup>23</sup> M. Esmein, quoted by M. Deslandres in *La crise de la science politique et le problème de la méthode*, p. iv.

<sup>24</sup> Munroe Smith, "Scope of Political Science," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, p. 4.

<sup>25</sup> *Introduction to Political Science*, p. 4. Compare the following from Lord Acton's inaugural as regius professor at Cambridge: "The science of politics is the one science that is deposited by the stream of history like the grains of gold in the sands of a river."

<sup>26</sup> *Development of European Polity*, p. 4.

his face turned backward." Not all of history is "past politics." Much of it—like the history of art, of science, of inventions, discoveries, military campaigns, language, customs, dress, industries, religious controversies—has little, if any, relation to politics and affords no material for political investigation.<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, not all political science is history. Much of it is of a purely philosophical and speculative character, and cannot therefore be assigned to the category of history. The true nature of the relationship has been clearly described by Burgess who says the phenomena of history must be conceived, first under the category of time, that is, in the order of antecedent and consequent; second, under the category of cause and effect, otherwise what we call history would be mere statistics or chronology;<sup>28</sup> and, third, it must possess the element of self-progression. He points out a truth which cannot be denied, that a mere repetition of events without an added increment is not history, and that historical knowledge consists not merely in knowing what has happened in the past, but in the correct apprehension of the variations and accretions in the succession of events.<sup>29</sup> This is the idea, expressed in different language, of the Hegelian doctrine that history is merely the unfolding of the human spirit; that, while its progress is marked by irregularities of movement, by stumblings and temporary retrogressions, there is, on the whole, a steady advance toward an ideal.<sup>30</sup> Political science,

<sup>27</sup> "Political science," says Schlegel, "forms but one part and not the whole "of human history" (*Philosophy of History*, p. 68). We have, as Professor Small observes, "histories" of everything from civilization to coinage—histories of church doctrine, military tactics, language, painting, prostitution, and even of the devil (*Journal of Sociology*, July, 1906, p. 18). It would, of course, be preposterous to assert that such "history" is "past politics."

<sup>28</sup> See on this point Jellinek, *Recht des modernen Staates*, Vol. I, p. 8. Jellinek points out that history presents to us not only facts, but the causal connection between those facts.

<sup>29</sup> *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, Vol. I, pp. 203-5.

<sup>30</sup> Hegel, *Philosophy of History* (trans. by Morris), p. 115. "History in the making," says Burgess, "is, therefore, the progressive realization of the ideals of the human spirit in all of the objective forms of their manifestation in language, tradition, and literature, in customs, manners, laws, and institutions and in opinion and belief. And history, in the writing, is the true and faithful record of

on the other hand, is the science of the state considered in its multiform relations. It is concerned, not only with government, but also with sovereignty and liberty. Constitutional law is the objective realization in legal institutions of its doctrines. The elements of time and progression which constitute the substance of history do not enter into the concept of political science.

While political science makes extensive use of historical material,<sup>31</sup> its problem is distinct from that of history. The function of history is to narrate and interpret a succession of events in the light of causal relations; to discover the reasons why social institutions persist and change from generation to generation; to trace tendencies and laws of growth. It is not restricted in its sphere to those parts of society which have received political organization, but covers the record of man prior as well as subsequent to the organization of the state. Thus in point of time history antedates political science, and in a sense prepares the way for its advent. The function of political science is to explain political institutions, and it is concerned only with that part of their history which is capable of throwing light upon their true character. According to certain writers, its principal problem is the teleological one of determining what *ought* to be, so far as the constitution and action of government are concerned, while history is concerned with what *has* been.<sup>32</sup> Thus, although their problems are distinct, they have a common subject in the phenomena of the state, and therefore their spheres touch at many points and overlap at others. To fully comprehend political science in its fundamental relations we must study it historically, and to interpret history in its true significance we must study that politically. Thus as studies they are mutually complementary progressive revelations of the human reason, as they mark the line and stages of advance made by the human race toward its ultimate perfection." When the race ceases to be the representative of progress, says Burgess, it not only ceases to make history, but really, thereafter, unmakes history. Its experiences thenceforth become material for tragedy and romance rather than for history.

<sup>31</sup> "Die beschreibende Grundlage aller Socialwissenschaft, also auch der Staatswissenschaft, ist die Geschichte welche die sociale Thatsachen in ihrem historischen Verlaufe fest- und darstellt sowie deren äussere und innere Verknüpfung nachweist."—Jellinek, *Recht des modernen Staates*, p. 8.

<sup>32</sup> Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*, p. 7; also *Development of European Polity*, p. 5.



tributary and supplementary rather than antagonistic. "Politics are vulgar," said Professor Seeley, "when not liberalized by history, and history fades into mere literature when it loses sight of its relation to politics."<sup>33</sup> Separate them, says Burgess, and the one becomes a cripple, if not a corpse, the other a will of the wisp.<sup>34</sup> Professor Seeley conceived history to be the name of the residuum which has been left when one group of facts after another has been taken possession of by some science. Ultimately, he says, a science will take possession of the residuum, and this science will be political science.<sup>35</sup> Many of the facts of history, he points out, are no longer recorded in historical treatises, but have been appropriated by other sciences. Thus for example, the facts of the past relating to meteorology, biology, hygiene, surgery, and various others sciences and arts, are not recorded in historical, but in scientific treatises. Physiology has taken possession of a definite group of historical facts; pathology, another; political economy is appropriating the facts of industry; jurisprudence of law; etc. If this process of appropriation continues, all the facts of history in the end will be swallowed up. Already historians deal meagerly with the facts regarding the phenomena of the sciences and arts, merely contenting themselves with referring the reader to some special treatise for information.

#### IV

With *political economy*—or *economics*, to use the more modern term—political science is closely related; indeed, it is classed as a branch of political science by at least one noted economist.<sup>36</sup> It was first called "political" economy by the Greeks, and was defined by them as the art of providing revenue for the state.<sup>37</sup> During the later Middle Ages it began to be

<sup>33</sup> *Introduction to Political Science*, p. 4.

<sup>34</sup> "Relation of History to Political Science," *Annual Report*, American Historical Association, 1896, Vol. I, p. 211.

<sup>35</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>36</sup> Dugald Stewart, *Lectures on Political Economy*, Vol. I, p. 24.

<sup>37</sup> Seligman, *Principles of Economics*, p. 7; Hadley, "Relation between Politics and Economics," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 1899.

conceived of as the art of augmenting the wealth and power of a nation through the development of its natural resources; that is, it came to be regarded as the economy of the state. Thus there was a gradual centering of attention on the political side, which resulted in giving to economics the character of a political science, in the popular mind at least. Senior remarks that as late as the eighteenth century political economy was regarded as a branch of statesmanship particularly by the Physiocrats, and that those who assumed the name of political economists avowedly treated, not of wealth, but of government.<sup>38</sup> His own conception of the scope of political economy was affected by this view, and he laid it down as a principle that the science involved a "consideration of the whole theory of morals, of government, and of civil and criminal legislation."<sup>39</sup>

The first systematic English writer on the subject, Sir James Stewart, in his *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy* (published in 1767), enunciated this view when he said:

What economy is in the family, political economy is in the state . . . but the statesman is not master to establish what form of economy he pleases. . . . The great art, therefore, of political economy is first to adapt the different operations of it to the spirit, manners, habits, and customs of the people, and afterward to model these circumstances so as to be able to introduce a set of new and more useful institutions.

The principles of the science of political economy were stated by Stewart to be, "to secure a certain fund of subsistence for all the inhabitants and to obviate every circumstance which may render it precarious."<sup>40</sup> Nine years later Adam Smith published his *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, in which he stated the objects of political economy, "considered as a branch of the science of a statesman," to be two: first, to provide adequate "revenue or substance for the people or, more properly, to enable them to provide it for themselves;" and, second, to supply the state or commonwealth "with a revenue

<sup>38</sup> *Political Economy*, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup> *Works*, Vol. I, pp. 2, 3.

sufficient for the public service." "It proposes," he said, "to enrich both the people and the sovereign."<sup>41</sup>

Without quoting further from the earlier writers, it is clear that they conceived economics to be a branch of the general science of the state. Writers of the present day no longer hold to the earlier conception, yet there is no difference of opinion among them concerning the question of a close relationship of economics and politics as independent social sciences. Political and social life is obviously intermixed, and the activities and, to some extent, even the forms of government are profoundly influenced by economic conditions. Conversely, there is a distinct interaction of politics upon economics, often manifesting itself in the relation of cause and effect. The production and distribution of wealth is largely conditioned upon the existing forms of government and the institutional basis of economic life.<sup>42</sup> The final solution of many economic problems is conditioned upon the existence of certain political conditions, while, on the other hand, some of the fundamental problems of the state are determined by economic considerations. Thus tariff laws and trade restrictive acts generally are favored or opposed almost entirely on economic grounds. The financial system of the state rests on economic principles, and to a large extent the whole question of the relation between government and liberty is at bottom an economic problem. The burning questions of present-day politics, government control of public utilities, relation of the state to corporate enterprise, and its attitude toward the whole question of capital and labor, are at the same time fundamentally questions of economics; indeed, the whole theory of government administration is largely economic.<sup>43</sup> There are

<sup>41</sup> Book IV, Introduction. It may not be out of place to mention that Smith as professor at Glasgow (1751-64) lectured on natural theology, ethical philosophy, jurisprudence, and political economy, believing that these subjects were not only related, but actually complementary to each other. Compare Mill, *Political Economy*, p. 3; and Sidgwick, *The Principles of Political Economy*, pp. 14-16.

<sup>42</sup> It is no doubt true, says Nicholson, that the system of government "operates on economic facts," and that "economic history furnishes endless examples of the injurious effects of bad government" (*Principles of Political Economy*, p. 13).

<sup>43</sup> Munroe Smith, "Scope of Political Science," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, p. 4.

few activities of the state that do not affect directly or indirectly, favorably or unfavorably, the economic interests of society; and for this reason the statesman should possess the widest knowledge of economic laws and principles.<sup>44</sup>

## V

In *statistics* political science finds a valuable and potent instrument of investigation. Both von Mohl and Holtzendorff treated it as one of the "political sciences." The former defined it as the science through which a picture of existing political and social conditions could be obtained;<sup>45</sup> the latter conceived it to be the means through which the fundamental principles and conditions of political activity could be learned and an insight into the relations of political phenomena gained.<sup>46</sup> To the same effect is the estimate of Sheldon Amos, who says: "The study and use of statistics must be regarded as a most valuable ally and an unmistakable proof of the scientific character of political studies."<sup>47</sup> Its relation to political science is hardly that of an independent science in the sense that economics and sociology are, but rather that of an auxiliary science. It is an instrument, a means in the dynamics of political science, and contributes to the study of it somewhat as microscopy does to pathology.<sup>48</sup> It gives us the quantitative measurements of political and social phenomena expressed in figures, and these constitute the material for an inductive study of political science—materials without which we should be largely helpless. It goes farther and shows us what shall be counted, and how that which is counted in one direction (population) shall be compared with that which has been counted in another direction (environment). Finally, it

<sup>44</sup> Compare J. S. Mill, *Principles of Political Economy* (ed. by Laughlin), p. 47; and Dugald Stewart, *Lectures on Political Economy*, Vol. I. p. 17. Burke stated the most important problem of political economy to be "to ascertain what the state ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual discretion."

<sup>45</sup> *Encyklopädie der Staatswissenschaften*, p. 745.

<sup>46</sup> *Principien der Politik*, p. 18.

<sup>47</sup> *Science of Politics*, p. 19.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Gumplowicz, *Sociologie und Politik*, p. 40.

directs our attention to possible relations of cause and effect which otherwise might escape our notice, and thus reveals to us the existence of a reign of law in the physical world.<sup>49</sup> The manifestations of political and social, like those of economic life, readily lend themselves to the statistical method; and when the results are properly measured, and carefully arranged and tabulated according to scientific methods and criteria, they serve as a guide for administrative action, as a basis for legislation, and as a means of testing the expediency or effectiveness of political policies. It is the practice of modern governments to collect and preserve in systematic form statistics relating to the political, social, and economic conditions of the state. No government could legislate intelligently without the aid of statistical information concerning its trade, finance, military and economic resources, social condition of the people, etc. Such evils as arise from the prevalence of disease, vice, crime, illiteracy, vicious moral training, unsanitary surroundings, must first be proceeded against practically.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, statistics relative to births, marriages, deaths, divorces, often serve an important purpose in the formulation of new policies of political and social reform. Thus in practical politics there is a constant and increasing demand for scientific statistical data in the form of measurements and descriptions.

## VI

There is evidence of a growing *rapprochement* between political science and *psychology*, as is shown by the increasing frequency of the attempts to explain political phenomena through psychological laws. Comte gave great weight to psychology as the basis of his social and ethical system, and Spencer emphasized it scarcely less than he did biology. Indeed, the biological theory which formerly held so conspicuous a place in the methodology of political science is being displaced by the psychological;<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Sociology*, pp. 13, 15.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16. See also *Statistics and Economics*, by the same author, p. 5. For further literature on the subject see Reichesberg, *Statistik und Sozialwissenschaft*, and von Mayr, *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre*.

<sup>51</sup> Baldwin, "Psychology of Social Organization," *Psychological Review*, Vol. IV, p. 482.

for we are coming to realize that it is only in its psychological aspects that the analogy between the state and the biological organism is properly applicable.<sup>52</sup> If we consider the state apart from its concrete organization and its manifestations through legally constituted agencies, we shall see that it is essentially psychic rather than physical, subjective rather than objective.<sup>53</sup> It is equally clear that a full understanding of the adaptability and functions of political institutions can only be gained through a study of the psychical factors upon which they rest. Government to be stable and popular must reflect the mental ideas and moral sentiments of the people; that is, it must be in harmony with what has been called the "mental constitution of the race."<sup>54</sup> The government of the king of Dahomey is probably an excellent one for his people, but the wisest constitution of Europe or America would be wholly unfitted for them, largely because of the totally different mental constitution of their race. The explanation of the capacity of the Teutonic races for the enjoyment of a high degree of civil liberty without producing anarchy, and the incapacity of others, as well as the widely varying conceptions of the proper relation between authority and freedom among different races, is to be found mainly in the psychological character of each. "Each people," says LeBon in his *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples*, "has its own mental constitution as fixed as its anatomy and character, from which are derived its thoughts, institutions, beliefs, and arts;" and "history in its great lines may be considered as the simple unfolding of the psychological conceptions of the race." It is especially in the domain of political institutions, he points out, that the mental constitution of the race manifests itself most markedly. The terms "race psychology" and "political psychology"<sup>55</sup> have fairly earned a place in the political vocabulary of the time. Holtzendorff, following some of the older German publicists, went so far as to classify *Völkerpsychologie*

<sup>52</sup> Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, p. 299.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Willoughby, *Nature of the State*, p. 38.

<sup>54</sup> LeBon, *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples*, p. 6.

<sup>55</sup> See *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 6, 99, 100.

as one of the disciplines of political science,<sup>56</sup> and the German political philosophers generally have always recognized a close relationship between the two sciences. Bagehot has attempted to explain the working of the English constitution upon psychological grounds, and more recently M. Boutmy, in two suggestive volumes on the political psychology of the English and American people, has pointed out the influence of psychological factors upon the character and workings of their political institutions.<sup>57</sup>

An American writer, Professor J. W. Burgess, has shown that the races of the earth may be classified on the basis of their political psychology; that each race has certain distinguishing political traits which mark it off from the others; and that the political institutions peculiar to each have been determined largely by psychological factors. Thus the political consciousness of the ancient Greeks never advanced beyond the idea of the city-state. That of the Romans, on the other hand, found

<sup>56</sup> *Principien der Politik*, p. 19; see also Bastian, *Politische Psychologie* (1886), and Lazarus and Steinthal in *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, Vol. I.

<sup>57</sup> *Essai d'une psychologie politique du peuple anglais* (1901) and *Eléments d'une psychologie politique du peuple américain* (1902). Boutmy's estimate of the English people is rather unfavorable. They are, he says, extremely individualistic, rather brutal, unsociable, wanting in sympathy, but withal frank, energetic, and conservative. His opinion of the Americans is more favorable, although he says they are more lacking in national patriotism than the Europeans. Comparing the French and American conceptions of the relation between government and liberty, he says: "The Frenchman says: 'Let us rather be governed badly than not at all; the American says: 'Let us be as little governed as possible rather than be governed badly.'" Concerning the political psychology of the Americans, James Bryce says: "The Americans know the constitution of their country; they follow public affairs; they join in local government and learn from it how government must be carried on, and in particular how discussion must be conducted in meetings and its results tested at elections. They are conservative in their fundamental beliefs, in the structure of their government, and in their social and domestic usages," (*The American Commonwealth*, Vol. II, pp. 284, 292.) Similar is the estimate of the German scholar Ratzel, who says: "Der Nordamerikaner ist ein politisches Wesen. Oeffentliche Angelegenheiten erfüllen seine Seele. Die amerikanische Litteratur hat bis jetzt keine über der Erde schreiende Geister hervorgebracht. Lyriker, Aesthetiker, Mystiker haben alle politisch gesungen, geredet, gewirkt" (*Politische Geographie der vereinigten Staaten*, p. 625).

expression in the idea of a world-state, and as a people they surpassed all races in the development of law and the formulation of legal rights. The national genius of the Celts has been distinctly unpolitical; attachment in small bodies to chosen chiefs has represented their idea of state organization, while violence and corruption have marked their politics, in consequence of which they have remained subject to more highly endowed political races.<sup>58</sup> Doubtless, if we should undertake to account for the lack of political genius among oriental races, and its presence in a high degree among those of Teutonic origin, who have become the leaders of the world in the organization of national states and in the political regeneration of inferior races, we should find ourselves face to face with large problems of race psychology.

Several attempts have recently been made to explain the law of social organization upon psychological grounds. One of these is embodied in the "imitation" theory of M. Tarde, who maintains that all civilizations, even the most divergent, are merely "rays from a single primordial center,"<sup>59</sup> and that social resemblances are due to conscious imitation rather than coincidence.<sup>60</sup> Another theory is that of M. Durkheim, who finds the underlying cause of social organization to be the influence of constraint which one individual exerts over another. The bond of social solidarity, he contends, is a "repressive right"—the fear of punishment for the rupture.<sup>61</sup> Still a third "psychological" view is the doctrine of Herbert Spencer and the English moral philosophers, who attribute the cause of social organization to certain primitive motives, such as sympathy. It is sufficient to say that none of these theories are accepted as adequate solutions of the problems of origins, but that need not affect our belief in the pos-

<sup>58</sup> Burgess, *Political Science and Constitutional Law*, Vol. I, chap. iii; cf. Jellinek, *Recht des modernen Staates*, pp. 73 f.

<sup>59</sup> *Lois de l'imitation* (trans. by Parsons), p. 51.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 74. For a criticism of Tarde's theory see Small, *General Sociology*, chap. xxxix.

<sup>61</sup> *Divisions du travail*, chap. ii. For the relation of race psychology to politics by an eminent German publicist, see Jellinek, *Recht des modernen Staates*, p. 72.



sibility of psychological influences in determining the course of state life, nor of the value of psychological aids in discovering the origin of many political institutions and understanding their workings. Political institutions must exist subjectively as ideas before they can be realized in objective form. It would be easy to show that the basis of many agitations for political reforms exists in mental attitudes rather than in any real need for change. The history of the past is full of coups, bouleversements, revolutions, that can be explained only from the psychological point of view.<sup>62</sup> Modern psychology, observes a well-known sociologist, is "the guiding thread in historical research, and is full of applications to the social life and political measures of the day."<sup>63</sup> If it contributed nothing else to political science, it would make good its claim to be regarded as a discipline through the lessons which it teaches concerning the problem of adaptation of institutions.<sup>64</sup>

## VII

With *geography* political science comes into close relation at important points. That branch of anthro-po-geography which has to do with the activities of man on the earth's surface, not as an individual but as a member of the state; which takes account of boundaries, settlements, sites of ports and towns, the lines of travel and migration; in short, which is concerned with the distribution of men into communities or states, as commercial geography deals with the distribution of the commercial products of the earth's surface, we may call political geography.<sup>65</sup> It is sometimes said that there is a place for physical

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Ellwood, "A Psychological Theory of Revolutions," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XI, p. 49; see also Tarde, *Les Transformations du pouvoir*; Wundt, *The Facts of the Moral Life* (trans. by Gulliver and Fitchener), p. 257; Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, Vol. I, pp. 38 f.

<sup>63</sup> Brinton, *Basis of Social Relations*, p. x; cf. Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-85.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. LeBon, *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples*, p. 3. On the general subject cf. Small "The Initial Problems of Social Psychology," in his *General Sociology*, chap. xl.

<sup>65</sup> Keltie in Mill's *International Geography*, p. 109; also *op. cit.*, p. 5; also Keltie, *Applied Geography*, p. 12. The two most recent and noteworthy treatises on this subject are Ratzel's *Politische Geographie* and his *Anthropogeographie*. The latter work, in two volumes, represents the most conspicuous attempt ever made

geography and history, but not for political geography; but in recent years, through the scholarly researches of Wallace, Geike, Strachey, Mill, Ritter, Herder, Geddes, Ratzel, Keltie, Draper, McKinder, and others, the political geographer has made good his claim to a place at court. There is no longer any doubt that geography deserves a primary place in all departments of research which have to do with man or with the institutions which he creates.<sup>66</sup> It is, says James Bryce, "the meeting-place of the sciences. It gathers up, so to speak, the results which the geologist, the botanist, the zoölogist, and the meteorologist have obtained, and presents them to the student of history, economics, and politics—we might perhaps add of law, philosophy, and architecture—as an important part of the data from which he must start."<sup>67</sup> Those who have read the second chapter of Buckle's brilliant *History of Civilization* will recall the influence which he attributed to the geographical factors of climate, soil, and food upon the industrial, intellectual, and political development of nations. It will be remembered how, to take a specific instance, he sought to account for the wide dissimilarity in the government, laws, religion, and institutions of Scandinavia, on the one hand, and those of Spain and Portugal, on the other, mainly in the dissimilarity of geographical conditions, and how he accounted for the civilization of ancient Egypt by the fertility of its soil and other favorable geographic influences.<sup>68</sup> There is no longer any doubt that Buckle greatly exaggerated the influence of geographic conditions upon civilization;<sup>69</sup> but to describe the relations between geography and the social sciences. It is a plea for a closer study of geography in its bearings upon sociology and political science. Like most of the "political geographers," Ratzel shows a tendency to overestimate the influence of geographical conditions in determining social and political conditions, but withal his work is well planned and contains much suggestive material.

<sup>66</sup> Ripley, *The Races of Europe*, p. 14; see also his "Geography as a Sociological Study," *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1895.

<sup>67</sup> *Contemporary Review*, Vol. LXII, p. 128.

<sup>68</sup> Buckle, *History of Civilization*, Vol. I, pp. 32, 59; compare on this point Barth's anthropo-geographical view of history in his *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Ripley, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

when due allowance has been made for all exaggeration, it cannot be denied that he was right in principle. Geography is the basis of all history,<sup>70</sup> and geographic conditions determine in a large measure the course of history, particularly economic and political history; and every historian ambitious of being more than a mere chronicler, as Keltie observes, must not fail to take into account the consideration of geographical factors.<sup>71</sup> The movements of the races over the surface of the earth, the settlements which they have made, the states which they have created, and the resulting lines of political division have been determined mainly by the physical conditions of its surface and its atmosphere.<sup>72</sup> The political man, like the intellectual and social man, is to a large extent the product of his environment.<sup>73</sup>

Of the great political writers of the eighteenth century, Montesquieu and Comte both emphasized the influence of geographical conditions upon political development. Montesquieu, in his *Esprit de lois*, undertook to trace a causal relation between climate and the system of law prevailing in a given state, and

<sup>70</sup> H. J. McKinder, in *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, Vol. VI, p. 78; see also Ratzel, *Anthropogeographie*, Part. I, p. 66: "Die Nothwendigkeit des Bodens für den Staat ist über allen Zweifel erhaben. Weil der Staat ohne Boden und Grenzen nicht zu denken ist, hat sich schon frühe eine politische Geographie entwickelt, und wenn auch die Staatswissenschaft die Raum- und Lagebedingungen der Staaten oft übersah, so ist doch eine den Boden vernachlässigende Staatslehre immer eine vorübergehende Täuschung gewesen." See also von Mayr, "Der Staat und sein Boden," *Geographische Zeitschrift*, 1807.

<sup>71</sup> *Applied Geography*, p. 6. "Without political geography," says Freeman, "history would have no existence; or, more truly, political geography looked at in that special aspect, is simply one essential part of history. But political geography implies physical geography, and physical geography is parted by a very narrow line from sociology."—*Methods of Historical Study*, p. 57.

<sup>72</sup> See Freeman, *Historical Geography of Europe*, p. 2; Bryce, "Relation of Geography to History," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. LXII, p. 128; Ratzel, *Anthropogeographie*, p. 558; Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, Vol. I, pp. 38, 39.

<sup>73</sup> Ratzel, *Anthropogeographie*, p. 41. Hume, in his essay on "National Character" (*Essays*, Vol. I, p. 21), argues against the view that climate influences national character. "I am inclined," he says, "to doubt its effect upon national character; also I do not believe that man ever in his spirit or destiny owed any thanks to atmosphere, food, or climate." For Ratzel's criticism of Hume see *Anthropogeographie*, pp. 43-45; also his chapter entitled "Das Klima," pp. 531 ff.; cf. also Maugeolle, *Le problème de l'histoire*.

between the fertility of the soil and forms of government. His conclusions, however, abound in paradoxes, and his estimate of the effect of climatic influences was greatly exaggerated.<sup>74</sup> Comte, with less disposition to exaggerate, pointed out the powerful influence of physical causes upon civilization, concluding that "it would be impossible to conceive of any adequate history of humanity apart from the real history of the terrestrial globe, the inevitable theater of progressive human activity."<sup>75</sup>

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the relation of geography to history. That the course of history, economic, social and political, has been determined at many points by geographical factors is incontestable.<sup>76</sup> The existence of the city-state in ancient Greece, and the virtual failure of all attempts to unite the several geographic unities into which Greece was divided by intersecting mountain ranges and arms of the sea,

<sup>74</sup> Sorel's *Montesquien* (trans. by Anderson), pp. 140, 141, Pollock, *History of the Science of Politics*, p. 83.

<sup>75</sup> *Positive Philosophy*, p. 448.

<sup>76</sup> On this point see George, *Relation of Geography to History*; Semple, *American History and its Geographical Conditions*; Smith, *Geography of the Holy Land*; Ratzel, *Politische Geographie*, also *Anthropogeographie*; Freeman, *Historical Geography of Europe*; Keltie, *Applied Geography*; Hubbard, "The Effects of Geographical Environment in the Development of Civilization in Primitive Man," *National Geographical Magazine*, 1897; Geddes, "Influence of Geographical Conditions in Social Development," *Geographical Journal*, 1898; Bryce, "Relation of Geography to History," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. LXII; Turner, "Significance of the Frontier in American History," *Annual Report*, American Historical Association, 1893. "The greatest events in the world's history," says H. J. McKinder, "are at least related to the great features of geography." "All history," he continues, "would have been radically different but for the Isthmus of Suez—the most important spot on the face of the earth." (*Scottish Geographical Magazine*, Vol. VI, p. 82.) "To a trifling geographical incident," says Shaler, "we owe the isolation of Great Britain from the European continent; and all the marvelous history of the English folk, as we all know, hangs upon the existence of that narrow strip of sea between the Devon coast and the kindred lowlands of northern France." "The independent political development of England for the last thousand years," he continues, "has been in a large part due to the measure of protection afforded by the British Channel. While every other country on the continent of Europe, except Scandinavia, which is itself largely a geographical insulation, has felt again and again the tread of conquering armies, this group of islands has been exempt from successive invasions. Many were attempted, and some would have succeeded without the geographical barrier which nature had interposed." (*Nature and Man in America*, pp. 153, 159.)

afford one of the earliest and most striking illustrations of this truth.<sup>77</sup> Nothing is clearer than that geographic isolation is unfavorable to political unity. It not only retards, in the beginning, the unification of neighboring races, but also different communities of the same race, promotes prejudices and want of sympathy, and, when political union has once been established, particularism and disunion. Moreover, lack of geographic homogeneity must influence to a certain extent the activities, if not the form, of government. People occupying parts of a state which are separated from the rest by high mountain barriers, impenetrable deserts, or large bodies of water, inevitably develop a variety of opinion which requires different legislation. They tend to acquire a different consensus of rights and wrongs, which necessitates a different criminal law, thereby rendering difficult a policy of centralized legislation. In short, homogeneity of geographical conditions is essential to a centralized political system, while want of it makes it advisable to establish the federal system which recognizes the right of the isolated parts to frame, within certain limits, the political institutions best suited to their local conditions. Likewise the geographical isolation of a state like England, which is economically dependent upon distant parts of the world, and which, by reason of the natural protection which such isolation affords, minimizes the military element, may influence in essential particulars its whole social, industrial, and political life.<sup>78</sup> The fact that Switzerland has maintained its local life comparatively undisturbed by the power-

<sup>77</sup> Oman, *History of Greece*, chap. i. For the effect of geographical conditions upon the future of the American republic see Bryce, "The Home of the Nation," in his *American Commonwealth*, Vol. II, chap. xci.

<sup>78</sup> Of the influence of geographic conditions upon the politics of England, Professor Shaler says: "In the wonderful state of Great Britain the national life-functions vary with reference to the topography of high Asia, the climate and surface of Africa, and certain portions of other countries; and almost every storm and every drought which affects the remotest lands and seas reacts upon that state. Ministers, and with them the purposes of the state, are changed by the chance of some battlefield at the antipodes. A bad harvest in the plains of the upper Mississippi means dear bread in England, fewer marriages, and shorter lives; in other words it produces an effect upon the social status of the country."—*Nature and Man in America*, p. 149.

ful states about it for more than a thousand years, is due largely to the geographical conditions which environ its folk.<sup>79</sup> It might also be shown that the political history of the Netherlands has been determined to a very considerable extent by the peculiar geographical condition of the country, and that the character which the inhabitants have acquired in their heroic struggle with nature lies at the basis of many of their political ideas and institutions.<sup>80</sup>

Size and area, no less than topography, influence the course of political development; the system of administration and, in a large measure, the activities of government in a state having a relatively small area are apt to differ widely from those prevailing in a state with more extensive boundaries. For the sake of internal development, if not self-preservation, it not infrequently happens that a small state finds it advisable to enlarge its boundaries by the acquisition of contiguous or distant territories, thus laying the basis of a colonial system, with its resulting modifications upon the entire governmental system of the expanding state. The increasing need of the European states for more territory in which to develop their national energy, for the support of their surplus population, and for their expanding commerce, has in late years led to an organized movement among them to take possession of such uninhabited portions of the globe as remain unannexed. Within a very few years the greater part of Africa has been partitioned out among the powers of Europe. So rapid has been the movement that it has been impossible to take effective possession of these vast territories except at a few accessible points, and the consequence has been the invention of a curious political institution, known as the "sphere of influence," as a means of delimiting the share of each.<sup>81</sup> The practice of leasing territories from other states for commercial, military, and naval purposes, where they cannot be purchased

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Shaler, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Keltie, *Applied Geography*, p. 7. For sound estimates of the influence of geographical conditions upon politics see Jellinek, *Recht des modernen Staates*, p. 71, and Treitschke, *Die Politik*, Vol. I, pp. 207 ff.

<sup>81</sup> See Keltie, *Partition of Africa*, chap. 23.

or otherwise acquired, has recently been followed by a number of governments.<sup>82</sup> Finally, it is to be noted that the industries and economic pursuits of a state are determined largely by the geographical elements of climate and soil and these, in turn, predetermine the political history of the state.<sup>83</sup>

### VIII

From *ethnology* and its kindred science *ethnography* political science draws some of its most fundamental principles. Ethnology, says Krauth-Fleming, investigates the organization and laws which depend upon the mental and physical differences of mankind, and seeks to deduce from those investigations principles of human guidance in all important relations of social and national existence. It is particularly with the organization of new states and the consolidation or division of existing states that the principles of ethnology play an important part. The recognition of this fundamental truth is one of the most conspicuous merits of Burgess' notable treatise on *Political Science and Constitutional Law*. He carefully distinguishes between the concepts "nation" and "state," defining the former as "a population of an ethnic unity inhabiting a territory of a geographic unity;" the latter, as "a particular portion of mankind viewed as an organized unit."<sup>84</sup> That is to say, he preserves the ethnic signification of the term "nation" and avoids confusing it with the political concepts represented by the state. Burgess conceives a geographic unity to be a territory separated from other territory by high mountain ranges, or broad bodies of water, or impenetrable forests and jungles, or climatic extremes. An ethnic unity he understands to be a population having a common language and literature, a common tradition, a common custom, and a common consciousness of rights and wrongs. Two or

<sup>82</sup> Within recent years Great Britain, Germany, and Russia have leased for a term of years territory from the Chinese government; the United States, from Cuba; Belgium, from Great Britain on the upper Nile; and France, from Great Britain on the Niger.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Ripley, *Races of Europe*, p. 4. For the relation of geography to jurisprudence see Schiffner, "Die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen der Geographie und der Rechtswissenschaft," *Mittheilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft*, Vienna, 1874.

<sup>84</sup> Pp. 1, 50.

more states may be embraced in the same geographic unity, and conversely a single state may be spread over several geographic unities. Similarly, two or more states may be embraced within the limits of a single nation, and several nations may be included within the boundaries of a single state. The lessons of history as well as the principles of sound political and ethnological science teach that where a state is composed of several nations an attempt should be made to develop ethnical homogeneity, by the use of force if necessary. On the other hand, where a number of states are embraced within one and the same ethnic unity, sound political science and good public policy require their union into a single state.

National unity is the determining force in the organization of modern national states, and therefore, as Burgess well says, the prime policy of states should be to attain proper physical boundaries and to render their populations ethnically homogeneous.<sup>85</sup> This means that in the organization, consolidation, or division of states, considerations of geography and ethnology must enter into the problem. The physically ideal state of the future—the state which possesses the greatest elements of permanence, stability, and national contentment—will be that whose political, geographic, and ethnic boundaries coincide. The history of Europe since 1815 has shown a steady tendency in this direction. The reckless disregard of this fundamental principle by the Vienna Congress was the greatest error that it committed, and led to the early undoing of much of its work intended to be permanent.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>85</sup> *Political Science and Constitutional Law*, Vol. I, p. 40.

<sup>86</sup> Ethnography, which bears about the same relation to ethnology that geology does to geography, may also be considered as a discipline of political science. "Ethnology is," says Brinton, "the necessary basis of correct history and sound statesmanship. It offers to history a foundation on natural law; it explains events by showing their dependence on the physical structure, the mental peculiarities, and the geographic surroundings of the peoples engaged in them. . . . To the statesman it offers those facts about the capacities and limitations of peoples which should guide his dealings with them; it comes with no vague feeling of optimism or pessimism such as doctrinaire philosophers love to air, but with the admonition that each people, each race must be studied by itself." (*Races and Peoples*, p. 300.) See also Ratzel, *Politische Geographie*, p. vi; Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, Vol. I, p. 37.



## THE ORIGINS OF LEADERSHIP. II

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*Leadership, occupations, and institutions in relation to the problems and crises arising in the expression of social impulses and interests.*—The basal problems and crises of the associate life originate in connection with the expression of the fundamental instincts, impulses, and interests of the organism in the process of adaptation to the physical and social environment, and it is in relation to the expression of these social tendencies, largely through occupational activities, that leadership and institutions are developed. The interests which are absolutely essential to the existence and perpetuation of society are the nutritive and reproductive, and all the occupations bear a close relation to the realization of these functions.

The problems connected with food-getting are persistent, specific, and imperious. While they occupy but a small part of the attention of some of the members of the more advanced societies, for the great majority of people they are now, as ever, among the dominant factors in the associate life. With the development of society they increase in complexity and variety, but in all stages of advancement they give opportunity for the expression and social recognition of various kinds of ability, and for the growth of leadership and personality.

The complex of reproductive interests, including the parental and filial impulses, is fundamental to the associational series in all its different degrees of development. It is one of the primal and most essential of the group-forming forces, and, as it is vital to the maintenance of association, its problems furnish one of the chief demands upon leadership. Under this group we may comprise all the functions by which new members are introduced into the group and trained or educated for the various social activities. Accordingly, it would include the functions of birth, pre-ado-

lescent and adolescent education, marriage, and, in general, all of the domestic relations and occupations. The problems of this group of interests occur with a certain regularity, and so can be anticipated. They, therefore, cause less of a shock to the social relations than the more violent and irregular changes, and tend to be assimilated more readily to the existing institutions. Nevertheless, they present problems of a specific character, and each particular case demands the adjustment of the customs and institutions to the special needs of the situation. The activities connected with these interests, therefore, become very important centers of leadership and institutional life.

While the nutritive and reproductive impulses and interests constitute the ultimate and irreducible factors of the life-process, there is a large number of other forces, even in the most primitive societies, which exercise a profound influence upon leadership and institutions. Among these we may mention as primary the acquisitive impulses or property interests, the governmental or political interests, and the religious, ethical, educational, aesthetic, sociability, and health interests.

The acquisitive impulses or property interests find expression through almost all of the different occupations. Among the primary sources of social activity these interests occupy a very prominent place. Acquisitiveness is one of the most potent of the innate social impulses and, under the influence of the various social conditions, gives rise to the different forms of property relations and institutions. Beginning with the defense and extension of food areas among the lower animals and primitive men, and the demand such activity makes for the superior individual, the acquisitive impulses grow to be among the most constant sources of attention in all grades of human societary development, and they originate some of the most vital and complex problems of association. Because of the intense interest and attention which have been bestowed upon the acquisition and ownership of property, and of the great variety and complexity of the problems that have arisen in this connection, these appropriative forces become one of the chief centers for the expression of personality and leadership. With the development of associate life, social

recognition and influence come to be associated with the ownership of property and the ability to acquire wealth. Ownership then becomes one of the principal means for securing the esteem of associates, and so of self-esteem and self-realization. The psychology of the powerful influence which property plays in societary life is pointed out by Professor James when he says:

Between what a man calls *me* and what he simply calls *mine* the line is difficult to draw. . . . *In its widest possible sense, a man's Me is the sum total of all he can call his*, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and his children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and his works, his lands and horses and yacht and bank account.

Possession of property, therefore, is one of the chief factors in the extension and development of the personality, in securing honor and influence and leadership in the group, and this social recognition, in turn, tends to reinforce the individual's consciousness of self and to increase his confidence in his ability to exercise the function of leadership.

The need of a direct control of the interactions of groups, and of individuals and groups, calls for particular occupations, such as those of chiefs, kings, judges, lawgivers, and the different civil and military officials required for the various political functions; and this activity issues in those habitual forms of social life called political institutions. The crucial importance of the preservation of the political group for all other forms of association has given it the central position in the attention of the historian. Upon the successful solution of the grave problems arising in connection with this phase of the associate life—as, for example, in wars for defense or aggression—has depended the very existence of all other phases of association, and hence the high esteem in which the efficient leaders in this kind of activity have been held. Wars and conquests are the most vehement forms of social activity, and they produce the most dangerous crises which the political group has to meet. Moreover, these crises occur irregularly, and so are more difficult to anticipate and control than many of the other forms of social exigencies. Consequently, they have been among the most potent sources of leadership and institutions.

<sup>22</sup> *Psychological*, Vol. I, p. 291.

War makes an urgent demand for leaders with great courage, persistence, and endurance, and with ability to organize and control others, and to form decisions rapidly, yet carefully, and then to act promptly, forcefully, and efficiently. In addition to these personal qualities, war has also furnished a strong stimulus to the inventor, investigator, mathematician, and technologist. However, there is danger of overemphasis of the influence of wars, conquests, and migrations in the evolution of institutions. The less intense problems of controlling intertribal and international relations, and the many interactions of groups within the larger political groups, as well as the relations of these groups to the particular individuals, if not so exigent, have been a more constant and regular source of leadership and of customs and institutions. To enumerate even a part of these relations would consume more time and space than can be given here, and we can only hope to touch upon their significance to the evolution of leadership and institutions in the treatment of the more concrete material that is to follow. We may note, in passing, the civil and criminal violations of customs, which constitute another set of problems or crises in the political phase of association, and which occur at uncertain intervals and create a demand for specially qualified leaders, and originate definite occupations such as that of the police, lawgiver, and judge.

The constant introduction of new individuals into the group by birth causes another problematic relationship which is the source of one of the principal branches of the function of leadership. Each child comes into the group with certain native tendencies to social activity. It is a bundle of unformed potentialities for social action. On the other hand, the group into which the child is born has acquired certain definite modes of associating, certain fairly well formed channels of social conduct into which the activities of each new unit must be directed. It is evident that a contrast or discrepancy, depending upon the stage of development reached by the group, will exist between these new members and the customs or institutions of the group. The necessity for continuity in the life-process of the group calls for an adaptive process between the new units and the institu-

tions. The social tendencies of the child must be shaped and directed in accordance with the organized modes of associating which have proved useful to the group. The problems arising in connection with this phase of the adaptive process make the demand for the teacher as leader, and, with the development of complexity in the social process, for a teaching profession and educational institutions. At first the educative functions are assumed by the women of the group, and in particular by the mother. The mother is the first teacher—especially is this true among the primitive peoples—and, as a rule, she is the principal teacher during the pre-adolescent period of the child. But among the more primitive peoples the discrepancy between the attainments of the group and endowments of the child is comparatively small, and the educational period is correspondingly brief. The customs and traditions are few and the occupations simple, and as a result the time required for the teacher to bring the child up to the institutional level of his group is comparatively short when compared with the period of training required of the modern child for the most efficient social action. In primitive society, with the advent of the adolescent period the youth passes from the more direct control of the mother and women of the tribe, and is initiated into the duties and privileges of manhood and womanhood, which means the enlarging of the circle of control and leadership to include the whole group. The adolescent period, with its rapid and important physical and psychical changes, its new and powerful social impulses, its enthusiasms, ideals, and hero-worship, and its high state of suggestibility, has in all stages of human association been one of the most prominent centers of leadership. The problematic features of this crucial period in the social development of the individual have called for the attention, not only of parents, but also of physicians, teachers, and the clergy. It is almost universally recognized by primitive peoples, and is the source of some of their most sacred rites and ceremonies, forming, in fact, the beginning of public educational institutions.<sup>24</sup> Both in Greece and in Rome careful attention was given to this period, and in the church it has been the time of

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Hall, *Adolescence*, Vol. II, pp. 232 ff.

confirmation. But even in modern society only a slight beginning has been made toward a historical and scientific study of the phenomena of this critical stage. Recently it has been receiving the attention of some of the best leadership of the educational world.

The constant presence of disease, suffering, and death in all stages of human societary development introduces into the social relations another set of irregularly recurring crises which have had no inconsiderable effect upon the development of leadership and institutions. The intense desire for the cure of disease and relief of pain, and the highly problematic nature of these abnormal conditions, have always been strong stimuli to the efforts of certain types of individuals for meeting these crises. Not only is the medical profession a result of these crises, but they have also been strong stimuli to the development of several branches of science.

The very essence of the religious impulses and interests is bound up with the leadership function and its correlates. The religious activity is largely personal, and the relationship of the persons is that of superiority and subordination. On the side of the follower there are faith, reverence, obedience, awe, love, and gratitude, and the desire for help and direction in all the difficulties and crises of life; while on the side of the leader or deity there are idealized all of the leadership qualities, such as wisdom, power, and foresight. The problems relating to this interest also give rise to a distinct occupation or profession, and institutions grow up about the greater religious and political leaders, whom memory tends to deify.

This enumeration of social impulses and interests, while in no way complete, is probably sufficient to illustrate the general relationship of occupational activity, leadership, and institutions to the expression of these forces. Certain impulses and interests are so important to the existence and development of association that they tend to draw about them one or more occupations in which groups of persons find the problems which engage most of their attention throughout life, and who form habits in conformity to the nature of the activity so constantly pursued. These

occupations constitute the principal channels for self-realization, and so they furnish the chief standards for comparing the value of individuals in the promotion of the social process. Those most efficient in meeting the problems and emergencies arising in the expression of the different impulses and interests become the leaders. In a general way it may be said that there are two kinds of leadership in relation to the occupations: (1) That which belongs to the occupations as such. This is most clearly exemplified in what are called the professions; as, for example, in medicine, where the physician is the leader of the whole community with reference to the problematic conditions involved in disease and accident. (2) That which exists within the occupation or profession. Within every occupation there are those who are leaders, either by virtue of superior ability for control of the difficulties involved in the vocation, or because of exceptional devotion of time and energy to the interests which the occupation serves. Specialism may be regarded as a subdivision of this class of leadership. Institutions are the ossification or crystallization, so to speak, of the successful portions of the occupational activity put forth in the expression of the social impulses, and so follow, not precede, the development of personality and leadership.

#### IV. LEADERSHIP AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS FROM THE GENETIC POINT OF VIEW

*Hunting peoples.*—In the investigation that follows, the attempt will be made to give a genetic account of the conditions which stimulate the growth of personality, of the authoritative personage, the specialist, the leader, and of the reflective and reconstructive processes which this leader initiates, guides, or organizes, and their crystallization into institutional life. For this purpose we begin with the hunting type of activity, which was the dominant one in the associate life until comparatively recent times. It is still the chief type of societary activity among the lower animals and the nature peoples, and, in comparison with the period of its duration in the **associational series**, **all the other types**, such as the agricultural, pastoral, manufacturing, and trading, have had but a very brief existence. The effects of

the long-continued dominance of this kind of activity have not been effaced by the later occupations, but are deeply rooted in the psycho-physical organism and in a very true sense form the foundation of the social structure of modern civilization. That the hunting type of activity is instinctive in human beings seems to be fairly well established by the evidence. The impulses to this kind of activity appear, with greater or less intensity, in all individuals of all races, and in some they are very strong, though of course they have been greatly modified by the changed environments and the different experiences of modern civilizations. The ease and avidity with which all classes in modern society turn to this type of activity for their recreation is also evidence of its instinctive character. The fact of its universality and its fundamental importance, both in primitive and in civilized society, makes the study of the phenomena connected with it of the highest value for a scientific comprehension of the social process.

Using the term in a broad sense, it may be said that the hunting type of associate life is based upon a complex of instincts, such as hunting or pursuit, fighting, playing, and gaming. It includes all of the more direct, spontaneous, highly intense, and emotional forms of societary activity, such as are found in the chase, the feud, the duel, the prize-fight, war, and gambling, and in play and the great variety of games and recreative activities, such as golf, tennis, baseball, football, billiards, dramatic performances, and theater-going.<sup>25</sup> It has been rightly pointed out that the element of conflict is very prominent in this kind of activity, but the fact should not be overlooked that the co-operative phase of association is also exceptionally strong here, its distinguishing characteristics being found rather in its intensity, immediacy, and spontaneity; in the comparative directness with which response follows stimulus, and the brief and rapid nature of the reflective processes and the great emotional excitement which accompanies it. There is rapt attention, largely of the spontaneous sort, so that there is less conflict of impulses and ideas and less effort involved than in the more roundabout, reflective types of activity. The problems are such as require very quick decisions

<sup>25</sup> C. Thomas, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, pp. 750 ff.



and response to stimulus. It involves a high degree of the perilous, precarious, and strategical, and demands severe and strained attention. Such activity is, therefore, absorbing and fascinating in the extreme, and is radically different from the longer, more roundabout, highly reflective processes, where considerable time elapses between the stimulus and response, and where attention and effort are prolonged, and the motor phase of the process is not so conspicuous or important. In his study of the gaming instinct, Professor Thomas<sup>26</sup> has shown that modern employments are attractive just in the degree in which they contain the highly problematic and vicissitudinous elements which characterize the hunting type of activity, and that the irksomeness of labor is limited chiefly to those occupations in which these elements are eliminated or greatly reduced, so that the activity is of a routine and monotonous character.

In addition to the more general qualities of the hunting activity as a type, there are a number of more special characteristics belonging to it in the narrower sense—i. e., as the principal method of obtaining food in a group. Where a tribe depends upon the hunting of animals for the larger part of its food, the process assumes a much more serious aspect, and almost all of the characteristics of the type, as mentioned above, are intensified. Catching or killing animals requires the most rapid and accurate movements, strained attention, and complete absorption in the process. Under such extreme tension, though of brief duration, there is a vehement stirring of the emotions. Success is attended with excessive joy, and defeat is followed by deep disappointment and dejection. A high degree of co-operation of the associatants and of co-ordination of all their movements is often absolutely essential for overcoming the superior motor capacities of the animals. It is a life-and-death struggle on both sides and in it man's powers of co-operation and conflict and inventiveness are often taxed to the utmost.

Though for the primitive man hunting is an essential occupation, and one that must be followed with a certain degree of regularity, yet it does not cease to be fascinating, as is evidenced,

<sup>26</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 750 ff.

in part, by the fact that the men reserve that phase of the groupal activity to themselves, and assign the more passive and routine phases to the women, such as collecting vegetable food and small animals, moving the camp, or carrying home the game. Its attractiveness is also further demonstrated by the reluctance with which it is abandoned for other pursuits requiring more constant care and attention, though they may afford a less precarious existence. Nieboer, whose work attests a wide knowledge of hunting peoples, gives the following excellent characterization of this type of associating, in which we may also see the reason for its irresistible charm:

Hunting is never a drudgery, but always a noble and agreeable work. Occupying the whole soul and leaving no room for distracting thought; offering the hunter a definite aim to which he can reach by one mighty effort of strength and skill; uncertain in its results like a battle, and promising the glory of victory over a living creature; elevating the whole person—in a word, intoxicating.<sup>27</sup>

While the hunting peoples as a rule possess a small degree of institutional development, nowhere have we found any evidence, even among the lowest groups, that they lack in skill and interest in the activity upon which their livelihood depends, and, in many cases, the ability manifested is marvelous to those whose occupations have not required such a training. The life of primitive peoples is so often described in merely negative terms that it is well to emphasize the more positive factors in their activity. The key to the situation, not only for primitive groups, but also for more advanced peoples, is given by Spencer and Gillen when, after speaking of the conspicuous ability of the native Australians in such activities as tracking, and in memory of events intimately concerned with their welfare, they say: "Their mental powers are simply developed along lines which are of service to them in their daily life." The illustration of this principle, taken from Australian life, which follows, may be regarded as typical of the discipline of the hunting activity. As a source of leadership, note should also be made of the differences in the ability of the natives as shown in the illustration:

<sup>27</sup> *Slavery as an Industrial System*, p. 193.

Not only does the native know the track of every beast and bird, but after examining any burrow he will at once, from the direction in which the last track runs, tell you whether the animal is at home or not. . . . Whilst they can all follow tracks which would be indistinguishable to the average white man, there is a great difference in their ability to track when the tracks become obscure. The difference is so marked that, while an ordinary good tracker will have difficulty in following them while he is on foot, and so can see them close to, a really good one will unerringly follow them up on horse or camel back. Not only this, but, strange, as it may sound to the average white man whose meals are not dependent upon his ability to track an animal to its burrow or hiding place, the native will recognize the footprint of every individual of his acquaintance.<sup>28</sup>

Speaking in general of the influence of occupations upon the Columbian Indians of the northwest coast of North America, Bancroft says:

West of the Cascade Range the highest position is held by the tribes who in their canoes pursue the whale upon the ocean and in the effort to capture Leviathan become themselves great and daring, as compared with the lowest order who live upon shell-fish and whatever nutritious substances may be cast by the tide upon the beach.<sup>29</sup>

And of the different tribes of the Columbians, the superiority of the inland hunting groups over the fishing tribes of the seashore is generally recognized by the students of the two cultures. The food supply of the coast tribes is probably much more abundant, but, with the exception of the capture of whales, the skill required for securing the food is less than that of the inland tribes. On the coast a sufficient amount of food is obtained with comparatively little effort, and the people become more indolent and sluggish, aside from the fact that there is not as great a degree of physical and mental development from fishing as from hunting activity. The hunting life requires more intelligence, greater energy, and skill, and a higher type of motor activity. These are concrete illustrations of the more abstract principle stated in the introduction to this discussion; i. e., that the different conscious processes occupy a modal relationship to the social process, and are called into being as aids to the more efficient control of the physical and social environment. Mental development,

<sup>28</sup> *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 24, 25.

<sup>29</sup> *Native Tribes of the Pacific Coast*, Vol. I, p. 153.

therefore, as well as the character of the institutional life, depends upon the nature of the activity required in a particular group to meet the conditions of the existence and growth of the group. From these illustrations, too, can be seen the general conditions in which leadership may originate. The superiority of some individuals in the control of the food-process or other interests makes them the leaders, while the nature of the groupal activity may determine the superiority and leadership of a particular group over other groups, or its inferiority and subservience to them.

#### V. EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE PREMATERNAL STAGE OF ASSOCIATION

The general nature of the hunting activity has been touched upon and it now remains to consider some typical hunting groups of different levels of development in order to determine more specifically the nature of the problems and crises of this type of association and therefore the stimuli and the personal qualities which determine leadership, as well as the habits of thought or customs and institutions created by the discipline of this kind of associate life. Both social structures and functions, as we find them in modern civilized society, are the products of long ages of growth. As we have seen, the simplest forms of social structure are found in instinctive activity, and from this may be traced all degrees of development and combination of instinctive and rational activity up to the most highly organized forms of institutional life in which are represented the maximum of social consciousness, of adaptability, and of control of the physical and social environment through purposive adjustment of means to consciously formulated ends. The lower we descend in the associational series, the less do we find of the institutional modes of control and of the control exercised through personality and the organized forms of leadership and authority.

In the associations of the lower animals instinctive activity predominates. In comparison with human beings, they possess a simpler nervous system and a corresponding lack in mental ability, and therefore, possess but a small degree of adaptability to new environmental conditions. With the possible exception of

some of the higher animals, the reasoning processes probably enter only in a slight degree into the adaptive activities of the animal associations, and consequently there is little basis for institutional development. But while there are no institutions among the lower animals, the fact should not be overlooked that they do possess social *structures* in the forms of numerous instinctive associative activities. They have many of the fundamental social impulses which human beings possess, and they should not be excluded from the social realm simply because these social impulses are expressed largely through hereditary mechanisms. While we cannot say that they have property institutions, matrimonial institutions, political institutions, etc., they do acquire property and have matrimonial relations and political activities. The social structures at this stage are the most rigid and unadaptable known to the associational series, and where social ends are reached in such a comparatively automatic and unconscious manner, there is but little opportunity for the development of consciousness of self or for the expression of personality. Leadership at this stage is also predominantly instinctive. There are no definitely organized modes of selecting a leader or a group of leaders, but in certain of the common undertakings, and in particular those which contain some degree of the novel, critical, or dangerous, a stronger or older member of the group will assume the leadership, assisting the group in the expression of its social impulses and directing the adaptive process in so far as the flexibility of the movements at this stage permit of an element of accommodation to problematic situations or emergencies. However, the need of leadership where ends are reached in this instinctive way is not so great as on the higher levels of development, where the reflective processes play a much larger part and where the complexity of social life introduces numerous problematic conditions.

With the transition to human beings, there is a more highly developed nervous system, and a correspondingly greater mental ability for the control of the conditions of the associate life. With the very complex and elaborate processes of memory, imagination, reasoning, and volitional activity, human beings are vastly

more effective than the lower animals in the control they can exert over the environment through associative activity. In man there is a greater variety of innate social impulses than in the lower animals, and, by virtue of his stronger and more elaborate mental powers, there is a far greater plasticity and adaptability in the expression of these impulses. Although the innate impulses remain as the basal forces in the human social process, they are greatly modified by individual and groupal experience, and out of them proceed innumerable acquired interests. But in the social process of human beings the social structures and functions vary greatly in their degrees of development, and a study of the nature and causes of these variations should throw considerable light upon our problem.

The simplest forms of human social structures and functions are probably to be found in what has been called the pre-matriarchal stage of association. It has been so styled from

the fact that ideas of kinship are so feeble that no extensive social filiation is effected through this principle, in consequence of which the group has not reached the tribal stage of organization on the basis of kinship, but remains in the biological relation of male, female, and offspring.<sup>30</sup>

This primitive human stage is exemplified by such groups as the Veddahs, Bushmen, Fuegians, Point Barrow Eskimos, Botucudos, and Tasmanians. The Veddahs live in very small groups, which have but little communication with each other. Their occupations consist chiefly in the chase and in collecting of edible plants and small animals; there is no division of labor except that between the sexes; there is no system of caste or slavery; each group has its headman, whose position depends upon age, energy, and skill, and whose authority is very limited and temporary. Because of their meager food resources, the Bushmen live a comparatively solitary life in small hordes; there is very little of what may be called institutional life, even the family unions being of the most transitory nature; there are no hereditary or elected chiefs, though the temporary leaders are notably superior to their followers in physique; they occasionally join in plundering expeditions under the guidance of a leader; there is no conception

<sup>30</sup> Thomas, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III, p. 762.

of a Supreme Being. The Fuegians live principally on shell-fish, and because of the scarcity of the food supply and their method of obtaining food, they are constantly changing about; they live in very small groups and recognize no chiefs in the usual sense of the word, leadership being temporary and acquired through age and experience; as a rule, the small groups have little relations with each other, with the exception of temporary unions for defense in their desultory wars, which are not under the direction of an organized leadership. Of the Botucudos Keane says:

There is no common bond of union between the different clans, which are grouped in separate communities of from ten to twenty families, occupying no fixed territory except certain hunting grounds which are tacitly recognized by the neighboring tribes; any encroachment on these lands leads to tribal disputes and quarrels, which are usually settled by a sort of duel between the champions of the respective factions, but which end occasionally in a free fight all round; a successful champion often becomes the chief or headman of the community, but he enjoys little personal authority, nor is the office hereditary, so that it is difficult to conceive of a lower state of social organization.<sup>31</sup>

Marriage is temporary, though not promiscuous; they believe in the influence of good and bad spirits, but have formed no idea of a Supreme Being. Among the Tasmanians there were no hereditary chiefs, and leadership depended purely upon personal qualities, such as exceptional skill in the chase or courage in the defense of the hunting territory; the leadership thus acquired was temporary and secured no institutional recognition.<sup>32</sup>

These illustrations may be taken as typical of the pre-matriarchal stage of societary development. They present certain characteristics in common. The food resources are meager; the population of the various groups is small; all of the interactions are of a simple, undifferentiated sort; they have but few contacts with other peoples, and there is no division of labor except that between the sexes; the life is nomadic, and there is but little permanency in their relations; as a rule they are peaceable, what wars they have being of an unorganized character; the two funda-

<sup>31</sup> *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XIII, p. 199.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Bonwick, *Daily Life of the Tasmanians*, p. 81.

mental functions of co-operation and conflict are both comparatively vague and indeterminate in character; there are few intense social stimuli or difficult problems, and consequently but a small demand for strong personalities and highly reflective processes which precede the definite and well-organized social activities which we call institutions; leadership is temporary, sporadic, and unauthoritative, and has not been institutionalized; there is but little direct personal control entering into their associational life; social stimuli are not sufficient in number or intensity to arouse either a high degree of group-consciousness or of consciousness of self; the training is not favorable to the growth of personality; the kind of conditions under which such groups associate are also unfavorable to the growth of any definite and coherent customs and traditions centering about the activities and personality of mythical or real heroes and ancestors. Traditions and customs imply a certain degree of memory and reflective consciousness based upon social relationships having a permanency of three or four generations, at least, and the interactions of these groups are too shifting and indefinite to permit the growth of any considerable body of traditions. In the pre-matriarchal stage there is some private property in movable articles, such as weapons and utensils, but there is no private property in land and no definite tribal boundaries, the communal ownership of the land by the group being only tacitly recognized by neighboring groups. Private property has received no institutional expression at this stage, and institutionalization of the matrimonial, political, educational, and religious relations can scarcely be said to have begun.

Having noted the meager amount of institutional and personal control of associational conditions in the pre-matriarchal stage, we may now take up some more advanced groups to discover, if possible, the relation between the development of personality, authority, and leadership and that of institutions. The Andamanese or "Mincopies," who were usually classed among the most primitive groups before the more careful study of them by E. H. Man, may be regarded as forming a sort of transition between the pre-matriarchal groups and the larger and better-organized matriarchal groups. They present many conditions in



common with the pre-matriarchal groups discussed above, being hunters and fishermen, and living a peaceable and comparatively isolated life. As they have few contacts with foreign peoples, one of the principal groups of stimuli to the development of leadership is absent—i. e., conflict with other peoples. Consequently, whatever leadership there is must be with reference to certain infra-tribal problems, such as arise in connection with the acquisition of a food supply, migrations, the settlement of disputes, the family life, religious activity, etc. But they differ from the former groups in having more abundant food resources. This allows a more settled life, nomadism being confined to one tribe on the shore, and “even among them there are hamlets which are only abandoned temporarily.”<sup>33</sup> The influence of the greater stability in their social relations is manifested by the permanency of the marriage tie, the beginnings of political organization, of the hereditary principle, and of the division of labor. Property in land, however, is communal. Each tribe has a head-chief, who usually resides at a permanent encampment, and has authority over the elders or sub-chiefs. The latter are in authority over each community, consisting of from twenty to fifty individuals.

The power of the chiefs is very limited and is not necessarily hereditary, though in the event of a grown son being left who was qualified for the post, he would, in most instances, be selected to succeed his father in preference to any other individual of equal efficiency. . . . Social status is dependent not merely on the accident of relationship, but on skill in hunting, fishing, etc., and on a reputation for generosity and hospitality. A certain pre-eminence is assigned those who excel as hunters or fishermen, and such are usually found to be chosen as chiefs or headmen of a community. The chiefs and elders are almost invariably superior in every respect to the rest.<sup>34</sup>

It is a significant fact in the development of leadership that the settlement of disputes is at first usually through the intervention of the chief, as in the case of the Andamanese. He thus acts as an inhibitive factor upon the more immediate and irrational process of punishment as represented in the blood-feud, and seems

<sup>33</sup> Man, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XII, p. 108.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

to be the earliest center about which grows up a rational settlement of difficulties through law and the judgeship. Because of the intimate relation of leadership to religion and the development of the concept of personality as related to deities, it is well to note here that the Andamanese have no forms of worship, but that "there is a vague belief in Puluga, an immortal, invisible being."<sup>35</sup> Growth of personality through leadership must precede any clear and well-defined ideas of the personal attributes of a deity. The dawn of the concept of personality among these peoples is reflected in their vague belief in a deity.

#### VI. EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE MATRIARCHAL AND PATRIARCHAL STAGES OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

*Leadership in relation to customs and institutions from the point of view of myths and traditions.*—When society arrives at the maternal or paternal system of organization, there is sufficient stability in social relations to permit of the growth of myths and traditions, and we have another source of information in regard to the evolution of the function of leadership and of institutions. In primitive society, without the use of printing and books, the only source of information on the early life of the group is to be found in the oral traditions and myths. Almost without exception the primitive peoples of the stages of development under consideration ascribe the founding and changing of their customs and institutions to some great leader, usually conceived as a deity or as quasi-divine.

The excellent investigations of Spencer and Gillen have shown that the natives of central Australia have a comparatively rich traditional life, and that their whole past life is bound up with totemic ceremonies,

each of which is concerned with the doings of certain mythical ancestors who are supposed to have lived in the dim past, to which the natives give the name of the Alcheringa.<sup>36</sup>

The exceptional leaders of that period were called *Oknirabata*, which

<sup>35</sup> Keane, *Man, Past and Present*, p. 169.

<sup>36</sup> *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 119.

means a great instructor or teacher, and it is at the present day applied to the wise old men who are learned in tribal customs and teach them to the others. It is a name only given to men who are both old and wise . . . and is regarded as a very high distinction.<sup>87</sup>

To these leaders is ascribed the founding of the various customs and institutions, of the ceremonies which control the food supply, of the complex marriage systems, etc. To them are also accredited various modifications which have been made in these customs. The profound influence which these traditions have upon their life is to be seen in the remarkable continuity in their social relations, extending down through their history. So complete is this that each individual is believed to be the direct reincarnation of an Alcheringa ancestor, or the spirit of some Alcheringa animal. This belief is also an important aid to the establishment of the principle of inheritance, and cases are given where leaders trace the right to their position back to an ancestral leader of the Alcheringa times. Because of the important relation of leadership to the development of personality and the consciousness of self, we may note here that the traditions of the natives assign the same personal content to animals and even plants as to human beings. Of this Spencer and Gillen say :

In the Alcheringa lived ancestors who, in the native mind, are so intimately associated with the animals and plants, the name of which they bear, that an Alcheringa of, say, the kangaroo totem may sometimes be spoken of either as a man-kangaroo or a kangaroo-man. The identity of the individual is often sunk in that of the animal or plant from which he is supposed to have originated.<sup>88</sup>

In describing the social life of some of the tribes of southeastern Australia, Howitt points out that it was believed that the various customs were instituted by the deceased headman, who is now regarded as a deity. He was also feared because it was thought that he would punish all violations of these customs by sickness or death.

The mythology of the Tlinkits centers about the experiences of Jelch, the raven. His sayings are widespread among the

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 187, 394.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

people and form their rules of conduct. The ruling principle in their lives is: "As Jelch lived so must we live."<sup>39</sup>

The civilization myth of the Incas relates that

men were savages dwelling in caves like wild beasts devouring wild roots and fruit and human flesh, covering themselves with leaves and bark or skins of animals. But our father, the Sun, took pity on them, and sent two of his children, Manco Caepac and his sister-wife, Mama Ocello; these rose from the lake of Titicaca, and gave to the uncultured hordes law and government, marriage and moral order, tillage and art and science. Thus was founded the great Peruvian Empire, where in after-ages each Inca and his sister-wife, continuing the mighty race of Manco Ceapac and Mama Ocello, represented in rule and religion not only the first royal ancestors, but the heavenly father and mother of whom we can see these to be personifications, namely, the Sun himself, and his sister-wife, the Moon.<sup>40</sup>

Of the character of the mythology of the American Indians, in general, and as relating to leadership, Brinton says:

The native tribes of this continent had many myths, and among them there was one which was so prominent, and recurred with such strangely similar features in localities widely asunder, that it has for years attracted my attention, and I have been led to present it as it occurs among several nations far apart, both geographically and in point of culture. This myth is that of the national hero, their mythical civilizer and teacher of the tribe, who, at the same time was often identified with the supreme deity and the creator of the world. It is the fundamental myth of a very large number of American tribes and on its recognition and interpretation depends the correct understanding of most of their mythology and religious life. The outlines of this legend are to the effect that in some exceedingly remote time this divinity took an active part in creating the world and fitting it to be the abode of man. At any rate, his interest in its advancement was such that he personally appeared among the ancestors of the nation and taught them the useful arts, gave them the maize or other food plants, initiated them into the mysteries of their religious rites, framed the laws which governed their social relations, and, having thus started them on the road to self-development, he left them, not suffering death, but disappearing in some way from their view. Hence it was nigh universally expected that at some time he would return. As elsewhere the world over, so in America many tribes had to tell of such a personage, some such august character, who taught them what they knew, the tillage of the soil, the properties of plants, the art of picture-writing, the secrets of magic; who founded their institutions and established their religions, who governed them long with glory

<sup>39</sup> Krause, *Die Tlinkit-Indianer*, pp. 253 ff.

<sup>40</sup> Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I, 354.

abroad and peace at home; and finally, did not die, but like Frederick Barbarossa, Charlemagne, King Arthur, and all great heroes, vanished mysteriously, and still lives somewhere, ready at the right moment to "return to his beloved people and lead them to victory and happiness."<sup>41</sup>

In New Britain, *To Kabinana*, a mythical personage, is considered the founder, creator, or inventor of all good and useful things. Fruitful land, well-built houses, fine fish-traps, were all his work or inventions; also all good institutions, customs, and usages are supposed to have been derived from him.<sup>42</sup>

The eponymous hero of the Chinese, Fu Hi, is the reputed founder of the empire. He

invented nets and snares for fishing and hunting, and taught his people how to rear domestic animals. To him also is ascribed the institution of marriage.<sup>43</sup>

In his discussion of *The Aryan Household*, where we reach a more highly developed form of association than hitherto considered, Hearn says:

Wherever there was a clan there was an eponym, or founder whether real or legendary, of that clan.

The eponym was the original house spirit and a deceased ancestor. Among the Aryans,

kinship comprised every social relation, every tie that binds man to life; and with them kinship implied a constant and vivid reference to the founder of their kin, the eponymous hero of their clan, or of their race.<sup>44</sup>

The founder of the ancient city was

the man who accomplished the religious act without which a city could not exist. He established the hearth where the sacred fire was eternally to burn. He it was who, by his prayers and his rites, called the gods, and fixed them forever in the new city. We can understand how much respect would be felt for this holy man. During his life men saw in him the author of a religion and the father of a city; after death he became a common ancestor for all the generations that succeeded him. He was for the city what the first ancestor was for the family—a *Lar familiaris*. His memory was perpetuated like the hearth-fire which he had lighted. Men established a worship for him, and believed him to be a god; and the city adored him

<sup>41</sup> *American Hero Myths*, p. 27.

<sup>42</sup> Danks, "Marriage Customs of the New Britain Group," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, pp. 281, 282.

<sup>43</sup> Keane, *Man: Past and Present*, p. 24.

<sup>44</sup> *The Aryan Household*, p. 143.

as its providence. Sacrifices and festivals were renewed every year over his tomb.<sup>45</sup>

The question now arises as to the value of these myths and traditions, as evidence in relation to the evolution of leadership and institutions. Though it is clear that there is an element of exaggeration in them, and that they are out of proportion to what really happened, still they present a fundamental trait in human nature and association. Their universality is further evidence of the innate character of reverence and of the profound need of leadership. Memory always tends to deify the great leader after his death, and hero-worship and the growth of the mythical element about any exceptional personality are not confined to the more primitive peoples. Says Mr. Lyall:

It does not follow, because a tribe claims its descent from a god, that the divine founder is a personage entirely mythical, as some comparative mythologers do vainly imagine. He is quite as likely to be a real hero deified, for the founder of at least one Rajput state, who is as authentic as any historic personage can be in India, is freely worshiped by his clan to this day.<sup>46</sup>

Moreover, these traditions could never have got into the attention of any people without having some intimate relation to their life. For the most part, they are concerned with the great problems of the group, the chief epochs and turning-points in its history. They center about the great crises in the life of a group, and memory has deified the heroes who carried the group through these difficulties and enabled it to adapt itself to the changed conditions. This evidence, therefore, apparently points to the great personality or leader as the forerunner of institutional life. He is not only the leader of the people during his life, but, if great enough, apotheosis makes him the leader of the group after his death, so that he continues to help or hinder men in the expression of their social impulses, either aiding in the maintenance or sanctioning changes of the customs and institutions of which, in a true sense, he was the founder.

*The native tribes of Australia.*—In the study of the further evolution of leadership and institutions under the maternal and paternal systems of social organization, the Australians afford at

<sup>45</sup> Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, p. 188.

<sup>46</sup> Quoted by Hearn, *loc. cit.*

least three excellent advantages. In the first place, they are typical hunters, making them especially valuable for this investigation which emphasizes the influence of occupations. Secondly, their exceptionally long period of isolation from the influence of foreign peoples removes one of the complicating factors in social development and makes it possible for us to get a clearer view of the other forces which have contributed to the evolution of social organization. In the third place, they have been very carefully studied by the ethnologists, which goes far toward removing one of the primary objections to conclusions drawn from data relating to primitive peoples, namely, the unreliability of the data. While they are a comparatively homogenous people, both in physical and mental characters, the great diversity of the wide extent of territory peopled by them has given rise to the development of important local differences in social organization and in these discrepancies from the common principles upon which their early life was based we may hope to find some of the causal factors in their social evolution.

The basal principle of their social organization is the division of the tribe into two exogamous intermarrying groups, and in the attempt to understand their social life this fact must be kept constantly in mind. Indeed, the fact that this form of organization is characteristic of primitive peoples everywhere at a certain stage of development warrants a comparatively full description of it here, for upon the comprehension of its meaning must depend, to a great extent, our understanding of the evolution of personality and institutions. This principle of social organization has been made the basis of classification of the different Australian tribes by such careful students of their evolution as Messrs. Spencer, Gillen, Fison, and Howitt. On the basis of this principle, Mr. Howitt distinguishes four types of organization, corresponding to the nature of the food conditions of the different parts of the continent. They are: (a) the Barkinji; (b) the Kamilaroi; (c) the Waramunga or Arunta; (d) the abnormal types.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>47</sup> *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 31, 72. Also, for a more recent and complete description of these types of organization, see Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, pp. 88-295.

The Barkinji type of organization is found in the south-central and southwestern portions of the continent. This region is a vast desert country, where, with the exception of a short period during the rainy season, the food supply is very poor. This type of social organization is the simplest in Australia. It includes all those systems which have two primary classes and a group of totems belonging to each, descent being counted through the mother. A man can neither marry a woman in his own class nor in his own totem. There are also further restrictions which tend to prevent marriage of near relatives. A more detailed description of the system cannot be given here, but, for our purpose, its salient features, as exemplified in the Urabunna tribe, which may be taken as typical of this kind of organization, are summarized by Spencer and Gillen, as follows:

(1) a group of men all of whom belong to one moiety of the tribe who are regarded as the *Nupas* or possible husbands of a group of women who belong to the other moiety of the tribe; (2) one or more women specially allotted to one particular man, each standing in the relationship of *Nupa* to the other, but no man having exclusive right to any one woman, only a preferential right; (3) a group of men who stand in the relationship of *Piraungaru* to a group of women selected from amongst those to whom they are *Nupa*. In other words, a group of women of a certain designation are actually the wives of a group of men of another designation.<sup>48</sup>

From the description of this type it will be seen that there exists what Spencer and Gillen have called "a modified form of group marriage," and they state that "the less complex the organization of a tribe, the more clearly do we see evidence of what Messrs. Howitt and Fison have called, in regard to Australian tribes, 'group marriage.'" They add that "individual marriage does not exist either in name or in practice in the Urabunna tribe," and the investigations of this type by Messrs. Fison, Howitt, and Gason tend to corroborate their statement. The opportunity for choice on the part of the individuals most immediately concerned in the marriage relation is slight. It is important to note here that they are "allotted" to each other in marriage, and the initiation and leadership in the allotment is taken by the elder brothers of the women and by the old men of the group. Not only the leader-

<sup>48</sup> *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 64.



ship of the old men, but also that of the more influential and popular men, is manifested in the expression of the marriage relationships.

The number of a man's Piraungaru depends entirely upon the measure of his power and popularity; if he be what is called *urku*, a word which implies much the same as our word "influential," he will have a considerable number; if he be insignificant or unpopular, then he will meet with scanty treatment.<sup>49</sup>

But the emphasis upon the collective phase of association and the limitation of choice and voluntary activity largely to a few of the elders in this kind of organization is not confined to the sexual relations, but extends to food, property, political, religious, and, in fact, all interests. The collective element plays the most prominent part both in securing and in distributing food, property in land is communal, and political and religious control presents but a small degree of the personal as distinguished from the groupal influence and control by unanalyzed custom.

Political leadership in the groups belonging to this kind of organization is secured by purely personal characteristics, such as superior ability as a hunter, orator, wizard, warrior, etc. But the power obtained is very meager, ill-defined, and temporary, and does not extend over the whole tribe, but is limited to the local group, horde, or totem. Rank or position is not transmitted by inheritance. One notable exception to this general rule, in the person of Jalina Piramurana, headman of the Dieri, is very instructive as to the influence of a great personality in modifying custom and building up new institutions. Jalina was a genius in the control of others. Of his ability and authority Mr. Gason says:

He was feared and greatly respected by his own and by the neighboring tribes. Neither his two brothers, both of them inferior to him in bravery and oratorical powers, nor the elder men presumed to interfere with his will or to dictate to the tribe except in minor matters. It was he who decided when and where the ceremonies of circumcision and initiation should take place. His messengers called together people from a circle of a hundred miles to attend the peace festivals, to attend his councils, or in other matters which were considered to affect the welfare of the tribe. I have often been invited to

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

attend his councils, when they proposed to celebrate any grand ceremony. He possessed wonderful powers of oratory, making his listeners believe anything he suggested, and at all times ready to execute his commands. His disposition was not naturally cruel or treacherous, as was that of many of the Dieri, but he was, when not excited, patient and very hospitable. I never saw anything low or mean in him. As a rule, the Dieri, being separated from all but their own relations, speak ill of each other; but I never heard anyone speak of this man but with the greatest respect and reverence. I have often watched him distributing presents to all his personal friends with an evident desire to prevent jealousy. I have seen him put a stop to disputes or fights, even chastising the offenders and not infrequently being himself wounded in so doing. On such an occasion there would be great lamentation, and the person who had inflicted the wound on him would usually be beaten. He was one of the greatest of the *Kunkis* (medicine-men), . . . was the son of the previous headman, . . . and was not only the headman of his totem, but also of the whole local organization. In connection with the question as to the existence of recognized authority among the Australian blacks, the fact is especially valuable that Jalina periodically visited the various hordes of the Dieri, and that they sent to him periodically presents which were acknowledged by him in person or by deputy. Such presents were even sent to him from a distance of three hundred miles by tribes beyond the Dieri boundaries, being passed on from tribe to tribe.<sup>50</sup>

It will be seen from this illustration that the power of personality annuls the principle of succession in the female line, and Jalina succeeds his father who was also an influential leader. Authority is extended to the whole tribe. Contrary also to the general rule of limitation of authority exclusively to the aged, apparently here is a young man employing exceptional power. It is through such personal influence as this that institutional life must have begun. Given the proper conditions, the prerogatives which Jalina exercised would receive permanent recognition by the group, and institutional life, as distinguished from the dominant control of instincts and customs, would begin. It should be noted that Jalina, as well as many other headmen of the Australians, either individually or in connection with the councils, settled disputes, and they were thus the first inhibitive centers acting upon the more direct and unreflective processes of revenge and paving the way for the judgeship, for law and the courts. However, the

<sup>50</sup> Quoted by Howitt, *Journal of Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XX, pp. 65, 66.

councils were not merely inhibitive centers, but were also the earliest social centers of discussion and reflective activity in the expression of the political interests, and so functioned both as inhibiting and as stimulating factors in the social process. The headmen and the councils constitute the two principal forms of political authority in this type of organization as well as throughout Australia. The council is usually found in each group, and is composed of the distinguished elderly men of the group, such as the warriors, orators, medicine-men, wizards, heads of totems and hordes. The headman of the horde or totem presides at the meetings of the council.

The Kamilaroi type of organization occupies a large area northeast of the Barkinji; it is also found in western Australia. This territory is better watered, more fertile, and has a greater food supply for an aboriginal population. Howitt's theory is that the Kamilaroi organization is a development from the Barkinji type. He says:

The Kamilaroi type may be shortly described as one in which a community divides into two primary classes, with four subclasses and with groups of totems corresponding to them. Descent in this type is generally in the female line. There are, however, exceptions which are of sufficient range to form a separate type.<sup>61</sup>

In the tribes belonging to this type there is a stronger tendency toward the individualizing of the marriage relation and of the other societary activities than in the groups belonging to the Barkniji type.

The Waramunga or Arunta type is characteristic of a large number of tribes in the center of the continent. It consists of eight intermarrying classes, with descent in the male line. The growth of individual as opposed to communal relationship is still more noticeable among the tribes of this class. The counting of descent in the male line is an advance toward the individual family and the principle of succession to position and property through inheritance, with the wide influence which these changes have upon the individualizing of all other social relations and the larger institutional expression of the voluntary activity of the individual.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, p. 42.

The tendency toward more permanent forms of leadership, or the institutionalization of authority, is easily traceable in its political aspects. Each local group, however small, has a headman (*Alatunja*), but chieftainship of the whole tribe has not yet been acknowledged as an institution, though cases occasionally occur in which a headman of a numerically important group, or a leader of extraordinary skill as a hunter or fighter, or one possessing exceptional knowledge of the ancient customs and traditions, will acquire considerable authority beyond his own group, or even become the leader of the whole tribe; but such a position passes with the passing of the particular leader. In the local group, however,

the *Alatunja* is not chosen for the position because of his ability; the post is one which, within certain limits, is hereditary, passing from father to son, always providing that the man is of the proper designation; that is, for example, in a Kangaroo group the *Alatunja* must of necessity be a Kangaroo man.<sup>52</sup>

This establishment of the hereditary principle with reference to political leadership is a distinct advance over the groups hitherto considered. But in other respects the advance is not so evident. The authority which the headman exercises is still vague. "He has no definite power over the persons of the individuals who are members of his group." He calls the council of elder men, but the real influence which he has in the council must depend upon his personal ability, and no superior authority is given to his advice or command simply because of his position or age. He has charge of "the sacred storehouse," and also takes the leading part in the *Intichiuma*, or special ceremony for increasing the supply of animal or plant after which the group is named. In directing the ceremony, he must adhere strictly to the customs of his ancestors.

While there are unmistakable evidences of the growth of the subjective individual, and of a more definite form of leadership and the institutional expressions of growth in this type of organization, yet personal and voluntary control is greatly circumscribed by the control of custom. Though there is an advance toward

<sup>52</sup> Spencer and Gillen, *loc. cit.*, pp. 9 ff.

individualized as opposed to collective activities, still it is significant that the terms of relationship are not modified, but remain groupal as in the more primitive, communal types of organization.

The remaining tribes have been included under the designation of "abnormal types." These are or were located chiefly along the eastern coast, between the Great Dividing Range and the sea. This coast region includes the best-watered and most fertile districts of the continent. There is a much more abundant supply of animal and plant food. In most cases descent is counted in the male line, and the development of leadership and institutions is higher than in the other parts of the continent. The increase of authority among these tribes is apparently due to the greater complexity of their societary life under the better conditions. They are more sedentary, and with more coherent and valuable interests to defend are, of necessity, more warlike, making the need of leadership and authority greater than in the other tribes of the continent. In the Gournditch-Mara tribe

the office of headman in the tribe was hereditary. When the headman died, he was succeeded by his son, or failing a son by his next male relative. This was the law of the tribe before any whites came into the country. The headman had the power of proclaiming war, and when he did this, all the men of the tribe were obliged to follow him. He settled all quarrels and disputes in the tribe. When he had heard both sides and had given his decision in a matter, no one ever disputed it. In war all spoils were brought to him, who divided them among his men, after having reserved the best for himself. The men of the tribe were under an obligation to provide him with food, and to make all kinds of presents to him, such as a kangaroo and opossum rugs, stone tomahawks, spears, flint knives, etc.<sup>53</sup>

In the western district of Victoria

every tribe has its chief, who is looked upon in the light of a father, and whose authority is supreme. He consults with the best men of the tribe, but when he announces his decision, they dare not contradict or disobey him. Great respect is paid to the chiefs, and their wives and families. . . . The succession of the chieftom is by inheritance. . . . The eldest son is appointed, unless there is some good reason for setting him aside. If there are no sons, the deceased chief's eldest brother is entitled to succeed him, and the inheritance runs in the line of his family. Failing him, the inheritance devolves upon the other brothers and their families in succession. If the

<sup>53</sup> Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 276.

heir is weakly in body, or mentally unfitted to maintain the position of chief—which requires to be filled by a man of ability and bravery—and if he has a brother who is more eligible in the opinion of the tribe, or who aspires to the dignity, the elder brother must either yield or fight the younger brother in single combat, at the first great meeting, for the supremacy.<sup>54</sup>

The influence of this greater and more definite authority of the earthly leader is reflected in their higher conception of the attributes and functions of the spirits.

From this examination of the four types of class organization in Australia, it may be noted that with increasing complexity or subdivision of the two primary classes there is an increase of individual relationships and personal control, and a decrease in communal relationships. The influence of the class organization and of the elders in marriage is weakened in certain localities by elopements, marriage by exchange, capture, and purchase. Moreover, physical barriers and great diversity of food areas, making possible only small and shifting groups in some localities, and more settled and larger groups in the more favored regions, tend to create local organizations which are antagonistic to the class organizations. The class organization which has just been described shows many dissimilarities in the various regions of the continent, but, on the whole, it may be taken as representing the generic and communal side of their social development, while local organizations may be regarded as representing primarily the particularizing, differentiating, and individualizing forces in their society life. Howitt compares the two organizations as follows:

In the aggregate of the whole community these two sets of divisions are conterminous, but no division of the one set is conterminous with any division of the other. That is to say, the people of any given locality are not all of the same totem, nor are the people of one totem in the community collected in the same locality. . . . This is the general rule. But a few exceptions are known to us, where the local organization has prevailed over the social, the line of descent has changed to that through males, and all the people in a certain locality have come to bear the same totem.<sup>55</sup>

In addition to the exceptions referred to by Howitt, it may be added that this latter movement has been the tendency among

<sup>54</sup> Dawson, *Australian Aborigines*, pp. 5, 6.

<sup>55</sup> *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XIV, p. 142.

the tribes of north-central Australia and along the eastern coast. In the interactions and conflicts between the class organizations and the local organizations are found some of the strongest stimuli toward changes of customs and institutions. The local organization is largely antagonistic to the social or class organization, though, perhaps, unconsciously so. Its tendency is to restrict the influence of the class organization, to bring about descent through males, to individualize the food, property, and marriage relations, to reorganize society on the basis of individual rather than collective principles, and to become the germ of the state.

*[To be concluded]*

## MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN NORTH DAKOTA

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President Roosevelt considered the question of marriage and divorce of so great importance that January 13, 1905, he sent a special message to Congress, and in it, referring to legislation, said: "Intelligent and prudent action in that direction will be greatly promoted by securing reliable and trustworthy statistics upon marriage and divorce. I deem the matter of sufficient general importance to recommend that the director of the Census be authorized to collect and publish statistics pertaining to that subject covering the period from 1886 to the present time."

Indeed, so important a question is the one of which we speak that scarcely a week passes but that some more or less interesting discussion appears in paper or magazine. It seems to be of almost inexhaustible interest, and just now it is undergoing one of its periodic discussions both in America and across the sea. This being admitted, it might seem as if the topic had grown threadbare, and that nothing new or original is left unsaid. But it is the purpose of this paper to investigate a new and unexplored field, and it is hoped that the facts produced will enable the writer to show the exact conditions which have existed and which now exist in North Dakota. These facts should be particularly interesting at this time, since our young state has attracted almost, if not quite, as much attention as a place, on the one hand, where family quarrels could be settled, as, on the other hand, a region of untold wealth and opportunity.

In gathering statistics for this state on this question, an investigation such as the United States government or the state might undertake was out of the question. As Dr. Samuel W. Dike, who is a recognized authority on the subject in this country, said, in a personal letter: "The task of collecting the figures for an entire state for fifteen years would be too much for any one man to do or to pay for doing." Nevertheless, the facts at hand cover thirty-eight out of thirty-nine counties in the state on the



question of marriage licenses; and thirty-four counties on the question of divorce, of which number at least twenty-eight are complete on the points investigated. These reports cover the period of fifteen years which have elapsed since the state was organized.

In order to make a detailed study of vital statistics such as those here presented, it is important to know the population for each year, so as to compare the number of marriages and divorces with the whole number of people. Up to the present time the population in this state has been ascertained only once in ten years, and therefore the population for the intermediate years must be found indirectly. The most simple and obvious method of obtaining the population for any one year is to assume that in each year of the interval the population changed by the same amount—i. e., one-tenth of the change for ten years. This method is not entirely perfect, but it has been used and will be accepted here as being sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this paper. Then let us at the outset reduce the number of marriages to a marriage-rate, examine the tendency in this state, and compare conditions here with similar figures for other countries and other parts of our own country.

As was noted above, the figures received up to date are complete for all but one county, and cover the period since statehood. The report is not complete for 1890, because the law requiring the keeping of records did not go into effect until July 1 of that year, and many counties have incomplete records up to that time. The population of these thirty-eight counties in 1890 was 180,848, and in 1900 it was 314,797—an increase of 74.07 per cent. in ten years. If the increase was regular, the annual increase was 7.407 per cent.; and the population in 1891 by this method would be 194,231. The marriage-rate is a comparison of the number of persons married (not marriages) with the population. In 1891 there were 1,443 marriages or 2,886 persons married, and therefore the marriage-rate for that year was 14.85. From that time to the present the increase is by no means regular, prosperous years and hard times having considerable influence, as will be pointed out later. But, nevertheless, there seems to be an increase in the average rate, for in 1900, with the population 314,797 and

4.884 persons married, the rate was 15.51—an increase of 4.44 per cent. over 1891. By 1903 (using the same basis) the population would be 384,745, and there were 6,890 persons married; therefore the marriage rate was 17.9, which is an increase of 20.54 per cent. over 1891. If an increase of 10 per cent. instead of 7.407 per cent. in the population were allowed during the last three years, the marriage rate would still be 17. For the years 1901-2-3 (1904 falling off as explained latter) we find the average rate to be 17.91.

The above facts point out the truth of the statement of Dr. Carroll D. Wright in his *Practical Sociology* (1901): "In the United States there is a widespread belief that marriages are relatively less frequent than they used to be and less numerous than in other countries. The unyielding statistics show that impression to be unfounded." But Dr. Mayo-Smith (1902) says: "Since 1871-80 there has been a tendency to a decline in most of the countries of Europe, with some recovery since 1890." And Dr. Howard, whose very valuable work, *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, has just appeared, says: "While the marriage-rate per capita of population is steadily descending, the divorce-rate is on the average rising." He does not refer to the recovery since 1890. The entire statement may be drawn from good evidence, but cannot be positively made as of universal application, because here in North Dakota at least we find the very opposite to be true. And so the best authorities are divided on the general rule. I think we may safely say that for North Dakota the marriage-rate is gradually increasing.

Comparing these figures with similar reports from other countries and other parts of our own country, we have the following:

North Dakota.....	1891	14.85	1900	15.51	1901-3	17.91
England and Wales.....	1871-90	14.70	1893	14.70		
Holland.....	" "	15.10	"	14.60		
German Empire.....	" "	16.40	"	15.80		
Vermont.....	1867	17.80	1886	15.60		
Massachusetts.....	"	21.60	"	18.00		
District of Columbia.....	"	33.30	"	20.70		
Ohio.....	"	23.80	"	16.40		
Illinois.....	"	23.60	"	17.70		

Variations such as are seen in the above sets of figures must be accounted for in each instance by natural causes, such as climate, seasons, geographical position, race, and social surroundings.

The more intricate the industrial and commercial life becomes, the more difficult it is to compare any phenomenon, such as marriage, with any one factor (such as the price of corn, as was found in Germany during certain periods). But here in North Dakota, where agricultural and allied industries are practically the only sources of wealth, the relations are more easily traced. The reports for 1890 are incomplete, as noted above. In 1891 there was considerable of a rise, and the same was true of 1892. And I have it from the very best of authority that North Dakota was exceptionally prosperous during those two years. The year 1893 saw hard times throughout the country, and that it affected this state is clearly shown by the table given below. The decrease continued the next year, and it was not until 1897 that the report of 1892 was exceeded or even reached, although the recovery was gradual (as was the recovery from hard times). The years 1897-98 were not a period of hard times, and so the break in the upward movement cannot be explained in that way. But it must be remembered that the Spanish-American War broke out at that time, and North Dakota sent her share of the troops (one regiment) to the Philippine Islands. Many of these were young men, as near the average marriageable age as could be found, and a slight falling-off should be expected. The increase is then more or less gradual, varying with economic conditions. In 1902-3 it is very rapid, but 1904, although fairly prosperous and the population of the state rapidly increasing, there was a noticeable falling-off. There has been a considerable emigration of our younger people to Canada on account of the free lands offered, and the increase in our own population is the result of the immigration of large families from other states, or of young men and women who return to their former homes to get married. Then, too, 1904 was leap-year; some men would fail to declare their intentions; only a very few women would take advantage of this legendary opportunity; and probably many would even refuse to

have the ceremony performed, lest it might appear that they had taken advantage of the opportunity referred to.

From a consideration of these facts and a study of the table below we may conclude that marriage is a fairly sensitive barometer of the economic conditions of a state or country. But our statistics are not complete enough to be nearly a perfect gauge. We are told that widowers and bachelors marry under different conditions—widowers being less affected by hard times; but from the records in this state it cannot be told whether the groom has been married before or not, nor any fact about him but his age. Not even nationality or religion is given, although these facts are very important in making any complete study of this phase of sociology.

The following table shows the number of marriages for each year from 1890 to 1904:

1890.....	1,070	1898.....	1,890
1891.....	1,440	1899.....	2,260
1892.....	1,790	1900.....	2,440
1893.....	1,690	1901.....	2,460
1894.....	1,650	1902.....	3,020
1895.....	1,680	1903.....	3,460
1896.....	1,770	1904.....	3,250
1897.....	1,920		

In making a study of births it is found that the tendency is to concentrate about certain months. The same is true of marriages. But that fact cannot be cited to prove the contention that the old mating season is still traceable in our present system, as some claim. Economic and social conditions seem to control, as will be pointed out. From the accompanying table it will be seen that of the 31,779 cases investigated, one-sixth were celebrated in one month—that of November. If the average number of marriages per month were represented by 100 per cent., in November we find 199.2 per cent., or nearly twice the average; and in May only 64.8 per cent., or less than one-third of November—a shorter month. The following table shows the number of marriages by months covering a period of fifteen years for thirty-eight counties:

January .....	2,270	July.....	2,290
February.....	1,750	August .....	1,820
March.....	2,120	September. ....	1,810
April.....	2,060	October .....	3,210
May .....	1,690	November.....	5,190
June .....	2,830	December.....	4,210

Using 100 as the average number of marriages per month, the following figures represent conditions in North Dakota from 1890 to 1904:

Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
87	68	81	80	65	109	88	70	69	123	199	161

Using the same basis, the following represents conditions in Germany in the period 1872-85:

Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
97	118	58	115	124	91	84	68	92	128	153	76

A comparison of these two sets of figures shows February in North Dakota not much more than half that of Germany; March is about 25 per cent. more; April and May only about half; June, more; etc., through the list.

The above being true, it is evident that very different explanations must be found to cover North Dakota conditions. We are told that in Germany "the influence of religious and social causes is very plain." In North Dakota economic conditions must be substituted. Being an agricultural state, its prosperity depends on getting in and harvesting a good crop. During these two seasons, then, all attention is concentrated on this one enterprise. The period for sowing grain is April and May, and the low number of marriages during this period will be seen from the above tables. June is more a month of respite, and if the crops are maturing and prospects good, a few extra marriages will be registered. During July the hay crop is cut, matured, and hauled in for winter months, and there is a corresponding falling-off of marriages. Most of those celebrated are near the first of the month

—preferably the fourth. During August and September most people are engaged in harvesting and threshing; and then, if the crops have been good and the return has been large, comes the period of most marriages. A great many ceremonies are performed during the latter part of October; but November is the month most patronized; December following as a close second, as shown above. The falling-off is then gradual, excepting a slight increase just before seeding time.

Some may claim that what has been said may apply to country districts, but that the cities should be examined separately, their population not being engaged in farming. As a matter of fact, the prosperity of our towns and cities depends so much on the conditions of the surrounding country, which is entirely agricultural, that little difference could be expected. And a slight difference is noticeable especially in the three valley counties—Cass, Traill, and Grand Forks—each of which has a considerable urban population. Thus there are 6 per cent. more June weddings than the average. That the “problems of marriage and the family can be solved only by grasping their relation to the economic conditions” is illustrated to some extent by the above facts.

The question as to what is the best age for men and women to marry is by no means settled, although there is no lack of expert testimony on the subject. It is the purpose of this paper to present some facts from North Dakota which must be taken to represent the opinion of the people from the district examined. First let us consider the figures for 1890. During that year the law provided that males sixteen years of age or over and females thirteen or over could marry, but making parental consent necessary for males under twenty-one years of age and females under eighteen. Out of 235 cases investigated (that being the total number for one year in Grand Forks County), only two males were under twenty-one (both twenty years) and fourteen females under eighteen (one at fifteen, five at sixteen, and eight at seventeen). Looking at the other extreme, we find fifteen grooms and four brides over forty years of age. Eliminating these extremes in order to get as nearly as possible at the fair average age, we find that of grooms to be 26.8 years and that of brides to be 22.68

years. Thus the grooms are 4.12 years older on an average than the brides.

After a lapse of fifteen years the same number of marriages were examined. Marriage is not now allowed under eighteen and sixteen for males and females, respectively, the ages of parental consent remaining the same. The average age at which men married in 1904 upon the above basis was 28.09 years, and for women it was 23.49. Thus the difference in the ages of the contracting parties is 4.6 years, and we find that men now delay marriage 1.29 years and women 0.81 years.

Comparing these figures with the latest at hand from other places we have :

	Grooms	Brides
North Dakota, 1890.....	26.80	22.68
North Dakota, 1904.....	28.69	23.49
Massachusetts, 1871.....	26.30	23.50
Massachusetts, 1890.....	27.20	24.30
England, 1885.....	28.37	26.08
Prussia, 1885.....	29.56	26.52
Norway, 1885.....	30.66	27.83

From these facts there seems no doubt that the average age is advancing. Indeed, the general tendency is to defer marriage. And, from watching concrete cases and from general observation, I believe this fact is especially true among the more highly educated. In an agricultural state, such as this, where land can be had for the asking and there is little difficulty in getting established, it would be no more than natural to find early marriage. Indeed, in the cases studied 25 per cent. of the brides were married before they were twenty years old. In England less than one-half of that percentage is found, and in New York City during 1891-92 there were 18.2 per cent. It has already been pointed out how economic conditions influence the marriage-rate and the time of year of marrying; and the same is no doubt true as to the age of the contracting parties.

The number of marriages, and whether the parties be male or female, is about all that can be ascertained from the records. Whether the groom is a bachelor, a widower, or a divorced person

cannot be found. The same is true as to the bride, unless perchance she sign her name "Mrs.," and then whether she is a widow or divorcee is not known. Out of some 540 cases examined, only eighteen were so signed—i. e., only  $3\frac{1}{3}$  per cent. If normal conditions existed here, there should be from 6 to 10 per cent. of brides who are widows, and probably as many divorcees. An attempt was made to get some data on this point by leaving blank forms to be filled out by asking these additional questions, but the returns have been so incomplete and scattered as not to be of any certain value in arriving at a conclusion. As to whether the contracting parties are of the same religion, race, or nationality, nothing can be learned from the records except from a study of the names, which is far too uncertain. No facts are available to show whether the parties are native- or foreign-born, literate or illiterate. That there is need for much more complete and better statistics all students of sociology are agreed.

#### DIVORCES

Before considering the statistics of divorce we may profitably examine some of the divorce legislation of North Dakota. During territorial days the laws required that the plaintiff should be a resident in good faith for ninety days next preceding the institution of the action for divorce. These laws were still in force when the state was organized in 1889, and remained the law for some time. Some idea of the condition of affairs during the early days will be got from the following quotations taken from *The Early Empire Builders of the Great West*, by Moses K. Armstrong (a pioneer congressman) :

Divorce bills are all the rage at present. One of these bills came up in the council last Monday, and was read a first, second, and third time, and passed in ten minutes. It is believed that the council is composed entirely of disunionists. . . . Some rich letters are read in connection with these divorce bills—in one of which, read today [April 30, 1862], the wife calls her husband "no better than a wooden man."

On January 6, 1863, he says :

To see the divorce bills presented, it would seem as if half the women this side of Hades were tired of their husbands and wished to marry the Dakota legislature. One of these precious creatures sets forth in her petition



that her husband is given to "habitual drunkenness;" another, to "habitual sleeping and snoring;" while a third avers the want of "natural affinity," and the fourth one states that her husband

"Hast learned to love another,  
And her heart is lonely now."

And again, on page 97, he says:

It is amusing to observe the long and anxious faces of married men, listening to the reading of the morning journal of the house, to see if they have not been divorced the previous day.

From such statements as this it will be seen that the place had already established a reputation. None of the first sessions of the state legislature touched on the question of dissolution of marriage. The sessions of 1893, 1895, and 1897 also passed without altering the then existing laws in any way. But during this period our state was a veritable Garden of Eden for whoever desired speedy and easy separation. In no way could North Dakota have got at once more extensive and more undesirable advertising. The glad news spread far and wide that whosoever would might come here, be received in open court, and be sent away rejoicing with a certificate of divorce. No get-rich-quick concern could have been better patronized, or have created more havoc, than this opportunity which we offered to break up families and destroy homes. It was not until 1899, when in some counties the number of divorce actions equaled or actually surpassed the number of marriages, that our legislators answered the demands of all fair-minded people with a provision which resulted in immediate and far-reaching importance and improvement. Up to this time the rapidity, secrecy, and cheapness with which a divorce could be secured by non-residents led to the flooding of the courts of the state in a few counties (four at least) with cases, mostly from eastern states, as the records show.

The session of 1899 began early in January. The first bill introduced in the senate was one which amended section 2755 of the *Revised Codes* by requiring that the plaintiff must have been a bona-fide resident of the state for twelve months (one year) next preceding the commencement of an action before a divorce could be granted; and also that he must be a citizen of the United

States or have declared his intentions of becoming such. By February 3 the bill had passed both branches of the legislature and had been signed by the governor. A later bill provided that the above act should "not apply to any action for divorce in which the complaint shall have been filed in the office of the district court prior to the first day of July, 1899," at which time all acts were to go into effect unless special provision was made. This last act helps to account for the large number of divorces granted in 1899 and even in 1900, the court calendars being filled so full that it took some time to clear them.

At the same session an amendment to the then existing laws made adultery, extreme cruelty, wilful neglect, wilful desertion, habitual drunkenness, convictions for felony, and incurable insanity the grounds for divorce. The latter cause must have existed for two years, and desertion, neglect, and intemperance one year, to be a good cause. The provisions concerning alimony were also amended.

In 1901 it was decreed that only death and a competent court are to be recognized agents to dissolve marriage. Another provision was that no party divorced may marry again within three months after the decree was granted. It was believed that this provision would deter at least a few from rushing into a separation in order to remarry. A study of the facts does not tend to show that much was accomplished, since a person may go to any county where he is not known, and easily obtain a marriage license without disturbing his conscience much, owing to the willingness of the officials not to press any question home which is not suggested. I have found the names of women who were widowed or divorced signed without the "Mrs.," thus easily avoiding the question as to whether they were divorced or not and how long, and at the same time apparently excusing the official from asking this highly repugnant question, as one of them confided to me.

The provision that the applicant must be a citizen of the United States was aimed at Canadians, who could easily cross the borders to escape the very rigid requirements in their own country. It was also expected that a large number of foreigners would be shut out—i. e., those who were rapidly coming to this state to get

free land. Insanity has not been a cause for divorce since 1901, when that provision was repealed.

I have received reports of various kinds from thirty-four out of the thirty-nine counties in the state. Of these only 26 are complete, 2 others being almost complete. The direction in which divorce is tending is best shown by a study of the figures received. First twenty-two representative counties, influenced very little by migration for divorce, have been selected to show what may be called the general tendency. After that the more abnormal districts will be examined.

A study of the accompanying figures will show that marriage and divorce have been tending along the same direction. The same general causes must be assigned for both phenomena. The prosperous times of 1891-92 are there, and also the hard times just following. Then comes the more or less gradual increase. The falling-off for last year is no doubt largely due to the fact that many cases were not brought to trial and are still on the calendar.

NUMBER OF DIVORCES GRANTED IN TWENTY-TWO RURAL COUNTIES.

1890.....	27	1898.....	71
1891.....	27	1899.....	67
1892.....	50	1900.....	72
1893.....	39	1901.....	59
1894.....	38	1902.....	68
1895.....	43	1903.....	92
1896.....	59	1904.....	67
1897.....	75		

The following table will give a better idea of the divorce movement, since it gives the rate of marriage to divorce in the twenty-two counties referred to. The marriage statistics for 1890 are not complete.

	Divorces	Marriages	Ratio
1891 .....	27	640	1 : 23.70
1892 .....	50	883	1 : 17.06
1893 .....	39	853	1 : 21.87
1894 .....	38	846	1 : 22.26

The above gives the best account of conditions during the divorce era; let us now see what the ratio has been since the new law passed:

	Divorces	Marriages	Ratio
1901 .....	59	1,189	1 : 20.15
1902 .....	68	1,442	1 : 21.21
1903 .....	92	1,501	1 : 16.31
1904 .....	67	1,376	1 : 20.53

From a comparison of the above two sets of figures it appears that in rural districts little affected by outside conditions the divorce movement is quite steady. Some idea of the conditions in other places will be got by a study of the following figures:

	Ratio
Vermont, 1902.....	1 : 10.0
Massachusetts, 1902.....	1 : 16.0
Rhode Island, 1902.....	1 : 8.4
Ohio, 1902.....	1 : 8.8
Michigan, 1900.....	1 : 11.0
Indiana, 1902.....	1 : 7.6

The above-named states prepare annual detailed reports of wide general interest and are widely quoted. A comparison of the conditions in these states with those in our own would show that the reputation gained by our young state was not deserved. But it was pointed out that only twenty-two rural counties of North Dakota were presented above, and these were little affected by those who migrated for the purpose of securing a divorce. Let us now examine some of the abnormal districts. We find four counties especially which show startling conditions existing; many others being more or less affected.

Cass County, containing Fargo, being the most populous in the state and nearest and most accessible to the outside world, will be taken up first. Conditions such as those which we find for Fargo are enough to give a city a reputation of which the worst should be ashamed. It is not my intention to attack the character of that city, but I believe that, by pointing out the facts and citing

concrete examples of what actually existed in our midst, the same will not be soon repeated.

Dr. Howard thinks that the statistics from some of the western states are "startling." But the worst he is able to find is Indiana for one year—1900—when the ratio was 1 to 5.7, and in the county of Marion, containing Indianapolis, it was 1 to 3.8. Compared with this, Cass County was certainly a "Mecca" for seekers after divorce. During the period since the state was organized to the beginning of the present year there have been 1,108 applications for divorce and 3,622 applications for marriage licenses; in other words, a ratio of 1 to 3.26. Of this number, 83.57 per cent. were granted. But it was not until 1895 that conditions became the worst. It is true that there was considerable migration for the purpose of securing a divorce before that date. Armstrong, whom I quoted above, showed the beginning of the movement; and in 1889-91 James Realf wrote articles for a magazine which told of the movement and which no doubt helped to bring on the notoriety which was fast being gained. By 1895 the ratio in Cass County was found to be 1 to 2.76—a condition worse than the worst which Dr. Howard, Dr. C. D. Wright, Dr. Mayo-Smith, or any other has yet pointed out. But that was only a beginning, for in 1896 the ratio was 1 to 1.91; in 1897 it was 1 to 1.89; in 1898 it had got 1 to 1.71—the worst up to that time. In July of the next year the new law went into effect and a decrease was sure to result. But the courts were rushed so full of actions that 1899 saw the ratio still up to 1 to 2.36; in 1900 it was still 1 to 2.69. By this time the courts were practically cleared and the improvement was rapid. Last year the ratio was 1 to 18.39, and the average for the last three years has been 1 to 14.

According to Professor Willcox, *A Study in Vital Statistics*, "the number of persons divorced (not the number of divorces) to every 100,000 of the population for Japan in 1886 was 608.45." This he finds to be the most extreme case on record, and in 1898 the figures for Cass County would be 1158.98—nearly twice the rate found in Japan. From the official digest of statistics of the Japanese empire, May, 1888, we find the following facts:

	Marriages	Divorces	Ratio
1884 .....	287,842	109,905	1 : 2.62
1885 .....	259,497	113,565	1 : 2.28
1886 .....	315,311	117,964	1 : 2.67

Thus we find that in Fargo during this period there were almost twice as many divorces on the average than even in Japan—the worst yet pointed out in the civilized world.

But Fargo was not in a class of her own. Other counties led even Fargo in benefiting from this questionable advertising. Morton County, containing Mandan, showed even worse conditions. In 1897 the rate was 1 to 1.70; in 1898 it was 1 to 1.15. Then come the improved conditions. The year 1899 saw it still 1 to 1.21, but the average for the last three years has been 1 to 20.3. Bad as the conditions pointed out were, the climax is not reached until we examine the statistics from our state capital. Away back there in the wilderness, where very few people lived and which was little frequented except by legislators, a condition sufficiently startling to suit the most exacting was to be found. Running backward from 1904, we find the following:

	Ratio
1904 .....	1 : 11.00
1903 .....	1 : 9.88
1902 .....	1 : 6.77
1901 .....	1 : 5.87
1900 .....	1 : 2.30
1899 .....	1 : 1.11

The exact ratio for 1898 and earlier cannot be positively stated. But that the conditions were "startling" will be pointed out. In 1898 there were ten more divorces granted than in 1899, when the ratio was 1 to 1.11, and the number of marriages would naturally be considerably less (the exact number could not be found out). But if we accept the percentage of increase in the number of marriages for those two years which holds good for other parts of the state, to apply to this county, then the ratio of divorce to marriage was 1 to 0.765; in other words, for every 76 weddings there would be 100 divorces granted. But enough has

been said on this score. The conditions were certainly deplorable, and were rapidly getting worse until the action taken by the legislature in 1899.

The question should here be considered: What effect does legislation have on divorce? Without hesitation I should answer that in any one state legislation may create whatever degree of good or evil is desired. Commissioner Wright believes that "it is quite apparent that the lines of statistics are curved in accordance with laws enacted just previous to the curve." But Professor Willcox criticizes that statement very severely, and Dr. Howard says that, in general, the influence is "slight, temporary, or questionable." Notwithstanding the above criticisms, that Dr. Wright's statement is very largely true is shown in this case by the figures presented above. It is not denied that the "difference in the divorce-rate existing among the states cannot very largely be accounted for by the difference in the number of grounds of petition sanctioned by the respective states." As to that phase of the question there seems to be no doubt but that "the true conclusion is that limiting the causes increases the number of divorces in those which remain, but without materially affecting the total number." But that fact does not interfere with the truth of the other statement.

The principal way in which our laws have attracted divorce colonies has been the short time of residence required and the serving of notice on the defendant to the action by publication. Dr. Wright says concerning migration for divorce: "The truth of the matter seems to be that the residence of a few notorious persons in states having lax divorce laws makes a greater impression on the public mind than is warranted by the facts." And after a study of Dr. Wright's various facts and statements, both Dr. Howard and Professor Willcox agree that "it seems highly probable that the number of such persons must be placed at considerably less than 10 per cent. of the whole number of persons divorced in the United States." And Dr. Samuel W. Dike remarks, in a personal letter, that "migration for divorce must be much smaller than many think." There is no intention to deny these as general statements, but there are very marked excep-

tions which must tend to bring the average up. Certainly in North Dakota there have been more than "a few notorious persons," for in five years in Fargo alone there were 596 divorces and only 1,230 marriages. Now the average divorce rate for the state at large, where migration affects it very little, is about 1 to 20. At that ratio there should have been only 61.5 divorces granted. This is only about 10 per cent. of the number which was granted, so that, in place of only 10 per cent. migrating for divorce, there were only 10 per cent. who were residents and 90 per cent. were immigrants.

One other point must be considered here: What percentage of the applications for divorce are granted? On this point Dr. Howard says (Vol. III, p. 207): "To some extent the evil of lax administration of the divorce laws is exaggerated by public opinion. In the main the courts are careful and conscientious in the trial of suits." According to the report of Commissioner Wright, in seventy counties scattered over twelve states but 67.8 per cent. of the petitions for divorce were granted. From this fact it is inferred that the "judges exercise a reasonable care before issuing a decree." He says also that for the counties investigated "it is certain that about 30 per cent. of the petitions have been denied. The number of cases involved is sufficiently different to lead one to the conclusion that the same state of affairs exists throughout the country, and that our courts, instead of being careless in the matter of granting divorces, weigh well the causes alleged, and do not grant decrees unless the allegations of the libellants are fairly sustained." Thus, 67.8 per cent. is the average number of actions which result in divorce on the basis referred to above. A further study shows that in Michigan in 1900 "about two-thirds of the applications were granted." If these facts are representative—and I think they must be accepted as illustrating the general results of court trials—then our state is again abnormal; for an investigation shows that of 2,637 applications 2,201 were granted. Thus for a long period there were 83.46 per cent. of the actions successful. And there does not seem to be any change for the better in this phase of the question. During 1900, 1901, 1902, and 1903, for twenty-five counties there were 636 applications



and 556 decrees granted; i. e., 87.4 per cent. of all the actions were successful. It may not be that our courts are careless in this matter, but the figures show that 20 per cent. more actions have been granted during the last four years than the average quoted.

The facts being in, something must needs be said in conclusion. It will be remembered that the ratio now obtaining in this state is about 1 divorce to 20 marriages. This seems to be far ahead of most of the other states from which reports could be secured, but there is still a chance for improvement. All kinds of cures have been suggested; but it is not my purpose here to cite the views of all who have recommended some more or less desirable change. Suffice it to say that I believe the change must come about gradually, not suddenly—evolution, not revolution. The movement to stop divorce can best be made successful by a movement to make marriage more difficult and more impressive. And, as someone has said: "Let there be unity before union." Hasty and careless marriages are the ones most apt to turn out unhappily and to seek relief in divorce courts. Indeed, considering the qualifications and intemperate zeal and suddenness with which many people enter the state of matrimony, the wonder is not that there are so many dissatisfied, positively wretched wives and husbands, but that there are not many more. If young people knew that there was little or no chance for ever becoming legally separated, there would be more careful consideration. A little more foresight accompanying a look into the past, and actually getting acquainted, would almost insure against later grief.

To restrict marriage too much, or to forbid remarriage, would be against public policy without a doubt; for the proper policy for man to pursue is to marry, lest the family be annihilated and the human race commit suicide. There is, however, one step which could, and I believe should, be taken at once to protect the home, and which would decrease the divorce movement. First of all, make it necessary that the defendant have actual notice of the proceedings and put in a defense, having the right to call upon the state's attorney to make the plaintiff show good and sufficient cause why the divorce should be granted. And if there is good ground for separation, there is also a good ground for criminal

prosecution by the state. Thus, 20.59 per cent. of all divorces are for adultery. If these twenty out of every hundred were quickly made to suffer (besides being divorced—a thing for which they have probably been working), there would surely be an improvement and a decrease in crime as well. Another 15.7 per cent. are granted for cruelty. In Canada those convicted of cruelty are introduced to the whipping-post. Desertion adds 38.54 per cent.; drunkenness, 4.2 per cent.; and neglect to provide, 2.4 per cent. If the party who is guilty were punished instead of getting what he is often working for—a divorce—I believe this would be a movement in the right direction.

There are many other collateral questions involved which cannot be touched upon here, but as a general statement I believe that a movement which would at once punish the guilty party and make marriage more the result of careful consideration would result in more real benefit to all concerned, and have less objections than any other policy which could be pursued.

# THE VALUE OF THE STUDY OF COLONIES FOR SOCIOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

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The student who would understand the framework of society is led from the outset to the contemplation of its simplest forms. Inasmuch as, by the nature of the case, he is debarred from such extended and controlled experiment as that of the physicist or chemist, he is obliged to scrutinize with the more jealous care such series of phenomena as are presented in least complex form by nature itself. Hence we find the work of a Spencer or Tylor concerning itself primarily with societies which lead relatively the simplest existence—i. e., societies of so-called “natives.”

Study of such societies gives us our only starting-points for the scientific demonstration of the evolution of human institutions. It is but seldom, however, that we get, in the case of any single human group, a perspective of societal evolution through several stages. It is one of the reproaches cast up against the sociologist that he pieces in such data from widely segregated human societies as best subserve his purposes of argument. This is too often true. But it is yet not impossible to offer to those who object to this process some actual proof of an unbroken evolution. This may be done historically, for instance, by tracing the evolution of an ancient people into its modern after-type. Here, of course, one has to meet the old criticism or cavil on the score of non-reliability of evidence and non-continuity of race. But further historical evidence may be accumulated through the study of groups detached from an older civilization and subjected to a graduated series of life-conditions, ranging from the primitive to the cultured—i. e., through the studies of colonies and colonial or frontier society.

The world has come to respect Haeckel's biogenetic law whereby physical man betrays his amphibian and other ancestry;

<sup>1</sup> A paper prepared for the Colonial Section of the Social Science Division of the Congress of Arts and Science at the St. Louis Exposition of 1904.

and to scoff less confidently even at Spencer's contention regarding the progress of the human child through the types of the intellectual past of his race. It is clear enough, if embryology, geology, and paleontology tell us any truth, that the former progression must have taken place; and it must be a matter of universal scientific experience that the latter succession of forms is all but as inevitable as the former. Such series are the necessary expressions of the development of the organism (growth) and of environmental influences.

It is not intended here to champion the often fancifully expressed analogy of child and mother as applied to colony and metropolis; nor to assert further and more rashly that the child-society obeys some sublimated biogenetic law by the necessities of its organism and ancestry. The biological analogy is interesting and suggestive; it possesses great pedagogic value—but it explains nothing. What the sociologist may note with safety is that in the colonial or frontier society there occurs an elimination of many artificial or cultural conditions of life prevalent in the metropolis, and that this results in an approach, more or less close, to conditions of existence characteristic of "savage" societies. What more natural than that men should adapt themselves, and so revert, one might say, to the less developed societal forms of their remote ancestors? With the gradual re-establishment of the less rude environmental conditions of the parent society, they would then pass through many phases once traversed by that society, only at an accelerated pace. That is, we should look, in their history, to find a rapid and, though imperfect, fairly complete evolution of social forms.

This expectation, here placed in *a priori* form, is really the conclusion of scientific *a posteriori* induction. A few selected facts will suffice to indicate the line of investigation or thought whence, with reserve and in safe terms, yet clearly enough for the purpose, the general conclusion may be drawn.

Take, for example, the New England colonies—for it is necessary, in order to satisfy our hypothesis regarding the identity of race of a considerable body of settlers, to take some temperate or settlement colony. The industrial organization was in many

respects rudimentary, many of the arts being plainly modeled upon those of the aborigines themselves as being thus best adapted to the new and rude environment; the media of exchange and standards of value were not essentially different from those in vogue in Fiji, and represented the best and most expedient system under the circumstances; war was without amenities; in short, the struggle for existence was crude and primitive. And the domestic system reflected these conditions in unmistakable form: the wife was an economic partner; children were, as economic assets rather than as additional burdens, greatly desired and plentifully begotten. There is no tale of "race-suicide" in a frontier society. Amusements were rude; even religion was less ethereal, and partook of an expedient practicality and rude rigidity, not to mention rank superstition. Law was in its infancy; and morals reflected a less evolved standard.

Brief reflection upon these considerations, and others suggested by them, convince one as to the affiliation between such a frontier society and what we call a "lower" or undeveloped society. However cultured and refined men had been in the old home, they (and their offspring) could not withdraw themselves from the influences that demanded either adaptation, or suffering and death; and they conformed perforce to a simpler type.

It is not long, as the progress of the world goes, since this type existed in New England. But the descendants of the settlers are now, and have for some time, been upon a level, materially and for the most part intellectually, with their distantly removed cousins in the old home. That is, in a few decades the former have passed through the intervening stages and have almost, if not quite, "caught up." Here is an evolution in very truth, albeit a speedy one, whose stages are at times blurred and all but over-leaped. And yet, if the observer considers in candor the history of the colonists, he will see it to be, what all evolution is, a series of successive and often involuntary adaptations to a modified environment.

The same story, in somewhat changed terms, may be read in the history of the colonies in Australia, New Zealand, the Cape, Argentina—that is, wherever the European races have been able

to live, breed freely, and found homes. Here is, in any case, a strong side-light for the student of human society. But if the colonists return, upon occasion of the impact of ruder environmental conditions, thus automatically to relatively the same status as present-day primitive peoples (which was, as we happen to know, that of their own forefathers), the inference is fortified that where no such parallelism is demonstrable, the status of the present-day primitive peoples must represent approximately that of the "progonoi" of present-day civilized races. The more intimate the study of frontier societies, the clearer one becomes in his own mind of the validity of the sociological evidence drawn from primitive societies and their life. For what he has before believed from general considerations, the sociologist now has a certain practical demonstration. And the greater the fund of the latter possessed by the sociologist, the more valid his claim to be heard in arguments hitherto ridiculed by some.

## REVIEWS

*An American Town: A Sociological Study.* By JAMES M. WILLIAMS, A.B., B.D. New York: Privately printed, 1906. Pp. 251.

This monograph is the first of two volumes apparently constituting the doctor's dissertation of the author who, receiving his A.B. from Brown University in 1898 and his B.D. from Union Theological Seminary in 1901, was a graduate student at Columbia University during the years 1899 to 1902. The obligation to Professor Giddings expressed in the preface appears constantly throughout the book which follows in many respects the method and terminology of his *Inductive Sociology*.

To regard this study, however, as merely a filling out of a prescribed schedule, the work of a census taker with his printed forms, would be to do it grave injustice. It is a painstaking, intelligent, and extremely suggestive piece of scholarly work, undertaken with the conviction that "what sociology most needs is *field work*," and that "the statistical method cannot get far unless used by the skilful *field worker*."

The fact that the author has spent the last three years in the study of small communities east and west in itself inspires confidence in the good faith at least with which he has undertaken his task.

*An American Town* analyzes and interprets the life, economic, political, social, and cultural of an unnamed but identifiable town in the "hop-belt" of New York from a settlement in 1792 up to the year 1900. This period is divided at the year 1875 into two parts, to each of which certain distinguishable characteristics are ascribed. The text is supplemented by twenty-one statistical tables and seventeen graphic charts based upon prices of hops, growth of population, journeys of inhabitants, building of houses, expenditures of churches for music and for missions, relief of the poor, extension of credit by merchants, numbers of students away from home at school and college, and many other facts of varying definiteness and significance. The reader cannot fail to be impressed by the skill, patience, and conscientiousness with which the available data have been

marshaled, as well as by the general caution with which they have been interpreted.

The basal thesis of the study is the pervasive influence in every activity, custom, and attitude of the community of its chief economic resource—the hop crop. In almost every graphic chart the “hop curve” appears in correlation with some other plotted series of facts. Social entertainments, credit, poor relief, expensive journeys, children away at school, church music, and mission collections, tend to respond sympathetically to the “hop curve.” Even when at first glance a new curve seems recalcitrant, the author points out—usually convincingly, sometimes only plausibly—that the apparent variation is due to influences initiated by the high price of hops but thereafter perpetuating themselves and only slightly affected by prosperity or depression.

The effects of economic changes and the increase of communication both within the community and with the larger world outside, upon social pleasures, church life, social classification, moral standards, and personal ideals are discussed with keen insight and discrimination. The analysis of motives, if it falls short of demonstration, is always subtle and ingenious. The later chapters contain many disputable theses upon several of which further light is promised in the second volume.

The concept of selection is an important clue to the whole study. Land, village, type of industry, is each treated as a selective agency. Thus early independent agriculture selects persistence, while later, more complex production selects sagacity. Country society sympathetically selects the hearty, jovial, physically active type; the town, the quiet, refined, and conventional person. Social life, church activities, types of ministers, moral standards, etc., are all interpreted in terms of selection. For the traditional terms “fitted,” “selected,” “surviving,” and the like the author proposed a technical use of *preferred*, *esteemed*, *approved*, and *chosen* to describe various kinds and degrees of social selection.

Although written in a somewhat technical style this study is eminently readable and is made vivid by constant quotation of the racy phrases and homely philosophy of the people themselves. It is to be hoped that out of these two volumes a work for popular use will be prepared. It would prove of great value to ministers, social workers, and intelligent persons generally. In such an edition care should be taken to place directly beneath each chart a clear



explanation. The difficulty of using the descriptions in the text—and often on another page—is irritating as well as baffling to the reader.

On the whole Mr. Williams is to be heartily congratulated on a piece of work which opens up new possibilities in the intensive study of localities, and proves that monographic work of this kind is to be of prime importance to sociology.

GEORGE E. VINCENT

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*Life and Death: A Study in Biology.* By DR. E. TEICHMANN.  
Translated by A. M. SIMONS. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr  
Co., 1906. Pp. 158.

This small volume in the "Library of Science for Workers" is a clear and interesting account of the most fundamental life-phenomena, and represents what may be called the "missing link" in the modern system of education. It is an attempt to bring the results of scientific pursuit to the popular mind in a generalized form. Huxley did it successfully, and the magazines are doing the same thing. But in general the scientist is so intensively engaged that he will not present his findings in a generalized form, and they leak out as best they may. In the industrial pursuits, where money is involved, there is a class of specialists engaged in carrying scientific results over into practice. But the social interests are not so well served, and in consequence there is a sharp break between consciousness of the world at large and the consciousness of the scientific world. We are glad to welcome a book which makes intelligence more general and consciousness more homogeneous.

W. I. THOMAS

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*Efficiency and Relief.* By E. T. DEVINE. New York: The  
Macmillan Co., 1906. Pp. 45.

The subtitle of this lecture, with which Dr. Devine began his work as Schiff professor of social economy in Columbia University, expresses the firm and clear conception of the scholar in practical life, "a programme of social work." The mere "practical man" has no principles and no programme, and the mere "theorist" has a scheme which has no relation to reality. In this volume a part of the problem of philanthropy is stated, to increase industrial

efficiency in the individual and to provide adequate relief for those who are of deficient wage-earning capacity (p. 1). This is the "social economic" definition, but it does not cover the entire aim of philanthropy. Large and fine as is the outlook of this lecture, it lacks something of complete analysis of the aim of charity. "Industrial efficiency" itself depends as the author himself appreciates, upon the awakening of desires for a fuller, richer life, and hope to attain them. The treatment is, indeed, broader than the definition; the spirit of the author is wider than the programme he outlines; and the lectures which will follow will pass beyond the territory which can be accurately named "economics."

C. R. HENDERSON

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*Annual Report of the Superintendent of Compulsory Education.*  
Board of Education of Chicago, 1906.

This brief report is unusually instructive in relation to the causes of truancy and the efficiency of the work of truant officers, parental school, and juvenile court.

C. R. H.

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*Esquisse d'une sociologie.* Par ÉMILE WAXWEILER, Directeur de l'Institut de Sociologie (Bruxelles), Professor à l'Université de Bruxelles. Bruxelles: Misch et Thron. Pp. 306. Fr. 12.

The professional sociologists ought not to overlook this outline. The author is mistaken in his judgment that there has been no progress in sociology, and that it is an exceptional service to the science for him to come to the rescue. There have been so many different contributions to sociology in the last dozen years that no single mind can fairly grasp their total significance. This by no means removes the fact that the science is in its infancy. The tone of Professor Waxweiler's preface, however, is needlessly patronizing toward the scholars who have contributed to the progress of sociology. The absence of caution in estimating the work of other scholars leads to the suspicion that the writer's acquaintance with the literature of his subject is limited. This impression is strengthened by such facts as the following: The title of the last chapter of the outline is "Les synergies sociales." The only reference that I can discover in the book to the name of Lester F. Ward is in a cita-

tion on a quite different point from Dealey and Ward (p. 81). Since no writer has done as much as Professor Ward to make the concept "social synergy" an important factor in sociological theory, a reader acquainted with the subject is inclined to infer that the instance may be an index to the reasons why Professor Waxweiler feels at liberty to pass depreciating judgments upon the work of his predecessors. In order that this caveat may not appear to be a mere American provincialism, I may cite, as an additional illustration of the same point, that I can discover in the book no reference to Simmel, or Tönnies, or Ratzenhofer! This is very much like saying that nothing has been going on in biology for the last decade, and at the same time neglecting to mention Weissmann or DeVries.

There is a curious appearance of something short of precision in the "Lexique sociologique," appended to the volume. This glossary contains upwards of 2,400 words without definition or explanation, "Susceptibles de suggérer directement un phénomène sociologique c'est-à-dire un phénomène réactionnel entre deux ou plusieurs individus de la même espèce, sans distinction de sexe" (!). Why the invidious distinction in favor of these 2,400 terms, and against the remaining thousands in the vocabulary? Whether a syllable of human speech suggests a sociological reaction to our mind does not depend upon the syllable, but upon our knowledge of its history. As phenomena of human association words are of one common origin, and if they do not suggest sociological relations it is our fault. Such a list would be absolutely useless, except as a measure of the sociological suggestibility of a given individual.

That the sketch, nevertheless, contains elements that may be valuable will be apparent to specialists from a glance at the table of contents, which I think it worth while to give in full, viz.:

## PREMIÈRE PARTIE

### La sociologie

#### CHAPITRE I.—*Sur l'adaptation des êtres à leur milieu.*

- § 1.—Notions générales.
- § 2.—L'éthologie.

#### CHAPITRE II.—*Le milieu vivant et le milieu social.*

- § 3.—L'interdépendance végétative.
- § 4.—L'affinité spécifique.
- § 5.—L'affinité sociale.

#### CHAPITRE III.—*Les phénomènes sociaux en sociologie comparée.*

- § 6.—Sur le terme "social."
- § 7.—Sociologie humaine et sociologie animale.

## DEUXIÈME PARTIE

## L'analyse sociologique

## CHAPITRE IV.—Les sources et la méthode.

- § 8.—L'observation directe.
- § 9.—L'expérimentation.
- § 10.—L'observation indirecte.
- § 11.—Le procédé statistique.
- § 12.—La méthode de concordance.
- § 13.—La doctrine actualiste.
- § 14.—L'inventaire sociologique du langage.
- § 15.—Plan d'analyse sociologique.

## CHAPITRE V.—La formation sociale.

- § 16.—Possibilités sociales pendant l'élevage.
- § 17.—L'entrée de l'enfant dans la vie sociale.
- § 18.—Tendances sociales chez l'adolescent.
- § 19.—Plasticité sociale de l'adolescent.
- § 20.—Pathologie de la formation sociale.
- § 21.—La notion de synthèse sociale.

## CHAPITRE VI.—Les aptitudes sociales.

- § 22.—Le polymorphisme sociale.
- § 23.—La discrimination sociale.
- § 24.—Les dispositions sociales.
- § 25.—Les jugements sociaux.
- § 26.—Les désirs sociaux.
- § 27.—Pathologie de l'affinité sociale.
- § 28.—La notion de potentialité sociale.

## CHAPITRE VII.—Les activités sociales.

- § 29.—Activités.
- § 30.—Activités protectrices ou nocives.
- § 31.—Activités compétitrices.
- § 32.—Activités divulgatrices.
- § 33.—Activités grégaires.
- § 34.—Activités répétitrices.
- § 35.—Activités initiatrices.
- § 36.—Activités acquisitives.
- § 37.—Activités sélectives.
- § 38.—La notion de réaction sociale.

## CHAPITRE VIII.—Les synergies sociales.

- § 39.—La conformité sociale.
- § 40.—L'interdépendance sociale.
- § 41.—La céphalisation sociale.
- § 42.—La coordination sociale.
- § 43.—La conscience sociale.
- § 44.—La notion d'organisation sociale.
- § 45.—Vue d'ensemble.

A. W. S.

*Sociological Papers.* Volume II. Published for the Sociological Society (of London). London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. 312.

This second volume contains Mr. Francis Galton's papers on "Restrictions in Marriage," "Studies in National Eugenics," and "Eugenics as a Factor in Religion," with twenty-four pages of dis-

cussion of the same by twenty-six contributors. The other papers, with discussions appended, are: "Civics: as Applied Sociology," Part II, by Professor Patrick Geddes; "The School in Some of its Relations to Social Organization and to National Life," by Professor M. E. Sadler; "The Influence of Magic on Social Relationships," by Dr. E. Westermarck; "On the Relation between Sociology and Ethics," by Professor Harald Höffding; "Some Guiding Principles in the Philosophy of History," by Dr. J. H. Bridges; "Sociological Studies," by Mr. J. S. Stuart-Glennie.

The Sociological Society is carrying on the somewhat audacious experiment of trying to fuse a considerable group of men and women, with highly heterogeneous interests, into a body that can adopt a common center for the study of sociology. The two volumes of papers that represent the activities of the society thus far impress me as leading evidence of the difficulties which beset the attempt. Strong individualities, and able scholars, with view-points which in many cases are hardly within one another's horizons, constitute both an encouraging and a precarious situation. If the members of this society can have patience with the divergencies which they represent until they come within sight of a scientific purpose which will correlate their methods of inquiry, they will bring in a new era of progress in social science. At present the absence of a methodological *modus vivendi* suggests the fear that the time may not yet be ripe for establishing a permanent working consensus among the British thinkers who ought to find their bearings as sociologists.

A. W. S.

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*Money and Currency: In Relation to Industry, Prices, and the Rate of Interest.* By JOSEPH FRENCH JOHNSON, Professor of Political Economy, Dean of the School of Commerce, Accounts, and Finance, of New York University. Boston: Ginn & Co., 8vo, Pp. 398. \$1.75.

The author deals less with the metaphysics of money than with its actual part in the economic processes of modern society.

The author has written for practical men as well as for students in high schools and colleges. He has slurred over certain controverted topics, in order to avoid snags which he regards as needless difficulties. Without presuming to pass judgment upon these disputed technicalities, it is safe to say that the book will be of use as an account of the actual phenomena of money and currency.

A. W. S.

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## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

**A Parallelism in Social Science.**—Recognizing the intimate relations of all the social sciences as components of a greater whole, since they have, each and all, their center in man, we may make a comparison of economic and political science:

1. In both instances, desire and aversion are the cardinal facts, and these mental attitudes always contain selfish and altruistic motives in varying proportion. The object of immediate desire in one field, may be so sought because of its influence in the other. Law and trade affect each other, and within their respective spheres they are connected with other objects.

2. Mere desire is insufficient: effective demand means, in economics, purchasing power; in politics, compelling power. The effective demand of a community is the algebraic sum of the demands of the individuals, whether it is in economics or legislation.

3. Demand always calls forth supply. But, while economic supply is divisible, political supply is usually a unit. In order not to prove abortive, therefore, intensity of desire or demand in politics must rise to a given level; else, all the effort is lost. "A miss is as good as a mile." Political adjustments are therefore in general rougher than in the case of economic supply and demand.

4. Economic supply "lags behind demand," often rising to a maximum when the demand is already declining. In politics measures are adopted, frequently, after the death of their exponents, or when ideas have already changed. The less complicated the machinery the closer and more immediate the adjustment. The need of creating new instruments hinders ready establishment of equilibrium. Further, if a given agency or instrument is furnishing only one political or economic commodity, it is more quickly adjusted to new demand than when it is closely bound up with other "interests."

5. A more or less temporary monopoly, economic or governmental, can for the time being limit or refuse a supply until the demand becomes too strong. Action in any event may be in behalf of interests purely selfish, or popular, or both mixed. The character of the supply may be made to affect future demand, and after the provision of a legal or economic function has been undertaken, to change means to sacrifice established interests or a breaking of established habits. Producers of durable commodities, like governments with long tenure, can, by waiting, take advantage of the favorable moment when the public is in the proper mood. This course is not open to dealers in perishable commodities or to governments with short tenure of office.

6. The parallelism between the two sciences is illustrated in the fallacy of the doctrine of "maximum satisfaction," often applied to both. Complete industrial freedom on the one hand, and complete political freedom, on the other, for the individual, are claimed to give the greatest common advantage. It does not follow that, even were each individual to follow his best interests when left alone, all individuals would work for the best common ends. The individual is not the best judge "of what he *ought* to want." Desires are not a test of capacity to fulfil them. Equal demand prices and equal voting power may obscure very great differences in the intensity of desire of individuals. The maximum real satisfaction may not be obtained. A majority is supreme, although the intensity of the desires of the minority may be greater.—A. C. Pigou, "The Unity of Political and Economic Science," *Economic Journal*, September, 1906. A. H. N. B.

**The Family System in Japan.**—The extraordinary efficiency shown by the Japanese in war has called attention to the nation throughout the world, and many explanations of their success have been offered. The chief reason is the family basis of their national life. The individualism of the West separates parents and children, and leaves each to seek individual good. In Japan "the honor and glory of the house are the first concern of all." By tracing back their origin many centuries to one founder, the Japanese obtain a center of allegiance in the personal representative

of the common ancestor, the emperor. All individual sentiment is wiped out before considerations of patriotism. The individual suffering is recognized as of social value.

The feeling of national unity has modified the religions accepted. Buddhism and Confucianism have been adapted to communal relations. The difficulty of introducing Christianity has mainly been due to its antagonizing ancestral relationships. With modern requirements the need for more individualism is recognized. The danger is seen in the tendencies toward self-centered interest in the young. Consequently, the problem of national persistence in Japan is the most effectual union of family regard and individual recognition—the combination of the strong elements in oriental and western civilizations.—Junjiro Takakusu, "The Social and Ethical Value of the Family System in Japan," *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1906.

A. H. N. B.

**The Unemployed and Trade Unions.**—Because the trade unions are becoming bankrupt on account of their money being sent abroad to assist sympathetic strikers they are less and less able to carry on a winning fight. To relieve the trade unions of their responsibility and in order that the honest workers may be benefited and protected in the days of sickness and old age from want and misery, the following outline of a plan is presented:

Let a labor tribunal be formed in every manufacturing center, composed of an equal number of laborers and employers before which disputes may be legally and equitably settled. This tribunal may be elected by public vote. Let a judge preside to see that the law is fulfilled. Where the tribunal is equally divided let a permanent arbitrator be referred to, all operators and operatives to covenant to abide by the decision of the tribunal.

Let every operative pay to the government a weekly sum out of his or her wages (not to exceed the amount paid at present to the trade unions) to be collected by the employers, paid weekly to the government at an appointed bank; a set of books being kept open to government inspection at every place of employment, every laborer being provided with a savings-book showing the wages paid and the amount paid to the government; men who pay this from the ages of twenty to thirty years to enjoy an earlier pension than those beginning later. The age at which pensions commence must be higher than when it has been developed; a subsistence to be allowed in case of sickness certified by a physician; accident by intemperance to receive no allowance; employers to pay the government one-half of the sum subscribed weekly by the labor they employ in addition to the sum paid by the operatives; in return for this they are to be relieved of the insurance paid under the Employers' Liability Act; women and children to subscribe *pro rata*. When children begin to subscribe as soon as they can earn wages they are to be provided with a certain sum when married with which to begin housekeeping.

By this plan, pauperism among the respectable would be decreased and the proud independence of the workingmen would be respected—they would have earned this saving.

At present there are a number of establishments erected for the benefit of the poor not answering their purpose, because the poor cling in old age to their relatives instead of going to these establishments. Some such places would be maintained for those with no relatives if this plan were adopted, viz: let the aged remain with their relatives but pay perhaps 4s. a week per head to the relatives. Orphan children could be kept in the country and raised by farmers; they would learn agriculture and a love of nature. Towns and cities ruin our rising generation. This education in the country must not increase the cost of education.

The plan is followed in Germany of subscribing to a state provision against old age and sickness. Those who will not work are treated as a special class, incapable of looking after themselves.—David McLaren Morrison, *Nineteenth Century and After*, March, 1906.

S. E. W. B.

**The Law of Heredity.**—The following are accepted conclusions: (1) Diseases, as such, whether inborn or acquired, are never transmitted; in the case of inborn affections, predisposition to the malady, but not the malady, is transmitted; (2) acquired external defects or mutilations are as a rule not transmitted; (3) In case of acquired pathological disarrangement of internal organs, there is some probability

of their being transmitted from parent to offspring, but under quite definite and special circumstances, that is to say, if these internal lesions have caused the parent great suffering and called for much endurance.—Louis Elkind, *North American Review*, August, 1906. S. E. W. B.

**A National Department of Health.**—The following circular letter explains itself:

*To the Editors and Publishers of America.*

Gentlemen: Pasteur wrote: "It is within the power of every man to rid himself of every parasitic disease."

The time has now arrived, in the judgment of many persons, for establishing a National Department of Health at Washington to wage warfare against the preventable diseases of mankind. In a similar way, the United States Department of Agriculture has expended during the last ten years fifty millions of dollars in a splendid fight against the diseases of plants and animals.

The fearful wastes of death and sickness and the dreadful havoc wrought can never be described. The fiercest battles ever fought left no such bloody trails, even when the mailed hand of war smote cruelest and harshest, as the crimson boulevards—ten-death-chariots-wide—traced by the passing finger-touches of pneumonia or consumption wastes within a week's end span. Along these ghastly boulevards will be strewn, before twelve months are gone, more blasted hopes and broken hearts than all the countless grinning skulls slain in fair fights and whitening battlefields since time began.

Could the 750,000 persons in the United States marked for death during the next twelve months from preventable causes voice in a threniad verdict their conviction, in a last solemn *morituri salutamus*, who can doubt what would be their admonition: that good health is more precious than rubies, and a long life well lived fairer than beaten gold? Who can doubt, if these measures were before the nation, how they would cast their verdicts? As the slaves chained to the chairs of the conquerors in the triumphs that are gone, so the passing hours silently remind us: "And we too are mortal."

In the accompanying paper read before the American Association for the Advancement of Science partial data have been assembled concerning the magnitude of these wastes and the possibilities of prevention. The great need is for the awakening of the nation to the splendid remedies which the great medical and sanitary experts could devise, if properly organized for the task.

Could only the busy editors of the nation, who guide all movements of humanity and progress, co-operate in bringing this fearful destruction vividly before their readers, no greater good could be accomplished; and in the years to come, many a man now marked for an early death, when celebrating his ninetieth birthday among his children, would thank his stars for a progressive press.

With best wishes, and thanking you in advance for whatever co-operation may be rendered in this agitation for inaugurating a National Department of Health, which must go on until the purposes are allowed and the means provided, believe me

Truly yours,

J. PEASE NORTON.

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## THE MIND OF WOMAN AND THE LOWER RACES

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### I

The mind is a very wonderful thing, but it is questionable whether it is more wonderful than some of the instinctive modes of behavior of lower forms of life. If mind is viewed as an adjustment to external conditions for the purpose of securing control, the human mind is no more wonderful in its way than the homing and migratory instincts of birds; the tropic quality of the male butterfly which leads it to the female, though she is imprisoned in a cigar-box in a dark room; or the peculiar sensitivity of the bat which enables it, though blinded, to thread its way through a maze of obstructions hung about a room.

The fact of sensitivity, in short, or the quality of response to stimulation, is more wonderful than its particular formulation in the human brain. Mind simply represents a special development of the quality of sensitivity common to organic nature, and analogous to the sensitivity of the photographic plate. The brain receives impressions, records them, remembers them, compares new experiences with old, and modifies behavior, in the presence of a new or recurrent stimulation, in view of the pleasure-pain connotation of similar situations in the past.

In very low forms of life, as is well known, there is no development of brain or special organs of sense; but the organism is

pushed and pulled about by light, heat, gravity, and acid and other chemical forces, and is unable to decline to act on any stimulus reaching it. It reacts in certain characteristic, habitual, and adequate ways, because it responds uniformly to the same stimulation; but it has no choice, and is controlled by the environment. The object of brain development is to reverse these conditions and control the actions of the organism, and of the outside world as well, from within. With the development of the special organs of sense, memory, and consequent ability to compare present experiences with past, with inhibition or the ability to decline to act on a stimulus, and, finally, with abstraction or the power of separating general from particular aspects, we have a condition where the organism sits still, as it were, and picks and chooses its reactions to the outer world; and, by working in certain lines to the exclusion of others, it gains in its turn control of the environment, and begins to reshape it.

All the higher animals possess in some degree the powers of memory, judgment, and choice; but in man nature followed the plan of developing enormously the memory, on which depend abstraction, or the power of general ideas, and the reason. In order to secure this result, the brain, or surface for recording experience, was developed out of all proportion with the body. In the average European the brain weighs about 1,360 grams, or 3 per cent. of the body weight, while the average brain weight of some of the great anthropoid apes is only about 360 grams, or, in the orangoutan, one-half of one per cent. of the body weight. In point of fact, nature seems to have reached the limit of her materials in creating the human species. The development of hands freed from locomotion and a brain out of proportion to bodily weight are *tours de force*, and, so to speak, an afterthought, which put the heaviest strain possible on the materials employed, and even diverted some organs from their original design. A number of ailments, like hernia, appendicitis, and uterine displacement, are due to the fact that the erect posture assumed when the hands were diverted from locomotion to prehensile uses put a strain not originally contemplated on certain tissues and organs. Similarly, the proportion of idiocy and

insanity in the human species shows that nature had reached the limit of elasticity in her materials and began to take great risks. The brain is a delicate and elaborate organ on the structural side, and in these cases it is not put together properly, or it gets hopelessly out of order. This strain on the materials is evident in all races and in both sexes, and indicates that the same general structural ground-pattern has been followed in all members of the species.

Viewed from the standpoint of brain weight, all races are, broadly speaking, in the same class. For while the relatively small series of brains from the black race examined by anthropologists shows a slight inferiority in weight—about 45 grams in negroes—when compared with white brains, the yellow race shows more than a corresponding superiority to the white; in the Chinese, about 70 grams. There is also apparently no superiority in brain weight in modern over ancient times. The cranial capacity of Europeans between the eleventh and eighteenth centuries, as shown by the cemeteries of Paris, is not appreciably different from that of Frenchmen of today, and the Egyptian mummies show larger cranial capacity than the modern Egyptians. Furthermore, the limits of variation between individuals in the same race are wider than the average difference between races. In a series of 500 white brains, the lowest and highest brains will differ, in fact, as much as 650 grams in weight.

There is also no ground for the assumption that the brain of woman is inferior to that of man; for, while the average brain of woman is smaller, the average body weight is also smaller, and it is open to question whether the average brain weight of woman is smaller in proportion to body weight.<sup>1</sup> The importance of brain weight in relation to intelligence, moreover, has usually been much exaggerated by anthropologists; for intelligence depends in the rapidity and range of the acts of associative memory, and this in turn on the complexity of the neural processes. Brains are, in fact, like timepieces in this respect, that the small ones work "excellent well" if they are good material and well put together. Although brains occasionally run above 2,000 grams

<sup>1</sup> See, however, Topinard, *Éléments d'anthropologie générale*, pp. 557 ff.

in weight (that of the Russian novelist Turgenieff weighed 2,012), the brains of many eminent men are not distinguished for their great size. That of the French statesman Gambetta weighed only 1,160 grams. It must be borne in mind also that there are many individuals among the lower races and among women having brain weights much in excess of that of the average male white.

Of all the possible ways of treating the brain for the purpose of testing its intelligence, that of weighing is the least satisfactory, and has been most indefatigably practiced. A better method, that of counting the nerve cells, has been lately introduced, but to treat a single brain in this way is a work of years, and no series of results exists. In the meantime Miss Thompson, in co-operation with Professor Angell, has completed a study of the mental traits of men and women on what is perhaps the best available principle—that of a series of laboratory tests which eliminate or take into consideration differences due to the characteristic habits of the two sexes. Her findings are probably the most important contribution in this field, and her general conclusion on differences of sex will, I think, hold also for differences of race:

The point to be emphasized as the outcome of this study is that, according to our present light, the psychological differences of sex seem to be largely due, not to differences of average capacity, nor to difference in type of mental activity, but to differences in the social influences brought to bear on the developing individual from early infancy to adult years. The question of the future development of the intellectual life of women is one of social necessities and ideals rather than of the inborn psychological characteristics of sex.<sup>2</sup>

There is certainly great difference in the mental ability of individuals, and there are probably also less marked differences in the average ability of different races; but difference in natural ability, is in the main, a characteristic of the individual, not of race or of sex. It is probable that brain efficiency (speaking from the biological standpoint) has been, on the average, approximately the same in all races and in both sexes since

<sup>2</sup> Helen B. Thompson, *Psychological Norms in Men and Women*, p. 182.



nature first made up a good working model, and that differences in intellectual expression are mainly social rather than biological, dependent on the fact that different stages of culture present different experiences to the mind, and adventitious circumstances direct the attention to different fields of interest.

## II

In approaching the question of the parity or disparity of the mental ability of the white and the lower races, we bring to it a fixed and instinctive prejudice. No race views another race with that generosity with which it views itself. It may even be said that the existence of a social group depends on its taking an exaggerated view of its own importance; and in a state of nature, at least, the same is true of the individual. If self-preservation is the first law of nature, there must be on the mental side an acute consciousness of self, and a habit of regarding the self as of more importance than the world at large. The value of this standpoint lies in the fact that, while a wholesome fear of the enemy is important, a wholesome contempt is even more so. Praising one's self and dispraising an antagonist creates a confidence and a mental superiority in the way of confidence. The vituperative recriminations of modern prize-fighters, the boastings of the Homeric heroes, and the *bâgan* of the old Germans, like the back-talk of the small boy, were calculated to screw the courage up; and the Indians of America usually gave a dance before going on the war-path, in which by pantomime and boasting they magnified themselves and their past, and so stimulated their self-esteem that they felt invincible. In race-prejudice we see the same tendency to exalt the self and the group at the expense of outsiders. The alien group is belittled by attaching contempt to its peculiarities and habits—its color, speech, dress, and all the signs of its personality. This is not a laudable attitude, but it has been valuable to the group, because a bitter and contemptuous feeling is an aid to good fighting.

No race or nation has yet freed itself from this tendency to exalt and idealize itself. It is very difficult for a member of western civilization to understand that the orientals regard us

with a contempt in comparison with which our contempt for them is feeble. Our bloodiness, our newness, our lack of reverence, our land-greed, our break-neck speed and lack of appreciation of leisure make Vandals of us. On the other hand, we are very stupid about recognizing the intelligence of orientals. We have been accustomed to think that there is a great gulf between ourselves and other races; and this persists in an undefinable way after scores of Japanese have taken high rank in our schools, and after Hindus have repeatedly been among the wranglers in mathematics at Cambridge. It is only when one of the far eastern nations has come bodily to the front that we begin to ask ourselves whether there is not an error in our reckoning.

The instinct to belittle outsiders is perhaps at the bottom of our delusion that the white race has one order of mind and the black and yellow races have another. But, while a prejudice—a matter of instinct and emotion—may well be at the beginning of an error of this kind, it could not sustain itself in the face of our logical habits unless reinforced by an error of judgment. And this error is found in the fact that in a naïve way we assume that our steps in progress from time to time are due to our mental superiority as a race over the other races, and to the mental superiority of one generation of ourselves over the preceding.

In this we are confusing advance in culture with brain improvement. If we should assume a certain grade of intelligence, fixed and invariable in all individuals, races, and times—an unwarranted assumption, of course—progress would still be possible, provided we assumed a characteristically human grade of intelligence to begin with. With associative memory, abstraction, and speech men are able to compare the present with the past, to deliberate and discuss, to invent, to abandon old processes for new, to focus attention on special problems, to encourage specialization, and to transmit to the younger generation a more intelligent standpoint and a more advanced starting-point. Culture is the accumulation of the results of activity, and culture could go in improving for a certain time even if there were a retrogression in intelligence. If all the chemists in class A should

stop work tomorrow, the chemists in class B would still make discoveries. These would influence manufacture, and progress would result. If a worker in any specialty acquaints himself with the results of his predecessors and contemporaries and *works*, he will add some results to the sum of knowledge in his line. And if a race preserves by record or tradition the memory of what past generations have done, and adds a little, progress is secured whether the brain improves or stands still. In the same way, the fact that one race has advanced farther in culture than another does not necessarily imply a different order of brain, but may be due to the fact that in the one case social arrangements have not taken the shape affording the most favorable conditions for the operation of the mind.

If, then, we make due allowance for our instinctive tendency as a white group to disparage outsiders, and, on the other hand, for our tendency to confuse progress in culture and general intelligence with biological modification of the brain, we shall have to reduce very much our usual estimate of the difference in mental capacity between ourselves and the lower races, if we do not eliminate it altogether; and we shall perhaps have to abandon altogether the view that there has been an increase in the mental capacity of the white race since prehistoric times.

The first question arising in this connection is whether any of the characteristic faculties of the human mind—perception, memory, inhibition, abstraction—are absent or noticeably weak in the lower races. If this is found to be true, we have reason to attribute the superiority of the white race to biological causes; otherwise we shall have to seek an explanation of white superiority in causes lying outside the brain.

In examining this question we need not dwell on the acuteness of the sense-perceptions, because these are not distinctively human. As a matter of fact, they are usually better developed in animals and in the lower races than in the civilized, because the lower mental life is more perceptive than ratiocinative. The memory of the lower races is also apparently quite as good as that of the higher. The memory of the Australian native or the Eskimo is quite as good as that of our "oldest inhabitant;" and

probably no one would claim that the modern scientist has a better memory than the bard of the Homeric period.

There is, however, a prevalent view, for the popularization of which Herbert Spencer is largely responsible, that primitive man has feeble powers of inhibition. Like the equally erroneous view that early man is a free and unfettered creature, it arises from our habit of assuming that, because his inhibitions and unfreedom do not correspond with our own restraints, they do not exist. Sir John Lubbock pointed out long ago that the savage is hedged about by conventions so minute and so mandatory that he is actually the least free person in the world. But, in spite of this, Spencer and others have insisted that he is incapable of self-restraint, is carried away like a child by the impulse of the moment, and is incapable of rejecting an immediate gratification for a greater future one. Cases like the one mentioned by Darwin of the Fuegian who struck and killed his little son when the latter dropped a basket of fish into the water are cited without regard to the fact that cases of sudden domestic violence and quick repentance are common in any city today; and the failure of the Australian blacks to throw back the small fry when seining is referred to without pausing to consider that our practice of exterminating game and denuding our forests shows an amazing lack of individual self-restraint.

The truth is that the restraints exercised in a group depend largely on the traditions, views, and teachings of the group, and if we have this in mind, the savage cannot be called deficient on the side of inhibition. It is doubtful if modern society affords anything more striking in the way of inhibition than is found in connection with taboo, fetish, totemism, and ceremonial among the lower races. In the great majority of the American Indian and Australian tribes a man is strictly forbidden to kill or eat the animals whose name his clan bears as a totem. The central Australian may not, in addition, eat the flesh of any animal killed or even touched by persons standing in certain relations of kinship to him. At certain times also he is forbidden to eat the flesh of a number of animals, and at all times he must share all food secured with the tribal elders and some others.

A native of Queensland will put his mark on an unripe zamia fruit, and may be sure it will be untouched and that when it is ripe he has only to go and get it. The Eskimos, though starving, will not molest the sacred seal basking before their huts. Similarly in social intercourse the inhibitions are numerous. To some of his sisters, blood and tribal, the Australian may not speak at all; to others only at certain distances, according to the degree of kinship. The west African fetish acts as a police, and property protected by it is safer than under civilized laws. Food and palm wine are placed beside the path with a piece of fetish suspended near by, and no one will touch them without leaving the proper payment. The garden of a native may be a mile from the house, unfenced, and sometimes unvisited for weeks by the owner; but it is immune from depredations if protected by fetish. Our proverb says, "A hungry belly has no ears," and it must be admitted that the inhibition of food impulses implies no small power of restraint.

Altogether too much has been made of inhibition, anyway, as a sign of mentality, for it is not even characteristic of the human species. The well-trained dog inhibits in the presence of the most enticing stimulations of the kitchen. And it is also true that one race, at least—the American Indian—makes inhibition the most conspicuous feature in its system of education. From the time the ice is broken to give him a cold plunge and begin the toughening process on the day of his birth, until he dies without a groan under torture, the Indian is schooled in the restraint of his impulses. He does not, indeed, practice our identical restraints, because his traditions and the run of his attention are different; but he has a capacity for controlling impulses equal to our own.

Another serious charge against the intelligence of the lower races is lack of the power of abstraction. They certainly do not deal largely in abstraction, and their languages are poor in abstract terms. But there is a great difference between the habit of thinking in abstract terms and the ability to do so.

The degree to which abstraction is employed in the activities of a group depends on the complexity of the activities and on the

complexity of consciousness in the group. When science, philosophy, and logic, and systems of reckoning time, space, and number, are taught in the schools; when the attention is not so much engaged in perceptual as in deliberate acts; and when thought is a profession, then abstract modes of thought are forced on the mind. This does not argue absence of the power of abstraction in the lower races, or even a low grade of ability, but lack of practice. To one skilled in any line an unpracticed person seems very stupid; and this is apparently the reason why travelers report that the black and yellow races have feeble powers of abstraction. It is generally admitted, however, that the use of speech involves the power of abstraction, so that all races have the power in some degree. When we come further to examine the degree in which they possess it, we find that they compare favorably with ourselves in any test which involves a fair comparison.

The proverb is a form of abstraction practiced by all races, and is perhaps the best test of the natural bent of the mind in this direction, because, like ballad poetry and slang, proverbial sayings do not originate with the educated class, but are of popular origin. At the same time, proverbs compare favorably with the *mots* of literature, and many proverbs have, in fact, drifted into literature and become connected with the names of great writers. Indeed, the saying that there is nothing new under the sun applies with such force and fidelity to literature that, if we should strip Hesiod and Homer and Chaucer of such phrases as "The half is greater than the whole," "It is a wise son that knows his own father" (which Shakespeare quotes the other end about), and "To make a virtue of necessity," and if we should further eliminate from literature the motives and sentiments also in ballad poetry and in popular thought, little would remain but form.

If we assume, then, that the popular mind—let us say the peasant mind—in the white race is as capable of abstraction as the mind of the higher classes, but not so specialized in this direction—and no one can doubt this in view of the academic record of country-bred boys—the following comparison of our

proverbs with those of the Africans of the Guinea coast (the latter reported by the late Sir A. B. Ellis<sup>3</sup>) is significant:

*African.* Stone in the water-hole does not feel the cold.

*English.* Habit is second nature.

*A.* One tree does not make a forest.

*E.* One swallow does not make a summer.

*A.* "I nearly killed the bird." No one can eat nearly in a stew.

*E.* First catch your hare.

*A.* Full-belly child says to hungry-belly child, "Keep good cheer."

*E.* We can all endure the misfortunes of others.

*A.* Distant firewood is good firewood.

*E.* Distance lends enchantment to the view.

*A.* Ashes fly back in the face of him who throws them.

*E.* Curses come home to roost.

*A.* If the boy says he wants to tie the water with a string, ask him whether he means the water in the pot or the water in the lagoon.

*E.* Answer a fool according to his folly.

*A.* Cowries are men.

*E.* Money makes the man.

*A.* Cocoanut is not good for bird to eat.

*E.* Sour grapes.

*A.* He runs away from the sword and hides himself in the scabbard.

*E.* Out of the frying-pan into the fire.

*A.* A fool of Ika and an idiot of Iluka meet together to make friends.

*E.* Birds of a feather flock together.

*A.* The ground-pig [bandicoot] said: "I do not feel so angry with the man who killed me as with the man who dashed me on the ground afterward."

*E.* Adding insult to injury.

*A.* Quick loving a woman means quick not loving a woman.

*E.* Married in haste we repent at leisure.

*A.* Three elders cannot all fail to pronounce the word *ekulu* [an antelope]; one may say *ekúlu*, another *ekulá*, but the third will say *ekulu*.

*E.* In a multitude of counselors there is safety.

*A.* If the stomach is not strong, do not eat cockroaches.

*E.* Milk for babes.

*A.* No one should draw water from the spring in order to supply the river.

*E.* Robbing Peter to pay Paul.

<sup>3</sup> *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa*, pp. 218 ff.

A. The elephant makes a dust and the buffalo makes a dust, but the dust of the buffalo is lost in the dust of the elephant.

E. *Duo cum faciunt idem non est idem.*

A. Ear, hear the other before you decide.

E. *Audi alteram partem.*

On the side of number we have another test of the power of abstraction; and while the lower races show lack of practice in this, they show no lack of power. It is true that tribes have been found with no names for numbers beyond two, three, or five; but these are isolated groups, like the Veddahs and Bushmen, who have no trade or commerce, and lead a miserable existence, with little or nothing to count. The directions of attention and the simplicity or complexity of mental processes depend on the character of the external situation which the mind has to manipulate. If the activities are simple, the mind is simple, and if the activities were nil, the mind would be nil. The mind is nothing but a means of manipulating the outside world. Number, time, and space conceptions and systems become more complex and accurate, not as the human mind grows in capacity, but as activities become more varied and call for more extended and accurate systems of notation and measurement. Trade and commerce, machinery and manufacture, and all the processes of civilization involve specialization in the apprehension of series as such. Under these conditions the number technique becomes elaborate and requires time and instruction for its mastery. The advance which mathematics has made within a brief historical time is strikingly illustrated by the words with which the celebrated mathematician, Sir Henry Savile, who died in 1616, closed his career as a professor at Oxford:

By the grace of God, gentlemen hearers, I have performed my promise. I have redeemed my pledge. I have explained, according to my ability, the definitions, postulates, axioms, and the first eight propositions of the *Elements* of Euclid. Here, sinking under the weight of years, I lay down my art and my instruments.<sup>4</sup>

From the standpoint of modern mathematics, Sir Henry Savile and the Bushman are both woefully backward; and in

<sup>4</sup> Whewell, *History of the Inductive Sciences*, Vol. I, p. 205.



both cases the backwardness is not a matter of mental incapacity, but of the state of the science.

In respect, then, to brain structure and the more important mental faculties we find that no race is radically unlike the others. Still, it might happen that the mental activities and products of two groups were so different as to place them in different classes. But precisely the contrary is true. There is in force a principle called the law of parallelism in development, according to which any group takes much the same steps in development as any other. The group may be belated, indeed, and not reach certain stages, but the ground-patterns of life are the same in the lower races and in the higher. Mechanical inventions, textile industries, rude painting, poetry, sculpture, and song, marriage, and family life, organization under leaders, belief in spirits, a mythology, and some form of church and state exist universally. At one time students of mankind, when they found a myth in Hawaii corresponding to the Greek story of Orpheus and Eurydice, or an Aztec poem of tender longing in absence, or a story of the deluge, were wont to conjecture how these could have been carried over from Greek or Elizabethan or Hebraic sources, or whether they did not afford evidence of a time when all branches of the human race dwelt together with a common fund of sentiment and tradition. But this standpoint has been abandoned, and it is recognized that the human mind and the outside world are essentially alike the world over; that the mind everywhere acts on the same principles; and that, ignoring the local, incidental, and eccentric, we find similar laws of growth among all peoples.

The number of things which can stimulate the human mind is somewhat definite and limited. Among them, for example, is death. This happens everywhere, and the death of a dear one may cause the living to imagine ways of being reunited. The story of Orpheus and Eurydice may thus arise spontaneously and perpetually, wherever death and affection exist. Or, there may be a separation from home and friends, and the mind runs back in distress and longing over the happy past, and the state of consciousness aroused is as definite a fact among savages as among

the civilized. A beautiful passage in Homer represents Helen looking out on the Greeks from the wall of Troy and saying:

And now behold I all the other glancing-eyed Achaïans, whom well I could discern and tell their names; but two captains of the host can I not see, even Kastor tamer of horses and Polydukes the skilful boxer, mine own brethren whom the same mother bare. Either they came not in the company from lovely Lakedaïmon; or they came hither indeed in their sea-faring ships, but now will not enter into the battle of warriors, for fear of the many scornings and revilings that are mine.<sup>5</sup>

When this passage is thus stripped of its technical excellence by a prose translation, we may compare it with the following New Zealand lament composed by a young woman who was captured on the island of Tuhua and carried to a mountain from which she could see her home:

My regret is not to be expressed. Tears, like a spring, gush from my eyes. I wonder whatever is Tu Kainku [her lover] doing, he who deserted me. Now I climb upon the ridge of Mount Parahaki, whence is clear the view of the island of Tuhua. I see with regret the lofty Tanmo where dwells [the chief] Tangiteruru. If I were there, the shark's tooth would hang from my ear. How fine, how beautiful should I look! . . . But enough of this; I must return to my rags and to my nothing at all.<sup>6</sup>

The situation of the two women in this case is not identical, and it would be possible to claim that the Greek and Maori passages differ in tone and coloring; but it remains true that a captive woman of any race will feel much the same as a captive woman of any other race when her thoughts turn toward home, and that the poetry growing out of such a situation will be everywhere of the same general pattern.

Similarly, to take an illustration from morals, we find that widely different in complexion and detail as are the moral codes of lower and higher groups, say the Hebrews and the African Kaffirs, yet the general patterns of morality are strikingly coincident. It is reported of the Kaffirs that "they possess laws which meet every crime which may be committed." Theft is punished by restitution and fine; injuring cattle, by death or fine; false witness, by a heavy fine; adultery, by fine or death; rape,

<sup>5</sup> Homer, *Iliad*, iii, 233; translation by Lang, Leaf, and Myers.

<sup>6</sup> Thomson, *New Zealand*, Vol. I, p. 164.

by fine or death; poisoning or witchcraft, by death and confiscation of property; murder; by death or fine; treason or desertion from the tribe, by death and confiscation.<sup>7</sup> The Kaffirs and Hebrews are not at the same level of culture, and we miss the more abstract and monotheistic admonitions of the higher religion—"thou shalt not covet; thou shalt worship no other gods before me"—but the intelligence shown by the social mind in adjusting the individual to society may fairly be called the same grade of intelligence in the two cases.

When the environmental life of two groups is more alike and the general cultural conditions more correspondent, the parallelism of thought and practice becomes more striking. The recently discovered Assyrian Code of Hammurabi (about 2500 B. C.) contains striking correspondences with the Mosaic code; and while Semitic scholars probably have good and sufficient reasons for holding that the Mosaic code was strongly influenced by the Assyrian, we may yet be very confident that the two codes would have been of the same general character if no influence whatever had passed from one to the other.

The institutions and practices of a people are a product of the mind; and if the early and spontaneous products of mind are everywhere of the same general pattern as the later manifestations, only less developed, refined, and specialized, it may well be that failure to progress equally is not due to essential unlikeness of mind, but to conditions lying outside the mind.

Another test of mental ability which deserves special notice is mechanical ingenuity. Our white pre-eminence owes much to this faculty, and the lower races are reckoned defective in it. But the lower races do invent, and it is doubtful whether one invention is ever much more difficult than another. On the psychological side, an invention means that the mind sees a roundabout way of reaching an end when it cannot be reached directly. It brings into play the associative memory, and involves the recognition of analogies. There is a certain likeness between the flying back of a bough in one's face and the rebound of a bow, between a serpent's tooth and a poisoned arrow, between floating

<sup>7</sup> Shooter, *The Kaffirs of Natal and the Zulu Country*, p. 102.

timber and a raft or boat; and water, steam, and electricity are like a horse in one respect—they will all make wheels go around, and do work.

Now, the savage had this faculty of seeing analogies and doing things in indirect ways. With the club, knife and sword he struck more effectively than with the fist; with hooks, traps, nets, and pitfalls he understood how to seize game more surely than with the hands; in the bow and arrow, spear, blow-gun, and spring-trap he devised motion swifter than that of his own body; he protected himself with armor imitated from the hides and scales of animals, and turned their venom back on themselves. That the savage should have originated the inventive process and carried it on systematically is, indeed, more wonderful than that his civilized successors should continue the process; for every beginning is difficult.

When occupations become specialized and one set of men has continually to do with one and only one set of machinery and forces, the constant play of attention over the limited field naturally results in improvements and the introduction of new principles. Modern inventions are magnificent and seem quite to overshadow the simpler devices of primitive times; but when we consider the precedents, copies, resources, and accumulated knowledge with which the modern investigator works, and, on the other hand, the resourcelessness of primitive man in materials, ideas, and in the inventive habit itself, I confess that the bow and arrow seems to me the most wonderful invention in the world.

Viewing the question from a different angle, we find another argument for the homogeneous character of the human mind in the fact that the patterns of interest of the civilized show no variation from those of the savage. Not only the appetites and vanities remain essentially the same, but, on the side of intellectual interest, the type of mental reaction fixed in the savage by the food-quest has come down unaltered to the man of science as well as to the man of the street. In circumventing enemies and capturing game, both the attention and the organic processes worked together in primitive man under great stress and strain.

Whenever, indeed, a strain is thrown on the attention, the heart and organs of respiration are put under pressure also in their effort to assist the attention in manipulating the problem; and these organic fluctuations are felt as pleasure and pain. The strains thrown on the attention of primitive man were connected with his struggle for life; and not only in the actual encounter with men and animals did emotion run high, but the memory and anticipation of conflict reinstated the emotional conditions in those periods when he was meditating future conflicts and preparing his bows and arrows, traps and poisons. The problem of invention, the reflective and scientific side of his life, was suffused with interest, because the manufacture of the weapon was, psychologically speaking, a part of the fight.

This type of interest, originating in the hunt, remains dominant in the mind down to the present time. Once constructed to take an interest in the hunting problem, it takes an interest in any problem whatever. Not only do hunting and fighting and all competitive games—which are of precisely the same psychological pattern as the hunt and fight—remain of perennial interest, but all the useful occupations are interesting in just the degree that this pattern is preserved. The man of science works at problems and uses his ingenuity in making an engine in the laboratory in the same way that primitive man used his mind in making a trap. So long as the problem is present, the interest is sustained; and the interest ceases when the problematical is removed. Consequently, all modern occupations of the hunting pattern—scientific investigation, law, medicine, the organization of business, trade speculation, and the arts and crafts—are interesting as a game; while those occupations into which the division of labor enters to the degree that the workman is not attempting to control a problem, and in which the same acts are repeated an indefinite number of times, lose interest and become extremely irksome.

This means that the brain acts pleurably on the principle it was made up to act on in the most primitive times, and the rest is a burden. There has been no brain change, but the social changes have been momentous; and the brain of each new gen-

eration is brought into contact with new traditions, inhibitions, copies, obligations, problems, so that the run of attention and content of consciousness are different. Social suggestion works marvels in the manipulation of the mind; but the change is not in the brain as an organ; it is rather in the character of the stimulations thrust on it by society.

The child begins as a savage, and after we have brought to bear all the influence of home, school, and church to socialize him, we speak as though his nature had changed organically, and institute a parallelism between the child and the race, assuming that the child's brain passes in a recapitulatory way through phases of development corresponding to epochs in the history of the race. I have no doubt myself that this theory of recapitulation is largely a misapprehension. A stream of social influence is turned loose on the child; and if the attention to him is incessant and wise, and the copies he has are good and stimulating, he is molded nearer to the heart's desire. Sometimes he escapes, and becomes a criminal, tramp, sport, or artist; and even if made into an impeccable and model citizen, he periodically breaks away from the network of social habit and goes a-fishing.

The fundamental explanation of the difference in the mental life of two groups is not that the capacity of the brain to do work is different, but that the attention is not in the two cases stimulated and engaged along the same lines. Wherever society furnishes copies and stimulations of a certain kind, a body of knowledge and a technique, practically all its members are able to work on the plan and scale in vogue there, and members of an alien race who become acquainted in a real sense with the system can work under it. But when society does not furnish the stimulations, or when it has preconceptions which tend to inhibit the run of attention in given lines, then the individual shows no intelligence in these lines. This may be illustrated in the fields of scientific and artistic interest. Among the Hebrews a religious inhibition—"thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image"—was sufficient to prevent anything like the sculpture of the Greeks; and the doctrine of the resurrection of the body in the early Christian church, and the teaching that man was made in

the image of God, formed an almost insuperable obstacle to the study of human anatomy.

The Mohammedan attitude toward scientific interest is represented by the following extracts from a letter from an oriental official to a western inquirer, printed by Sir Austen Henry Layard:

*My illustrious Friend and Joy of my Liver:*

The thing which you ask of me is both difficult and useless. Although I have passed all my days in this place, I have neither counted the houses nor inquired into the number of the inhabitants; and as to what one person loads on his mules and the other stows away in the bottom of his ship, that is no business of mine. But above all, as to the previous history of this city, God only knows the amount of dirt and confusion that the infidels may have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam. It were unprofitable for us to inquire into it. . . . Listen, O my son! There is no wisdom equal to the belief in God! He created the world, and shall we liken ourselves unto him in seeking to penetrate into the mysteries of his creation? Shall we say, Behold this star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail goeth and cometh in so many years? Let it go. He from whose hand it came will guide and direct it. . . . Thou art learned in the things I care not for, and as for that which thou hast seen, I spit upon it. Will much knowledge create thee a double belly, or wilt thou seek paradise with thine eyes?

The meek in spirit,

IMAUM ALI ZADI \*

The works of Sir Henry Maine, who gained by his long residence in India a profound insight into oriental character, frequently point out that the eastern pride in conservatism is quite as real as the western pride in progress:

Vast populations, some of them with a civilization considerable but peculiar, detest that which in the language of the West would be called reform. The entire Mohammedan world detests it. The multitudes of colored men who swarm in the great continent of Africa detest it, and it is detested by that large part of mankind which we are accustomed to leave on one side as barbarous or savage. The millions upon millions of men who fill the Chinese Empire loathe it and (what is more) despise it. . . . There are few things more remarkable, and in their way more instructive, than the stubborn incredulity and disdain which a man belonging to the cultivated part of Chinese society opposes to the vaunts of western civilization which he

\* *Fresh Discoveries at Nineveh and Researches at Babylon: Supplement.*

frequently hears. . . . There is in India a minority, educated at the feet of English politicians and in books saturated with English political ideas, which has learned to repeat their language; but it is doubtful whether even these, if they had a voice in the matter, would allow a finger to be laid on the very subjects with which European legislation is beginning to concern itself—social and religious usage. There is not, however, the shadow of a doubt that the enormous mass of the Indian population hates and dreads change.<sup>9</sup>

To the fact that the enthusiasm for change is comparatively rare must be added the fact that it is extremely modern. It is known but to a small part of mankind, and to that part but for a short period during a history of incalculable length.<sup>10</sup>

The oriental attitude does not argue a lack of brain power, but a prepossession hostile to scientific inquiry. The society represented does not interest its members in what, from the western standpoint, is knowledge.

The Chinese afford a fine example of a people of great natural ability letting their intelligence run to waste from lack of a scientific standpoint. As indicated above, they are not defective in brain weight, and their application to study is long continued and very severe; but their attention is directed to matters which cannot possibly make them wise from the occidental standpoint. They learn no mathematics and no science, but spend years in copying the poetry of the T'ang Dynasty, in order to learn the Chinese characters, and in the end cannot write the language correctly because many modern characters are not represented in this ancient poetry. Their attention to Chinese history is great, as befits their reverence for the past; but they do not organize their knowledge, they have no adequate textbooks or apparatus for study, and they make no clear distinction between fact and fiction. In general, they learn only rules and no principles, and rely on memory without the aid of reason, with the result that the man who stops studying often forgets everything, and the professional student is amazingly ignorant in the line of his own work:

Multitudes of Chinese scholars know next to nothing about matters directly in the line of their studies, and in regard to which we should consider ignorance positively disgraceful. A venerable teacher remarked to the

<sup>9</sup> Maine, *Popular Government*, p. 132.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.



writer with a charming naïveté that he had never understood the allusions in the Trimetrical Classic (which stands at the very threshold of Chinese study) until at the age of sixty he had an opportunity to read a Universal History prepared by a missionary, in which for the first time Chinese history was made accessible to him.<sup>11</sup>

Add to this that the whole of their higher learning, corresponding to our university system, consists in writing essays and always more essays on the Chinese classics, and "it is impossible," as Mr. Smith points out, "not to marvel at the measure of success which has attended the use of such materials in China."<sup>12</sup> But when this people is in possession of the technique of the western world—a logic, general ideas, and experimentation—we cannot reasonably doubt that they will be able to work the western system as their cousins, the Japanese, are doing, and perhaps they, too, may better the instruction.

White effectiveness is probably due to the superior technique acting in connection with a superior body of knowledge and sentiment. Of two groups having equal mental endowment, one may outstrip the other by the mere dominance of incident. It is a notorious fact that the course of human history has been largely without prevision or direction. Things have drifted and forces have arisen. Under these conditions an unusual incident—the emergence of a great mind or a forcible personality, or the operation of influences as subtle as those which determine fashions in dress—may establish social habits and copies which will give a distinct character to the modes of attention and mental life of the group. The most significant fact for Aryan development is the emergence among the Greeks of a number of eminent men who developed logic, the experimental method, and philosophic interest, and fixed in their group the habit of looking behind the incident for the general law. Mediaeval attention was diverted from these lines by a religious movement, and the race lost for a time the key to progress and got clean away from the Greek copies; but it found them again and took a fresh start with the revival of Greek learning. It is quite possible to make a fetish

<sup>11</sup> Smith, *Village Life in China*, p. 99.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

of classical learning; but Sir Henry Maine's remark, that nothing moves in the modern world that is not Greek in its origin, is quite just.

The real variable is the individual, not the race. In the beginning—perhaps as the result of a mutation or series of mutations—a type of brain developed which has remained relatively fixed in all times and among all races. This brain will never have any faculty in addition to what it now possesses, because as a type of structure it is as fixed as the species itself, and is indeed a mark of species. It is not apparent either that we are greatly in need of another faculty, or that we could make use of it even if by a chance mutation it should emerge, since with the power of abstraction we are able to do any class of work we know anything about. Moreover, the brain is less likely to make a leap now than in earlier time, both because the conditions of nature are more fixed or more nearly controlled by man, and hence the urgency of adjustment to sharp variations in external conditions is removed, and because the struggle for existence has been mitigated so that the unfit survive along with the fit. Indeed, the rapid increase in idiocy and insanity shown by statistics indicates that the brain is deteriorating slightly, *on the average*, as compared with earlier times.<sup>13</sup>

Nature is not producing a better average brain than in the time of Aristotle and the Greeks. If we have more than the wisdom of our ancestors, our advantage lies in our specialization, our superior body of knowledge, and our superior technique for its transmission. At the same time, the individual brain is unstable, fluctuating in normal persons between 1,100 and 1,500 grams in weight, while the extremes of variation are represented, on the one side, by the imbecile with 300 grams, and the man of genius with 2,000, on the other. It is therefore perfectly true that by artificial selection—Mr. Galton's "eugenism"—a larger average brain could be created, and also a higher average of natural intelligence, whether this be absolutely dependent on

<sup>13</sup> On the increase of insanity and feeble-mindedness, see R. R. Rentoul, "Proposed Sterilization of Certain Mental Degenerates," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, pp. 319 ff.

brain weight or not. But it is hardly to be expected that a stable brain above the capacity of those of the first rank now and in the past will result, since the mutations of nature are more radical than the breeding process of man, and she probably ran the whole gamut. "Great men lived before Agamemnon," and individual variations will continue to occur, but not on a different pattern; and what has been true in the past will happen again in the future, that the group which by hook or by crook comes into possession of the best technique and the best copies will make the best show of intelligence and march at the head of civilization.

### III

The foregoing examination of the relation of the mental faculty of the lower races to the higher places us in a position to examine to better advantage the other question of the relation of the intelligence of woman to that of man.

The differences in mental expression between the lower and the higher races can be expressed for the most part in terms of attention and practice. The differences in run of attention and practice are in this case due to the development of different habits by groups occupying different habitats, and consequently having no copies in common. Woman, on the other hand, exists in the white man's world of practical and scientific activity, but is excluded from full participation in it. Certain organic conditions and historical incidents have, in fact, inclosed her in habits which she neither can nor will fracture, and have also set up in the mind of man an attitude toward her which renders her almost as alien to man's interests and practices as if she were spatially separated from them.

One of the most important facts which stand out in a comparison of the physical traits of men and women is that man is a more specialized instrument for motion, quicker on his feet, with a longer reach, and fitted for bursts of energy; while woman has a greater fund of stored energy and is consequently more fitted for endurance. The development of intelligence and motion have gone along side by side in all animal forms. Through motion chances and experiences are multiplied, the whole equilibrium

characterizing the stationary form is upset, and the organs of sense and the intelligence are developed to take note of and manipulate the outside world. Amid the recurrent dangers incident to a world peopled with moving and predacious forms, two attitudes may be assumed—that of fighting, and that of fleeing or hiding. As between the two, concealment and evasion became more characteristic of the female, especially among mammals, where the young are particularly helpless and need protection for a long period. She remained, therefore, more stationary, and at the same time acquired more cunning, than the male.

In mankind especially the fact that woman had to rely on cunning and the protection of man rather than on swift motion, while man had a freer range of motion and adopted a fighting technique, was the starting-point of a differentiation in the habits and interests, which had a profound effect on the consciousness of each. Man's most immediate, most fascinating, and most remunerative occupation was the pursuit of animal life. The pursuit of this stimulated him to the invention of devices for killing and capture; and this aptitude for invention was later extended to the invention of tools and of mechanical devices in general, and finally developed into a settled habit of scientific interest. The scientific imagination which characterizes man in contrast with woman is not a distinctive male trait, but represents a constructive habit of attention associated with freer movement and the pursuit of evasive animal forms. The problem of control was more difficult, and the means of securing it became more indirect, mediated, reflective, and inventive; that is, more intelligent.

Woman's activities, on the other hand, were largely limited to plant life, to her children, and to manufacture, and the stimulation to mental life and invention in connection with these was not so powerful as in the case of man. Her inventions were largely processes of manufacture connected with her handling of the by-products of the chase. So simple a matter, therefore, as relatively unrestricted motion on the part of man and relatively restricted motion on the part of woman determined the occupations of each, and these occupations in turn created the character-

istic mental life of each. In man this was constructive, answering to his varied experience and the need of controlling a moving environment; and in woman it was conservative, answering to her more stationary and monotonous condition.

In early times man's superior physical force, the wider range of his experience, his mechanical inventions in connection with hunting and fighting, and his combination under leadership with his comrades to carry out their common enterprises, resulted in a contempt for the weakness of women and an almost complete separation in interest between himself and the women of the group. The men frequently formed clubs, and lived apart from the women; and even where this did not happen, the men and women had no mental life in common. To this contempt for women also was added a superstitious fear of them, growing out of the primitive belief that weakness or any other bad quality is infectious, and may be transferred by physical contact or association.<sup>14</sup>

From Mr. Crawley's excellent paper on "Sexual Taboo" I transcribe the following illustrations of this attitude:

In New Caledonia you rarely see men and women talking or sitting together. The women seem perfectly content with the company of their own sex. The men who loiter about with spears in most lazy fashion are seldom seen in the society of the opposite sex. . . . The Ojebwey, Peter Jones, thus writes of his own people: "I have scarcely ever seen anything like social intercourse between husband and wife, and it is remarkable that the women say little in the presence of the men." The Zulus regard their women with a haughty contempt. If a man were going to the bush to cut firewood with his wives, he and they would take different paths, and neither go nor return in company. If he were going to visit a neighbor and wished his wife to go also, she would follow at a distance. In Senegambia the women live by themselves, rarely with their husbands, and their sex is virtually a clique. In Egypt a man never converses with his wife, and in the tomb they are separated by a wall, though males and females are not usually buried in the same vault.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> It is true that in many parts of the world, among the lower races, woman was treated by the men with a chivalrous respect, due to the prevalence of the maternal system and ideas of sympathetic magic; but she nevertheless did not participate in their activities and interests.

<sup>15</sup> A. E. Crawley, "Sexual Taboo," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XXIV, p. 233.

Amongst the Dacotas custom and superstition ordain that the wife must carefully keep away from all that belongs to her husband's sphere of action. The Bechuanas never allow women to touch their cattle; accordingly the men have to plow themselves. . . . In Guiana no woman may go near the hut where *ourali* is made. In the Marquesas Islands the use of canoes is prohibited to the female sex by *tabu*: the breaking of the rule is punished with death. Conversely, amongst the same people *tapa*-making belongs exclusively to the women: when they are making it for their own head-dresses it is *tabu* for the men to touch it. In Nicaragua all the marketing was done by the women. A man might not enter the market nor even see the proceedings at the risk of a beating. . . . In Samoa where the manufacture of cloth is allotted solely to the women, it is a degradation for a man to engage in any detail of the process. . . . An Eskimo thinks it an indignity to row in an *umiak*, the large boat used by women. The different offices of husband and wife are also clearly distinguished; for example, when he has brought his booty to land it would be a stigma on his character if he so much as drew a seal ashore, and generally it is regarded as scandalous for a man to interfere with what is the work of women. In British Guiana cooking is the province of the women, as elsewhere; on one occasion when the men were compelled perforce to bake some bread they were only persuaded to do so with the utmost difficulty, and were ever after pointed at as old women.<sup>16</sup>

Amongst the Barea, man and wife seldom share the same bed; the reason they give is that the breath of the wife weakens the husband. . . . The Khyongthas have a legend of a man who reduced a king and his men to a condition of feebleness by persuading them to dress up as women and perform female duties. When they had thus been rendered effeminate they were attacked and defeated without a blow. . . . Contempt for female timidity has caused a curious custom amongst the Gallas: they amputate the mammae of the boys soon after birth, believing that no warrior can possibly be brave who possesses them, and that they should belong to women only. . . . Amongst the Lhoosais when a man is unable to do his work, whether through laziness, cowardice or bodily incapacity, he is dressed in women's clothes and has to associate and work with the women. Amongst the Pomo Indians of California, when a man becomes too infirm for a warrior, he is made a menial and assists the squaws. . . . When the Delawares were denationalized by the Iroquois and prohibited from going to war they were according to the Indian notion "made women," and were henceforth to confine themselves to the pursuits appropriate to women.<sup>17</sup>

Woman was still further degraded by the development of property and its control by man, together with the habit of treat-

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 227.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123-25.

ing her as a piece of property, whose value was enhanced if its purity were assured and demonstrable. As a result of this situation, man's chief concern in women became an interest in securing the finest specimens for his own use, in guarding them with jealous care from contact with other men, and in making them, together with the ornaments they wore, signs of his wealth and social standing. The instances below are extreme ones, taken from lower social stages than our own, but they differ only in degree from the chaperonage of modern Europe:

I heard from a teacher about some strange custom connected with some of the young girls here [New Ireland], so I asked the chief to take me to the house where they were. The house was about twenty-five feet in length and stood in a reed and bamboo enclosure, across the entrance of which a bundle of dry grass was suspended to show that it was strictly *tabu*. Inside the house there were three conical structures about seven or eight feet in height, and about ten or twelve feet in circumference at the bottom, and for about four feet from the ground, at which point they tapered off to a point at the top. These cages were made of the broad leaves of the pandanus tree, sewn quite close together so that no light, and little or no air could enter. On one side of each is an opening which is closed by a double door of plaited cocoanut tree and pandanus tree leaves. About three feet from the ground there is a stage of bamboos which forms the floor. In each of these cages, we were told there was a young woman confined, each of whom had to remain for at least four or five years, without ever being allowed to go outside the house. I could scarcely credit the story when I heard it; the whole thing seemed too horrible to be true. I spoke to the chief and told him that I wished to see the inside of the cages, and also to see the girls that I might make them a present of a few beads. . . . [A girl having been allowed to come out] I then went to inspect the inside of the cage out of which she had come, but could scarcely put my head inside of it, the atmosphere was so hot and stifling. It was clean and contained nothing but a few short lengths of bamboo for holding water. There was only room for the girl to sit or lie down in a crouched position on the bamboo platform, and when the doors are shut it must be nearly or quite dark inside. They are never allowed to come out except once a day to bathe in a dish or wooden bowl placed close to the cage. They say that they perspire profusely. They are placed in these stifling cages when quite young, and must remain there until they are young women, when they are taken out and have each a great marriage feast prepared for them. One of them was about fourteen or fifteen years old, and the chief told me that she had been there for five years, but would soon be taken out now. The other two were about eight or ten years old,

and they have to stay there for several years longer. I asked if they never died, but they said, "No."<sup>18</sup>

They [the Azande] are extremely jealous of their women-folk, whom they do not permit to live in the same village with themselves. The women's village is generally in the bush, about 200 yards or so distant from that of the chief. Women are never seen in an Azande village, the pathway to their own being kept secret from all outsiders. This system while being something like that observed by the Arabs, has the important distinction that the women are not shut up. They are free to come and go and do what they like, except visit the men's village. In common with the entire native population of Central Africa, the custom among the Zande is that the men do no work that is not connected with the chase or the manufacture of implements. All agriculture is carried on by the women.<sup>19</sup>

From the time of engagement until marriage a young lady is required to maintain the strictest seclusion. Whenever friends call upon her parents she is expected to retire to the inner apartments, and in all her actions and words guard her conduct with careful solicitude. She must use a close sedan whenever she visits her relations, and in her intercourse with her brothers and the domestics in the household maintain great reserve. Instead of having any opportunity to form those friendships and acquaintances with her own sex which among ourselves become a source of much pleasure at the time and advantage in after life, the Chinese maiden is confined to the circle of her relations and her immediate neighbors. She has few of the pleasing remembrances and associations that are usually connected with school-day life, nor has she often the ability or opportunity to correspond by letter with girls of her own age. Seclusion at this time of life, and the custom of crippling the feet, combine to confine women in the house almost as much as the strictest laws against their appearing abroad; for in girlhood, as they know only a few persons except relatives, and can make very few acquaintances after marriage, their circle of friends contracts rather than enlarges as life goes on. This privacy impels girls to learn as much of the world as they can, and among the rich their curiosity is gratified through maid-servants, match-makers, peddlers, visitors, and others.<sup>20</sup>

The world of white civilization is intellectually rich because it has amassed a rich fund of general ideas, and has organized these into specialized bodies of knowledge, and has also developed a special technique for the presentation of this knowledge and

<sup>18</sup> Danks, "Marriage Customs of the New Britain Group," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XVII, p. 284.

<sup>19</sup> Burrows, "On the Native Races of the Upper Welle District of the Belgian Congo," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, N. S. Vol. I, p. 41.

<sup>20</sup> Williams, *The Middle Kingdom*, Vol. I, p. 786.



standpoint to the young members of society, and for localizing their attention in special fields of interest. When for any reason a class of society is excluded from this process, as women have been historically, it must necessarily remain ignorant. But, while no one would make any question that women confined as these in New Ireland and China, as shown above, must have an intelligence as restricted as their mode of life, we are apt to lose sight altogether of the fact that chivalry and chaperonage and modern convention are the persistence of the old race habit of contempt for women, and of their intellectual sequestration. Men and women still form two distinct classes and are not in free communication with each other. Not only are women unable and unwilling to be communicated with directly, unconventionally and truly on many subjects, but men are unwilling to talk to them. I do not have in mind situations involving questions of propriety or delicacy alone, but a certain habit of restraint, originating doubtless in matters relating to sex, extends to all intercourse with women, with the result that they are not really admitted to the intellectual world of men; and there is not only a reluctance on the part of men to admit them, but a reluctance—or rather, a real inability—on their part to enter. Modesty with reference to personal habits has become so ingrained and habitual, and to do anything freely is so foreign to woman, that even free thought is almost of the nature of an immodesty in her.

In connection also with the adventitious position of woman referred to in another paper,<sup>21</sup> the feminine interests and habits are set so strongly toward dress and personal display that they are not readily diverted. Women may and do protest against the triviality of their lives, but emotional interests are more immediate than intellectual ones, and human nature does not drift into intellectual pursuit voluntarily, but is forced into it in connection with the urgency of practical activities. The women who are obliged to work are of the poorer classes, and have not that leisure and opportunity preliminary to any specialized acquirement, while those who have leisure are supported in that position

<sup>21</sup> "The Adventitious Character of Woman," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, pp. 32 ff.

both by money and by precedent and habit, and have no immediate stimulation to lift them out of it. They sometimes entertain ideas of freedom and plan occupational interests, but they have usually become thoroughly habituated to their unfreedom, and continue to feed from the hand.

Custom lies upon them with a weight  
Heavy as frost and deep almost as life.

The usual reasoning as to the ability of women also overlooks the fact that many women are larger and stronger than many men, and some of them possessed of tremendous energy, will, wit, endurance, and sagacity. This type appears in all classes of society, but more frequently in the lower classes and among peasants, both because the natural qualities are less glozed over there by aristocratic custom, and because these classes are bred truer to nature. Unfortunately, the attention of the women of these classes is limited to very immediate concerns; but, on the other hand, they present the true qualities of the female type, and few, I believe, will deny that the peasant woman described below would shine in intellectual walks if fate had called her there:

Mother was a large, stout, full-blooded woman of great strength. She could not read or write, and yet she was well thought of. There are all sorts of educations, and though reading and writing are very well in their way, they would not have done mother any good. She had the sort of education that was needed in her work. Nobody knew more about raising vegetables, ducks, chickens and pigeons than she did. There were some among the neighbors who could read and write and so thought themselves above mother, but when they went to market they found their mistake. Her peas, beans, cauliflower, cabbages, pumpkins, melons, potatoes, beets, and onions sold for the highest price of any, and that ought to show whose education was the best, because it is the highest education that produces the finest work.

Mother used to take me frequently to the market. . . . The market women were a big, rough, fat, jolly set, who did not know what sickness was, and it might have been well for me if I had stayed among them and grown up like mother. One time in the market-place I saw a totally different set of women. It was about eight o'clock in the morning, when some people began to shout: "Here come the rich Americans! Now we will sell things!"

We saw a large party of travelers coming through the crowd. They looked very queer. Their clothes seemed queer, as they were so different from ours. They wore leather boots instead of wooden shoes, and they all looked weak and pale. The women were tall and thin, like bean-poles, and their shoulders were stooped and narrow; most of them wore glasses or spectacles, showing that their eyes were weak. The corners of their mouths were all pulled down, and their faces were crossed and crisscrossed with lines and wrinkles, as though they were carrying all the care of the world. Our women all began to laugh and dance and shout at the strangers. . . . The sight of these people gave me my first idea of America. I heard that the women there never worked, laced themselves too tightly, and were always ill.<sup>22</sup>

The French dressmaker who wrote this passage has the true idea of education and of mind. The mind is an organ for controlling the environment, and it is a safe general principle that the mind which shows high power in the manipulation of a simple situation will show the same quality of efficiency in a more complex one.

The savage the peasant, the poor man, and woman are not what we call intellectual, because they are not taught to know and manipulate the materials of knowledge. The savage is outside the process from geographical reasons; the peasant is not in the center of interest; the poor man's needs are pressing, and do not permit of interests of a mediate character; and woman does not participate because it is neither necessary nor womanly.

Even the most serious women of the present day stand, in any work they undertake, in precisely the same relation to men that the amateur stands to the professional in games. They may be desperately interested and may work to the limit of endurance

<sup>22</sup> *The Life Stories of Undistinguished Americans*. (Edited by Hamilton Holt), pp. 100 ff.

This peasant woman represents the true female type, and the American women in the scene represent the adventitious type of woman. The frail and clinging type is an adjustment to the tastes of man, produced partly by custom and partly by breeding. But in so far as the selection of frail women by men of the upper classes has contributed to the production of a frail or so-called "feminine" type in these classes, this applies to the males as well as the females of these classes. And there is, in fact, a more or less marked tendency to "feminism" apparent among the men and women of the "better classes." If we want to breed for mind, we can do so, but we must breed on a better principle than beauty.

at times; but, like the amateur, they got into the game late, and have not had a life-time of practice, or they do not have the advantage of that pace gained only by competing incessantly with players of the very first rank. No one will contend that the amateur in billiards has a nervous organization less fitted to the game than the professional; it is admitted that the difference lies in the constant practice of the professional, the more exacting standards prevailing in the professional ranks, and constant play in "fast company." A group of women would make a sorry spectacle in competition with a set of men who made billiards their life-work. But how sad a spectacle the eminent philosophers of the world would make in the same competition!

Scientific pursuits and the allied intellectual occupations are a game which women have entered late, and their lack of practice is frequently mistaken for lack of natural ability. Writing some years ago of the women in his classes at the University of Zürich, Professor Carl Vogt said:

At the lectures the young women are models of attention and application; perhaps they even make too great effort to carry home in black and white what they have heard. They generally sit in the front seats, because they register early, and, moreover, because they come early, long before the lecture begins. But it is noticeable that they give only a superficial glance at the preparations which the professor passes around. Sometimes they pass them to their neighbor without even looking at them; a longer examination would prevent their taking notes.

On examination the conduct of the young women is the same as during the lectures. They know better than the young men. To employ a classroom expression, they are enormously crammed. Their memory is good, so that they know perfectly how to give the answer to the question which is put. But generally they stop there. An indirect question makes them lose the thread. As soon as the examiner appeals to individual reason, the examination is over; they do not answer. The examiner seeks to make the sense of the question clearer, and uses a word, perhaps, which is in the manuscript of the student, when, pop! the thing goes as if you had pressed the button of a telephone. If the examination consisted solely in written or oral replies to questions on subjects which have been treated in the lectures or which could be read up in the manuals, the ladies would always secure brilliant results. But, alas! there are other practical tests in which the candidate finds herself face to face with reality, and that she cannot meet successfully

unless she has done practical work in the laboratories, and it is there that the shoe pinches.

The respect in which laboratory work is particularly difficult to women—one would hardly believe it—is that they are often very awkward and clumsy with their hands. The assistants in the laboratories are unanimous in their complaint; they are pursued with questions about the most trifling things, and one woman gives them more trouble than three men. One would think the delicate fingers of these young women adapted especially to microscopic work, to the manipulation of small slides, to cutting thin sections, to making the most delicate preparations; the truth is quite the contrary. You can tell the tale of a woman at a glance: from the fragments of glass, broken instruments, the broken scalpels, the spoiled preparations. There are doubtless exceptions, but they are exceptions.<sup>23</sup>

Zürich was among the first of the European universities opening their doors to women, and it is particularly interesting to see their first efforts in connection with the higher learning. Without a wide experience of life, and without practice in constructive thinking, they naturally fell back on the memory to retain a hold on results in a field with which they were not sufficiently trained to operate in it independently. It is frequently alleged, and is implied in Professor Vogt's report, that women are distinguished by good memories and poor powers of generalization. But this is to mistake the facts. A tenacious memory is characteristic of women and children, and of all persons unskilled in the manipulation of varied experiences in thought. But when the mind is able at any moment to construct a result from the raw materials of experience, the memory loses something of its tenacity and absoluteness. In this sense it may even be said that a good memory for details is a sign of an untrained or imitative mind. As the mind becomes more inventive, the memory is less concerned with the details of knowledge and more with the knowledge of places to find the details when they are needed in any special problem.

The awkwardness in manual manipulation shown by these girls was also surely due to lack of practice. The fastest typewriter in the world is today a woman; the record for roping steers (a feat depending on manual dexterity rather than physical

<sup>23</sup> Ploss, *Das Weib*. 3. Aufl., Vol. I, p. 46.

force) is held by a woman; and anyone who will watch girls making change before the pneumatic tubes in the great department stores about Christmas time will experience the same wonder one feels on first seeing a professional gambler shuffling cards.

In short, Professor Vogt's report on women students is just what was to be expected in Germany forty years ago. The American woman, with the enjoyment of greater liberty, has made an approach toward the standards of professional scholarship, and some individuals stand at the very top in their university studies and examinations. The trouble with these cases is that they are either swept away and engulfed by the modern system of marriage, or find themselves excluded in some intangible way from association with men in the fullest sense, and no career open to their talents.

The personal liberty of women is, comparatively speaking, so great in America, suggestion and copies for imitation are spread broadcast so copiously in the schools, newspapers, books, and lectures, and occupations and interests are becoming so varied, that a number of women of natural ability and character are realizing some definite aim in a perfect way. But these are sporadic cases, representing usually some definite interest rather than a full intellectual life, and resembling also in their nature and rarity the elevation of a peasant to a position of eminence in Europe. Nowhere in the world do women as a class lead a perfectly free intellectual life in common with the men of the group, unless it be in restricted and artificial groups like the modern revolutionary party in Russia.

Even in America a number of the great schools are not co-educational, and in those which are so, many of the instructors claim that they do not find it possible to treat with the men and women on precisely the same basis, both because of their own mental attitude toward mixed classes and the inability of the women to receive such treatment. In the case of women also we can say what Mr. Smith says of the Chinese and their system of education, that it is impossible not to marvel at the results they accomplish in view of the system under which they work.

The mind and the personality are largely built up by suggestion from the outside, and if the suggestions are limited and particular, so will be the mind. The world of modern intellectual life is in reality a white man's world. Few women and perhaps no blacks have ever entered this world in the fullest sense. To enter it in the fullest sense would be to be in it at every moment from the time of birth to the time of death, and to absorb it unconsciously and consciously, as the child absorbs language. When something like this happens, we shall be in a position to judge of the mental efficiency of woman and the lower races. At present we seem justified in inferring that the differences in mental expression are no greater than they should be in view of the existing differences in opportunity.

Whether the characteristic mental life of women and the lower races will prove to be identical with those of the white man or different in quality is a different question, and problematical. It is certain, at any rate, that our civilization is not of the highest type possible. In all of our relations there is too much of primitive man's fighting instinct and technique; and it is not impossible that the participation of woman and the lower races will contribute new elements, change the stress of attention, disturb the equilibrium, and force a crisis which will result in the reconstruction of our habits on more sympathetic and equitable principles. Certain it is that no civilization can remain the highest if another civilization adds to the intelligence of its men the intelligence of its women.

# INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE

## I

### THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE DEMAND FOR A SOCIAL POLICY OF WORKINGMEN'S INSURANCE

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1. The economic condition of wage-workers calls for insurance as a necessary part of their protection against dependence and suffering. While the statistical material for determining the number of persons requiring social insurance is not entirely satisfactory, it does enable us to make a fairly accurate estimate for our purpose. There is a common assumption in this country that the wages of workingmen are so high that social insurance is not desirable; that, with the ordinary private associations and insurance companies at hand, there is no demand for collective effort, with some measure of governmental intervention, stimulus, and regulation. It is not necessary to exaggerate poverty to prove the need of a social policy of insurance. This is demonstrated by the fact that it is precisely the men of the successful classes who realize the wisdom of distributing risks, and of providing a fund in case of incapacity for labor or of death by the method of insurance rather than by depending entirely on savings and investments. If the ordinary professional man should wait until his investments would provide for his needs in long illness or for his family in case of his death, during the first part of his career the family would be practically within a few months of dependence on charity. On the other hand, no system of saving or of insurance can do much for the non-industrial classes, as idiots, insane, paupers of all categories, vagabonds, and criminals. Workingmen's insurance can help only workingmen—those who spend most of their lives earning a living and who are paid wages or small salaries. For defectives and paupers industrial insurance is inapplicable, and these must be supported by public or private relief; while delinquents are placed under



public control at compulsory labor in coercive institutions. People of wealth can easily protect themselves by investments or by insurance in private companies. If they pay too much for this benefit, their business training enables them to discover legal means of redress and correction. But the majority of wage-earners are not in like situation and require some form of collective action.

In this connection we must determine as accurately as possible who should receive the advantages of a social policy of insurance. Various attempts have been made to estimate the average income necessary to prevent dependence on public relief and private charity. The average income will vary in purchasing power in different localities, and whole sections of the population do not enjoy the average rate of earnings. In certain occupations the workers live in cities where rent and food are unduly expensive, and yet their earnings are made low by competition among themselves, as in the needle industries in New York and Chicago. To speak of the average earnings in this connection is often misleading mockery. We may, however, give estimates of careful observers in relation to the margin of dependence on relief.

Mr. P. Roberts says: "It was shown by the Bureau of Statistics of Massachusetts that it takes a family of five persons \$754 a year to live on."<sup>1</sup> This does not give the minimum standard of bare existence, but a reasonable standard of comfort, and that only for certain areas in the state of Massachusetts. It would not apply to the negroes of South Carolina, where one of their families might regard an income of \$400 a year as luxury.

The minimum standard means the income below which an average family cannot fall without reducing industrial efficiency and becoming to some extent dependent. Dr. E. T. Devine, whose experience as secretary of the Charity Organization Society of New York gives his judgment special weight, thought that the minimum income on which it is practicable to remain self-supporting, and to maintain a decent standard of living, was \$600 a year, in his city. In 1904 he thought that the amount should be placed at \$700 on account of the rise in cost of articles

<sup>1</sup> *Anthracite Coal Communities*, p. 346.

necessary to maintain existence. In 1907, in view of more recent studies, he inclines to raise this figure very much.<sup>2</sup> Here again the minimum standard is explicitly reckoned for the largest and most crowded city in the United States, where rents are highest, food most costly, and the cold climate demands good house shelter, much fuel, and warm woolen clothing.

Generally speaking, the class of persons who need and can receive benefit from any system of collective insurance are, on the one side, not the wealthy, nor, on the other side, the dependents, defectives, and delinquents, but, actually, the vast majority of those who live on small wages or salaries, and who, in a struggle to live decently and educate their children, have difficulty in "making ends meet." In fact, this description covers much more than half the population; that is, in the United States, perhaps now over 40,000,000 persons, bread-winners and members of their families dependent on them for a living. This is an under estimate, but it is a number large enough to present a problem worthy of arousing the attention of scholars and statesmen. It is not worthy of a nation like ours to regard social care as merely a means of keeping the weakest members from abject misery and death by starvation. The aim of social insurance is not only to "keep the wolf from the door," but to keep him so far away that he cannot destroy sleep with his howls. The wage-worker has special claims upon collective consideration because he no longer has any ownership in the materials and instruments of production, nor any voice in management of the process nor control of the conditions under which his body and mind may suffer. It is this fact, and not their absolute misery, which gives the members of the wage-earning group a special right to the consideration of lawmaking bodies. The employers enjoy armed protection of their lives and property, without which they would be at the mercy of the majority of inferior economic position. No class of persons receive relatively so much help from government as the rich. Over against this is the interest of the wage-earners in having their fortunes protected by a power which is over all and which is directed by the representatives of all.

<sup>2</sup> *Principles of Relief*, pp. 34-36; cf. *Charities and Commons*, November 17, 1906.

The extent of the group under consideration cannot be measured with desirable exactness, but for practical purposes the following analysis will aid the judgment. The total population of the United States, according to the Twelfth Census, including Alaska, Hawaii, Indian Territory, Indians on reservations, was 76,303,387 (75,693,734 without counting the persons in districts named), of whom 66,890,199 were whites and 8,803,535 of African descent.<sup>3</sup>

The number of persons at least ten years of age who were engaged in gainful occupations was given in the last census.<sup>4</sup> Only a part of the more significant facts are here reproduced. Of 10,381,765 engaged in agricultural pursuits, 4,410,877 are called agricultural laborers and 5,674,875 farmers, planters, and overseers. Many other laborers are lumbermen, raftsmen, wood-choppers, etc. The negro laborers of the south must be studied apart.

In the group "professional services" we notice that teachers and professors in colleges number 446,133, the majority of whom require some form of insurance, especially for sickness, invalidism, and old age, since they are on low salaries.<sup>5</sup> The "trade and transportation" group includes persons of widely differing incomes, but nearly all need industrial insurance, and it is with this group that the most reliable insurance schemes have already been organized. There were in this class 4,766,964 persons.

In the group devoted to "manufacturing and mechanical pursuits" there were 7,085,992 persons (5,772,788 males and 1,313,204 females). The great majority of these are wage-workers or employees on small salaries, and need industrial insurance in all its forms. The employees are not separated from the employers in this enumeration. It is well known that the tendency is to increase the relative ratio of wage-workers to employers where the great industry prevails. The total number of persons above ten years of age in "gainful occupation" was 29,074,117 (23,754,205 males, 5,319,912 females).

<sup>3</sup> *Statistical Abstract*, 1903, p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 494-97.

<sup>5</sup> National Education Association, *Report of Committee on Salaries, Tenure, and Pensions of Public-School Teachers in the United States*, 1905.

Of family incomes of workingmen in the United States we have a valuable recent study based on investigations of the conditions of life for 25,440 families in various callings and districts. The data were gathered in the principal industrial centers of thirty-three states, including the District of Columbia.<sup>6</sup> The investigation was restricted to families of wage-workers and of persons on salaries not exceeding \$1,200 a year, and persons engaged in business on their own account were not considered. The facts refer chiefly to the year 1901. We may select one of the most general statements of income:

The total family income varied from \$908.68 in Colorado to \$420.03 in South Carolina. In eight states the income was above \$800 per year, in twelve states between \$700 and \$800, in ten states between \$600 and \$700, in two states between \$500 and \$600, and in one state below \$500. The largest average income per family from all sources in any of the geographical divisions was \$883.39, reported for the Western states. In the North Atlantic states it was \$755.49; in the North Central states it was \$751.62; in the South Atlantic states it was \$690.80; and in the South Central states it was \$675.42.

These family incomes were made up from several sources:

Expressed in percentages, these figures would show that 79.49 per cent. of the average income of all families came from the earnings of husbands, 1.47 per cent. from the earnings of wives, 9.49 per cent. from the earnings of children, 7.78 per cent. from boarders and lodgers, and 1.77 per cent. from other sources.<sup>7</sup>

The difficulty of representing the actual condition of many families through these general statements has been felt by all students. Professor Mayo-Smith, on the basis of earlier data, ventured the statement, with very strong qualifications as to the value of the estimates, that the average annual earnings for all employees, in 1890, excluding officers, firm members, and clerks, was \$444.83.

This figure is, perhaps, the nearest approach we have to an average wage for the United States. It is not, however, a typical wage, for the reason that it includes the wages of men, women, and children, of apprentices and piece-workers.

<sup>6</sup> *Eighteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, 1903*: "Cost of Living and Retail Prices of Food."

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58.

He thought that it would be approximately correct to say that the wages of operatives were: "for males above sixteen years, \$498; for females above fifteen years, \$276; for children. \$191.<sup>8</sup>

If we take the large and interesting group of anthracite miners by themselves, we find that the average number in each family is between five and six persons, and the earnings of contract miners, who form only 25 per cent., of all the persons employed in the mines, is about \$600 a year; while other workers, 60 per cent. of all, receive \$450 a year.<sup>9</sup>

The conditions can be set before the mind from another point of view by considering the expenditures of workingmen's families. The total expenditures for all purposes per family, in the United States in 1900, as indicated by the study of 20,615 families, was \$699.24. It varied in individual states from \$786.64 in the District of Columbia to \$365.15 in South Carolina. The average expenditure in the North Atlantic states was \$704.16; in the South Atlantic states, \$650.18; and in the South Central states, \$640.44. The expenditure constituted 93.21 per cent. of the income in the North Atlantic states; 94.12 per cent. in the South Atlantic states; 94.31 per cent. in the North Central states; 94.82 per cent. in the South Central states; 84.27 per cent. in the Western states; and 93.29 per cent. in all states. The average income for the year of 25,440 families exceeded their average expenditures by \$50.26, or, including payments made during the year on the principal of mortgages on homes, \$7 more on the average.<sup>10</sup>

In the same *Report* is shown the surplus and deficit of family incomes (p. 61).

A surplus at the end of the year was reported by 12,816 families, or about one-half of the whole number of families. The average surplus for these families was \$120.84. A deficit was reported for 4,117 families, the average deficit for these families being \$65.58. Of the total there remained 8,507 families, and these reported that they came out even at the end of the year.

<sup>8</sup> Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Economics*, p. 298-302, citing U. S. Census of 1890, *Manufactures*, Part I, p. 20.

<sup>9</sup> P. Roberts, *Anthracite Coal Communities*, p. 346.

<sup>10</sup> *Eighteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor*, pp. 60, 61. Facts for negroes are included in tables and not shown separately, p. 15.

Assets and liabilities are not shown. The figures given indicate the narrow margin between income and subsistence. A few weeks of sickness or incapacity through accidents, and the meager reserve is consumed, and the family faces want and dependence on charity; for the little savings and feeble credit on honor or pawn will not go far. The statistics of charity give a picture, though as yet very imperfect, of the number of families who each year cross this line and eat the bitter bread of public or private relief; but no statistics which can ever be gathered can visualize the conditions of constant dread of suffering and pauperism which are the hourly torment of thoughtful workingmen.<sup>11</sup>

If we turn to the question of savings, we encounter serious complications; for the deposits in savings banks are composed of the savings of persons of all classes. In the *Report* just cited it is said that of 2,567 families studied, 1,480 families had a surplus at the end of the year, and disposed of it as follows: kept it on hand, 491 families; placed it in bank, 682 families; invested in building associations, 63; in real estate, 42; in shares of stock, 5; loaned money, 3; paid debts, 60; other methods, 1; not reported, 133 families.<sup>12</sup>

The *Statistical Abstract for 1903* (p. 72) stated that in the United States, in 1902-3, there were 7,035,228 depositors in the savings banks; the amount of their deposits was \$2,935,204,845; the average to the credit of each depositor, \$417.21. But this gives little direct light on our subject, because the social and financial classification of depositors is not given.

It would be interesting to know how far the savings of workingmen are invested in some form of insurance; and here we have considerable information, but not much that is encouraging. Of 2,567 families reported to the commissioner of labor, 806 held insurance on property and 1,689 on life; 944 paid dues to labor organizations, and 1,123 to other kinds of organizations, including a certain sum for insurance.<sup>13</sup> On the surface the showing is very impressive. There were in the year 1902 in the United

<sup>11</sup> Adams and Sumner, *Labor Problems*, pp. 142 ff., 526.

<sup>12</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 512.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 421-69, 501.

States 4,160,088 policies of the ordinary form, with annual payments of premium, or at least infrequent payments, in force. The face value of these policies was \$8,701,587,912.

The total income of all companies was \$504,527,705, and payments to policy-holders \$199,883,721; the assets, \$2,091,822,-851; the surplus, \$293,685,990; the number of policies of all kinds, 17,608,212; and their value, \$10,508,478,776.

If we turn to the "industrial" companies, we have to deal with insurance which really touches vitally the working people on small incomes, and in these companies we find 13,448,124 policies, with a face value of \$1,806,890,864. The average amount of each policy is small—about \$135.<sup>14</sup> This analysis will be carried further in the discussion of private insurance.

Another point of view may be taken for the consideration of the need of insurance of workingmen in this country. Have they accumulations of wealth which will furnish them credit in case of incapacity for daily labor? Here again the averages of wealth per inhabitant, including billionaires and day laborers, are absolutely deceptive. Though often cited by political partisans to prove the extraordinary prosperity of wage-earners, they have no value for any such purpose. And when we come to classify the population by income we confront serious, perhaps insuperable, difficulties. C. D. Wright says: "American statistics do not warrant any very careful classification of the distribution of wealth."<sup>15</sup> He quotes Mulhall's estimate for England:

With a population in 1891 of 38,857,000 he finds that the rich numbered 327,000, with an average of about \$136,000 per head; that the middle class numbered 2,380,000, with nearly \$4,500 per head; that the working class numbered 18,210,000, with about \$150 per head; and the children 17,940,000, without any estimates as to their holdings. In all probability the distinctions here approximate those for the United Kingdom.

2. There is a marked tendency in all modern countries to form a group of families dependent on wages or small salaries for their living. These are in a certain degree dependent on

<sup>14</sup> *Statistical Abstract*, 1903, p. 421, prepared by Frederick L. Hoffman, insurance statistician of the Prudential Company.

<sup>15</sup> *Practical Sociology*, p. 312.

managers of capital even for the opportunity of labor and for the determination of the conditions of life. In no country is the growth of the great industry more marked than in the United States. It is true that the agricultural occupations have not yet come into this current, and that very many moderate industries are fairly prosperous and have a prospect for the future. But these eddies must not divert our attention from the main direction of industrial development. The enlargement and concentration of the class of wage-earners are facts of vital importance in relation to the need of social insurance. The manager of business finds in the business itself means of investment and a provision for periods of incapacity for active labor—a store which he can personally control. The well-paid professional man can support himself in periods of leisure, in sickness and old age, out of financial reserves invested in productive funds. The farmer can rely upon a mortgage or sale of lands or cattle for credit or income while he is laid aside from personal industry. But the wage-worker generally lives in cities where all he consumes must be paid for in money; the wages of most members of this class furnish scant margin of surplus for investment; the accumulation of a fund which will provide income in emergencies is a long and painful process; and thus the only reliable method of providing surely and at the beginning of need for emergencies is insurance. Investments in the securities offered by industrial and commercial companies, even if there are savings, seem to the person unacquainted with this world of speculators as little better than gambling. Secure bonds render slight returns. The tendency toward the enlargement of a class of persons dependent on wages is indicated in this citation from Mayo-Smith:

While population from 1880 to 1890 increased 24.6 per cent., the number of persons ten years of age and over engaged in gainful occupations increased 30.7 per cent. The increase in agriculture, fisheries, and mining was, however, only 12.6 per cent., and in domestic and personal services, 24.5 per cent. On the other hand, the number of persons engaged in professional services increased 56.6 per cent.; in manufacturing and mechanical industries, 49.1 per cent.; and in trade and transportation, 78.2 per cent.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Economics*, p. 70.



This means that most of the workers are absolutely without hope of escaping from a position in which they depend on capitalists for employment, and that their permanent interests are with their own group. The same writer presents further illustrations in the words:

In the manufacture of agricultural implements the number of establishments decreased 1,033 or 53 per cent., while the number of employees increased 2,964 or 7.5 per cent., and the value of the products twelve million dollars or 18.4 per cent.<sup>17</sup>

In the manufacture of boots and shoes, gristmills, paper factories, cotton-mills, the same tendency is observed. But the fact is too familiar and obvious to require further mention.

3. The necessity for providing industrial insurance has become acute. If the nation only knew the facts, there would be radical legislation within a short time. But, as a matter of fact, men of the business world, forced by the absurd employers' liability laws, have followed a policy of concealment as by a universal instinct. Of occupational accidents we gain suggestive glimpses, but of the causes of disease and premature age and death in industries we have in this country little information either from governments or from insurance companies. The insurance companies are apparently afraid to join in a comparative study of their own experience, for fear their competitors will use the information. And so we are compelled to put together mere fragments of knowledge, and hope that the general and state governments will pursue the study, and thus awaken general interest and direct action. Only in the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission have we fairly satisfactory reports of accidents to passengers, workmen, and others. The laws of eleven states require reports of accidents in factories, but only one state is attempting to secure reports of accidents in all industries. The state of Wisconsin passed a law in 1905 which makes it the duty of physicians to report all accidents which result in the serious injury of workmen and cause incapacity for work during a period of more than two weeks. The final results of these reports are not yet known, but it has been estimated that the accidents

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 173.

in that state number from 15,000 to 20,000 annually. One of the most important casualty companies has given out certain figures which it has made in connection with insuring employers from loss occasioned by damage suits of injured workmen. During the years 1889-1903 this company issued policies to employers who paid out \$1,905,515,398 in wages to about 3,811,030 workmen, and in this number there occurred 185,088 accidents. After bringing together all the evidence he could collect, Dr. Josiah Strong estimates the number of killed and wounded in the army of labor at over 550,000 annually. This does not include the sickness and consequent death caused by occupations.

This is 50 per cent. more than all the killed and wounded in the late war between Japan and Russia. There are more casualties on our railways in a single year than there were on both sides of the Boer war in three years. . . . There were twenty-four times as many casualties on our railways in one year as our army suffered in the Philippine war in three years and three months. . . . Taking the lowest of our three estimates of industrial accidents, the total number of casualties suffered by our industrial army in one year is equal to the average annual casualties of our Civil War, plus those of the Philippine war, plus those of the Russian and Japanese war.<sup>18</sup>

The hazard varies, of course, in different occupations. In an investigation made in New York for 1899 and covering selected industries it was found that the number in 1,000 injured was in trades connected with stone and clay products, 15.18; metals, machinery, and apparatus, 26.57; wood, 18.42; leather, rubber, pearl, etc., 3.21; chemicals, oils, and explosives, 44.06; pulp, paper, and cardboard, 41.46; printing and allied trades, 9.19; textiles, 8.91; clothing, millinery, laundering, etc., 1.35; food, tobacco, and liquors, 13.51; public utilities, 37.28; building industry, 26.20. Mr. F. L. Hoffman estimates the average number of miners killed in the United States and Canada at 2.64 per 1,000. The number of men killed per 100,000 of population in the registration states during the year ending May 31, 1900, was: in the professions, 61.1; mercantile and trading, 46.0; laboring and servant, 220.2; manufacture and mechanical industry, 88.4; agriculture, transportation, and other outdoor, 139.6.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *North American Review*, November, 1906, p. 1030 ff.; *Social Service*, August, 1906.

<sup>19</sup> Bailey, *Modern Social Conditions*, pp. 247-97, 253.

It is probably generally supposed that agricultural industry is comparatively free from accidents; but this does not seem to be true. The figures we have for America agree with those which have been collected in Europe. The number of deaths of men (between fifteen and forty-four years of age), according to the Twelfth Census, was in cities 122.4 per 100,000 population, and in the rural population 122.1.

The mortality from accidents in specified occupations, according to English experience, 1890-92, is shown by Mr. F. L. Hoffman in this table (rate per 1,000 at each age).<sup>20</sup>

Ages	Professional	Agricultural	General Trades and Industries	Unhealthful Trades	Dangerous Trades	Unhealthful and Dangerous Trades	Common Labor
15-19.....	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.4	1.6	0.4
20-24.....	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.6	1.6	0.6
25-34.....	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.6	1.8	0.8
35-44.....	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.9	2.1	1.1
45-54.....	0.3	0.6	0.8	0.8	2.3	2.8	1.5
55-64.....	0.6	1.0	1.1	1.1	3.0	3.2	2.0
65 and over.....	1.0	1.6	1.9	2.2	3.9	4.1	3.4

4. Influence of individualistic optimism on the progress of social policies in the United States. Confidence in the ability of each man to care for himself has grown out of the facts of those early economic conditions when the hunter defended himself Indian fashion against Indians, and earned his livelihood on his own farm. In one generation a nation has passed through all stages of industrial development, from hunting and household production for household use to leadership in collective production by huge combinations for a world-market. Sentiments, in the form of prejudices, survive the situation which produced them, men carry the ideas of the isolated farm into the congregate life of cities where they are out of place, and fathers teach to sons the philosophy of *Poor Richard's Almanac* in an environment where it requires enlargement to explain and fit the facts. Until very recently it was the common belief, for which there was much evidence, that any industrious, sober, and thrifty wage-worker could become an independent manager of business; and this cheerful faith endures millions of disappointments.

<sup>20</sup> *Annals of American Academy*, May, 1906, p. 28.

Leadership is still largely in the hands of vigorous men who climbed to places of power under the spur of this faith in individual effort, and who, spite of the revolution in methods of conducting affairs, preach the same doctrine to thousands of wage-workers whom they control as with a rod of iron. The unconscious assumption of our captains of industry is that intervention of government is necessarily evil—unless they happen to be in a council asking a franchise, or in a lobby asking for a protective tariff for some infant industry. The managing class, mindful of the success of their splendid confidence in their own power to master difficulties, sincerely believe that wage-workers have no need of social care. They have been encouraged in this creed by the economic and political instruction which had its root in the revolutionary effort to cast off mediaeval restrictions. According to this theory, the state has but one task—that of preserving order and property, while competition is left to work out all the advantages which they expect from it. "The best government is that which governs least," has been a popular proverb.

It is true that the logic is forgotten when a railroad company asks from government half the land along its right-of-way, and a large cash bonus to reward its enterprise and make dividends secure; or when a city council has special privileges to barter. The same leaders return to the inherited theory when rates are to be regulated, workmen are to be protected, or lives of citizens to be safeguarded. The stinging epithets of "socialist" or "paternalist" is apt to be flung at anyone who suggests that the nation which demands of its workmen both taxes for support and in war lives for its defense ought to act in return so that its wise paternalism shall evoke patriotism.<sup>21</sup> When one seeks to gather from the experience of older countries lessons to guide our own action as we move onward rapidly to the economic condition of ancient states, we are told that we of a free republic cannot copy the methods of "absolutism," cannot submit to the "tyranny" of a country like Germany. Progress is often halted for a time by such catchwords which betray provincialism of thought.

Distrust of governmental interference is fostered by defects

<sup>21</sup> What is patriotism but love for "fatherland"?

in our political organization and conduct familiar to all, and these are largely due to the fact that the hope of prizes in the world of management has drained off much of the best talent to business and away from direct public service of the community. It is not too much to say that the average successful business man has an ill-concealed contempt both for the ability and for the integrity of men who direct politics. There has been so much inefficiency and corruption under the spoils system that only too much reason exists for this widespread distrust of competent men for those in charge of municipal and national administration. Some of the leaders of business have only too intimate knowledge of the ways in which representatives of the people can be purchased to have respect for politicians as a class, for they have themselves made the deals. This distrust has been deeper and wider than was deserved; for, in fact, the administration of many public works has been, on the whole, successful and a part of the national glory. Where the public administration has failed it might have succeeded better if business men had not been so absorbed in making themselves rich.

5. The absence of a national legislative power and of either national or state administrative organs adapted to insurance has tended to retard progress in the social protection of workingmen. Congress is limited by the Constitution to interstate commerce as a field of legislation and control. Many of the industries can be touched only by state laws. In the states until recently a central administrative organization has been almost entirely wanting. In Germany there has long been a central administration with great power, and in France the nation is accustomed to give to the regulations of administrative councils all the force of law. The development of the Home Office in Great Britain enables the legislator there to enforce laws which here would require the creation of new agencies or the very great increase of functions of existing organs. The independence of each state is an obstacle in the way of passing laws which involve expense in the management of business, since the manufacturers and traders of each state are in competition with those of all other states. These are some of the difficulties which must be overcome in the

process of securing for workingmen the protection and insurance which have come to be regarded as just in all other advanced nations. A bill brought before the Legislature of Massachusetts in 1904 to introduce the British Compensation Act of 1897 was defeated by the claim of the manufacturers that the indemnities required of them would cripple them in competing with manufacturers of other states. The same argument could be used in all other states, and we should have a deadlock, if the argument were sound.

6. In order to escape from this whirlpool in which our political system seems to hold us, it must be shown that the social policy of protection, education, and insurance, so far from being a financial burden on the manufacturers of a state, is a paying investment; that the best investment of a business community is not in machines of steel and wood, but in its productive human agents; and that the state which first commits itself honestly to this policy and works it out wisely will take and keep the lead in business, by attracting and holding an army of healthy, sober, conservative, relatively contented and faithful workmen. This is no place to do more than suggest the outline of an argument in favor of this proposition. It rests on the fact that the condition of bodily vigor, of comparative contentment and serenity of mind, of freedom from irritating and depressing despair in prospect of incapacity to earn a living temporarily or permanently, is an asset of first importance in the process of continuous manufacture. The workman who has suitable conditions of human existence is for that industrially more efficient, is a better customer with larger and more steady purchasing power, loses less time by drunkenness and vice, has more varied wants, and demands more kinds, finer grades, and larger quantities of commodities. The state whose industries take best care of its men will swiftly and surely attract and hold the best workmen. It is the fashion in some quarters to undervalue this argument, and to ascribe all virtue to improved machinery and shop organization and modes of paying wages; but, after all, the experience of a century is worth more than the passing passion of a man sore after a strike, and common-sense will surely come to the help

of morality and decide that, on the whole, human workers, with sound bodies and varied wants, are at once our first factor in large production and our largest market for goods made. A million such civilized customers are better than several millions of naked savages or all the spendthrifts in the world.

It is a pleasure to quote the testimony of a man in the highest position in finance, that workingmen's insurance "has become one of the leading factors in helping Germany to the industrial pre-eminence which she is gaining."<sup>22</sup> In speaking of the sickness insurance of Germany he says:

The testimony in regard to the value of the work done in the sick insurance system is almost universally favorable. It would be hard to calculate its economic importance, but it is so great that it has become one of the leading factors in helping Germany to the industrial pre-eminence which she is gaining.

7. The attitude of the trade-unions to obligatory insurance, the only kind which can ever afford help to all and especially to those who most require it, is still in doubt. The national assembly of the American Federation has voted down a resolution favoring such insurance in the form presented to it. But the probability is that under its more recent forms, when once clearly explained to the members and properly presented, it will soon win their favor. Obligatory workingmen's insurance has been in the past in this country connected with attempts to compel the workmen to pay an excessive share of the premiums, to break the power of the union and alienate its members, and to retain the equitable share of the funds to which the men have contributed if they leave the service or are discharged. In conventions the propositions for collective insurance have been championed by the socialist faction and have gone down in the defeat of this party. Insurance in the European sense has never yet been offered to our workmen in any state. When it is shown that obligatory insurance does not mean absolute control of employers, but union of effort in which both sides are fairly represented in local management; that the interest in collective bargaining remains untouched; that voluntary organizations are recognized and made

<sup>22</sup> Mr. F. A. Vanderlip, in *North American Review*, December, 1905, p. 925.

secure by suitable state supervision and control; and that taxpayers, so far from being asked to increase burdens, will be substantially relieved from many charity demands, it seems likely that indifference and antagonism will change to approval. Mr. John Mitchell has expressed a favorable opinion which already has won the attention and the approval of many trade-unionists.<sup>23</sup>

8. America has no system of industrial insurance, but a beginning has been made from various starting-points—local societies, trades-unions, fraternal societies, employers' initiative, private corporations, casualty companies, and municipalities. The nation throughout its history, from Plymouth pilgrims down to our own day, has developed the most extensive pension system known to the civilized world. Out of these fragmentary, contradictory, inadequate, unsystematic experiments the nation has yet to develop a consistent and worthy social policy. It is our purpose to describe these various schemes,<sup>24</sup> and to inquire what measures promise immediate improvement and tend in the right direction. Signs are not wanting that many of the most competent leaders of industry and commerce will in the near future give much more attention to this problem than they have hitherto done.

<sup>23</sup> *Report of Industrial Commission*, Vol. XII, p. 50.

<sup>24</sup> The Department of Labor is now engaged on a thorough investigation of the whole subject, and a report is expected at the end of the year 1907.



## FACTORY INSPECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

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The subject of labor legislation has never received any serious consideration from the successful business men of the United States, because interference with the "private affairs of the individual" has been looked upon as socialistic and un-American. The enthusiastic supporter of the Dingley tariff preaches an extreme doctrine of *laissez faire*, when forced to discuss so unimportant a subject as the conditions under which the wage-worker labors; if he acknowledges the existence of evils in the absence of regulation, it is a grudging concession to the sentimentalist or the meddling American woman. Yet at no time in the industrial countries of Europe have manufacture and trade been free from governmental interference; in England the old mercantile regulations were not swept away before the crying evils incident to the new methods of industry had called forth the factory laws. The first timid effort toward amelioration was the ineffectual statute regarding the employment of pauper children passed by the British Parliament in 1802; this was followed by a succession of laws affecting a larger and larger number of children, and then including women and men, until today there is hardly an industry in Great Britain that is not regulated by statute as regards the hours of labor for women and children, sanitary conditions, and the guarding of machinery. The factory codes of other European countries, like their industries, are of much more recent origin than those of England, but they are elaborate and effective in prohibiting the labor of young children and insuring the laboring man and woman fair conditions of work. The United States has followed these examples rather haltingly, and certainly has no cause for self-gratification over the manner in which she has safeguarded her factory workers against the dangers of their callings. This indifference is surprising in a

country of democratic ideals, and is to be explained by a consideration of several facts in economic and social life. The richness of the country in industrial opportunity, the rapid advancement from the lower to the higher social and industrial classes of capable men, and the filling-up of the lower ranks by immigrant foreign workers, who in turn quickly rise from their first lowly state, have all served to blind the people to the necessity of a permanent class of factory laborers whose welfare is a matter of primary importance. The factory hand has been looked upon as a trifling fellow, who might have raised himself out of his undesirable position, if he had been capable and industrious. Of course, in recent years trade-unionism has been forcing upon public attention the needs of wage-workers and the solidarity and permanence of a manual laboring class. In the second place, the rapidity with which industries develop in communities that are little acquainted with the complications of modern industrial methods, and are ruled by the social and economic ideals of rural life, explains the indifference of the people of many of the newer states. Again, the representatives of organized capital in the legislative assemblies of our commonwealths are not opposed by any rich and powerful landed proprietors who have inherited a grudge against the manufacturing interests and also some traditional sense of responsibility toward the laboring classes, so that the influence of the employers is much more nearly supreme than in England, where such opposition does exist. Of more importance than all other considerations is the fact that under our federal system of government the regulation of labor and industry is left to the individual states. Since there are no commercial boundaries to correspond to these political lines, the case is that of the chain whose strength is no greater than that of its weakest link; for whether or not the enlightened policy of a state can prove its undoing economically, there are always legislators ready to believe this to be true. And for the time being it is quite possible that an industry in an enlightened commonwealth, which restricts the hours of labor for women and children, and imposes requirements of expensive safeguards for dangerous machinery, may suffer from the competition of unregulated plants in neigh-

boring states. The cotton manufacturer of Massachusetts, limited in the number of hours he can employ women and children, and hampered by the extra cost of machine guards, must meet the price of the competitor in *ante-bellum* Georgia, who is unrestricted in his choice of methods; boys may not be employed in the glass houses of Ohio, but across an imaginary boundary line the Pennsylvania manufacturer works cheap lads when he chooses. This hardship often results in economies in the long run, for the necessity of decent methods is at times the mother of an invention which takes the place of the child; but the employer who clamors for a repeal of the limitations put upon him does not stop to consider this cold comfort.

Another obstacle in the establishment of effective regulation of industry is the extreme skepticism of a large part of the intelligent classes as to any further enlargement of state administrative duties; for as nothing succeeds like success, so nothing fails like failure, and the unedifying spectacle of inefficiency and dishonesty in our past and present public officials is a most potent argument against the establishment of urgent reforms. For the competent business man is somewhat justified in regarding any enlargement of government functions as a patent means of creating new offices with which to satisfy the claims of party supporters. His objection to having third-rate politicians interfere in the private affairs of the capable employer of labor blinds him to the real nature of the question. For these reasons the manual laborers must depend largely upon their own unaided efforts to decrease the dangers and hardships incident to their employment, although the aid of the more enlightened philanthropists and the club woman seeking for a cause may usually be counted upon. Among the altruistic agitators there have been, however, few men of note in public life—no Illinois Shaftesburys or New York Peels.

That, in spite of these unfavorable conditions, considerable progress has been made in the regulation of the conditions of labor is certainly true, and in this regard the meeting of the International Association of Factory Inspectors in August, 1905, in the city of Detroit was of considerable interest. It seems to

bode well for the better execution of the laws that the not too greatly respected state officials have been sufficiently interested in their work to form an association for the improvement of the service. This was done nineteen years ago at the instigation of Hon. Henry Dorne, of Ohio, and annual meetings have been regularly held since that time. The discussions of this convention were also of significance because they emphasized the necessity of greater uniformity in state legislation. Again and again inspectors declared that the indispensable condition of the effective regulation of child labor was the existence of the same or equivalent limitations upon competitors in different states. Of similar import were the meeting at Narragansett Pier, the object of which was the furthering of a movement toward greater uniformity in the private law of the commonwealths, and the divorce-law conference in Washington, called by Governor Pennypacker of Pennsylvania. Variety in statutes concerning these and similar subjects results in injustice or ineffectiveness. The inspectors' convention also offered an opportunity of studying an administrative type and of making some generalizations as to the more serious problems of factory inspection.

Besides attending the sessions of the convention and interviewing a number of officials during the course of the several pleasure excursions, the writer has sent out lists of questions regarding the working of the laws to the officials in those states in which there is any important amount of manufacturing. Rather interesting returns were received from twelve commonwealths; Massachusetts declined to answer because "it would cast a reflection upon parties interested;" New York and Maine ignored the request. Upon the whole, the information obtained is suggestive.

As a rule, the laws regulating the employment of labor have been won from indifferent legislatures as concessions to the labor vote, and the offices created in this way have been usually conceded to the unions as a sop to Cerberus. Officials answered questions concerning the influences that had brought about the passage of the laws as follows: that the unions had effected their adoption in Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota; in Illi-

nois, New York, and Wisconsin the statutes are said to be due to the combined efforts of unionists and philanthropists, and in West Virginia to the philanthropists alone. In some states a fairly well-organized labor lobby is maintained during the sessions of the legislature, but this elaborate arrangement of caring for the interests of labor is rather recent.

The laws, which are the resultant of such various forces as the opposition of the employers' representatives, the indifference and ignorance of a large part of the legislators, and the inexperience and sometimes mixed motives of the unionists, are often clumsy and ineffective. The experience of one state is disregarded often by its next neighbor; the newer commonwealths in adopting child-labor laws today have not taken the Massachusetts laws of the present as a model, but have gone back to the regulations of that state twenty years ago. In the matter of children's age and school certificates, for example, there is the greatest variety of provisions, and many of them are unsatisfactory. Upon the whole, however, there is no doubt that conditions of labor have been greatly improved as a result of the legislation of the last ten years.

Almost as important as the provisions of the statutes is the character of the persons who are appointed to administer them, and a factory inspectors' convention furnished a convenient opportunity to study this class. Of the twenty-five states providing for factory inspection about one-half sent delegates to the meeting. Connecticut was the only New England state represented; New York had four delegates; Ohio, six; Illinois had the presidency and sent two other inspectors. In all there were perhaps fifty delegates and visitors in attendance. As might have been expected, the great variety of types was the most marked fact about the personnel of the convention. Prominent in the discussions were a Methodist minister, a lawyer, a floor-walker, a carpenter, a cigar-maker, and a veteran of the regular army. A good proportion of the inspectors are trade-unionists, and practically all had been appointed because of work for the political party in power in the given state. For instance, a young cigar-maker explained his appointment as a deputy in a great

manufacturing state by saying that he had been precinct chairman and had done a good deal to elect the new governor, a man supported by the broad-minded element of his party. A much bejeweled lady from the same office proffered the information that she was on the staff because of her being the sister-in-law of the former governor. At the present writing an enlightened executive is with difficulty restrained from removing a chief, whom the friends of reform declare to be fairly honest and capable, in order to make a political appointment. Officials admit that practically all appointments are made for political reasons, though in some of the states of the Middle West, as in Massachusetts and New York, there is serious consideration of personal fitness within the limits of personal and party affiliations. This system of appointments, together with the small salaries, which cannot hold men who are efficient in business, results in a rapidly changing personnel of the various inspection forces and of the membership of the association. The chief inspector from Quebec, who had attended the meetings of this body for the last fifteen years, said that the new faces always outnumbered the old, and that there are now only two or three inspectors to be found who were at the first meetings. Chief officials from a dozen states answered questions upon this subject, and, in spite of the reticence of several correspondents, a few interesting details were gathered. The testimony showed generally that, except in states where there are civil-service regulations relating to this department of administration, the present incumbents would be removed if a governor of a different political party was elected. A number of officials said, however, that, while only partisans are appointed, they must be properly qualified and are appointed for efficiency. In Indiana and Ohio the chief inspector must be an expert mechanic; in Ohio the term of the head of the department is three years, while that of the governor is two years, and the force has been more permanent than in most other states; in twenty years there have been only four chief inspectors, and of the present force five have served more than five, eight more than three years. In Pennsylvania an answer to the question upon this point was refused, but Pennsylvania's reputation leaves little

doubt. Three-fourths of the officials had held office upward of five years. In Rhode Island there have been no changes in seven years; in West Virginia none in twelve years. In Minnesota the changes are frequent and appointments are frankly political. Wisconsin has during the past year placed the department under civil service rules; previously there were frequent changes. The provisions for the choice of inspector in Kansas are very peculiar; the labor unions choose delegates to form a society of labor and industry, which meets once a year and elects the usual officers, of whom the secretary is the commissioner of labor and factory inspector; of the effectiveness of such a system the writer has no information. Among the representative inspectors in attendance at the recent convention the former trade-unionists appeared to be the most serious-minded and practical. Some of the better-schooled men were apparently making their way up the political ladder, using the office of inspector as one of the rungs. According to good authority, this may be done effectively by extending one's acquaintance among the wage-workers and by making friends of the mammon of unrighteousness in the persons of employers who desire to be favored in the execution of the law. One of the most intelligent officials had been a leading politician in a small town, and had accepted the office of labor commissioner in order to have an occupation in the capital of the state, which was also the seat of the university, and thus be enabled to educate his daughter without sending her from home. A very different type was an inspector who has been president of a powerful union and had served two terms in the legislature of a great commonwealth. Such a man, while likely to have the faults incident to his rôle of labor agitator, will probably take his duties more seriously than one who has not been in the ranks of the wage-workers, and he is more frequently an able official than a professional man who can be attracted by the low salaries and uncertain tenure of office which these positions offer. Such considerations suggest the advisability of keeping distinct the duties of labor commissioner and chief inspector, the two offices requiring quite different qualifications. The functions of the commissioner of labor, as developed in the most enlightened common-

wealths, are those of a skilled statistician, possessing some managerial ability. The factory inspector should work in harmony with this department and should have the advice and direction of the statisticians in the presentation of reports and like matters, but he should be of the so-called practical type. Together these departments should have considerable influence in shaping legislation regulating the conditions of labor, for they are in the position of experts on these subjects. The reports of the labor commissioners and of factory inspectors are often badly arranged—undigested masses of facts, which repel all those who are not vitally interested in them. The significance of this material should be made clear in a well-written text; and a summary of the whole, together with the views of the department as to new legislation, should be popularized by publication in the daily press.

That part of the inspectors' duties which received most attention at the Detroit convention was the enforcement of the child-labor laws. Indeed, a disproportionate amount of time was spent upon this subject, probably because these regulations form a considerable part of the labor code of many states and because of recent agitation upon the subject. There was considerable variety of opinion as to the main points of these laws. Even upon the question of age, which has been settled by so many states at fourteen years, there was not entire unanimity of judgment. One of the New England representatives considered thirteen years quite high enough, and thought that some much better proof of physical fitness and education could be found than mere age certificates, since children vary so greatly in both. Another point that was discussed at some length was the question whether the law should be enforced strictly or with discretion; the arguments in favor of leniency being based upon the fact that the laws were so clumsily framed that they worked real hardship, if enforced strictly at all times; for instance, in Ohio the school authorities issue age and school certificates, but the law does not require them to do so at all times, so that for a considerable part of the year certificates cannot be obtained, yet the old minor labor law makes it an offense with penalty for an employer to have in his establishment any person under sixteen without keeping on record an age



and school certificate. In the Pennsylvania law, which is less than a year old, similar defects are complained of. If the parents' oath is accepted, there is no likelihood that the object of the certificate will be attained, for perjury is the rule rather than the exception. On the other hand, if a birth certificate is required, a hardship often results, because immigrants, and even Americans, frequently find it difficult or impossible to obtain such documents. For this reason, if for no other, physical fitness and school acquirements should supplement the proofs of age. The feeling was general that compulsory school attendance was needed to make effective the limitations upon factory work for children, as well as to attain its immediate object. Whether the educational requirement should be a certain degree of advancement in the schools, the ability to read and write the English language, or any language, was a point upon which there was a variety of opinion. Apparently New York has the highest requirement, which is that the child shall not only prove his age, but shall be able to read and write simple English sentences correctly, and shall present a school record showing that he has attended school for a hundred days the previous year and has had instruction in grammar, geography, arithmetic as far as fractions, etc. The judgment of the inspectors as to ascertaining the age of children was that the burden of proof should be thrown upon the employer, presence in a factory during working hours being *prima facie* evidence of employment.

No inspector would put himself on record as declaring that there were no children illegally employed in his state, for all considered their forces to be so inadequate that they could not feel secure of perfect enforcement. The feeling was general that prosecutions must be the means of creating a wholesome dread of the law and of supplementing the work of actual inspection; yet some heat was shown in the discussion as to the degree of discretion which the inspector might employ in the execution of the law. Some of the officials seemed to think that the direct commands of the statute were to be obeyed or not, as seemed expedient.

A question as to the worst evils of child labor received various answers; they were night work, leaving the child uneducated and

undeveloped physically, ignorance, bad moral and physical effects of work in the breweries, cuts from bottling and tin-cutting machines. Some of these answers are of course very general, while others are specific; but they are all suggestive of actual evils. The industries in which the greatest number of children are employed are these: in Indiana, wood-working; in Illinois, paper-box, soap, and candy-making and tailoring; in Michigan, work in knitting-mills and cigar factories; in Kansas, work in packing-houses; in Ohio, work in tobacco, chain, glass, and stamping-mills; in Rhode Island, textile factories; in West Virginia, glass houses; in Wisconsin, breweries, tin-ware factories, binderies, cigar, wooden ware, and candy factories.

With regard to the eight-hour day for children from fourteen to sixteen, all the inspectors were of the opinion that it was a desirable thing, but that it was long enough for adults also—a more or less radical view-point. The more carefully worded answers (from Indiana, Pennsylvania, Quebec, and Rhode Island) declared it to be impracticable as long as adults had a ten-hour day.

The hours of work for women are more widely regulated than is generally realized. Fourteen states limit the working-day for women and young people, usually those under eighteen, to ten hours. In several states provision is made to complete the sixty-hour week by adding to this number on five days sufficiently to allow a Saturday half holiday. The states making such restrictions are Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma, Virginia, Massachusetts, Louisiana, Maine, and Maryland (in the last-named state the restriction is applicable to cotton- and woolen-mills only, and here with a large loophole). Pennsylvania has a twelve-hour day; Wisconsin and Colorado, an eight-hour limit. In Wisconsin the nominal eight-hour restriction is ineffective on account of the wording of the law, and the ten-hour provision for children under fourteen is not extended to women. The Colorado provision is of no significance, since it merely prohibits an employer from requiring a woman whose tasks require her to stand from working more than eight hours. In twelve states, which include the

great mining areas, women and children under fourteen or twelve are prohibited from working in mines. In several commonwealths women and minors are forbidden to work in barrooms and other like places. Thirty states require seats to be provided for women in stores and other places where the work allows their use. That this provision is effective is quite uncertain. Night work for females is prohibited in Nebraska and Indiana. In Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Missouri separate toilet-rooms for women employees are required and in some cases provisions regarding ventilation and other sanitary matters are made more strict for places where women are employed. Upon the whole, the regulation of the conditions of women's labor in the factory and store leave much to be desired; for it is not clearly enough realized that women are a permanent factor in industry and that the proper provision for their comfort is not a humanitarian concession to the "weaker sex," but an indispensable condition for insuring a fair state of health and morals for the community. It is not a matter of indifference to the public that in a great manufacturing state, where women's work is wholly unregulated, factory toilet-rooms are quite ineffectively screened from the working-place and vitiate the air of the whole factory, and that great tobacco firms furnish no private place in which women and girls can make the change of clothing required by their work, but leave them to make their toilets in the publicity of a great room filled with men, women, and boys. Such conditions mean a physical and moral deterioration that is of importance to the community as a whole. Provisions for the health and social welfare of female workers are voluntarily made by some employers, either from humanitarian considerations or with a view to attracting the more intelligent and capable class of factory laborers. But such sporadic efforts are quite inadequate to raise the general conditions of a commonwealth. Experience teaches that it is only where a fairly high standard is demanded by the state that health and morals are guarded at all adequately. The courts have repeatedly recognized sex alone as sufficient justification for exacting better sanitary provisions and shorter hours for women than for men, and the way is open for trade-

unionists and other friends of working-women to further their welfare by causing laws to be passed establishing high standards for their conditions of work.

The provisions regarding the protection of life and limb from accidents arising from the use of dangerous machinery, as well as the regulations of the conditions of unhealthful occupations, are quite inferior in this country to those in Europe; but within the last few years fairly satisfactory codes have been developed in several of the middle western states, as well as in Massachusetts and New York. The primary requirement that all accidents of any importance shall be reported to the factory inspector is the law in ten states (Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Rhode Island, and Tennessee). The regulations in the most important manufacturing states consist of such requirements as the guarding of hatchways and shafts, the inclosing of belting, shafting, and gearing, and of vessels of molten metal; the inclosing of stairways; the providing of polishing wheels with exhaust fans, and other means of ventilation; the provision of separate closets for women and girls; the furnishing of guards for wood-working machines; and other similar precautionary measures. Still another class of laws have to do with the protection against fire in factories and workshops.

The conclusions reached as a result of attendance upon the convention of factory inspectors and a consideration of the answers of officials to the questions sent out are as follows: (1) The more important manufacturing states have fairly satisfactory child-labor laws; these include Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio; several middle western states of less importance in manufacturing enjoy fair standards. In the South the regulations are of no significance. (2) These laws are enforced in some states with discretion, in others with rigor. Many inspectors seem to read into the statutes a discriminating power that they consider warranted by the necessities of the situation. (3) Laws as to sanitation and safety appliances are fairly adequate in the principal manufacturing states except Illinois where they are almost entirely wanting. (4) In all states the

inspection force is inadequate to control the situation. (5) The greatest hindrance to realizing ideal conditions—if there can be ideal factory conditions—according to the consensus of opinion of the factory officials, is the existence of different requirements in competing commonwealths. (6) At the present time appointments are made in most states as a reward for political service, but in a few cases tenure of office has become fairly stable. (7) The personnel of the factory inspectors' convention was as high as could be expected in view of the custom of short terms of office and political appointments. The variety of types represented was perhaps the most marked fact about this body. Enthusiasm for their work was not entirely absent, but it was not remarkable for its superabundance.

## THE ORIGINS OF LEADERSHIP. III

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Before concluding this discussion of the Australians, we may note briefly the part played by leadership in educational, religious, and health interests.

The early education of the child in Australia is by the mother and other women of the group. Then, with the advent of the adolescent period, the youth passes out from under the direct influence of the women and through the initiation ceremonies comes under the more direct control of the men and of the wider tribal influences. In some tribes these ceremonies are begun at the age of ten or eleven, and continue until the age of twenty-five or even thirty. While they vary much in detail from tribe to tribe, the general purpose which they serve is practically the same in all tribes. Very careful and complete discussions of these ceremonies have been given by Mathews, Howitt, Spencer, and Gillen, and all agree that their purpose is to confer upon "the youth of the tribe the privileges, duties, and obligations of manhood," to bring the young men under the control of the old men, to teach them habits of self-restraint and hardihood, and the customs, traditions, secrets, and moral laws of the tribe. "In addition to all this, there is even a quasi-religious element which tends to strengthen very greatly the effect which the ceremonies are likely to have upon the minds of the youth." The initiative in regard to the ceremonies is taken by the headman and his council of old men. They make all preparations for the ceremonies, and appoint the leader and guardians. The leader is usually an old man who has an almost perfect knowledge of the traditions, and each youth has a guardian, an old man, who is his instructor in the ceremonies. Absolute obedience is demanded of the youth in every respect. Mutilations, magic, and pantomimic performances are among the means used to secure control

over the youth. These ceremonies are the beginnings of educational institutions. They bring together all the members not only of one tribe, but sometimes of several tribes. Meetings are held day and night for several weeks or even months, as in the case of the Engwura, which continues for four months. The traditions are repeated and discussed by the old men and taught to the young men. With relation to leadership and customs or institutions, then, these ceremonies serve two general purposes: the first and chief purpose is, through the wisdom and authority of the old men to teach and maintain the customs and traditions; secondly, great meetings like these, with their discussions, serve as mediums by which changes may be introduced and disseminated throughout the tribes, though this second function is more rarely performed than the first, owing to the strong conservatism of the natives.

Sickness and death are crises which become centers of leadership in Australia as elsewhere, and those who can cure disease or locate the enemy who has caused it hold a position of considerable influence in the tribe. The natives have implicit faith in them, and in cases of serious illness the services of two or three may be obtained. As a rule, they are men, but there are also doctors among the women. The principal function of the medicine-man is to cure disease, but, since all cases of illness are attributed to the malevolent influences of some enemy, either in human or in spirit form, there is a tendency in almost all the tribes for the medicine-man's functions to be extended to the discovery of this cause through magic or sorcery. And, in addition to this, in some tribes he may also assume the rôle of causing harm, disease, or death to an enemy, either individual or groupal. In some tribes the medicine-men are quite clearly differentiated from those who have the power of communicating with the spirits, the latter not being medicine-men at all. In the Arunta and Ilpirra tribes the personal influence exercised by the medicine-men shows the beginnings of institutionalization. There are three distinct schools in which those intending to become practitioners are initiated and given instruction.

The Australians believe in good and bad spirits which

influence their social life, but they seem to have no conception of a Supreme Being with well-defined attributes, and there is very little, if anything, that can be called institutional religion, most authorities concurring in the statement that there is no worship, prayer, or sacrifice. In some of the tribes the ideas concerning the spirits are very misty, and they are not much feared and do not exercise much influence; but in the more highly developed tribes the spirits are more real and are believed to have considerable power. The spirits are ancestral, at least in some cases, but there is no ancestor-worship. In addition to the medicine-men, there are other men, whose titles vary in the different groups, who are believed to have the power of seeing and communicating with the spirits, and who are for this reason held in considerable respect. Through the spirits it is believed that they gain important information in regard to the welfare of the tribe, such as the proper time for the performance of the rain and food ceremonies, or information as to the movements of enemies. But the religious leadership is not so far advanced as the political, and has received practically no institutional recognition. Certainly, there is nothing more than the mere beginnings of the priesthood and the church organization of civilized countries, even in the most highly developed groups.

This rather long description of the societary life of the Australians has been necessary to get a setting for the study of the evolution of leadership and institutions. It has been seen that the part played in the most primitive societies by the leader, the innovator, the subjectively conscious individual, is comparatively small. So far as innovations are concerned, the leader has a still smaller influence; adherence to custom is very strong, and leadership is confined largely to the maintenance of customs and traditions. Authority, nowhere very great, is limited largely to the elders. The communal phase of the social process is in the ascendancy, and the group, not the individual, is the unit. In the marriage relationship, it is not the group in the form of a household, as among the Aryans, described by Hearn, nor that of Maine, based upon the patriarchal family, but a group founded upon a still more primitive form of the family and marriage relations.



The individual family, as found in modern civilization, has no existence at this stage. One of the greatest difficulties in understanding their marriage systems as well as many other of their societary relations, and a primary cause of the diversity of opinions in regard to them, can be ascribed to the prominence of the groupal aspect of their interactions.

To understand the native, it is simply essential to lay aside all ideas of relationship as counted amongst ourselves. They have no word equivalent to our English words "father," "mother," "brother," etc. A man, for example, will call his actual mother *Mia*, but, at the same time, he will apply the term not only to other grown women, but to a little girl child, provided they all belong to the same group.<sup>56</sup>

There is no contract between the parties entering upon the matrimonial relationship. Marriage is through allotment or prescription by the old men or headmen, in so far as the choice of anybody enters into the relationship, but it is rather determined by custom, the parties being born into certain very inflexible relations to each other, to which in the allotment even the elders must conform, and which were instituted by the great ancestors, the Oknirabata. While in marriage among civilized peoples custom determines the relationships within certain limits, still customs are more plastic, and there is a large sphere for the voluntary activity of the individuals most directly concerned. Not only in the marriage relations, but in the expression of every interest among the native Australians, the group is the unit; "the whole gens is the individual;"<sup>57</sup> personality or consciousness of self, as we know it, has not developed. Not that there is no self-consciousness, but rather that we find it here at the minimum. There is nothing to give it a clear expression. Consciousness of self or personality is the result of the part played by the individual in the social process, of his voluntary activity in meeting problematic conditions, and of the reactions of his associates in approval or disapproval of his activity. Consequently, where societary relations are determined largely by instinct, custom, and communal forces, and where rights and responsibilities belong

<sup>56</sup> Spencer and Gillen, *loc. cit.*, p. 58.

<sup>57</sup> Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, p. 170.

to the group or but a few in the group, and that in a very limited degree, there can be no general or high degree of development of personality. Food among the native Australians is obtained and distributed according to groupal regulations, and property is communal, with the exception of a few movable articles. In general, it may be said that property does not have any influence in conferring honor or leadership on the individual in any of the pre-matriarchal, matriarchal, or patriarchal groups hitherto considered in this investigation. The absence of property removes one of the strongest influences in the development of leadership, personality, and institutions. This groupal principle is also manifested in the political organization. The emergence of the individual from the group and the growth of the personal element of control, as contrasted with control by custom and communal forces, can probably be observed first in the political functions, as the earliest development seems to have taken place there. Of necessity, the problems of the political phase of societary life have occupied first place in the attention of the group, and enthusiastic approval of the successful activities of superior individuals in guiding the group through these difficulties has tended to make the political leader stand out from the group most prominently, and to create in him the consciousness of power, together with the desire to perpetuate it through the establishment of the principle of inheritance of rank, wealth, etc. Generalizing from a large amount of evidence from many groups in different parts of Australia, it may be said that leadership is determined almost invariably by purely personal qualities of the type developed in the hunting life, ownership of property, the principle of inheritance, and other aids found in more highly developed societies, having but little influence. The one essential quality apparently is old age, the leadership of the young occurring but rarely. However, for anything more than nominal headship, to age must be added superior ability as hunters, fighters, rain-makers, wizards, medicine-men, orators, or exceptional knowledge of the customs and traditions of the group. Control by the aged is doubtless partly due to the lack of any intense stimuli, such as wars, which call for great activity and endurance. The leadership of the old men also adds to the

conservatism of the people, who, contrary to the usual theories still prevailing concerning primitive peoples, are the slaves of custom, any changes from the regulations of the ancestors being made only with the greatest difficulty. But, while leadership must be acquired by the demonstration of ability, skill, experience, etc., almost everywhere the individual authority of the headmen is meager and indefinite, and has received but little institutional recognition. Both the chief and the council are rather representatives of the collective phase of the social process than initiators and inventors and agitators. Neither the chief nor the council has very much direct control over the societary relations. The headman of a horde or totem in some of the better-organized groups sometimes succeeds to the position by inheritance, but nowhere is the principle firmly established. Moreover, even in these cases it is usually the groupal influence and not the individual that predominates. The heir to the position must be a member of a certain group, and he is not necessarily the son of the headman or his sister's son. Within this group the position is hereditary. Another factor which shows the dominance of the groupal principle is found in crime and its punishment. The whole group is considered the offender and is punished for the crime of one of its members; or, if it is an individual that is punished, it is not necessary that it should be the guilty individual, but any member of the group will answer. On the other hand, it is the duty of the whole group to revenge the injury to any of its members by another group. From this evidence of the strength of custom and of groupal regulations among the Australians, and of the small amount of personal control or voluntary activity of the individual in determining social ends, with the resulting meager development of the subjectively conscious individual, it is still easier to understand our difficulty in apprehending the true status of the more primitive peoples. In modern society there is a much greater development of personality, and it is far more general, because of what may be called the individualizing of the individual through giving to him larger rights and responsibilities, and a wider sphere for voluntary activity in the expression of all his interests, wherein he must meet many of the prob-

lems and crises of life himself and decide upon the course to be pursued. We are, therefore, constantly inclined to read into the life of the more primitive peoples a much higher consciousness of self than has been attained by them, and this error is greatly exaggerated by the tendency to speak of the ideal independence of primitive man and his freedom from restraint; while, as a matter of fact, the greater the control by instinct and custom, the less is there of freedom; for freedom is the result of the opportunity for individual choice and innovation within a wide range of societary activities, and of the larger and more assured control of societary conditions resulting therefrom.

At this stage of human association there are no castes or classes, no kings or nobles, no landlords or villains or serfs or slaves; there are no monarchies or despotisms, and, contrary to the usual assumption, there are no democracies. It is true that authority is very limited, but democracy is more than the absence of the despot—it means that every individual of the tribe or nation has come to consciousness of his own dignity and worth; it means that each individual plays an important part in the social process, that he exercises a wide degree of initiative and has definite rights and responsibilities; and, furthermore, it means that he is not only conscious of his right to an equality of opportunity with every other member of his tribe or nation, but that this right finds a genuine expression in his societary activities. But such a concept cannot exist before the emergence of personality and its expression in institutional life. The consciousness of self has a phylogenetic as well as an ontogenetic development. It is a social product, and is very closely related to the function of leadership. Without any leaders with clearly recognized and well-defined powers, there can be no basis for a clear concept of personality, for a definite consciousness of self or of other selves; and without a large and well-recognized sphere of voluntary activity for each individual, there can be no development of the subjective personality in all members of the group.

*Leadership among the native hunting tribes of America.*—The situation in America in regard to leadership and social organization among the native groups presents many points of simi-

larity as well as dissimilarity to that of Australia. In the first place, both of the races have been carefully studied by the ethnologists, and the data relating to them are fairly reliable. Another principal feature of similarity between the two races is the long-continued freedom from foreign influence. The absence of the disturbing influences of foreign peoples makes a comparison with the Australians as to the influence of other social stimuli much simpler and more valuable. Still another elementary factor of similarity is found in the division of the tribe into two exogamous intermarrying groups with their totemic divisions. The word *totem* is Indian in origin, and it was among these peoples that this feature of social organization was first carefully studied. The unit in American social organization is the totemic group, and not the family or individual.

But the differences between the American race and the Australian are also such as to make the comparison very valuable for this investigation. Better food resources and, in North America, a more temperate climate, supply the conditions for a higher type of associate activity. Accordingly, the mental ability of the Indians, in general, is superior to that of the Australians, and they also possess a more equable temperament, manifesting a better regulation of the emotions and greater self-control. In Australia, as has been seen, we have to deal with a predominatingly hunting type of life. While the animal food secured by the men was supplemented by the collection of vegetable food by the women, yet there was little or no cultivation of the soil. On the other hand, in America there are not only typical hunting groups, but also hunting and agricultural occupations are frequently found in the same tribe, and in several important instances agriculture predominated; so that it is possible to compare the influence of the two kinds of occupations upon the same race as well as the influence of the same occupation upon different races. Moreover, America presented several different stages of social organization, ranging from the lowest savagery to the advanced societies in Mexico and Peru; and it should be possible to gain some insight into the causes of these differences.

The influence of environment and occupations is well exempli-

fied in the fact that the same stock, Uto-Aztecan, under the discipline of different environments and occupations displayed both the lowest and the highest stages of organization found in America; while four independent stocks, known as the Moqui, Kera, Tehua, and Zuñi families, under the influence of the same environment and occupations developed substantially the same culture.

An attempt has been made to include in this section only those tribes of Indians in which hunting or fishing is the dominant occupation.

The northern groups of the Athapascan family are hunters and have a very primitive organization. Descent is usually in the female line, and marriage among the most inferior tribes is temporary. Governmental institutions are practically unknown; there are no laws; the chieftainship is acquired through ability in the chase or daring in war, or generosity, but the chief has but little authority or power, and the position is not a hereditary one. The food of the Chepewyans, the most inferior of this family, consists mostly of fish and reindeer, the latter being easily taken in snares. Land is held in common, and food is shared according to the communal principle. This branch of the family believes that it has descended from a dog, and "their religion consists chiefly in songs and speeches to birds and beasts, and to imaginary beings for assistance in performing cures of the sick."<sup>58</sup> It is evident that where associate activity is of such a simple sort as this there can be but little development of personality or institutions. There are but the beginnings of leadership, even in the expression of the political interests, and the lack of any clear consciousness of self is reflected in their religion.

In the hunting tribes of the central part of North America leadership depended almost solely upon personal qualities, such as eloquence, wisdom, hospitality, tact, courage, and prowess. The leaders were those who manifested superior ability in the chase or in war. As these groups were more warlike than the Australians, ability in warfare counted for more in conferring leadership than in the latter race. War, as has been seen, is one

<sup>58</sup> Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, Vol. I, pp. 118-20.

of the most prominent forms of what we have called the hunting type of activity, using the phrase in a broad sense. Since these are the only tribes among the hunting peoples that we have hitherto considered in which war occupies a conspicuous place, they should afford a valuable means of determining the influence of war upon the social organization of hunting peoples. The principal occupations of the Algonquins were hunting and warfare. Each gens had a chief, and the tribe had a permanent peace-chief, and a war-chief. The authority of the peace-chief was limited to the general affairs of the tribe. The war-chief "wielded only the influence that he could secure by his personal prowess and his tact."<sup>59</sup> The chiefs of the Blackfeet, a tribe in which war

absorbs all other considerations, . . . as a general rule, are elective, though great respect is paid to hereditary chiefs. They have little or no power, unless they have distinguished themselves as warriors and are supported by a band of braves.<sup>60</sup>

Of the Siouan Indians, most of whom were hunters, McGee says:

All the best-known tribes had reached that plane of organization characterized by descent in the male line, though many vestiges and some relatively unimportant examples of descent in the female line have been discovered. . . . The government was autocratic, largely by military leaders, sometimes (particularly in peace) 'advised by the elders and priests; the leadership was determined primarily by ability, prowess in war and the chase, and wisdom in the council. Leadership was thus hereditary only a little further than characteristics were inherited; indeed, excepting slight recognition of the divinity that doth hedge about a king, the leaders were practically self-chosen, arising gradually to the level determined by their abilities. The germ of theocracy was fairly developed, and apparently burgeoned vigorously during each period of peace, only to be checked and withered during the ensuing war, when the shamans and their craft were forced into the background.<sup>61</sup>

The fact that women do not possess as much authority as in some groups which are more peaceable is probably due to the warlike

<sup>59</sup> Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West*, Vol. I, pp. 82, 90.

<sup>60</sup> Schoolcraft, *History, Condition, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States*, Part V, p. 686.

<sup>61</sup> McGee, "The Siouan Indians," *Fifteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, pp. 187, 188.

character of these tribes. Among the Assiniboins "women are never acknowledged as chiefs, nor have they anything to say in council."<sup>62</sup> Among the Omahas, who formerly depended mainly upon hunting, "civil and religious government are scarcely differentiated, but military government is almost entirely so," and the powers of both head-chiefs and subordinate chiefs are comparatively well defined. The tendency of the leader or chief to attempt to extend his influence through the establishment of hereditary rank is well illustrated by the Omahas, of whom Dorsey says: "While the chieftainship is not hereditary, each chief tries to have one of his near kinsmen elected as his successor."<sup>63</sup>

While among most of the Athapaskan, Lower Californian, and northern Mexican tribes there is little if any advance in social organization over that in Australia, the hunting groups of both the Algonquin and Siouan families manifest a distinct superiority over the Australians both in the development of authoritative personages and in institutional life. The groups are larger than those of Australia, and the organization is more coherent; the prerogatives and duties of the leaders are more clearly recognized and defined. Better food conditions, and the fact that some of the tribes in these two families are more sedentary and agricultural, account for part of this difference. Moreover, the fact that they are more warlike than the Australians increases the complexity of their social activity and calls for greater authority, with a tendency to a stronger influence of the personal element of control as contrasted with the control of custom. This is also evidenced in the fact that the old men do not possess such exclusive authority among these tribes of Indians as among the Australians, their influence being confined largely to advice in times of peace, as already noted by McGee. Of the Assiniboin Dorsey says: "Age, debility, or any other natural defect, or incapacity to act, advise, or command, would lead a chief to resign in favor of a younger man."<sup>64</sup> The prevalence of militant activity in

<sup>62</sup> Dorsey, "Siouan Sociology," *ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>63</sup> "Omaha Sociology," *Third Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, pp. 356, 357.

<sup>64</sup> "Siouan Sociology," *loc. cit.*, p. 224.



these tribes requires greater energy and endurance, and calls for the leadership of younger men. This also results in a higher development of personal control, as well as the beginnings of military institutions.

The most notable exception to the dependence of leadership upon purely personal qualities among hunting and fishing peoples is found among the northwest-coast Indians of North America. Here the possession of property was one of the chief factors in the acquisition of honor and leadership. Wealth had a very great influence upon all their social relations, and in this we find the principal differentiating factor between these tribes and the other hunting peoples. While in the Australian tribes wealth rarely, if ever, makes the leader, in these tribes it is one of the principal factors in conferring rank and leadership. Ability in other respects than that of control over property is also recognized, such as in war, directing ceremonies and food expeditions. This difference was due primarily to the abundant food supply, making possible larger and more permanent groups than are usually found among hunting peoples. The greater food resources and larger population led to a considerable division of labor and to the accumulation of a comparatively large amount of property. In addition to fishing and hunting, trade and commerce constituted important elements in their economic activity, and among some of the tribes—e. g., the Tlinkits—there were professional wood-carvers, smiths, and silver-smiths. The kinds of property which determined rank and leadership among them consisted of implements, blankets, canoes, wives, slaves, etc., property in land being communal as among all hunting and fishing peoples. In some of the tribes the large and well-made canoes are owned by a few individuals, who thus become capitalists and increase their wealth through controlling the labor of others. The accumulation of property beyond the means of subsistence is chiefly for the purpose of acquiring influence and a reputation for generosity through distribution of presents at their feasts, which are their principal forms of amusement. Ownership of slaves prevails throughout these tribes. They are obtained by war or kidnapping, and add much to the social esteem bestowed upon their owner. Among

the Sound Indians "for a master to kill half a dozen slaves is no wrong or cruelty; it only tends to illustrate the owner's noble disposition in so freely sacrificing his property."<sup>65</sup> Distinctions of rank are rigidly observed in all their social relations and depend chiefly upon wealth. Among the Nootkas the feasts are given by the chiefs and richer classes

nearly every evening during the "season." As in countries more civilized, the common people go early to secure the best seats, their allotted place being near the door. The élite come later, after being repeatedly sent for; on arrival they are announced by name, and assigned a place according to rank. In one corner of the hall the fish and whale blubber are boiled by the wives of the chiefs, who serve it to the guests in pieces larger or smaller according to their rank.<sup>66</sup>

Even the burial of the dead is regulated by class distinctions; "the common people are usually left on the surface; the nobility are suspended from trees at heights differing, as some authorities say, according to rank."<sup>67</sup> The influence of wealth and of militant activity gave rise to the four classes found in most of the tribes; viz., chiefs, aristocracy, common people, and slaves.

The researches of Bancroft, Krause, and Boas indicate that the class organization founded upon the totemic relation prevailed among these tribes as in Australia. Among the Tlinkits the two primary exogamous classes are the Wolf and the Raven, and each of these classes contains five totemic divisions. With certain variations, these totems are found in all of the thirteen tribes of the Tlinkits.<sup>68</sup> Descent in the female line apparently is the rule, though there are important exceptions in which it has broken down. The influence of wealth upon the marriage relation is very powerful, marriage by purchase being quite common, the women having no choice. Polygyny is frequently found among the chiefs and more wealthy classes, but monogamy seems to be the prevailing form of marriage among the poorer classes.

They resemble the Australians also in that they are not a very warlike people. Though conflicts among some of the tribes are frequent, they are more of the nature of quarrels than wars, being

<sup>65</sup> Bancroft, *Native Races of the Pacific States*, Vol. I, p. 217.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Krause, *Die Tlinkit-Indianer*, p. 112.

of short duration and not very destructive of life. Bancroft says of the Chinooks that they "were always a commercial rather than a warlike people, and are excelled by none in their shrewdness at bargaining." However, leadership is sometimes dependent upon ability in war, and in this they resemble the hunting tribes of the central part of North America.

Chieftainship exhibits several different stages of development. Among the Koniagas

authority is exercised by heads of households, but chiefs may, by superior ability, acquire much influence. Before they became broken up and demoralized by contact with civilization, there was a marked division of communities into castes, and hereditary nobility and commonality. In the former was embodied all authority, but the rule of American chieftains is nowhere of a very arbitrary character.<sup>69</sup>

Among the Aleuts,

every island and, in the larger islands, every village has its *toyon* or chief, who decides differences, is exempt from work, is allowed a servant to row his boat, but in other respects possesses no power. The office is elective.<sup>70</sup>

The warmer and more genial climate of the Tlinkits aided in producing a more complex type of social activity and organization than has been reached among the tribes farther north.

The chieftainship depends upon wealth, and especially the possession of a large number of slaves. As a rule, the chieftainship as well as property is hereditary in the female line, but there are exceptions in which, instead of the recognition of the hereditary principle, the chief is chosen in disregard of it. At almost every place there are several chiefs, called *amkau*, one of whom is usually recognized as superior. The power of the chief is very much restricted, and varies greatly in accordance with the strength of the personality of the chief. He is leader only of the common undertakings and of the councils. In the other activities the heads of families are free to do whatever does not conflict with custom and tradition or injure the rights of others.<sup>71</sup>

Among the Haidahs

rank is nominally hereditary, for the most part by the female line, but really depends to a great extent on wealth and ability in war. Females often possess the right of chieftainship.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Bancroft, *loc. cit.*, p. 80.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 94.

<sup>71</sup> Krause, *Die Tlinkit-Indianer*, p. 122.

<sup>72</sup> Bancroft, *loc. cit.*, p. 167.

### Among the Sound Indians

there is a nominal chief in each tribe, who sometimes acquires great influence and privileges by his wealth or personal prowess, but he has no authority, and only directs the movements of his band in warlike incursions. I find no evidence of hereditary rank or caste, except as wealth is sometimes inherited.<sup>73</sup>

Among the Nootkas "the head chief's rank is hereditary by the male line," and this constitutes an important illustration of the breaking-down of the principle of female descent through the influence of political leadership. The grandeur of the head-chief is

displayed on great occasions, when, decked in all his finery, he is the central figure. At the frequently recurring feasts of state he occupies the seat of honor; presides at all councils of the tribe, and is respected and highly honored by all; but has no real authority over any but his slaves. Between the chief or king and the people is a nobility, in number about one-fourth of the whole tribe, composed of several grades, the highest being partially hereditary, but also, as are all the lower grades, obtainable by feats of valor or great liberality. All chieftains must be confirmed by the tribe and some of them appointed by the king; each man's rank is clearly defined in the tribe, and corresponding privileges strictly insisted on. There are chiefs who have full authority in warlike expeditions.<sup>74</sup>

These examples of political leadership help to give further insight into the growth of institutions about the personality of the leader. As has been noted, the new factor introduced into this process in these tribes is the influence of wealth, though it will be seen from the evidence that superior ability in various social functions is also an important factor. In fact, the possession of wealth at this stage of societary development, when the hereditary principle as applied to property has not become firmly established, depends almost entirely upon exceptional personal qualities. In some of these tribes institutionalization of the privileges and responsibilities obtained by the superior individuals has proceeded a little farther than in the tribes hitherto considered. This is notably the case with regard to the appearance of a nobility in several of the tribes.

While, as has been seen, all forms of rank and leadership

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 194.

depend largely upon wealth, there are some interesting examples of the establishment of classes and securing of leadership through ability in the more difficult aspects of the hunting type of activity that should be given in this connection. This is exemplified, in particular, in the capture of whales. "In the tribes of the Aleuts whale-fishing is confined to certain families, and the spirit of the craft descends from father to son."<sup>75</sup> Among the Nootkas whales "are attacked in canoes by the chief and a select few from each tribe who alone have the right to hunt this monarch of the sea."<sup>76</sup> Among the Makah only a few "attain the dignity of whalers, a second class devote themselves to halibut, and a third to salmon and inferior fish, the occupations being kept distinct, at least in a great measure."<sup>77</sup> In general it may be said that "the common business of fishing for ordinary sustenance is carried on by slaves or the lower class of people; while the more noble occupation of killing the whale and hunting the sea-otter is followed by none but chiefs and warriors."<sup>78</sup> From these illustrations we find that here, as among all hunting tribes, the rank which the individual has in the group depends almost entirely upon the function which he performs, and that he is aided but little by the structural phase of society as found in institutions.

The medicine-man or *shaman* has a high rank among these tribes, and the people have implicit confidence in his ability to cause or cure disease. In some tribes the shamans possess considerable knowledge of the medicinal properties of herbs and of the use of bandages, splints, etc., and in certain cases their treatment is very efficacious, as, e. g., where the cause of the difficulty is clear, such as cuts, bruises, sprains, snake-bites, and broken limbs. But when the illness becomes very serious or mysterious, resort to magic is the rule, and, apparently, the most important part of their vocation consists in dealing with the spirits or supernatural powers that are believed to cause these more baffling forms of disease. If the patient is wealthy, the treatment is elaborate and noisy, but if he is poor, little attention is given

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 186.

<sup>77</sup> Gibbs, as quoted by Nieboer, *Slavery as an Industrial System*, p. 175.

<sup>78</sup> Meare, as quoted by Bancroft, *loc. cit.*, p. 158.

him. There is no very clear differentiation between the shaman or medicine-man as physician and as priest, sorcerer, or magician. In some of the tribes the same individual exercises all of these functions. But in other tribes a shaman has several assistants, both male and female, and there is a considerable difference in rank among them, with a tendency toward institutionalization in the form of a school.

Their religious life indicates but a very meager development of personality. There are no clear ideas of deities with well-defined individualities or personal attributes. Their myths are concerned chiefly with stories of the totems or animal ancestors and certain preternatural agents, either animal or human, and there is a shifting back and forth from the one to the other, which shows that they, like most of the hunting tribes, draw no sharp distinction between animal and human consciousness but assign practically the same personal content to both.

Reference has been made<sup>79</sup> to the physical, mental, and moral superiority of the inland Columbians over the tribes of the coast. This superiority is not due to any difference in race or stock, but chiefly to the influence of occupations, and may be traced throughout their social organization. The widespread custom among primitive peoples of betrothal by the parents of the children while very young is practiced in some instances among these tribes, but there are also cases in which the wishes, not only of the young man, but also of the young woman, are consulted. Marriage by purchase, or rather by an exchange of gifts, is the usual form. Occasionally there is a marriage ceremony; "a Spokane suitor must consult both the chief and the young lady, as well as her parents." Descent is in the female line, though in some instances the influence of political leadership has been strong enough to break down this regulation and substitute descent in the male line in cases of the chieftainship. The child is named after some animal, the name being changed frequently in later life. Trade and property are fairly well advanced, some of the groups possessing a large amount of wealth, especially in horses. While they cannot be called a warlike people, they are brave war-

<sup>79</sup> See *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, p. 377.

riors when necessity for defense arises, and their more advanced tribes have carried on very successfully, campaigns both of aggression and defense.

War-chiefs are elected for their bravery and past success, having full authority in all expeditions, marching at the head of their forces, and, especially among the Flatheads, maintaining the strictest discipline, even to the extent of inflicting flagellation on insubordinates. With the war their power ceases, yet they make no effort by partiality during office to insure re-election, and submit without complaint to a successor. Except by the war-chiefs, no real authority is exercised. The regular chieftainship is hereditary so far as any system is observed, but chiefs who have raised themselves to their position by their merits are mentioned among nearly all the nations. The leaders are always men of commanding influence and often of great intelligence. They take the lead in haranguing at the councils of wise men, which meet to smoke and deliberate on matters of public moment. These councils decide the amount of fine necessary to atone for murder, theft, and the few crimes known to the native code; a fine, the chief's reprimand, and rarely flogging, probably not of native origin, are the only punishments; and the criminal seldom attempts to escape. . . . The regular inland chiefs never collect taxes nor presume to interfere with the rights or actions of individuals or families.<sup>80</sup>

While, in general, it may be said that the development of voluntary activity and of personality is greater among the hunting peoples of the American race than of the Australian, and that their organization is more definite and coherent, yet relationships are still predominantly groupal. Ownership of the greater part of the property is communal. The individual Indian possesses very little property. Almost all wealth belongs to the clan, gens, or tribe. With the exception of the northwest-coast Indians, property plays but a small rôle in conferring honor or reputability upon the individual. The marriage relation has not advanced far toward individualization. Powell makes the generalization that marriage is by "prescription" or "legal appointment," and in this it resembles the condition in Australia, though there is a more marked tendency to "selection by personal choice" among the Indians. In some of the more highly developed tribes, as will be seen from the evidence cited, the chieftainship shows a consid-

<sup>80</sup> Bancroft, *loc. cit.*, pp. 275 ff.

erable advance in prerogatives and institutionalization over that of the Australians, and the council is a more deliberative body.

The education of the children is for the activities most necessary for the survival of the group, and is very practical. The groupal point of view measures the value of a man to the community in terms of his ability and skill as a hunter, fisherman, or warrior. Accordingly, the training of the boys must be for these activities, and all that pertains to efficiency in them is taught to the boys early in life. By the older men they are taught how to shoot, hunt, and fish, and through them they also learn the traditions of the tribe, its songs, love-stories, and tales of bravery in war. Through the mother and her sisters both the boys and girls receive their earliest education, and the girl's training, no less practical than that of the boy, is continued by the women of the gens or clan. She is taught how to do the many different kinds of work that fall to the lot of women, such as weaving, basketry, pottery, bread-making, tent-making, and the elements of the crude agriculture carried on by the women. Particular attention is given to the adolescent period in almost all the tribes, and it is especially a time for moral and religious instruction. It is observed by numerous ceremonies of sacred or religious character. At this time in many of the tribes the young man or woman was believed to come into direct communication with supernatural powers and to receive a personal guardian spirit that presided over his or her destiny in life. Self-control, self-denial, and endurance are taught, and obedience to the elders and all superiors is inculcated. The boys are under the tutorship of the old men, and the girls are instructed by the old women.

The functions of the medicine-men apparently are not more clearly differentiated from those of the priest than in Australia. The medicine-man owes his influence to actual or supposed control over certain crises entering into the life-process of the group, to his knowledge of the customs and traditions, to his leadership of secret societies, etc. His primary function is the cure of disease, either through knowledge of the medicinal properties of herbs, etc., or through control of the spirits which are believed to cause illness. In general, they acquire their position through



personal merits, though in some cases it is hereditary, and there is a tendency toward institutionalization in the form of a secret society, caste, or sacerdotal order, as in the case of "The Midewiwin" or "Grand Medicine Society" of the Ojibwa.

A belief in good and evil spirits is widespread among the hunting tribes of America, but the best authorities upon their religious life all agree that the statement that they worship one "Great Spirit" is erroneous. Doubtless they had a certain vague idea of a so-called "Great Spirit," the result of contact with civilization and missionary influence, and imposed upon their cruder though indigenous forms of belief, but, like all such ideas, being purely external and exotic, and not a growth out of their own societary activity. The artificiality of such beliefs is evidenced everywhere in the fact that they answer as long as life is running smoothly, but in the face of a great crisis the people turn to their simpler, though to them more effective, beliefs. The concept of a Supreme Being, or of one overruling personal God, has not developed at this stage of association, and in the nature of the case could not exist before a more unified associate life was reached, with a higher development of personality, and with greater leaders whose personal qualities and attainments mark them off clearly from the other members of the group.

## VII. CONCLUSION

This survey of the hunting type of associating has brought under review several different steps in the evolution of leadership and institutions. Our general problem has been the method of control of the conditions of the life-process, in so far as that control is effected through association or the reciprocities of living organisms. Our particular problem has been the evolution of leadership in relation to institutions as fundamental modal forms of societary control. It has been seen that in the most primitive associations control of the conditions upon which existence depends is largely instinctive or automatic; that the personal element plays a very meager rôle, and institutional life has scarcely begun. In the pre-matriarchal stage we find both leadership and institutions in their lowest terms. The simplicity of the life-process

does not lead to the development of any great personalities, or of the institutional forms which are the precipitate of the more personal and voluntary phases of social control, and which result from the more complex interactions of individuals and groups. Because of the close similarity of the occupations and the simplicity of both the infra-groupal and inter-groupal phases of the social process, there is no differentiation of the population into classes or castes, such as results in larger groups with more complicated and definitive interactions, and where there are strong stimuli to achievement of distinction and honor through the exercise of superior personal qualities in the solution of societary difficulties, in the acquisition of wealth, in wars, conquests, etc.

Under the maternal system, with organization on the basis of kinship through the female, the population of the groups is much larger than in the pre-matriarchal stage, interactions are more diverse and complex, and there is a greater differentiation of societary functions. The transition from the maternal to the paternal system is not abrupt, and often the two coexist in the same tribe or stock; it has, therefore, been best to consider them together. It has been seen that there are considerable differences in the development of leadership and institutions in the tribes which have been selected as typical of the hunting life. The fundamental fact determining the general nature of leadership and institutions among the hunting peoples is to be found in the characteristics of the hunting occupation, the different stages of growth being due to variations in race and temperament, and to local differences such as climate, contour of the country, food resources, contact with other groups, etc.

The general nature of the hunting activity has been touched upon, and it now remains to make some applications in relation to the data which have been considered.

The growth of both of the elements of social control under consideration—i. e., leadership or personal influence, and institutions—centers about the problems, crises, and emergencies entering the social process; and these difficulties, in turn, depend upon a large number of conditions, some of the more general of which are the size and stability of the group, the degree of com-

plexity of its activity, the definiteness of its organization, the nature of its food resources, its sedentary or nomadic character, and its relation to other groups. The hunting life, using the phrase now in its narrower sense as the dominant food occupation of a group, has its problems, the solution of which is as important as those of any other form of associate life. The difficulties which the leader of this type of associating is called upon to solve require extraordinary keenness of the senses, exceptional powers of physical strength and endurance, promptness of decision, superior ability in making motor co-ordinations, etc. — There is a strong demand for the individual possessing some or all of these qualities in a larger degree than the other members of the group. The problems are such as require direct, immediate, personal adaptation of the social habits to the new conditions and the ends to be reached. The leaders, as we have seen, are always — individuals of superior ability of the nature required to control the conditions of this type of association. In the more primitive groups old age is the most general requisite for eligibility to leadership, though it must always be accompanied by some kind of ability to give any real influence in the group. Another primary factor in conferring leadership is exceptional ability in control of the food supply, so that the great hunter, fisherman, or rain-maker always occupies a position of honor and influence in the group. The other leaders are the ablest warriors, the orators, medicine-men, wizards, wealthiest men, and those exceptionally well versed in the customs and traditions of the tribe.

If there is an urgent demand for leaders in the hunting life, and this demand is met by individuals of superior ability in solving the groupal problems, the question arises: Why in most cases is their influence only temporary and their authority very much limited as compared with the other types of associate life? The answer must be found in the nature of the hunting activity. In comparison with agricultural, pastoral, or manufacturing peoples, the hunting groups are usually much smaller and more unstable or nomadic. Their food resources are poorer and more precarious. Where a group is almost constantly changing its location, large accumulation of property is impracticable, if not

impossible. Descent is usually in the female line. The continuity of development which gives rise to the institution of private property, to agnatic descent, to the patriarchal household, and finally to the individual family, together with all the stimulating and inhibiting forces which inhere in this regularity of growth, is absent from the highly motor and unstable life of the hunting group. A roaming life makes all of their relationships more indefinite, unstable, and temporary, and this condition of affairs is extremely unfavorable to the growth of the organized and static phase of the social process, as represented, in particular, by institutions. Hence it is that the leadership which originates in connection with the problematic conditions that the hunting people must confront tends to be temporary, poorly defined, and meager, and to fail of institutionalization. Moreover, consciousness itself must partake of the nature of this instability, and the few permanent centers of interest and attention react upon the voluntary life of the group, and lessen the opportunities for the growth of personality and leadership. Under such conditions, the occasions for the individual to exercise much influence through control of the activities of others and through voluntary control of the various social interests are extremely limited, and the growth away from the more automatic, unconscious, and instinctive methods of control which characterize the associations of lower animals and, in a less degree, the more primitive human associations, is very slow.

However, there are the beginnings of personal and voluntary control and of institutions, and, in some of the cases cited under the maternal and paternal systems, leadership has made considerable advancement, so that, taking the situation as a whole, among the hunting peoples it is possible to discover some of the principles upon which the evolution of leadership and institutions depends. One of the most important generalizations to be gained from the examination of the data relating to hunting groups is that every individual that attains a position of leadership in the group must do so by the performance of some function which the group considers of importance. The appearance of leaders and authoritative personages in the social process precedes the

organization of the institution. The institution proper begins in the stimulating and inhibiting influences that arise through the conscious direction of the social activity on the part of some superior individual or group of superior individuals. Association in its lowest terms has no established principle of inheritance by which an individual may acquire position, honor, or influence apart from personal merit. The leadership function must precede the leadership structure, and some form of voluntary activity, usually initiated and guided by the few, must precede that most important phase of social structure—the institutional.

Some of the more favorably located hunting groups show beginnings of institutionalization of almost all the elemental impulses and interests. In the expression of the political interest, in some instances, the principle of inheritance of rank and property is fairly well established in both the female and the male lines, inheritance by the former method usually preceding that by the latter. A number of important cases were cited in which the maternal system of descent has been superseded by the paternal system. This change has taken place usually where, through the presence of good food areas, groups are more sedentary, considerable property has been accumulated, and all their societary relations have become more complex, or where there is need of comparatively well-organized military activity for purposes of defense or aggression. Under such conditions, the activities arising out of the various social impulses begin to receive a more distinctively institutional mode of expression. This growth in size, complexity, and definiteness of social organization introduces more conflicting interests, the tensional elements are increased, and, therefore, the demand for leadership is stronger and more constant, and its reward is greater. Situations affording honor and profit to the individual possessing extraordinary courage, strength, endurance, ingenuity, skill, and experience are multiplied. The work of the leader receives the approval of the group; he is admired, honored, and praised, and, together with memory of his exceptional service to the group and the growing permanence of groupal relationships, his power and authority tend to become perpetual during his life. Through success in

controlling others, through social approval, and through his exalted position in the group, his own consciousness of superiority is intensified. The desire to extend the influence thus acquired beyond his life makes a strong force in the establishment of the principle of succession to official rank and property by inheritance. In general it may be said that political leadership in the prematernal, maternal, and paternal stages is the prerogative of the male. This is the direct result of the nature of the principal problematic conditions of primitive groups and of the difference in the metabolism of the sexes.<sup>81</sup> While female authority and leadership under the maternal system was at no time very great, the principle of descent through the mother was in direct opposition to the institutionalization of leadership in the paternal line. The son of the leader could not inherit the rank or property of his father. The sister's son acquired the position of leader wherever the principle of succession by inheritance had been established under the maternal system; or if the leader was chosen in some other way, the method was usually under the regulation of the same system. The increasing honor and wealth which fall to the lot of the leader with the growing complexity of society, and the concomitant development of his consciousness of strength and influence, create a stronger desire to extend this influence beyond the limits of his own life. His sense of kinship and of interest in his own children is increased by this desire, and there is created in him a strong opposition to the maternal system. It is in this way that political leadership comes to be one of the main forces in breaking down the maternal organization and originating the patriarchal organization, and the principle of succession to rank and wealth by inheritance in the male line—a principle or institution which has played and still continues to play an important rôle in social life.

The appearance of the council among hunting peoples has been noted. Its significance in control of societary phenomena is very great, and its more general relationship to leadership and institutions should receive our attention. It is doubtful if it

<sup>81</sup> Cf. W. I. Thomas, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. III, pp. 31 ff., 754 ff.

exists among the societies of the lower animals, where response to stimulus is more immediate, mandatory, and unreflective than among human beings. In the pre-maternal stage it may exist, though we have found no reference to it. In the maternal and paternal stages it is usually found, though in very different grades of development. Deliberation and discussion are among the most important functions in social life in the controlling of societary phenomena, and the level of social development is determined by the extent to which these reflective processes prevail in regulating the nature of response to stimuli. The composition of the council varies in different tribes, but it usually includes the leaders of the different interests of the group, such as the chiefs, the old men, the medicine-men, orators, warriors, sorcerers, etc. Its function in its best form is that of deliberation upon or discussion of the problems of the group. It is thus analogous to the reflective activities in the individual mind; it is the social organ of deliberation and choice. There are evidences that the council of the hunting tribes of North America, like all other forms of social life, has reached a higher stage of development than in Australia. In Australia it discusses societary difficulties, such as violation of custom, time for holding ceremonies, etc.; but the effort seems to be merely to determine the custom applying to the case in hand and to adhere closely to it; whereas with the Indians there is not merely adherence to custom, but a discussion of problematic conditions, with a direct purpose of adapting the customs to new situations and to changing them where it is deemed best. The council among the Indians is also a more distinctive and coherent organization than among the Australians. But in both races we find in the council the germs of the various kinds of deliberative bodies of more highly organized societies, the tracing of the evolution of which should be of great value to the science of sociology.

The relation of leadership to the punishment of crime has been discussed in various places in this investigation, and we give a brief summary of it here. The earliest forms of punishment are largely the expressions of the instinct of revenge, and partake of all the immediacy and unreflectiveness of instinctive

activity, issuing in the various forms of the blood-feud. Communal responsibility for crime and the punishment of any member of an offending group, whether the guilty one or not, is further evidence that the individual as such is not recognized, and that it is the result of the act, not the motive, that is considered. From the data relating to hunting peoples, we reach the conclusion that the headman or chief of the group is the first to introduce deliberative and inhibitive elements into the process of punishment. He acts as an arbitrator or judge in cases of quarrels, fights, and various forms of disputes, and determines the nature of the punishment for the violations of custom. In the more advanced groups he is assisted by the council in the performance of this important function. From these beginnings of a more rational control of the treatment of crime have evolved the highly deliberative functions of the judge and the judicial institutions of modern society.

Educational functions are not omitted among hunting peoples, as may be seen in particular from the study of the Australians and the North American Indians. Professor James says: "Our education means little more than a mass of possibilities of reaction, acquired, at home, at school, or in the training of affairs."<sup>82</sup> Among primitive as among civilized peoples this, too, is the purpose of education. The "mass of possibilities of reaction" which the child of primitive man needs to acquire is not so great as that of the child of civilized man, because the societary activity is not so complex; but even the most primitive group has acquired certain habits of supplying its wants, and these organized ways of reacting to the environment must be learned by the child. His first teacher is his mother and her sisters, tribal or blood. Steinmetz,<sup>83</sup> who has made a careful study of the relation between parents and children among primitive peoples, reaches the conclusion that in general the parents are very kind and affectionate to their children, often spoiling them through overindulgence. Especially is this love for the children

<sup>82</sup> *Talks on Psychology and Life's Ideals*, p. 38.

<sup>83</sup> *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, Vol. I, p. 607; also *Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe*, Vol. II, pp. 177 ff.



and lack of punishment found among the hunting peoples, though there are examples of strict discipline. Education is not methodical and continues for but a brief time. To this conclusion of Steinmetz we may add that the boys are trained in the habits of hunting and warfare, and the girls in woman's work, and both are taught the traditions and customs of the group. Institutionalization of educational functions has not proceeded far, and there are no schools in the modern sense, the nearest approach to them being the initiation ceremonies, which sometimes continue for three or four months.

Under the pre-matriarchal system, marriage is often monogamic and for this reason some authorities have compared it favorably with the monogamous unions of civilized society, but there is a vast difference between the two systems. Marriage in the pre-maternal stage is temporary, and with the simple, nomadic life of this period there is but little advance over the instinctive form of monogamy in animal societies. The small degree of definiteness and coherency in the marriage relation under this system makes it scarcely possible to speak of the family as an institution. In the transition from this most primitive form of the family to the more individualized form of civilized society there are several important steps, some of which, so far as they are conditioned by the function of leadership, have been discussed. Under the maternal system and, to a less degree, under the paternal system, in hunting life, the whole group is the unit, not the individual or the family. Control of societary conditions is largely through communal activities; but little privilege is given to the individual; he manifests or expresses himself through voluntary activity only in a small degree; he does not select his companion or companions in marriage; they are assigned or allotted to him. However, marriage is not promiscuous, but is rigidly regulated by custom and the few who interpret custom. Of course, there is always a tendency toward the exercise of choice on the part of those most immediately concerned in the marriage relation, and this tendency increases with the growth of society; but at first this voluntary activity is greatly circumscribed by custom and the influence of the elders. Perhaps the

phrase giving the best expression of this stage in the marriage relation is that it is a "modified form of group-marriage."<sup>84</sup>

The same dominancy of groupal regulation is manifested in the expression of the property interests. The individual has control over a small amount of property in movable articles in which there is some opportunity for self-expression, but the control over the land among hunting peoples is communal. With the exception of the northwest coast tribes of North America property among hunting peoples has a very small influence in conferring distinction and leadership upon the individual.

The intimate relation of the leadership function to religious phenomena has been noted as it appears in the different stages of the hunting life, and it has been seen that even among the most primitive hordes there is a belief in the influence of preternatural beings who may help or hinder individuals or groups in the attainment of social values. In the pre-maternal stage this belief does not extend beyond a very vague idea of good and bad spirits. Under the maternal and paternal systems there is a growth in the clearness of ideas of deities, but the concept of a Supreme Being with clearly defined personal attributes has not developed. The mythology shows more or less definite and clear ideas of certain earthly leaders who were the founders of their customs, or were believed to have been, and who taught them various useful arts. Everywhere the clearness of the concept of the deities or preternatural leaders is in direct proportion to the degree of development of leadership and authoritative personages with definitely recognized prerogatives and superior personal attributes that make them stand out clearly from the other members of the group. Most hunting groups seem to make no clear distinction in the qualities assigned to persons, animals, and things, and in their religious beliefs there is strong evidence that the development of the consciousness of self has not progressed very far.

Taking the social process as a whole in relation to leadership and institutions, it may be said that in most primitive expressions of associate life, where the interactions of organisms are under

<sup>84</sup> See *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, p. 390.

control of instincts and unconscious customs, there is but little opportunity for the development of leadership, personality, and institutional life. This is most clearly manifested in the societies of the lower animals, where control of societary phenomena most nearly approaches the automatic or mechanical form. In the most primitive human associations instinctive activity still predominates, though modified by custom. However, custom at this stage is very rigid, and ends and aims are few, and the means for attaining them are very inflexible and unadaptive. But with better food resources, and the consequent increase of the population and complexity of social conditions, the problems entering into societary life increase in number and difficulty, and there is a greater demand for individuals of superior ability. Division of labor follows, a few individuals through marked ability obtain positions of influence and authority in the tribe, and these privileges they endeavor to perpetuate during their life, and to extend to their children and friends. Institutionalization of the prerogatives gained takes place, and classes and castes begin to emerge. These institutional forms increase in strength, and may finally lose in plasticity until they become almost as inflexible as instincts and customs, and a social organization, of which the classical illustration is China, results. Or, on the other hand, the power of one or a few individuals may continue to grow until an absolute despotism or an oligarchy is formed. Between these two extremes of control by one individual or by a few individuals, and control by instincts, customs, or very inflexible institutions, such as castes, the social process presents numerous varieties of relationship between these two forms of the organized and organizing phases of associate life. In the hunting life there are but few groups in which there is any intimation of the exercise of absolute authority by one individual, authority in general being very meager and temporary. On the side of social structure, the control of instinct and custom frequently reaches extreme proportions, but, with very few exceptions, the social structure which we have called institutional has not attained any marked development. The tracing of the evolution of the relation of these two forms of societary control, as they are expressed in pastoral, agri-

cultural, manufacturing, and commercial types of life, should give a better insight into the causes of the dominancy, at times, of one or the other of these phases of social control, and the consequent injury to the whole social process. Such a study should also help greatly in gaining a better insight into all the laws of growth of these two highly important factors in the determination of social welfare.

This investigation of hunting groups has shown that the development of both leadership and institutions has centered about the problems and crises entering into the social process. All social changes, whether a progressive or regressive character, originate in stimuli, creating tensions in the social process and demanding adaptive activities. In these adjustive processes the leader finds his chief function. In the adaptive processes there are various degrees of failure and success, but if the group is to survive, the successful activities must predominate. The long period of existence of hunting peoples, far outreaching that of any other type of associate life, proves that they were able to adapt themselves to their native conditions. But contact with civilized societies introduced problems and disturbances too great for the leaders of primitive man to cope with, and, however friendly might be the attitude of the newcomers toward the native, universal experience has taught that he has been unable to adjust himself to the more complex organization, that the tension has been too great, and that he has broken down under it. Though the hunting groups have all but disappeared from the earth, the hunting impulses still exist in us all and seek expression in the more complex organization under which we live.

Another conclusion of importance in relation to some of the most difficult problems of modern life may be drawn from this discussion. The popular belief in the ideal freedom and perfect democracy of primitive man has no basis in fact. There is little freedom in the mechanical response to stimuli, as represented in instinct or unanalyzed custom. Freedom, in the largest degree, is the result of the control of life-conditions through the reflective or rational processes and of these primitive society knows but the beginnings. Moreover, the dominance of communal or groupal

activities does not mean the existence of a perfect democracy; for such a method of control of life-conditions affords only the most meager opportunities for the development of personality through the part which each individual plays in the social process, and without the consciousness of self which arises because of the rights and responsibilities which belong to each individual in the group, there can be no democracy. The emergence of the individual from the group, or the individualizing of the individual, is a slow growth. Democracy is a late development in associate life. The conferring of privileges and responsibilities begins with the few and gradually extends to the many. That the opportunities of civilized man for self-expression in all of the interests of life have increased greatly beyond those of the hunting man would hardly be questioned by anyone who had carefully reviewed the evidence afforded by ethnology, but many of the steps by which that position has been attained have not been worked out. That a true democracy in the expression of all life's interests has been reached even in the most advanced societies would probably not be asserted by anyone acquainted with the facts, but the ideal exists as a stimulus, and injustice in various forms furnishes still stronger stimuli toward efforts to attain the ideal. An enlightened method for the attainment of the ideal and of the ideals that continue to evolve is the great desideratum, and depends upon the acquisition of a knowledge of the laws of associate life.

## SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BIBLE<sup>1</sup>

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This paper is not an exhibit of the sociological material in the Bible, nor does it claim the Bible as exclusive territory for social science. It argues that the sacred book is a fact for sociology before it is a fact for theological discipline. In other words, it claims that the Bible is primarily material for scientific treatment. Its deeper meaning is a matter for discussion from other standpoints. In biblical inquiry, as in other departments of learning, the distinction of standpoints needs to be rigorously maintained. The sociological investigator is merely a scientist; and science cannot have the final word on the deeper problems of life. This paper claims the Bible for the process of social evolution. The Bible originated in oriental society, and has become the sacred book of our own civilization. These facts raise a presumption that there is an essential community of nature between all the social situations in which the Bible has figured. Whatever may have been the special circumstances of its origin within the history of ancient Israel, that history discloses the elements common to the general process of social evolution. We venture to say that the Bible affords better concrete ground of appeal for a special course introductory to sociology than any other material at our command. We anticipate the establishment of courses in biblical introduction to sociology, with points of attachment in our conventional ideas about sacred things.

It is well sometimes to emphasize the commonplace. All the world's mysteries are lodged in the heart of the familiar. We have spoken of the Bible as the sacred book of our society. It is more or less familiar to us from childhood. We say "more or less" because, with most of us, the Bible is yet very largely a

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered before the Philosophical Society of the Ohio State University, December 11, 1906.

strange and unspeakable thing. Our ancestors in a far-off age inherited this book from another branch of the human race; and for many centuries there was no scientific study of its contents.

But with the revival of learning at the beginning of the modern period the sacred book very slowly came into its rights. The first great stage in modern critical study of the Bible was mainly of a *literary* character. In 1520 Carlstadt ventured, contrary to the received view, that Moses may *not* have been the author of the Pentateuch, since the general style of the narrative remains unchanged after the account of the death of Moses. Martin Luther was familiar with this view and seems to have had a bias toward it. In 1570 Du Maes published a biblical commentary which regarded the Pentateuch and Joshua as late compilations under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. In the following century Hobbes and Spinoza took strong positions against Mosaic authorship. In 1678 the French priest Simon published a *Critical History of the Old Testament*, in which he showed that not only the so called "Mosaic" books, but other works of the canon, were compiled by writers who stood at some distance from the events described. Criticism had taken the initial step in the direction of a working hypothesis of the Bible.

But the seventeenth century did not advance beyond the position represented by Simon. Not until the eighteenth century was the key to the literature discovered. In 1753 Astruc, a Catholic physician, put forth a little treatise which is one of the most important contributions ever made to biblical study. Although he accepts the old, ecclesiastical tradition of Mosaic authorship, he presents a thesis which is far in advance of his time. The title of his book is *Conjectures on the Original Memoirs Which Moses Used in Composing the Book of Genesis*. This work brought clearly into view the fact that the biblical narrative is composed of two main strands, each having its own, characteristic name for the Deity. The book of Genesis, for instance, is constructed by taking out passages from earlier books, and piecing these excerpts together like newspaper clippings. According to one of these documents, God revealed his name "Yahweh" to Moses at the time of the exodus from Egypt, stat-

ing that he had not been known to the earlier patriarchs by that name; but according to the Book of Genesis the patriarchs long before Moses were well acquainted with the name "Yahweh" and used it frequently. On the unitary theory of authorship, discrepancies like these, which occur frequently, present a difficult, if not an insoluble, problem; but on the view that the Pentateuch and other parts of the Old Testament were constructed, like the gospels and other ancient works, out of excerpts from earlier books, the literary problem is solved.

The next important work was a treatise written by Eichhorn, entitled *An Introduction to the Old Testament*. This was published in 1780. Eichhorn applied the term "higher criticism" for the first time to the scientific study of the Bible. He describes his task as that of investigating the inner constitution of the different books. Planting himself on Astruc's documentary theory, he carried the inquiry further into detail without making any radical advance. This work signified that scholarship was awakening to the fact that the Bible is not a single treatise, but a *literature*. It was necessary that this fact be firmly established before the higher criticism could develop into another stage.

Thus we see that up to the close of the eighteenth century biblical criticism was mainly of a literary nature. But with the nineteenth century a new phase of investigation comes into view. Criticism of the Bible passes into the *historical* stage. The turning point is marked by De Wette's work, entitled *Contributions to the Introduction to the Old Testament*, published in 1806. Although this writer treats the literary phase of the subject, he shows that there is a deeper problem—the relation of biblical literature to the institutional history of Israel. In De Wette the outlines of the modern position begin to come into view. His work was incomplete, although of great value; and it offered points of departure for later criticism.

The next notable work approaching the Bible from the historical standpoint was published by Ewald in the middle years of the nineteenth century. Its title is *History of the People of Israel*. This book is the first attempt to bring historical study of Israel into line with corresponding investigation of other ancient



peoples. It comes within the category of modern works based upon critical sifting of the "sources." Its main defect is in its position that the priestly elements of the Bible are earlier than the prophetic elements. The mistakes of Ewald were corrected by a number of scholars—chief among whom are Graf, Kuenen, and Wellhausen—through whose labor the reigning school of biblical higher criticism was established. The official religion of Israel down to the time of the Babylonian exile was exhibited on a level with the religions of antiquity. A cardinal fact in the history was pointed out in the great prophetic movement. The predictive aspect of prophecy was minimized; while its contemporaneity was emphasized and put into the foreground. The older view had regarded the prophets as concerned mainly with the future. The new school explained them as creative preachers to their own times, and showed that the history was marked by a succession of reforms growing out of the prophetic movement. The claims of Yahweh, as represented by the prophets, were asserted with growing force and exclusiveness until the last vestiges of the earlier heathenism were cast out. The higher prophetic ideas about God and his moral nature were, so to speak, inclosed within the protecting hedge of priestly institutions which grew up around them. Thus the Prophets came before the Law. But Judaism after the exile conceived the Law as having been supernaturally imposed upon Israel at the beginning of the national history; and this idea was inherited by Christianity. It remained for historical criticism to show that instead of "The Law and the Prophets" we should say "The Prophets and the Law."

The readjustment of perspective growing out of the critical movement has been revolutionary. It is to be compared with the Copernican astronomy, which deposed the earth from its imaginary position at the center of the solar system. In spite of dissenting voices, the higher criticism, both literary and historical, has come to stay. At some points the reconstruction has probably been carried to extremes that will provoke reaction. Too many of Israel's ideas and institutions have been supposed to originate after the exile; and concessions will have to be made

to the demands of a more sober criticism. But in the final issue the main results of the modern school will stand. This paper takes the biblical higher criticism for granted. But we dispute the current assumption that it ends with the historical stage as thus far developed. If our standpoint is correctly taken, the critical movement will pass into a *sociological* stage before its work is completed.

While the historical higher criticism is true as far as it goes, it fails to explain the Old Testament situation. Although the older view of the Bible has been discredited in the world of science, we have to reckon with the fact that higher critics are not united in explanation of the Bible and its theology.<sup>2</sup> The new scholarship exhibits different views about the origin of biblical religion as contrasted with religion in *general*. The old theory of Mosaic revelation having been abandoned, some critics become "orthodox" at one point in the history and some at another; by some there is a vague appeal to the "religious genius" of Israel in the same way that the older physiology invoked the aid of a peculiar "vital force" to explain the phenomena of living bodies; while the extreme naturalistic wing of criticism assumes that the Bible is a result of the secular process, but fails to give a credible account of the process. From the standpoint of scientific explanation—by which we mean the reduction of phenomena to their simplest possible terms—the historical school is hardly more satisfactory than the old orthodoxy. We do not mean to imply that scientific explanation can penetrate all mystery. We gladly grant the substratum of mystery under the whole social process from the earliest ages down to the present. But we object to setting up an antithesis between Israel and the rest of humanity, and imposing upon this oriental people an additional burden of mystery over and above the common, universal mystery of human life.

This brings us to the point where it is in order to differentiate between history and sociology: The historical interest is pri-

<sup>2</sup> "Men of every shade of opinion with regard to the supernatural and to evangelical religion may be found among the advocates of the theory."—Briggs, *Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch* (New York, 1897), p. 94.

marily in the *narrative*; while the sociological interest is primarily in the *motive*. In a general way, the historian subordinates motive to narrative. The sociologist, on the other hand, subordinates narrative to motive. When we try to tell *what* happens, we are working in the conventional historical interest. But when we try to tell *how* things happen—when we attempt the reduction of historical phenomena to their lowest possible terms, as such—we are working in the sociological interest. It is a mistake to suppose that sociology is trying to set the historian aside. Instead of this, it merely tries to modify the historian's outlook.

History has well been called "sociology in the yolk." But sociology is not merely a renaming of historical discipline. Already there have been differentiated from history a number of special sciences which deal with common historical data from different standpoints. Not one of these particular sciences, however, can be cultivated without making appeal to the rest. The term "sociology" is the name for correlation of the material of the different social sciences in a single perspective. Sociology is ultimately a struggle to see human life as a unitary fact. The particular social sciences bear the same relation to general sociology that the sciences of anatomy, physiology, histology, etc., bear to general biology. The physiologist is primarily concerned with the functions of living bodies; but he cannot investigate function without appealing to the facts of structure. In the same way, none of the social sciences can be cultivated independently. Each must in the long run appeal to all the rest. In this way there slowly emerges a body of doctrine which is not identified with any of these disciplines, which is logically introductory to them, and which we are learning to call "sociology." "The name has come to stand for something which is asserting itself whether we like it or not," says Small; "and history, whether the historians like it or not, will remain a collection of litter, more or less artistically arranged, until it is generalized as sociology."<sup>3</sup>

"The latest word of sociology," says the writer just quoted, "is that human experience yields the most and the deepest meaning when read from first to last in terms of the evolution, expres-

<sup>3</sup> *General Sociology* (Chicago, 1905), p. 46.

sion, and accommodation of interests."<sup>4</sup> Although interests fall into a number of categories, all classes of interest can be brought under the general head of *self-interest*. Society can be studied as a plexus of reactions between the interests of the individuals that compose the social body. The terms employed in these reactions are "good" and "bad," or their equivalents. This, no doubt, is very elementary and commonplace; but, as already observed, it is well sometimes to emphasize the commonplace. Anything that helps what we conceive to be our interest is called "good." Whatever works against our interest, we term "bad." In the endeavor to satisfy our interests we take up certain relations toward each other. These relations are the structures, or institutions, of society. Social structure in general is the issue of compromise between the interests concerned. It never satisfies everybody; and there is always a tendency toward modification of the structure. We may define history as the working of social structure punctuated by readjustment of the structure. Thus the process of social evolution moves on from one adjustment to another without end.

Now, if the sociological proposition is valid, it must cover all history, including the history of Israel. If it applies universally, the Bible is in some way a phenomenon of interests. We are confronted by two facts: the Bible is the sacred book of society—the peculiar, holy book of civilization; and it applies the terms "good" and "bad" to human conduct with more frequency and emphasis than any other book in the world. These great, fundamental facts are a challenge to *sociology*. Why is the Bible the sacred book of society? Why is it so preoccupied with "good and evil"? How do these terms come to be so closely related to the idea of God?

Even a cursory examination of the Old Testament shows that Israelitish history involved a struggle of interests of *some kind*. The struggle is described in terms that vary according to the standpoint of the observer. On the old view of the Bible, the antagonism of interests lay merely between a fully developed, heaven-revealed system of religion on the one side, and "heathen-

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 282.

ism" on the other. But if the modern school of criticism is right, the fully developed system of religion did *not* stand at the beginning of Israel's life; and in this case there is ground for claiming that the distinctive religious ideas of the Bible are not a *cause* but an *effect* of the struggle of interests that agitated the history.

There are several avenues of approach to the Bible as a phenomenon of interests. A good introduction is offered by the legends of the Book of Genesis. In this ancient work man is created in the midst of a scene of rustic happiness; and the first city has an evil origin, being built by Cain the murderer. Later, the people of the earth undertake to build a city with a great tower; but "Yahweh scattered them abroad upon the face of the earth, and they left off building the city." The family of Abraham leaves Ur, the city of the Chaldees; and Abraham, "the father of the faithful and the friend of God," becomes a dweller in tents. In another legend God brings destruction upon Sodom, Gomorrah, and the cities of the Plain for their great wickedness. Abraham intercedes and secures a divine guarantee of exemption for Sodom if there should be found fifty "good" men within its walls. He then persuades the Almighty to reduce this figure to forty-five, then forty, then thirty, then twenty, and finally ten. But Sodom shares the fate of the other cities. We recall the words of the prophet Jeremiah, who cried: "Run ye to and fro through the streets of Jerusalem, and seek in the broad places thereof, if ye can find a man, if there be any that doeth justly, that seeketh faithfulness; and I will pardon her."<sup>5</sup> Jeremiah came from a country village a few miles north of Jerusalem. The proposition at this point is that the legends of Genesis, having been compiled at a late period, reflect the situation of that late period back upon the patriarchal narrative.

These hints might be worthless did not the Bible furnish abundant evidence that throughout a large part of the history there was a hostile reaction of interests between the central and the outlying parts of Israelite society. This reaction does not by any means exhaust the situation; but it occupies an important

<sup>5</sup> Jer. 5: 1.

place in the perspective, and furnishes *one* clue to the vital correlation of biblical material.

The process of social evolution, when unchecked, always resolves the social mass into a *center* surrounded by outlying, or peripheral, parts. The center is the city, which functions as an exchange point for the entire body. From the purely analytical standpoint, as an aid to clarity of thought, all the cities of any society may be figured as *one* city; and the rustic element may be pictured as disposed around that city in a circle. This ideal figure is usefully applied in the general study of civilization; but we are now concerned with it only in reference to the Bible.

Prior to the invasion of Canaan by the tribes of Israel, the land had had a long history going back into a dim past. It was the crossroads of ancient oriental civilization. Many fortified cities had grown up here in the midst of the usual rustic environment. According to the rule in ancient history, the symbols of Canaanite society were found in connection with its religious observances. Each district had its own god, the Baal, or divine proprietor. According to ancient practice, worship of these gods would naturally come to a center in the cities, where the markets were held. "The proper site of an ancient shrine," says Dr. G. A. Smith, "was nearly always a market."<sup>6</sup> It was Jeremiah who complained at a later time: "According to the number of your cities are your gods."<sup>7</sup> The centralization of early religion at the points of exchange needs to be emphasized. Other eastern societies illustrate this fact.

Concerning early Arabia Professor W. R. Smith writes as follows:

In the centuries before Mohammed the gods of the . . . villagers and towns-folk had superseded the gods of the . . . dwellers in tents. Much the most important part of the religious practices of the nomads consisted in pilgrimages to the great shrines of the town Arabs.<sup>8</sup>

To this we might add that the shrine of the city of Mecca had become so sacred under the old paganism that Mohammed found

<sup>6</sup> *Book of the Twelve Prophets* (New York), Vol. I, p. 36; cf. H. P. Smith, *Old Testament History* (New York, 1903), pp. 172, 173.

<sup>7</sup> Jer. 2:28.

<sup>8</sup> *Religion of the Semites* (New York, 1894), p. 112.

it necessary to accommodate his new system to the situation by adopting the city as the focal point of Islam. Turning to ancient Egypt, we learn that

the superior splendor of the deities in the large cities, with their great temples, led to the worship of the tutelary gods of the villages and small towns being more and more abandoned.<sup>9</sup>

The same was true of Mesopotamia:

In its first recognizable form the state was a city gathered about a temple, the center of worship. . . . Each of the city-states of Babylonia had its god with whom its interests were identified.<sup>10</sup>

In such an agricultural country, villages grow up in protected centers where fortification is possible. . . . This was . . . no doubt the origin of the Babylonian cities. These cities were in the first instance the residence of fellow-tribesmen and were built around the temple of their divinity of fertility. . . . Before the dawn of our present historical knowledge, about 4500 B. C., the struggle between these cities for supremacy had not only been begun, but had been waged with such varying fortunes that now one city had been in supreme power over the others for a century or two, and now another. This struggle . . . continued until terminated by the final supremacy of Babylon about 2300 B. C.<sup>11</sup>

Bearing in mind this fact of cult concentration, we take special notice that when the Israelites invaded the land of Canaan they were generally unable to reduce the fortified cities. It is true that the book of Joshua represents the children of Israel as taking victorious possession of the entire land; but this account is unhistorical. The real nature of the invasion is indicated by the first chapter of Judges, where we are told of about a score of prominent Canaanite cities which, with their suburbs, the Israelites were unable to take. These unsubdued places were the principal cities of the land. In a general way, then, the invaders occupied the country districts, while the Canaanites retained the cities, becoming a factor of enormous importance in Old Testament history.

<sup>9</sup> Professor W. Max Müller in *Encyclopedia Biblica* (New York, 1901), col. 1215; cf. Breasted, *History of Egypt* (New York, 1905), p. 31, and Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* (Boston, 1898), p. 649.

<sup>10</sup> Goodspeed, *History of the Babylonians and Assyrians* (New York, 1902), p. 80.

<sup>11</sup> Barton, *Semitic Origins* (New York, 1902), p. 162.

About two centuries after the invasion a monarchy was founded which embraced both country and city in a single state. Upon the accession of the fourth king the nation divided into two rival kingdoms, north and south.

A hundred years after the division we reach an extraordinary period marked by phenomena of the utmost interest. We are now in the *ninth* century before Christ. If we make a list of the names of Israelite political heads, beginning with the judges, passing up through the monarchy and the double line of kings who ruled after the division, a remarkable fact comes into view. In the ninth century the name of the national god, "Yahweh," begins to be incorporated as a rule in the names of Israelite political heads. Another noteworthy fact is that in this period begins the line of those great prophets who, from now until the Babylonian exile, fiercely preached that Israel ought to be faithful to Yahweh and cast away the Baals and all other gods. Another notable fact in the ninth century is the abrupt rise and fall of what may be called the "miracle line." The Old Testament contains many stories of supernatural occurrences; but these accounts of the supernatural follow a *natural* law of distribution within the sources. No qualitative estimate can be attempted. We speak merely in terms of quantity. There are two large masses of miracles in the Old Testament. One of these is connected with the period of the exodus from Egypt and the invasion of Canaan. The other is connected with the period now before us. These masses form, as it were, two mountains; while the miracles between make a line of little hills. There was no movement in the history between the invasion and the ninth century powerful enough to force the miracle line upward. There is nothing to correspond to the establishment of the united monarchy, and nothing that answers to the great disruption—dramatic as these events were. But in the *ninth* century the miracle line rises abruptly to a considerable height, and then falls. Another notable thing in this age is the founding of the Rechabites, a peculiar sect of country people, whereof more presently. Still another special fact is the literary activity which the modern historical school assigns to this age. The ninth cen-



tury seems to have been the time in which the earliest code of laws was brought together and the first great historical document compiled. The last item in our catalogue is more spectacular than all the rest. The monarchs of both Israelite kingdoms were assassinated in a bloody political revolution which attempted to root out Baalism in the interest of Yahweh worship.

The clue to explanation of these remarkable phenomena leads to understanding not only of the ninth century, but of much that came before and after. At the time of the invasion, the heads of Israelite families acquired country estates in freehold by right of conquest. These lands were held by farmers like Gideon, and Elkanah, and Kish, and Saul, and Jesse, and David, and all the rustic folk who appear in the Books of Judges, Samuel, and Kings. But as the territory was limited, these parcels of land were taken up before no very long time. At a later period—perhaps about the time of Solomon—there evidently set in a gradual concentration of landed property in fewer and fewer hands, like that which has taken place in all the great historic states—Greece, Rome, modern Europe, and America. There were many causes for this in the natural course of things; but we need not go into detail. A suggestive passage bearing on the subject may be reproduced from Professor Hogg, of Oxford:

In the days of Israel's greatness, when agriculture was the chief occupation of the people, the population . . . was certainly enough to bring the country into a state of cultivation, even in places that are now quite barren. The land would be full of husbandmen tilling their fields by day, and returning to their villages at night. . . . At the other extreme also—in such a society as is described, for instance, by Amos and Isaiah—there was an aristocracy that had little immediate connection with the land it owned. Slave labor would doubtless, as elsewhere, be a weak point in the agricultural system, tending to lower its status. . . . After making due allowance for homiletic coloring, we are bound to suppose that agricultural enterprise must have suffered grievously from a sense of insecurity in regard to the claims of property, and from the accumulation of debts. . . . Civil disturbances (such as those abounding in the later years of Hosea) and foreign wars would, in later times, take the place of exposure to the inroads of nomadic tribes. The burden of taxation and forced labor would, as now in many eastern lands, foster the feelings that find expression in the narrative of the great schism and in some accounts of the rise of the kingdom.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Encyclopaedia Biblica* (New York, 1899), col. 85.

The fact of land concentration is undisputed. The point for emphasis here is the form which this concentration took within the social mass. All the evidence leads to the conclusion that country property fell more and more into the grasp of the wealthy classes who centered in the cities. There seems to have been a general mortgaging of country lands. Experience proves that the temptation to borrow is very seductive. The owner of real estate has no difficulty in getting loans up to a certain proportion of the value of his holding. When the Israelite peasants felt the pressure of hard times, they found it easy to obtain loans from the wealthy classes. Wealth centered in the cities of Canaan long before the Israelite invasion. It was precisely these places and their suburbs that were not reduced by the newcomers; and their continued wealth is proved by the abundant references of the literary prophets, like Amos and Isaiah. Of course, all the wealthy persons in the nation were not found in the walled cities. We assert merely that the bulk of the rich were there; and that all well-to-do families tended to move into the cities or their suburbs in order to obtain the many advantages of the great centers of population. The same conditions that forced the mortgaging of country lands made it difficult to redeem the mortgages. Loans are easier to get than they are to repay. All this led either to foreclosure, or to a permanent charge on farm property, or to the absolute slavery of the farmer and his children. The case of the ninth-century widow who appealed in her trouble to the prophet Elisha was not exceptional: "Now there cried a certain woman of the wives of the sons of the prophets unto Elisha, saying, Thy servant my husband is dead; and thou knowest that thy servant did fear Yahweh; and the creditor is come to take unto him my two children to be bondmen."<sup>13</sup> This woman was widow of one of the "sons of the prophets" who, in his lifetime, had been heavily in debt. The Hebrew phrase translated "son of a prophet" could be more liberally rendered "candidate for the prophetic office." Several interesting inferences might be drawn from the fact that a would-be prophet of Israel was in debt. The situation in the

<sup>13</sup> II Kings, 4: 1.

time of Nehemiah, although much later than the period here in view, is worth citing in this connection:

Then there arose a great cry of the people. . . . We are mortgaging our fields, vineyards, and houses: let us get grain because of the dearth. . . . We have borrowed money to pay taxes upon our fields and vineyards . . . and lo, we bring into slavery our sons and daughters. . . . Neither is it in our power to help it, for other men have our fields and vineyards.<sup>14</sup>

Against this condition the once free peasants reacted. The result was a tension between the central and outlying parts of the social mass. According to this interpretation, the reaction between country and city is a factor of large importance in the problem of the Old Testament. The remarkable facts listed in our catalogue of the ninth century will now appear in their proper connections.

The enslavement of the outlying districts—the adding of house to house and field to field, about which the Yahweh prophets bitterly complain—this condition became acute in the ninth century before Christ. If the present view is correct, the famous conflict between Yahwism and Baalism was, in the short run, a struggle between the country districts and the cities. We say “in the short run” because in the *long* run it was far more than a struggle of the rustic and the city man. On this rendering, the Yahweh prophets were, at first, the spokesmen of the peasantry. At the outset, the champions of Yahweh were preoccupied with a special problem.

The first of the great prophets came from the rural districts. Elijah was a countryman from the hills of Gilead beyond the Jordan. Elisha, the next prophetic leader, was a farmer whose property was located near the village of Abelmeholah. The next was Amos, a herdsman and a dresser of sycamore trees, whose home was in the village of Tekoa, a few miles below Jerusalem. Contemporary with Amos, and perhaps a little later, was Hosea, whose interests were in the northern kingdom, but whose home is not known. His book shows that he sided with the peasantry. Micah, the next prophet, lived in the village of Moresheth, in the Judean south country. It is true that in a *later* period the prophets located in the city; but of this more presently.

<sup>14</sup> Neh. 5: 1-5.

The prophetic protests were directed largely against the kings and the governing classes. In general, there was a breach between prophecy and government. Now, the government of Israel had commenced in the country. None of the political heads in the period of the judges were properly city men. After the judges the first king, Saul, was a farmer. David, the succeeding monarch, began life as a shepherd boy in the service of his father Jesse. Before taking the crown, he married the widow of a wealthy sheepmaster. After he became king of all Israel, he captured the city of Jerusalem and made it his capital. It is worth while to emphasize that Jerusalem was one of the Canaanite cities which were not captured at the time of the invasion. Like other fortified cities, it had remained wholly or partly Canaanite until a late period; and King David seems to have reached an accommodation with its inhabitants. The place became known as "the city of David;" and thenceforward the government, both of the united kingdom and of the two monarchies, was administered from the fortified cities. After the age of David, the peasantry doubtless felt that power was more and more slipping from their grasp. When the prophet Elijah came forward to rebuke King Ahab for treacherously seizing the land of Naboth, a great thrill of sympathy went through the homes of the countryside. As the Old Testament law codes prove, the moral ideas of the peasantry made no distinction between treacherously seizing land, after the manner of King Ahab, and foreclosing a mortgage. Foreclosure was thought to be on the same ethical plane as robbery and murder. It was held to be wrong even to charge interest on loans. We see here the primitive, tribal standpoint of the peasants in opposition to the more modern, commercial standpoint of the walled cities.

So profound was the impression made by Elijah and Elisha, as the first great prophetic leaders of the peasantry, that their memory was honored by the luxuriant growth of miracle stories already noted in connection with the ninth century.

After the death of Elijah, the agrarian movement found expression in the field of practical politics. The prophets of Yahweh, under the leadership of Elisha, encouraged the army

officer Jehu to exterminate the royal house and seize the crown. In carrying out his bloody programme, Jehu had the formal, public support of Jehonadab the son of Rechab, who founded the remarkable sect of the Rechabites mentioned above. The Rechabites were country people, who lived in tents, and who probably followed the occupation of shepherds. They supported the side of the prophets in the revolution of Jehu.

Probably it was amid the turmoil of this remarkable age that the primitive law code was compiled which is listed in our catalogue of the ninth century. Although its compilation was probably an incident of the literary activity of that century, there is no reason to suppose that it contains ideas which were new to the age. It was attributed to Yahweh, the god whose worship had been imported into Canaan by the ancestors of the country folk. "The background," in the words of Dr. Harper, "is agricultural throughout."<sup>15</sup> The code could not have been an element of the "official" religion of Israel at the time of its compilation because, on the whole (and especially in its economic aspects), it represents the attitude of the only one party in the state—the agrarian party. But its ideas may confidently be set far back in time—perhaps before the monarchy. It is to be found principally in the middle chapters of the book of Exodus. One of its principal concerns is with the lending of money by free Israelites to free Israelites, and the holding of erstwhile free Israelites in slavery by their brethren the children of Israel. The agrarian party, which wanted to enforce these laws, was helpless in the face of a great social movement. When you lend money to any of your brethren who are in need, you must not be as a creditor to them; nor may you charge interest for the use of your money. When your brethren become your slaves, you must not hold them in slavery more than six years. In the seventh year they shall go out free. Laws like these were dead letters from the start. Instead of being acknowledged by city and country alike, they merely stood for the *desires* of the rustic party. When they became a part of the officially recognized code after the exile, they were

<sup>15</sup> *Amos and Hosea* ("International Critical Commentary," New York, 1905), p. lix.

evaded; and even had it been possible to enforce them, the remission of interest, and the limitation of slavery, would not have stopped the adding of house to house and field to field. These demands were as unpractical as the law of redemption in Leviticus, which draws a distinction between city and country. According to this law, the man who sells farm property may redeem it, if he care to, at the "jubilee;" but the man who disposes of property in a *walled city* has the right of redemption for only one year, after which the property is confirmed in the hand of its new owner.<sup>16</sup>

The remaining item in our catalogue of the ninth century is the fact that in this period the name of Yahweh begins to be incorporated as a rule in the names of the kings. The change in king names may be set alongside the fact that the seat of government, once it was located in the city, remained there to the very last. It indicates that the campaign of the farmers was beginning to have objective results. The prophet Elijah had called upon the nation to serve Yahweh more faithfully, and renounce the Baalim. Yahweh had given Israel the land of Canaan, and raised the people up to great prosperity and glory under David and Solomon. They "were many as the sand by the sea, eating, and drinking, and making merry, every man under his vine and under his fig tree." But now great trouble had come. No longer did every man sit in happy freedom under his vine and fig tree, for the land was coming into control of the wealthy class in the cities. The kingdom was divided; and the royal arms had met defeat on the battlefield. If the people had been as faithful to the covenant with Yahweh as he had been; if they had not mixed his worship with that of the Baalim whose great shrines were in the walled cities; if there had been more brotherly kindness, then Israel might have remained in the Golden Age. On the one hand, the Yahweh party advanced the superstitious claim represented by the Book of Deuteronomy, that the

<sup>16</sup> Lev. 25: 29 f. It was the *walled cities*, not taken at the time of the Israelite invasion, that served as the great shelters of old Canaanite Baalism. It is to these that we refer in speaking of the "city classes." Many so-called "cities" in the Old Testament were nothing more than country villages. Cf. I Sam. 6: 18.

worship of Yahweh resulted in material *good*, and Baal worship in material *evil*; while, on the other hand, this movement had an unmistakably *moral* character, inasmuch as it fiercely condemned certain kinds of conduct. The platform of the Yahweh party was not carefully reasoned out. It was a blending of primitive superstition and the crude ethic of the clan. It was incredible to the city aristocracy. Its emphasis upon Yahweh and its denunciation of Baal were not thought to be well taken. But the Israelite agrarian party is not the only party that has operated successfully on a poor platform; and the strength of a movement which had such leaders as Elijah and Elisha, and which could engineer the bloody revolution of Jehu, forced the respect of its opponents. When Jehu was in the midst of his revolution, he called upon Jehonadab to see his "zeal" for Yahweh. This was a purely formal, ritualistic devotion. Led by the kings, the cities were now adopting a policy of greater *zeal* toward the national god; and one sign of this reform is found in the Yahweh king names which become the rule in the ninth century before Christ. The situation is exactly struck off by Jeremiah when he addresses the god of Israel in these words: "Thou art near in their mouth, but far from their reins."<sup>17</sup>

While the new zeal for Yahweh was worthless in itself, it was vastly important for the evolution of religion. The agrarian party had apparently won a great victory; but the pressure of

<sup>17</sup> Jer. 12:2. The limits of this paper forbid enlarging upon the *covenant* aspect of the Yahweh cult, upon which Jeremiah and his fellows laid emphasis. Most ancient gods were thought to be the actual fathers of their worshipers, and hence to be indissolubly connected with society. Sometimes, however, a people acquired part of its cult by association. There is more and more agreement that such was the case with reference to Yahwism. After the misfortunes in Egypt, one or more of the Israelite clans under the leadership of Moses entered into covenant with the Midianite Kenites of the Mount Sinai region; and the Yahweh cult came in at this time and place. From the standpoint of ancient theology, this transaction was conceived by the prophets as the *choice* of Israel by Yahweh; and from this they deduced that he could separate himself from his chosen people if they did not *choose* to do "good" and thus maintain intact "the inheritance of Yahweh." For an excellent statement of the Kenite position, see Professor Paton's articles in the *Biblical World* for July and August, 1906, entitled "The Origin of Yahweh-Worship in Israel." See also Budde, *Religion of Israel to the Exile*.

the social problem continued as before. The reformers were thus goaded into further effort. Inasmuch as the worship of Yahweh was now more zealous than ever, it became clear that the fundamental issue was not merely between the god Yahweh and other gods, but between right and wrong ways of serving Yahweh himself. Nowhere in the Old Testament is the reaction of the outlying districts against the cities formulated explicitly in such terms. To express it in this form would have been a great strategic blunder, and, indeed, would have been impossible. The prophets necessarily assumed that the worship of Yahweh was as ancient in the fortified cities as it was in the country. They could not proclaim Yahweh a god of the rural districts, for after the union of Israelites and Canaanites in the monarchy he had become the god of the entire land. The early prophets merely exploited the national god as champion of the special brand of "righteousness" which was demanded by the agrarian party; while, in contrast with Yahweh, the Baalim were more and more identified with the wrong which was consolidating in the cities. In other words, even at the time of Elijah, in the ninth century, Yahwism had a very definite, but narrow, ethical content. Yahweh versus Baal meant the struggle of Right and Wrong as the peasant saw it. But if Yahweh laid ethical demands upon a city capitalist who was foreclosing a country mortgage, or taking interest from a peasant, or enslaving some poor farmer to work out a debt—if the god of Israel prohibited wrongs like these, why was he not against wrong *everywhere*? He was God of all Israel. There was, indeed, but a single step from the narrow ethics of early Yahwism to the broad moral demands of prophecy in the eighth and following centuries. For the social problem was not merely a question between the peasant and the city plutocrat. It pressed for solution *inside* the cities as well as in the outlying districts. Although in the short run the issue of the great Yahweh-Baal conflict lay between country and city, yet in the long run this great struggle simply furnished the ethical symbols for a wider movement. The last great prophetic leaders, Isaiah and Jeremiah, seem to have lived and worked in the fortified city Jerusalem. If the Yahweh movement had not



advanced beyond the stage represented by Elijah, it would not have been a fact of world-wide significance. But the literary prophets, who worked after the revolution of Jehu, took up the symbols of the rural-urban reaction, and read into them a profounder moral meaning than Elijah could have conceived. The writing prophets took the terms of the crude struggle between Yahweh and Baal, and recast them into coin fit for circulation wherever human society is found.

This paper is necessarily a mere sketch of certain aspects of the Old Testament problem. But perhaps we have assembled enough historical facts to illustrate our main propositions relative to the sociological meaning of the Bible and the need for a new stage in biblical higher criticism. Recurring to the introductory statements, we claim the Bible, not as imposed upon the social process according to the old theology, but as a *part* of the process. We have to bear in mind that long before the religion of the Bible became a fact in the world there was going on within society the same struggle of "good and evil" that is taking place around us today. The forms of the struggle vary; but everywhere men strive to make other men do what they conceive to be "good," and avoid what they regard as "evil." Two remarkable items of evidence in ancient Semitic society are the Egyptian "Book of the Dead" on the one side of Israel, and the "Code of Hammurabi" on the other. Coming long before the Bible and its theology, these early works bear impressive witness to the common ethical striving of the race. This mighty movement was universal in humanity before the religion of the Bible arose. It is the biblical dynamic—the motive that strikes along through the whole complicated process by which this lofty religion was realized for us. Bible religion is an involution of the common ethical struggle, conditioned by the special circumstances of Bible history. Its conceptions and institutions are the result of a development which passes through a number of crises, each disclosing a composition of *interests*—priestly and prophetic, conservative and radical, rural and urban. It is the merit of the literary stage of biblical criticism to show us the nature of the documents. It is the merit of the historical stage to emphasize

the fact of development. It will be the merit of the sociological stage to indicate how this development took place.\*

\* There are so many works from which a good introduction to biblical higher criticism can be obtained that it is difficult to make a minimum list without omitting some of the best. The sociological student would do well to begin with historical treatises from the modern standpoint: Kent, *History of the Hebrew People*; H. P. Smith, *Old Testament History*. Other good works in English are Wade, *Old Testament History*, and Cornill, *History of the People of Israel*. In German, corresponding to the above, are the histories by Löhr, Guthe, and Thomas. In French, Pipenbring. For the Old Testament prophets (i. e., preachers) see Cornill, *The Prophets of Israel*; Harper, *The Prophetic Element in the Old Testament*; W. R. Smith, *The Prophets of Israel*. For a general outlook on Semitic religion, see Barton, *Semitic Origins*, and W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*.

## REVIEWS

*The Election of Senators.* By GEORGE H. HAYNES, Ph.D. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1906. xii+295.

A timely book, one that would have been timely several years ago and is likely to be for several years to come, is one on the election of United States Senators. In the first chapter of his book Dr. Haynes tells how the present system came to be adopted. Out of four methods proposed, it is interesting to note that James Wilson, who is just now enjoying a sort of recrudescence as a statesman, stood out boldly for election by the people. However, he was able to carry only one state, his own, for his proposition. In opposing this method, Gerry said that it "would leave no security to the [commercial] interest." He probably never dreamed how completely the Senate was to become subservient to the "interests."

Although Congress was given power to regulate the time and manner of electing senators, it did not do so for more than seventy-five years. The practice of concurrent votes in separate session, which was followed by most of the state legislatures during this time, often resulted in deadlocks, and several times caused vacancies in the representation. Finally, the election of senators by a rump legislature in Indiana, 1857, led to a bill for the regulation of such elections by federal law, though it did not find a place on the statute-books until 1866. It provides that, when a vacancy is about to occur, on the second Tuesday after meeting and organizing, the houses shall ballot, *viva voce*, in separate session for senator; that they shall meet in joint session the next day; "and if the same person shall have received a majority of all the votes in each house, or if either house shall have failed to take proceedings as required by this act, . . . the joint assembly shall then proceed to" elect. In case of failure to elect on the first ballot, the two houses must meet in joint assembly on each succeeding day, and ballot at least once until an election is secured, or until the end of the session. A majority of the votes cast in the joint assembly, a majority of the members elected to each house being present, shall elect.

The author does not seem to have thought the provisions of the act open to criticism. One would like to know the effect of the

vote in separate session? If the same person receives a majority in separate session, is he thereby elected? If so, why vote in joint assembly? If not, why vote in separate assembly?

If this system was intended to prevent deadlocks, it has signally failed to accomplish that end. From 1891 to 1905 there were forty-six cases of failure to elect on the first joint ballot, an average of three states for each year. The lowest number of days on which there was a joint assembly for joint balloting was three, in North Dakota; the highest one hundred and fourteen, in Delaware. In fourteen cases there was no election. During one entire Congress both of Delaware's senatorial seats remained vacant. Many elections on first ballot have been preceded by long and bitter contests in the party caucus. These embitter the legislators and unfit them for their proper work. In 1897 the Legislature of Oregon never succeeded in organizing. The constitution requires the presence of two-thirds of the members-elect. Foreseeing the probable results of a joint ballot for senator, more than one-third of the members of the lower house absented themselves to prevent organization.

Out of ten cases of investigation by the Senate for bribery, nine have occurred within the last fifteen years. However, the author does not attribute this to the operation of the present law, but rather to the system of election by legislatures. The ten cases do not include any of the defeated candidates. The rules of the Senate for investigation evidence a desire to palliate rather than condemn the corrupt use of money. To invalidate a claim to a seat it must be proved by legal evidence (1) that the claimant was personally guilty of corrupt practices, or (2) that corruption took place with his sanction, or (3) that a sufficient number of votes were corruptly changed to affect the result (57).

In a chapter on "The Personnel of the Senate" Dr. Haynes seeks to show that it has suffered a considerable decline. Very little argument is needed to convince the well-informed reader of this, but Dr. Haynes hardly marshals his proof in a manner convincing to one not acquainted with the facts. He classifies seventeen out of a possible ninety as representing the "best traditions of the Senate." One would like to know what proportion it took to create the "best traditions" in the days of the Senate's glory. Not necessarily a majority. Is not a great deal of our respect for that

body of the past due to the transcendent greatness of a few men, such as Webster, Clay, Calhoun, and a few others?

That the foregoing evils have produced widespread dissatisfaction with the present method of electing is evidenced by the demands for a change. During the first eighty years of the republic the movement was somewhat sporadic, only nine resolutions on the subject being introduced in Congress during that period. But of late years it has gained much in strength and persistency. Resolutions for popular elections have passed the House of Representatives by the necessary two-thirds vote in five different Congresses, in two of them without a division and never with more than fifty-one votes in the negative. The demand has been incorporated in the national platforms of the People's Party since 1892, and in those of the Democratic Party since 1900. In one way or another thirty-one state legislatures have signified their desire for a change. At least two other states have approved the movement by their attempts to put in practice popular election through the nominating primary, and single houses of several other states have signified their approval. Here is the necessary two-thirds of the states upon whose demand Congress is under obligation to call a constitutional convention; but still the Senate holds out. How long will it continue to do so? When the colonists felt oppressed, they appointed committees of correspondence to keep in touch with the different parts of the country and encourage one another to stand together for relief. In 1899 Pennsylvania initiated this method to secure the co-operation of the other states in making demand upon Congress for a convention. Other states have followed her example. While this review was being prepared, the Senatorial Amendment Convention met at Des Moines and took definite steps looking to the calling of a constitutional convention. Given time and persistence, and the cause will be won.

Meantime, in many of the states efforts are being made to nullify the constitutional method of choosing senators by various devices. In some states the parties have simply given their stamp of approval to particular candidates by formal nominations. In many cases now unanimous elections by the legislature have been preceded by heated campaigns in the primary. A few states have made legal provision for an expression of choice by the people. A few states have gone almost as far as it is possible to go in their

effort to make the popular choice binding on the legislature. Oregon is one of these. That her legislature had the temerity to disregard the plain mandate of the people is only added argument for removing such possibilities.

Such, in the main, are the facts brought out in the first half of Dr. Haynes's book. The greater part of the remainder is taken up with briefs and arguments for and against popular election of senators. These are fairly and clearly stated, though the author does not hesitate to reveal his sympathies for the affirmative. For his work in bringing before the public the results thus far accomplished Dr. Haynes is deserving of hearty thanks. An excellent service would be rendered the cause of popular election by putting a copy of the book in the hands of every United States senator. It is time for them to see the writing on the wall.

DAVID Y. THOMAS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

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*The Legislative History of Naturalization in the United States from the Revolutionary War to 1861.* By FRANK GEORGE FRANKLIN, Ph.D. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1906. Pp. 308.

Because aliens and their descendants form so large a part of our population, a *Legislative History of Naturalization* is a not uninviting subject for a book. Dr. Franklin's book is an expansion of an article on the same subject which he published in the *Annual Report* of the American Historical Association, 1901; consequently one might expect a mature presentation.

The first chapter deals with citizenship in the Revolutionary Period; the second, with the action of the Convention of 1787 in regard to the subject of naturalization. Seven chapters are devoted to the several acts passed from 1790 to 1824, the last being preceded by one on "Expatriation." Then follow three chapters on "Native Americanism" as introductory to the act of 1855, and a final one on "The Know-Nothing Period."

During the Revolution the Continental Congress passed several resolutions and acts bearing upon citizenship. One of these attempted to define citizenship of the colonies (states). Perhaps the most significant act was the one requiring all officers to abjure allegiance to King George and swear allegiance to the United

States. The fact that the states legislated upon naturalization, and in at least one case, Virginia, on expatriation, is adverted to, in consequence of which there was a great diversity of practice; but no effort is made to summarize their laws. One of the indictments against the Confederation was that, while it had created an interstate citizenship, it had no uniform rule of naturalization. This defect was cured by the Convention of 1787.

The debates on the naturalization acts are reported with wearisome details. Many speeches of unknown men, which had been "entombed rather than preserved" in the *Annals*, are here given an untimely resurrection. The chief value of some of them is to reveal the astounding ignorance displayed by the debaters; for example, when one asserted that no nation in Europe refused to allow its subjects to become citizens of another nation (p. 149). The chapter on "Expatriation" gives the opinions of congressmen and of others more or less distinguished on that subject, but leads to no very definite conclusion as to why Congress failed to legislate on it. While most acknowledged expatriation to be a natural right, they did not deny the necessity of legislation to regulate its exercise. Calhoun, however, denied that it belonged to anybody except Virginians, upon whom the state had conferred it. The chapters on "Native Americanism" and "The Know-Nothing Period" are rather lengthy for such small results. The act of 1848, belonging to this period, appears to have been overlooked.

Altogether the book is a very unsatisfactory treatment of the subject. There is no reason for stopping arbitrarily with the year 1861. Some of the most interesting features of naturalization have developed since then, not the least of which are our numerous naturalization treaties. Even a strict construction of the subject "legislative history" would hardly exclude them, for they are legislative in effect. For the period covered the author might have improved his treatment by summing up the opinions of congressmen, instead of allowing everyone to have his say, and by discussing the more illuminating judicial decisions, diplomatic correspondence, and the rulings of State Departments. Such matter not only is not foreign to the subject, but it often serves to throw the best kind of light on legislation. For some unexplained reason the important subject of collective naturalization receives no notice whatever. When so much space was given to expatriation, though there was no legislation, the subject of reversion of nationality might

at least have been mentioned. The practice of some of the states of conferring the suffrage upon aliens can hardly be altogether foreign to the subject. On the whole, the author has contented himself with summarizing the debates and acts of Congress; rarely does he discuss and draw conclusions of his own.

DAVID Y. THOMAS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

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*The Subconscious.* By JOSEPH JASTROW, Professor of Psychology in the University of Wisconsin. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906. Pp. ix+549. \$2.50.

Professor Jastrow's latest volume is hard to classify: (1) Is it written for the use of scientifically trained investigators in psychology? (2) For scientific men interested in allied fields, but not primarily in psychology? Or, finally (3), is it written, as a restatement of fairly well-known facts, for the use of a rather larger circle which we may call the educated public? His preface does not wholly decide the matter. His previous book, *Fact and Fable in Psychology*, is an interesting restatement of fact which appeals both to the general public and to the scientific man who deals with subjects related to psychology. Were it not for its figurative and lengthy presentation, the present book might appeal in a similar way to the same class of readers as that attracted to the former volume. As matters stand, however, the scientific student of sociology or anthropology who might pick up the "Subconscious" in order to find a critical restatement of fact would probably turn to look again at the title page (thinking perchance that he had inadvertently obtained a book on "the uses of simile and metaphor") when he had read the second sentence of the Introduction:

At favorable moments, when the sea of consciousness is unruffled, and calm contemplation seems promising, he peers intently into the shadowy depths, and is disappointed to find how little he can distinguish of what lies below the surface, how constantly the waters send back merely the reflection—partly distorted—of his own familiar features.

And the farther our student goes into the text, the more convinced will he become that the title of the book as it stands is a misnomer. It would be an interesting calculation to find out just the number



of metaphors, similes, hyperboles, alliterations, etc., which our author uses. Attention is called to chap. vii, which begins:

The assault upon the intrenchments of the subconscious is the more promising of result if carried on, not in the main by direct attack, but by flanking movements, by quick advantage of momentary breaches in the investment, by night surprises, and all the shrewd devices of strategy . . . . or to change the figure (!) . . . .

Four solid pages are given over to this and similar figures (pp. 82-85), without our being carried one step farther along into the subject. As a result of this incontinent use of rhetorical figures, the size of the book has been made unduly large. For this fact alone the book becomes tedious to the man whose time is limited.

*The Subconscious* will be difficult for the outside public to read. In many places the book is labored, and in others redundant and obscure. There is, too, a certain looseness in the assemblage of facts and in the development of points, which is shown most clearly when one comes to the end of a section; one feels that somewhere, somehow, into the "unruffled sea of consciousness" one has let slip overboard the meaning of that particular section. Nor need the popular reader feel that he is alone in his mishap!

The lack of a critical and scientific form of presentation, of specific historical references, and of close articulation with the results of advanced researches in experimental and analytical psychology, prevents the book from having any wide sphere of usefulness in the psychological research world.

Loking at the table of contents, we find that Professor Jastrow treats of the subconscious in its normal phases in Part I, in its abnormal phases in Part II, while Part III is given over to a theoretical discussion of the subconscious in both its normal and in its abnormal manifestations. Our discussion here will be limited to a *partial statement of the normal processes to which Professor Jastrow applies the term "subconscious."* If our interpretation of his position is not correct, it is partly the author's fault, for we have looked in vain in the book for a summarized and definite statement of the content of the term "subconscious" as used by him.

The author emphasizes the fact that introspection in any given analysis ordinarily concerns itself with those mental processes which have a separate and distinct standing in consciousness. Expressed in the words of James, introspection deals most successfully with the "substantive states of mind"—the places where the mind can

contemplate its own workings for a longer or a shorter period. Such halting places are definite perceptions, images, memories, volitions, etc. But lying deeper in the conscious matrix are to be found the "transitive states," the feelings of likeness and difference, the feelings which accompany tension in neural tissue (e. g., when we search for a name which will not quite come) etc.; and those sensations accompanying habitual muscular reactions, which are usually unattended to. In addition to those mentioned, we find vague sensations from circulation, respiration, and from metabolic changes in general, from which consciousness is never entirely freed. *"Our initial quest is for influences which intrude unannounced, remain undiscovered when introspectively sought, and yet by some indirect testimony betray a functional presence in their effect upon the quality of psychic response"* (italic ours), is the way Professor Jastrow states the first step in his problem (p. 413).

It is thus seen at once that subconscious activity is difficult to state in terms of conscious content, and yet functionally it is oftentimes as potent in influencing our behavior as those mental processes which have a clearer introspective representative in consciousness. The function of the subconscious can best be illustrated (in its most obvious phases) by an appeal to such memories as come to us in dreams or in day reveries—wherever, in short, conscious control is for any reason lessened. Professor Jastrow cites, as illustrating his point, those dreams in which mathematical problems and others have been solved which were unsolvable in ordinary waking consciousness. Automatic writing and the feats of the somnambulist are equally good illustrations of subconscious activities.

The working of the subconscious on a distinctly higher plane is to be found in the "subconscious maturing of thought." When a word escapes us which we were on the point of speaking; when groups of ideas crowd into the mind only one of which can be immediately utilized, we oftentimes have the desire to reinstate the vanishing word, or the fleeting ideas when the progress of the thought later demands it. Failure to grasp these fleeting processes induces "a submerged troubled feeling while the mental explorer 'goes forth and comes back like the dove in the ark, having found no rest.'" Professor Jastrow remarks that, while the psychologist possesses no reliable means of arresting these fugitive processes, there is a class of beings—viz., the crystal-gazers—who have the

"knack of developing the subconscious image by fixing the eyes upon a reflecting surface and noting the fleeting pictures that form thereon, apparently without conscious direction." The section on "lapses of consciousness" deals principally with an interesting descriptive catalogue of lapses of the motor type and subconscious motor responses to sensory stimulation inadequately apprehended.

Enough has been said to show that Professor Jastrow in his book is dealing with material which belongs to the province of a legitimate psychology, and nowhere do we find him lending a helping hand to mysticism, occultism, and other allied vagaries of a leisure but uneducated class. His explanations, so far as he attempts to explain at all, are couched in psychophysical terms. If we may be allowed to make an unfavorable comment in closing, we should say that the chief defect in the book is due to this, viz., that Professor Jastrow attempts to give a somewhat airy and literary form of finality to his statement of facts which for some time have occupied the minds of mature psychologists, and which are likely to occupy them until functional psychology can be more thoroughly worked out and more adequately stated.

JOHN B. WATSON

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*A Living Wage: Its Ethical and Economic Aspects.* By JOHN A. RYAN, Professor of Ethics and Economics in the St. Paul Seminary. Introduction by RICHARD T. ELY. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906. Pp. xii+346.

*The argument of the author.*—A *personal* living wage means that amount of remuneration that is sufficient to maintain decently the laborer himself without reference to his family. A *family* living wage for the adult male laborer means a wage capable of maintaining himself, his wife, and those of his children who are too young to be self-supporting, in a condition of reasonable comfort. The latter is estimated as follows: first, anything *less* than \$600 per year is *not* a living wage in any of the cities of the United States; second, this sum is *probably* a living wage in those cities of the southern states in which fuel, clothing, food, and some other items of expenditure are cheaper than in the North; third, it is *possibly* a living wage in the moderate-sized cities of the West, North, and East; and, fourth, in some of the largest cities of the last-named regions it is certainly *not* a living wage.

The *right* to a wage is derived from the right to live from the bounty of the earth, and the *right* to a *living* wage is the inherent sacredness of personality. What is a just wage is neither in practice nor in the best prevalent theory determined by freedom in bargaining. Most economists recognize some moral element in determining what is a just wage.

At least 60 per cent. of the adult male workers in the cities of the United States are (1905) receiving less than \$600 annually, while monopolistic combinations, rapid displacement of labor by machinery, and excessive multiplication of the instruments of production will in all probability be with us for many years yet, increasing the rate of unemployment and restricting the upward movement of wages.

So far as the productive resources of the country are concerned, no class need lack; hence, the need of so large a portion of the laboring class must be due to maladjustment in distribution. Certain psychical, economic, and social forces apportion the national product among the owners of land, business ability, capital, and labor in the shares called rent, profit, interest, and wages. Such a distributive system determines the particular classes of persons upon whom the obligation to provide a living wage to the laborer rests, and also sets certain limits to their power to discharge it. The employer cannot escape the duty of paying a living wage by taking refuge behind the terms of a so-called free contract, and upon him the obligation falls primarily. The other economic classes in the community—the landowner, the loan-capitalist, the consumer, and the man of wealth—share the responsibility of providing the laborer with a decent livelihood in a secondary degree, and in accordance with the nature and possibilities of their several economic positions. Finally, the state is morally bound to compel employers to pay a living wage, whenever and wherever it can, with a moderate degree of success, put into effect the appropriate legislation.

*An estimate by the reviewer.*—*A Living Wage* is a good contribution on a most important subject. All good men everywhere should welcome this serious attempt to find the ethical and economic basis of just wages, and be grateful for its sane and clearly stated findings. Perhaps the least satisfactory part of the book is the discussion of the fact and nature of a man's *right* to a living wage. These chapters are not essential to the value of the book, the author to the contrary notwithstanding. For those to whom such an argu-

ment is necessary they are not convincing, and to those whom they would convince they are not necessary. The author finds the ethical basis of a living wage in the essential dignity of the human personality. His ultimate terms are, therefore, natural rights, personality, dignity, and his argument takes him outside of the field of inductive science and economics and social philosophy—where the economist, the employer, the laborer, and probably the sociologist will not follow. To the reviewer it would seem more promising to find the ethical basis within the social process of which distribution is one part; or even to depend upon the axiomatic nature of the statement that the workingman's right to a living wage is his right to a decent livelihood, to establish the proposition that the man who works has a right to a living wage.

The socialist will find little comfort in the author's exposition of the obligation of the state. With the possible exception of the chapters referred to above, the book progresses with strong argument and should prove of large service.

T. J. RILEY

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

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*Looking Forward: A Treatise on the Status of Woman and the Origin and Growth of the Family and the State.* By PHILIP RAPPAPORT. Chicago: Kerr & Co., 1906. Pp. 234.

As the preface states, "this book is written from the standpoint of historic materialism." Its aim is to show how past forms of the family and of the state have been determined by economic conditions, especially by methods of production, and to demonstrate incidentally that Marxian socialism is the only means of social salvation and the natural goal of development. The author shows considerable acquaintance with the socialist school of social and economic writers, but beyond that his acquaintance with the scientific literature of the subjects upon which he writes is very limited. Like all socialist writers, he makes large use of Buckle and Morgan, but he seems utterly unaware of the works of later investigators which long since have made Buckle and Morgan out of date. For example, in his discussion of the origin and evolution of the family one looks in vain for any mention of Westermarck, Crawley, Howard, or other recent authorities. Our author

does not swallow Morgan whole, for he concludes that there is no good evidence that the consanguine and the Punaluan family were ever universally prevalent forms; but he does not indicate in what particular way Morgan's theories are to be modified. The discussion of present social conditions is characterized by the same lack of critical consideration of facts and authorities, and of course by a socialistic bias toward all current problems.

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CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

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*The Positive Outcome of Philosophy.* By JOSEPH DIETZGEN. Translated by ERNEST UNTERMANN. [International Library of Social Science, Vol. I.] Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co. Pp. 444. \$1.

*The Physical Basis of Mind and Morals.* By M. H. FITCH. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co. \$1.

*Social and Philosophical Studies.* By PAUL LAFARGUE. Translated by CHARLES H. KERR. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co. \$0.50.

*What's So and What Isn't.* By JOHN M. WORK. Third edition, revised and enlarged. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co. \$0.50.

The first and second of these volumes have but an indirect relation to the scope of this *Journal*; the third could only in a fractional degree be classed within the sociological field; while the fourth has the same relation to pure sociology which belongs to any explanation of a theory of social practice.

There is a sense, however, in which each of these volumes comes directly into our field of view. Each is an important piece of evidence touching the campaign of education which the Marxian socialists are now conducting in this country. They are not merely attempting to lay a foundation for their faith in general philosophy, in biology, in psychology, and in sociology. They are also demanding that these subjects be taught by convinced socialists. They are scattering a literature in which every possible implication of the fundamental sciences which can be turned to the credit of socialism is used for all it is worth. This literature ought to be examined and reported on by experts in the different departments of knowl-

edge which it represents. When a writer on a fundamental science is recommended because he is a Socialist, our confidence in him is at once prejudiced, just as it would be if he were heralded as a Baptist or a Homeopathist or a Prohibitionist. We are bound to be on our guard against any sectarianism, political, economic, or ecclesiastical, which is conscious of itself when attacking problems of pure science. A Socialist has the same right to prefer to be taught biology by a Socialist that a Methodist has to be taught the same subject by a Methodist. In all such cases, however, the parties concerned assume a burden of proof that they are scientists first and sectarians second. On the other hand, the Socialist is inclined to the belief that there is more partisanship in rejecting than in professing socialism, and that scholars who do not admit that science points toward socialism are not to be trusted. The more this contention is tested in the open, the better. There can be no sectarian science at last, and science is abortive if it is arrested in the abstract stage, when it might be available for modification of practice. These books are virtually challenges to scholars to reconsider results of their sciences up to date with reference to the question of their bearing upon social programmes.

The fourth book in the list is a primer of socialism, as a zealous believer assumes that it would work out. However sure we may be that the socialists are cherishing vain hopes, there is no doubt that people who reject their opinions have made a mistake in judging the socialists too much on the basis of second- or third-hand versions. They are entitled to a hearing out of their own mouths, and should not be disposed of on the testimony of unbelievers. I cannot say that the present exposition is likely to convince persons who have devoted much unprejudiced attention to the study of society. It makes an effective appeal, however, to untrained thinkers, and for that reason it deserves consideration by everyone interested in exerting counter influence.

On the whole, it must be said that, though the book abounds with sensible remarks and just criticisms of present social conditions, it is an example of that pseudo-science which has brought disrepute upon the social sciences among men of scientific training; and that the less of such books with scientific pretensions we have published, the better it will be for the social sciences.

A. W. S.

*The Economy of Happiness.* By JAMES MACKAYE. Pp. xv+533. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. \$2.50.

Although the author starts by jauntily begging the question whether happiness is the end of life, thus avoiding consideration of the question whether something else is the end, and happiness an incident more or less parallel with the process which approaches the end or possibly constitutes the end, he has made a book that deserves serious attention. As a philosophy of life it leaves not a little to be desired. As a method of testing reasons for a certain range of the conduct of life, it offers much that is illuminating. However we may quarrel with any variation of hedonism, even in the most refined shapes of eudemonism, we may agree that for practical purposes happiness of some sort is at all events a sign that the conduct which secures it is making in the direction of the ultimate goal of life. Those who reject eudemonism as a final formulation of the ethical end may therefore unite with those who accept it, at least to the extent of assuming that, provided the concept happiness is safely defined, a surplus of happiness is presumably an index of a surplus of good in the conduct which results in the happiness. Accordingly a critique of happiness, and of the means by which it is gained, is to be welcomed by all who are not content with purely dogmatic morals.

The author is sure enough of himself to assume the onus of phrases which less virile thinkers might try to avoid. He frankly asserts that he proposes to offer a "cure-all" for failure to solve the problem of happiness.

The panacea I propose is *common-sense*, and I claim that it will cure all the ills which can be cured by any means whatever, and that it offers a complete solution of the problem of happiness. Moreover, I claim that there is no other solution, and that the many substitutes which have been proposed and practiced will prove in the future, as they have in the past, to be delusions. (P. 2.)

"Common sense" is defined as "a kind of sense susceptible of tests which are independent of the convictions of any man or assemblage of men" (p. 2). "Common sense, then, is concerned first with the *nature of intelligibility*, second with the *nature of truth*, and third with the *nature of utility*" (p. 3). Book I, entitled "The Principles of Common Sense," is a system of logic. In eighty-seven pages the method of inductive reasoning is epitomized, and thirteen pages are



devoted to moralizing upon the value of such reasoning. The third chapter analyzes "utility," and it reaches the conclusion: "*A right act is an act of maximum utility.* It is that act, among those at any moment possible, whose presumption of happiness is a maximum. *A wrong act is any alternative of a right act*" (p. 143). The freshness of treatment in these chapters almost disarms the inevitable criticism that one book would do enough if it should elucidate a problem of morals. It is rather excessive to undertake the rudimentary education of readers as well. It is not true that Book I contains nothing needed as an introduction to the other two books. It is true, however, that the class of readers who are likely to furnish a public for Books II and III might well have been trusted to supply for themselves the primary lessons in Book I. They would not all muster the needed preliminaries, to be sure, but the people who are interested in the problem of happiness are not likely to be in a state of mind to be schoolmastered in logic. On the other hand, people who are willing to be taught that they need to learn logic would hardly choose a treatise on happiness as the medium of instruction. On the whole, therefore, although Book I, considered on its own merits, is a thoroughly good piece of exposition, it was probably a mistake not to have begun the volume with Book II.

The subject of Book II is "The Technology of Happiness—Theoretical." The "factors of happiness" are said to be three: (1) the sentient being or happiness-producing agent; (2) the adaptation of said agent to his environment; (3) the number of said agents. A chapter is devoted to each of these factors. They are the work of a man who has broken away from dogmatic leading-strings, and is seeing with his own eyes, but has not yet seen enough to give his observations the weight of authority. They are acute, but they are not comprehensive except by assumption. The chapter on "Liberty" reminds one of a treatise on optics that might be written by a blind man with a turn for mathematics. While theoretically correct, the color of reality would be lacking.

Book III discusses "The Technology of Happiness—Applied." The chapter titles are: "The Social Mechanism," "Competition," "Private and Public Monopoly," "Pantocracy," and "The Next Step." The impression which this part of the book makes upon the sociologist is that it is a brief which deserves respectful treatment, but it is in many ways premature. No permanent contribution to the theory of ethics, either on the pure or the technological side, is

likely to be made without more thorough acquaintance with analysis of the social process than this book indicates. Meanwhile the volume seems to be the work of a man who has not stopped learning, and who is likely to use the clues in the present argument to good purpose in further study of social problems. He is well entitled to a hearing. Indeed, it would be a mistake for anyone capable of independent thought about ethics to accept this notice in place of reading the book itself. The absence of an index is unfortunate.

A. W. S.

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*Les principes sociologiques du droit civil.* Par RAOUL DE LA GRASSERIE, Juge au tribunal de Nantes, Lauréat de l'Institut de France. Paris: Giard et Brière, 1906. Pp. 432. Fr. 10.

This is said to be the first important attempt to construct a sociology of the civil law, and it may be doubted whether the effort has been successful. The essayist in the present case has been a prolific contributor to the literature of civil sociology, one of his most notable contributions being *Les principes sociologiques de la criminologie*, published in 1901—an attempt to do for the criminal law what the present work aims to do for the civil law. To this science of civil sociology the author applies the term *civilologie*, corresponding to the term “criminology” in the sphere of the criminal law. The work is divided into two principal parts: pure sociology considered, first, from the point of view of the dynamics of the state, and, second, from the point of view of the state as a static body. A third and briefer part deals with the principal facts of applied civil sociology. Under the head of dynamic civil sociology M. Grasserie describes the evolution of civil-judicial sociology among different peoples, so far as there is a regular and uniform order discoverable. In the part which is devoted to the statics of civil sociology he treats of the nature and divisions of the science and its place among the other sciences; of the elements and pathology of a civil contract or obligation; of filiation, paternalism, and tutelage; of testaments, successions, and property; of the sociology of legal sanctions, civil procedure, and international private law. Applied civil sociology, he says, is nothing more than the science and the art of civil legislation (p. 414).

J. W. GARNER

*Citizenship and the Schools.* By JEREMIAH W. JENKS, Ph.D., LL.D. New York: Henry Holt & Co. Pp. viii+264.

This is a collection of nine essays and addresses, all but one of which have been printed in periodicals or delivered in public. The subjects treated are: "Training for Citizenship," "The Social Basis of Education," "The Making of Citizens," "Relation of the Public Schools to Business," "Education for Commerce," "The Far East," "Free Speech in American Universities," "Critique of Educational Values," "Policy of the State toward Education," "School-Book Legislation."

The name of Professor Jenks guarantees certain solid qualities of excellence in the book. It aims to contribute "toward giving our teachers the view-point of social and political betterment as their chief aim in teaching," and suggests that "in no other way can the burden of our overcrowded curriculum be so much lightened and the interest of pupils and parents be so easily aroused and retained as by careful work toward the unification of the curriculum around the central idea of social service."

It is a collection of essays that deserves the attention of public-school workers for its vital contact with the real present, its courageous but temperate idealism, and its sane counsels. It is characterized rather by a semi-proverbial style than by sustained argument, and contains numerous fresh and terse presentations of wise and weighty principles and practical conclusions.

EDWARD C. HAYES

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*Christian Missions and Social Progress: A Sociological Study of Foreign Missions.* By JAMES S. DENNIS. Chicago: F. H. Revell Co., 1906. Vol. III.

After a patient labor of twelve years upon abundant material, and after a long personal experience as a leader and organizer, Dr. Dennis has brought his monumental work to a happy conclusion. No apology needs to be made for giving a favorable notice to these volumes, one of which has already been mentioned in a journal of sociology. Scientific men have not seldom spent much energy on far less significant movements. The author of this series has drawn up his plan in full and conscious view of the modern analysis of social aims, forces, and institutions. His study in the chief urban

center of America, and his illustrative materials have traveled to him from all parts of the world.

It is impracticable here to give any conception of the wealth of this material or of the skill with which it is arranged and presented. Incidental to his main purpose, Dr. Dennis has shown that, with all the differences in customs, characteristics, and stages of development, the essential elements of human welfare are the same the world over.

Very interesting is his account of the way in which citizens of Christian civilized lands carry in their own memories and habits all the factors of a modern life of culture and set up new centers of suggestion and imitation wherever they go. While their supreme purpose is religious awakening, they cannot be indifferent to the needs of men in relation to economic, physical, and intellectual affairs. Hence every educated missionary becomes a pioneer for the commerce, the education, the political institutions, the morals, of the western nations. If he is not always tactful, he is almost in every instance guiltless of selfish and sinister motives. This is part of the explanation of the organic connection indicated in the title between missions and social progress.

C. R. HENDERSON

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*Sabbath Laws in the United States.* By R. C. WYLIE. Pittsburgh: National Reform Association, 1905.

In view of the recent enactment of Sunday laws in France, the subject has special interest in this country. The volume here mentioned contains in convenient form the texts of all laws of this class now in force in the United States.

C. R. H.

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*Une expérience industrielle de réduction de la journée de travail.*

Par L. G. FROMONT. Avec une Préface de E. MAHARIN.  
Bruxelles: Misch et Thron, 1906. Pp. xx+120.

This essay is a description of an experiment in an establishment for the reduction of zinc ore and the production of sulphuric acid in Belgium. Three stages of the experiment are carefully analyzed, and the effects upon profits, output, wages, health, and morals are set down with mathematical precision. The conclusion is that in this particular manufacture, where effort must be long

sustained and the workmen are energetic and courageous, the day of eight hours is economically the best; but that no decisive advice can be formulated for other industries and other kinds of workmen on the basis of this experiment. The method of organizing the experiment and of carrying out the plan will be found suggestive in any other form of industry. Such studies might well be repeated in this country for the advancement of economic science and humane legislation.

C. R. H.

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*Modern Social Conditions.* By WILLIAM B. BAILEY, Assistant Professor of Political Economy in Yale University. New York: The Century Co., 1906. Pp. 377.

The field covered by this volume is part of that treated in Mayo-Smith's *Statistics and Sociology*. The first chapter is an elementary treatise on the history and theory of statistics. The other chapters give statistical information in relation to sex, age, conjugal conditions, births, marriage, death, and the growth of population. The author has rendered a service to students by bringing up the figures as nearly as possible to date, the last census being exploited wherever it furnished material. Foreign sources are cited, and comparisons are constantly drawn.

C. R. H.

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## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

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**A New Periodical.**—Following close upon the Atlanta race riot, perhaps as its literary aftermath, a unique monthly magazine will begin publication in Atlanta in November under the title of *The Race Question and Southern Symposium*. This magazine, its publishers announce, will be monographic in character, handling the negro problem from the standpoint of sociology, ethnology, and political economy. It will in no wise be an organ of incendiary agitation, but will discuss the race issue dispassionately from the view-point of the southern white man, and be a reflex of Caucasian sentiment. Each issue will contain special articles by leading public men and thinkers who have made the negro a study, and a large part of the magazine will be devoted to a free-for-all symposium of popular ideas on the race question and subjects thereto related, as the South's labor problem, foreign immigration, cotton production, etc. The best newspaper comment on these subjects will be reproduced, and it will be full of condensed and meaty matter of a distinctively southern character. The printed prospectus declares that "this publication will stand, editorially, for the imperious but magnanimous Anglo-Saxon, who dominates and will ever dominate, politically, materially, and morally, the human affairs of this great section of our common country. It will try to be just, but it has no compromise or temporization to offer unholy race yearnings, hatreds, and crimes." The editor is Mr. R. W. McAdam, for the past five years an editorial writer of the *Atlanta Constitution*, and literary editor of the *Sunny South*. The publishers are the Southern Symposium Publishing Co., Atlanta, Ga., and the subscription price is \$1.50 a year.—*Publishers' Announcement.*

**American Policy with Criminals.**—This policy has defects: it fails to furnish reliable statistics, it is tainted by the spoils system, and it permits abuses in jails. Yet it has lessons of value for Europe and is a vital growth. The new policy which commands the situation is rational, humane, austere, yet regenerative. In expelling the theory of vengeance and introducing the reformatory principle, the jurists have been less influential than theologians, sociologists, and teachers. It is the sociological, not the biological, view of crime which is used to explain its origin. The policy aims at the beginnings of evil and expresses itself in (1) the reformatory system, (2) probation, (3) juvenile courts. The essential factors in the reformatory system are: (1) progression toward liberty, (2) indefinite sentence, (3) conditional release under supervision. The entire process is educational. The author defends the American method from charges of sentimentalism, of inducing hypocrisy, and of giving undue power to administrative officers. All the essential features of the American system can be and should be introduced into Europe. The author bases his conclusions on his personal study of the situation in a recent journey in the United States.—Berthold Freudenthal, *Amerikanische Kriminalpolitik* (Frankfurt am Main, J. Guttentag, 1907; 23 pages). C. R. H.

**The Working Principle of Advertising.**—How is it possible that people are driven by advertising to make bargains against their better judgment or intention? The answer is that this question is based on a false assumption. It has meaning only when the silent assumption is made that everything a man does or neglects to do is done under the control of a correct judgment and rational insight. It is clear, however, that this assumption, which probably no man on earth has yet attained, is thoroughly false; that there are numerous other independent springs of action besides the reason, and these very frequently find themselves opposed to reason and often are stronger in their working than

rational thoughts. Of these other springs of action we need notice only two: sensuality and intellectual receptivity—i. e., the readiness of the mind to take over foreign judgments. We find it to be these latter that advertising seeks to master, and that this often occurs to such a degree that their influence immediately determines the bargain which people make, and overcomes quiet reflection and right judgment. These latter are, even without this, as a rule not strikingly strong or lively in men.—Bernhard Wities, in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, July, 1906.  
V. E. H.

**Causes of the Irreligion of the Proletariat.**—The religious indifference of the proletariat becomes general in proportion as the machine production enlists new recruits. Machine production makes the capitalist religious, the proletariat irreligious. The workman knows he must work or starve; praying will not give him food. The wage-worker is his own providence. His ambition cannot get beyond a raise in wages, and a job that shall last all the days of the year, and all the years of his life. The unforeseen chances of fortune which make the capitalist superstitious do not exist for the proletariat. If the wage-worker were to let himself be drawn into a belief in that God whom he hears talked about, he would immediately question his justice which allotted to him nothing but work and poverty. He would picture God under the form and aspect of a capitalist exploiter.

The life led by the laborer in the great industries has removed him from the environment of nature, which in the peasant keeps up belief in ghosts, sorceries, witchcraft, and other superstitious ideas. Nature has no power over him; his work puts him in touch with the terrible natural forces, unknown to the peasant. Instead of being mastered by them, he masters them. He controls mechanical power at will.—Paul Lafargue, in *International Socialist Review*, November, 1906.  
S. E. W. B.

**What British Labor Leaders Read.**—A letter was addressed to each of the fifty-one labor members of the House of Commons, asking what books he had found most useful. Half of these are avowed socialists. This is the result: One hundred and forty-eight different authors were named, more than half of them only once. The votes were: Ruskin, 17; Dickens, 17; Bible, 14; Carlyle, 13; Henry George, 12; Shakespeare, Scott, John Stuart Mill, 10 each; Bunyan, 8; Burns, 7; Tennyson and Magenni, 6 each; Kingsley, 5; Adam Smith, Macaulay, Green, Rogers, Thackeray, and Cobbett, 4 each. Scarcely any socialist writers are mentioned. There is little difference between the reading of socialist and non-socialist members, the only noticeable one being that the names of Carlyle and George are very prominent in the socialist lists. Poets occupy an important place. These men, though students of economics, seem to care very little for history. As a rule, only writers who have been known a long time appear in the lists. Even Tolstoi and Ibsen are not mentioned. The qualities that most attract labor members seem to be two in number: an interest in economic problems, and an intense moral fervor.—R. B. Kerr, in *International Socialist Review*, November, 1906.  
O. E. W. B.

**A French Project for a System of Eugenics.**—The recognition of the moral and physical deterioration of our time necessitates reasoned selective processes, by means of large voluntary associations that should include all those, however different in social rank, etc., who possess the requisite sound moral and physical qualities. The *Elite* is such an association, composed of local branches united by a central committee in Paris. The members pass a medical and character examination, special attention being given to the exclusion of venereal diseases and hereditary blemishes. The locals meet for instruction in bodily hygiene—food, clothing, housing, preventive measures against disease, care for the sick, the bearing and rearing of children, and general moral behavior under all conditions.

The subject of marriage among members of the *Elite* is to be carefully regulated. Modern science gives the different characteristics of man and woman conducive to the best progeny, and transportation facilities make possible the gathering of marriageable persons at central stations, where they may be grouped according to their mutual affinities. Choice in selection will greatly obviate divorce. The other social effects would be choice of professions more in accordance with capacities, while the *Elite* would be an example to the rest of the population.—Alfred Pichou, "L'Élite: association philanthropique pour la conservation de la vie et l'amélioration de l'espèce humaine," *Revue internationale de sociologie*, August-September, 1906. A. H. N. B.

**Physical Degeneracy or Home Labor.**—(1) The decline in the birth-rate is not merely the result of an alteration in the ages of the population, or in the number or proportion of married women, or in the ages of these. (2) The decline in the birth-rate is not confined to the towns, nor (so far as England and Wales are concerned, at least) is it appreciably, if any, greater in the towns than it is in the rural districts. (3) The decline in the birth-rate is exceptionally marked where the inconvenience of having children is specially felt. (4) The decline in the birth-rate appears to be specially marked in places inhabited by the servant-keeping class. (5) The decline in the birth-rate appears to be much greater in those sections of the population which give proofs of thrift and foresight than among the population at large. (6) The decline in the birth-rate is due to some new cause which was not appreciably operative fifty years ago. Statistical evidence points, in fact, unmistakably to the existence of a volitional regulation of the marriage state that is now ubiquitous throughout England and Wales, among apparently a large majority of the population. The report indicates that the offspring of each limited marriage is almost precisely one and one-half children per marriage.

A generation ago, the economists, and still more the enlightened public opinion that caught up their words, would have seen in the progressive limitation of population, whether or not it had their approval, the compensating advantage of an uplifting of the economic conditions of the lowest grade of laborers. But no such limitation of numbers prevents the lowest grade of workers, if exposed to unfettered individual competition, from the horrors of "sweating" or the terrors of prolonged lack of employment. Nor can we look forward, even if we wished to do so, to the vacuum remaining unfilled. It is, as all experience proves, impossible to exclude the alien immigrant. This particular 25 per cent. of our population, as Professor Karl Pearson keeps warning us, is producing 50 per cent. of our children. In order that a due number of children may be born, and that they may be born rather of the self-controlled and farseeing members of each class than of those who are reckless or improvident, we must alter the balance of considerations in favor of the child-producing family. For instance, the arguments against unlimited provision of medical attendance on the child-bearing mother and her children disappear. We may presently find the leader of the opposition, if not the prime minister, advocating the municipal supply of milk to all infants, and a free meal on demand (as already provided by a farseeing philanthropist at Paris) to mothers actually nursing their babies. We shall, indeed, have to face the problem of the systematic endowment of motherhood, and place this most indispensable of all professions upon an honorable economic basis. There would be no greater encouragement to parentage in the best members of the middle and upper artisan classes than a great multiplication of maintenance scholarships for secondary, technical, and university schools and colleges at nominal fees, or even free.—Sidney Webb, reprint in *Popular Science Monthly*, December, 1906, from the *London Times*. J. A. FITZGERALD

**State-aided Insurance in Germany.**—The twenty-fifth anniversary of the introduction of state-aided insurance shows that one out of every five persons is insured against sickness, one out of three against accident, and one out of four

against infirmity. Almost \$125,000,000 is annually expended in benefits, the contributions being approximately one-half by employers, 10 per cent. by the state, and the balance by the workers. It has been shown that of those between the ages of twenty to twenty-four years who apply for relief, about 55 per cent. are suffering from tuberculosis, and this has led to the establishment of sanatoria throughout the empire, now numbering seventy-four. The average length of residence in these institutions, is three months, and over 75 per cent are discharged as cured. Although many of these suffer a relapse after returning to their former unhealthy environment, some 31 per cent. are able to work four years after their discharge. In 1902, of the total number treated under the insurance law, 16,518 were tuberculous, and 19,433 were suffering otherwise. The success in treating early stages of disease has made possible systematic attack on alcoholism, bad housing, etc., which the imperial commissioner holds could have been done only under a system of compulsory insurance. The quarter-century of the operation of the law has not verified the prediction of some that it would have an adverse effect on savings. In the year 1903-4, Prussia, although regarded as a poor country, had \$52.70 per capita in savings banks, as against \$23.90 per capita in wealthy England.—*Soziale Praxis*, November 15, 1906.

A. H. N. B.

**Regulation of Juvenile and Home Labor.**—At the last general meeting of the International Union for Legislative Labor Protection the following propositions were drawn up as basic principles for legislation concerning:

I. *Night work for juvenile laborers.*

1. In general the night work of juvenile laborers up to eighteen years of age should be prohibited.

2. Up to the fourteenth year the prohibition should be absolute.

3. For juvenile laborers over fourteen years of age exceptions may be made.

a) In cases of *force majeure* or exceptional conditions.

b) In those industries the raw products of which perish quickly.

4. The night labor is entirely forbidden in the trading, hotel, and saloon business; as also in the bureaus of those industries in which night labor is prohibited.

5. The length of the night rest, where such is prescribed, must at least include the time from 10 P. M. to 5 A. M.

6. The International Union expresses its wish that these provisions be carried out earnestly by a system of inspection.

II. *Industrial labor in the home.*—The International Union is of the opinion that legislative intervention is necessary, and urges the national delegation:

1. To request from their governments legislative measures which require anyone employing sweat-shop labor:

a) To keep a record of those employed by him, and to present the same to the authorities whenever desired.

b) To furnish such persons with a definite statement of the wages paid for piece-work, and to rate the price of the finished product.

2. To expand the factory inspection and workmen's insurance to include sweat-shops.

3. For the public good as well as the private interest of those employed in sweat-shops the strictest enforcement of general sanitary laws in those places should be exercised.—"The General Meeting of the International Union for Industrial Protective Legislation," in *Soziale Rundschau*, October, 1906.

SAMUEL N. REEF

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## THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

In December, 1905, a number of persons interested in promoting the study of sociology met at Baltimore, during the sessions of the Historical, Economic, and Political Science Associations, and organized the *American Sociological Society*. The first annual meeting of the society was held in connection with the meetings of the cognate societies at Providence, R. I., December 27-29, 1906. The proceedings of that meeting are contained in the following pages.

The establishment of the *American Sociological Society* marks a notable stage in the positive investigation of human conditions. Not many representatives of the older forms of social science are ready to admit that there is a function for sociology. A sufficient nucleus of scholars has been differentiated from the traditional social sciences, however, to give sociology the prestige of a visible personal following. Together with the *Institut International de Sociologie*, and the *Sociological Society of London*, the *American Sociological Society* bears witness that a few men and women, in full possession of their senses, are convinced that something is lacking in methods of interpreting human experience, and that the most effective means of supplying the lack must be sought without rather than within the older sciences of society.

This organization demonstrates, in the first instance, merely that its members have the courage of their convictions. Since those convictions have now taken corporate form, they must henceforth command a somewhat heightened degree of atten-

tion. More will be said, and more definitely, and with more confident emphasis, from and about the sociological point of view. What is said from this point of view will necessarily attract more notice from both theorists and practical men who have hitherto regarded sociology as negligible. The sociologists do not imagine that they are appointed to destroy the vocation of other investigators of society. They feel themselves called to represent factors in the problems of human association which have thus far received less than their share of attention. In organizing a society they are not beginning, but continuing, the work of winning for those neglected factors the appreciation they deserve. The society makes no appeal for credit. It simply proposes to encourage sociological inquiry and to await competent judgment of results. It believes that it can add an essential factor in promoting both special research and correlation of special investigations among the phenomena of human association. It maintains that our last attainable insight into the meaning of life must be derived from organization of such special researches. It heralds the faith that all the social sciences are unscientific in the degree in which they attempt to hold themselves separate from each other, and to constitute closed systems of abstractions. It demands correlation of the social sciences, to the end that real knowledge of human life as it is may increase; that insight into the quality of life as it is capable of becoming may expand; and that effort to realize the possibilities of life may grow more concerted and more intelligent.

# THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

PROFESSOR LESTER F. WARD

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I do not propose on this occasion to enter into any defense of the claims of sociology to be called a science. I wish simply to show that its history, and the steps in its establishment, do not essentially differ from those of other sciences.

On a former somewhat similar occasion I took the same position, and as the words then spoken in a foreign tongue have never been reproduced in our own, they seem to form a fitting introduction to this address. This is what I said:

Certainly no member of the International Institute of Sociology doubts that there is a sociological science, but certain persons suppose that there is a difference between this and other sciences. The fact that the foundations of the science are still being discussed, and that sociologists differ with regard to them, while the foundations of other sciences seem to be recognized by all, causes it to be imagined that sociology is a science different from the rest. But one needs only to study the history of other sciences to see that such is not the case. Without entering deeply into this study, it is sufficient to consider the most completely established sciences at a special epoch in their history. Everyone knows that astronomy is the most exact and the most perfectly established science that we have. Let us consider it, for example, in the seventeenth century. Descartes was acquainted with the theories of the ancients. He knew the Ptolemaic theory. That of Copernicus was familiar to him, as well as the modification of that theory proposed by Tycho Brahe. Modern astronomy is chiefly based on the theory of Copernicus, and its exactness depends entirely upon the law formulated by him of the revolutions of the planets. But was astronomical science established at that period? Certainly not. In the possession of all this knowledge the greatest genius of the seventeenth century rejected the true principle and elaborated a new hypothesis very different from all that had preceded it—a massive and complicated hypothesis which the modern world has almost entirely forgotten. Astronomy in the seventeenth century was, then, in a condition somewhat similar to that of sociology today.

It would be easy to show that the same was true of physics before the

<sup>1</sup> Address of the president of the American Sociological Society at its first annual meeting in Providence, R. I., December 27, 1906.

discovery of the law of gravitation, and also that it was true of chemistry before the discovery of the true nature of combustion. As regards chemistry, it is appropriate to mention it in this amphitheater devoted to its study,<sup>2</sup> and it is the glory of France and of the immortal Lavoisier to have made that great discovery which lifted chemistry out of the state of vague theories and false hypotheses, and placed it on the firm and secure basis on which it stands today.

But there is a difference between the modern theories of sociology and the theories which prevailed in the other sciences before their final establishment. The theories of Ptolemy and Descartes in astronomy were false, or they contained only a minute germ of truth. The theory of phlogiston in chemistry was almost entirely false. This is not the case with modern theories in sociology. The organicist theory is not false, nor is that of imitation, nor that of the struggle of races, nor that of social control, nor yet that of the consciousness of kind (these last two come from America, and I do not speak of principles laid down by myself). These hypotheses, and almost all others in sociology are true, or contain a considerable part of the grand sociological truth which is the final synthesis of them all.<sup>3</sup>

More recently a South American, Ernesto Quesada, professor of sociology in the University of Buenos Ayres, has uttered very similar words, going, however, much more fully into the subject.<sup>4</sup> He was practically driven to this course by a remark of the retiring dean, Miguel Cané, of the university, in a public address, reflecting severely upon the study of sociology. He said, among other things, that "sociology, far from being a science, was little more than empty verbiage," and added that he would see with great satisfaction the abandonment of a word more pretentious than expressive of anything real, and more capricious than scientific. To study the various human groups, the causes that actuate them, and all the other determining elements of their respective activities, is to set forth principles of a general character, which, though accepted only provisionally, serve as a basis for further investigations. But from this to the erecting into a science, with fixed, immutable boundaries, of a mixture of hypotheses and empirical assertions, and calling it a science in the same sense as algebra or mechanics, seems to me an enormous stride. A science ought to be that

<sup>2</sup> The congress held its session in Hall of Chemistry of the Sorbonne.

<sup>3</sup> *Annales de l'Institut international de sociologie*, Vol. X (Paris, 1904), pp. 50-52.

<sup>4</sup> Ernesto Quesada, "La sociología: Carácter científico de su enseñanza," *Revista de la Universidad de Buenos Aires*, 1905, Vol. III. (Reprint, Buenos Aires, 1905, 43 pp., 8vo.)



impregnable region where alone reign truths and proved laws. If twenty professors, all working along the lines of the modern sociologists, were charged with the preparation of a program of the subject, I am certain that they would present twenty different programs, each conforming to the quality of mind, personal education, and peculiar method of the author; whereas, of twenty professors of geometry there would not be one who would dare to attack the hypotenuse and attribute to it properties that it does not possess.

Professor Quesada replied to all this very fully and with great ability, but he failed to point out the complete irrelevancy of Dean Cané's attack, comparing sociology to mathematics, which is not a science of concrete things at all, but simply the norm by which all science is tested, and even referring to algebra, which is only an instrument, or tool, to be used in the solution of problems of quantity.

But Professor Quesada shows very clearly that no science is absolutely fixed. All are compelled to start with certain postulates—i. e., unproved propositions, or assumptions—and build upon these; and he enumerates the chief of them as defined by the masters in each science. He shows, moreover, that these postulates are often doubtful, and that several of them—as, for example, that of the atom of chemistry—are undergoing profound modification with the advance of our knowledge. He may be said to have made out a clear case that there is no “impregnable region where alone reign truths and proved laws,” and that all the sciences are perpetually *in fieri*, in the same sense as is sociology. He does much more; for he proceeds to show, not only that sociology is already a science of great importance, but that it may be applied directly to practical affairs; and he promises in his lectures to show the legislators and statesmen of Argentina how they may utilize it in advancing the interests of their own country and people.

All the attacks upon our science might easily be met in a similar way, and I have taken some pains to collect all the objections I could find and to ascertain the fallacy that underlies each one. I had thought of presenting the result of this study; but not only would it require more time than can be devoted to it in this address, but, upon mature consideration, I conclude that

it is not worth the while, as sociology is marching over all these stumbling-blocks, and nothing that its enemies can do will greatly check its sure and steady advance. What I propose to do, therefore, is simply to draw your attention to a few of the steps that sociology has taken, and endeavor to point out what has actually been done in the direction of its establishment as one of the great sciences.

Probably the most important result that sociology has accomplished is that of showing what society is; that, if it is not an "organism"—and few now would go that far—it is at least a great organization, bound together by organic ties in all its parts. To be more specific, sociology shows us that human institutions constitute the structures, organs, and organic parts of society, and that they are not independent, but are connected into one great system, which is society. It has not only done this as the result of a study of society in its finished form, but it has confirmed this truth by a study of the origin of human institutions. It has shown how they have arisen. It has traced them back to their primordial, undifferentiated forms, and studied their development from this state of homogeneity to their present state of heterogeneity. It has watched first their differentiation and then their integration.

The general result is that we have come to know what society really is. Sociology has enabled us to orient ourselves in this great maze of human life, to see what the human race is, how it came into existence, approximately when and where it began, in what ways it has developed and advanced, and how it has come to be what we find it. "Know thyself," said the old Greek philosophers; but man never did really know himself until these studies of origins had been undertaken and successfully carried out.

Involved in this we have the true genesis of all the most important human institutions—religion, language, marriage, custom, war, cannibalism, slavery, caste, law, jurisprudence, government, the state, property, industry, art, and science. Instead of a great bewildering maze, a vast meaningless chaos, society reveals itself as a true genetic product of uniform laws.

and forces, a product of social causation, and stands out in clear relief against the background of history.

But sociology has done more than this. It has not only discovered the laws of society; it has discovered the principles according to which social operations take place. It has gone farther even than physics, which has thus far only discovered the law of gravitation, but has not yet discovered its cause or principle. Sociology has not only established the law of social evolution, but it has found the principle underlying and explaining that law. Just as in biology the world was never satisfied with the law of organic evolution worked out by Goethe and Lamarck until the principle of natural selection was discovered which explained the workings of that law, so in sociology it was not enough to formulate the law of social evolution, however clear it may have been, and the next step has been taken in bringing to light the sociological homologue of natural selection which explains the process of social evolution. That principle is not the same as natural selection, but it serves the same purpose. It also resembles the latter in growing out of the life-struggle and in being a consequence of it; but, instead of consisting in the hereditary selection of the successful elements of that struggle, it consists in the ultimate union of the opposing elements and their combination and assimilation. Successively higher and higher social structures are thus created by a process of natural synthesis, and society evolves from stage to stage. The struggling groups infuse into each other the most vigorous qualities of each, cross all the hereditary strains, double their social efficiency at each cross, and place each new product on a higher plane of existence. It is the cross-fertilization of cultures.

The place of sociology among the sciences has been definitely fixed. It stands at the summit of the scale of great sciences arranged in the ascending order of speciality and complexity according to the law of evolutionary progress. It rests directly upon psychology, in which it has its roots, although it presents a great number of striking parallels with biology, chemistry, physics, and even astronomy, showing that there are universal laws operating in every domain of nature. The motor principle

of sociology is psychic, and the study of this principle has shown that social phenomena are produced by the action of true natural forces, which, when abstraction is made of all perturbing elements, are found to be as regular and reliable as are the forces of gravitation, chemical affinity, or organic growth.

As a result of this it has been possible to establish the sub-science of social mechanics and to work it out with something like the completeness that has been attained in the mechanics of physical nature. At least it has been possible to distinguish clearly between static and dynamic phenomena in society. This distinction, dimly seen by Comte, and still more dimly by Spencer, when fully and clearly apprehended, throws a flood of light over the whole field of social phenomena. Social statics is found to constitute the domain of social construction, and to explain the origin of all social structures and human institutions. It underlies the social order. Social dynamics, on the other hand, is the domain of social transformation, and explains all change in social structures and human institutions. It is the science of social progress. The laws of both these sciences have been to a large extent discovered and formulated, and their workings described.

All this has been accomplished by a careful study of the social energy alone. But sociology has not stopped here. It has plunged boldly into the far more difficult and recondite field of social control. The social energy is so powerful as to exceed its proper bounds and threaten the overthrow of the social order, and would do so but for some effective curb to its action. The motor power of society has to be guided into channels through which it can flow, in harmony with the safety of society. This guidance has been furnished by the higher mind or intellect of man. This guiding or directing agent is a far more subtle element than the motor force itself, and one much more difficult to understand. But sociology has not shrunk from the task of studying it and unfolding its laws and operations, and these have been sufficiently mastered to be in large part formulated and described. This fairly complete mastery of the dynamic and directive agents of society has placed sociology in position to deal in a thoroughly

scientific way with all the facts and phenomena of society—with its origin, its history, and its present condition.

Finally, with the light shed by social dynamics on the spontaneous modification of social structures and the consequent progress of society in the past, and further guided by the established law of social uniformitarianism, which enables us to judge the future by the past, sociology has now begun, not only in some degree to forecast the future of society, but to venture suggestions at least as to how the established principles of the science may be applied to the future advantageous modification of existing social structures. In other words, sociology, established as a pure science, is now entering upon its applied stage, which is the great practical object for which it exists.

## HOW SHOULD SOCIOLOGY BE TAUGHT AS A COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY SUBJECT?

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Sociology may be defined, in the narrow sense, as the theory, on the one hand, of social organization, and, on the other, of social evolution. In other words, it is the biology and psychology of the associational process. But I assume that in a department of sociology in a college or university closely related subjects, other than sociology in this narrow sense, will and should be taught, such as demography, including social statistics, philanthropy, and social psychology. In one sense all of these subjects are sociology. Some, indeed, would prefer to call demography "descriptive sociology;" and some would name the applied science of social betterment "applied or practical sociology" rather than "philanthropy;" while personally I would prefer the term "psychological sociology" instead of "social psychology." At any rate, they are all closely related subjects, and there can be no doubt that they should be taught together in any college or university where the work in sociology is well organized. My problem, therefore, becomes: How should sociology and the subjects immediately connected with it, either as its preliminary data or as its applications, be taught in a college or university?

Another difficulty presents itself in the question of the teaching force available for the teaching of these subjects; for it is manifest that they must be taught differently according as one or several men, or only one-half or one-fourth of one man, are engaged in teaching them. In most colleges and universities at the present time sociology is but a mere appendix or addendum to the department of political economy, or perhaps history or philosophy; and usually only the part of the time of one man is devoted to teaching subjects which may with any strictness be called sociological. For the purposes of this paper, however, I

shall assume that such important subjects as sociology, demography, and philanthropy cannot be properly taught in a college or university of any size without practically the whole time of at least one man being devoted to their teaching. What I shall say, therefore, about methods of teaching sociology presupposes that at least one man is giving practically all of his time to work in sociology and closely allied subjects; but, of course, the ideals set up may be, in part, adapted to conditions where only half of the time of one man can be given to those subjects.

I must disclaim at the outset any intention of laying down dogmatic rules as to how sociology and allied subjects should be taught. I have not sufficiently reflected upon the matter, nor is my experience sufficiently wide, to warrant my laying down such rules. Again, I do not believe that one teacher can make rigid rules for the guidance of another, even in the same field; the most that can be done is that a certain order and method can be indicated, and suggestions as to details given. For these reasons, and also for the sake of concreteness, I shall limit myself, in this paper, to telling what methods and organization of work I have found on the whole successful in a six-years' teaching experience at the University of Missouri.

At the University of Missouri—where a free elective system prevails—there is no course in sociology open to freshmen. During the first two years of my experience I admitted them to my elementary course, but I soon found that in general they were not mature enough to take the work with profit as I had it organized. Hence freshmen are now advised to take a general course in European history or in physiography as preparation for the courses in sociology. This is not saying, of course, that a suitable course in sociology, or rather in the descriptive study of social organization, could not be organized for freshmen. Such a course might easily be arranged, and in my opinion it would be a valuable introduction to the more intensive study of the problems of the social life attempted in the following courses. It should include, among other things, a careful study of local conditions and institutions and of neighborhood organization, a

descriptive analysis of present American society, based largely upon the census, and a study of the relations of social institutions to physiographic conditions. Such an elementary course in social analysis has not been organized at the University of Missouri, partly on account of lack of sufficient teaching force, but chiefly because the curriculum is already crowded and it seems wiser to direct the attention of students to the courses in history and physiology.

As the work in sociology has been organized at the University of Missouri, there have been three chief courses open to undergraduates. These courses are all arranged on the three-hour-a-week plan, and continue each through a year. In a college or university where the classes meet five times a week, each of these courses would be condensed to a single semester, and they could all, then, come in the junior and senior years, which, I think, would be advantageous. The three courses referred to are: (1) an introduction to the scientific study of social problems; (2) a study of the abnormal classes of society—the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes—and of the methods of scientific philanthropy in dealing with them; (3) a critical study of sociological theory.

The first course, as the name implies, is an introduction to all of the social sciences as well as to sociology. Its aim is to show the student how scientific methods may be applied to the study of social problems. The course opens with a survey of the field of the social sciences and of their relations to each other, especially to sociology, whose character as a synthetic and fundamental science of the whole field of social phenomena is emphasized. Scientific methods of studying social problems are then considered—the method of personal observation, the statistical method, the historical method, the comparative method, the evolutionary method, and the method of deduction from biology and psychology. The whole purpose of the course is to illustrate the concrete application of these methods to the problems of the social life in such a way that the essential factors in social organization and evolution will stand clearly forth. Accordingly the main part of the course is spent in examining certain typical or



fundamental social problems in the light of these scientific methods.

The first problem studied is that of the origin and evolution of the family. I may say here that it has long been my conviction that the study of the family as an institution forms the best introduction to scientific sociology, and all my experience thus far has tended to confirm this conviction. The study of the evolution of the family reveals, in a concrete way, to the elementary student of society, as nothing else can, all of the essential factors at work bringing about social changes and maintaining social order. It exhibits in miniature the social process, so that the student can analyze it without getting confused; and it exhibits it in its natural genetic setting, not in an artificial way. Moreover, the study of the family, and of the phenomena of birth-rate and death-rate which are intimately connected with the family life, serves to give the student that biological point of view which is necessary for sanity in the study of social problems. Just as there can be no sound individual psychology without the biological point of view, so there can be no sound psychological theories of the social life without its biological aspect being kept constantly in view. Finally, the study of the family, although it shows so clearly the biological factors at work in society, exhibits not less clearly the spiritual factors, such as religion, government, culture, and moral ideals; and there is, therefore, little danger of the student becoming one-sided in his views of the social process, such as there may be in the study of economic institutions.

Here I wish to express my conviction that economics, and especially theoretical economics, does not afford the best possible preparation for either philanthropy or theoretical sociology. It fails to give, not only the biological point of view, but that all-sided, well-balanced view of the social life-process which both the social worker and the student of sociological theory require. In other words, the study of economics should not precede, but should accompany or follow, such a course as I am describing.

The first semester's work in this course embraces, then, the study of the evolution of the family as an institution, including

of course the modern divorce movement, the study of the birth-rate of various countries and of various elements in our population, in connection with their respective death-rates, and finally a study of the theory of population. The whole makes up a semester's work which, one might say, is predominantly on the biological aspect of the social life-process. The second semester's work is on allied problems, of a more or less fundamental character, which grow out of the problems studied the first semester. Thus the problems of population naturally lead into the immigration problem, and this in turn brings up problems of racial adjustment, among which the negro problem is of commanding importance; finally, all these problems lead to a consideration of those connected with the growth of cities and the social conditions of urban life, with which the year's work closes, after a brief summary of the conclusions reached of value for sociological theory.

Throughout the course the point of view maintained is the sociological one—that is, the view-point of the organization and evolution of society as a whole. All problems are approached from this point of view, and made to throw light upon the real factors in social growth and organization. Moreover, the problems treated afford excellent opportunities for the illustration of the statistical, historical and comparative methods of social study, in all their complexity. Thus the instruments of independent thinking and investigating are placed in the students' hands, and they are encouraged to think for themselves. By the end of the year the thinking students are in a position to think clearly about the social life-process as a whole; while those who do not think have at least, by the scientific study of these problems, been better trained for their duties as citizens. Training for citizenship, I may say, is an aim kept constantly in view throughout the course. This is not difficult, because the first requisite in training for citizenship is, in my opinion, the securing of the scientific attitude toward all social problems.

Thus far I have said nothing about methods of instruction used in this course in the technical sense of that term. The methods of instruction used are lectures, required reading, and

quizzes. The problems treated in the course are all presented by means of lectures, and the series of lectures may accordingly be said to be the main feature of the course. I do not wish to defend the lecture method—that is not necessary. But I would point out that in an unorganized subject, like sociology, if a wide field is to be covered in a relatively brief time, the lecture method is indispensable. With relatively mature students it is, moreover, if supplemented by quizzes, required reading, or the writing of papers, liable to but little abuse. In the course I am describing wide reading is required of the students. They are first of all required to read some simple text presenting a scientific analysis of society. This has been deemed necessary because it has been found that, though they have studied history, they are not used to thinking of society objectively and analytically. They are next required to do reading along the line of the problems treated in the lectures, special reading being assigned in connection with each topic. Finally, they are encouraged to read certain elementary texts in theoretical sociology, though they are not required to do this. On a part of their reading the students are quizzed the same as on the lectures; on the rest they are required to take notes and hand them in at the end of the semester. There are frequent written quizzes upon the lectures and parts of the required reading, oral quizzes being found impracticable with large classes. No papers are required to be written in this course, as in general the students in such an introductory course are not yet prepared to write papers with profit; but mature students taking the course are permitted to write papers in lieu of doing certain required reading and handing in their notes. It would be desirable in such a course, if practicable, to require, in addition to the above, personal observation of local social conditions and institutions, but with large classes I have not found it practicable to do this.

The course which I have described is intended, not only as an introductory course to the other courses in sociology and philanthropy, but also, where a student can spend only a limited time in studying sociology, as a relatively complete elementary course.

In other words, where a student can take but one course in sociology, he is advised to take this course.

For a second course in sociology I believe that there should be made a thorough study of the abnormal or depressed classes in society, together with the scientific methods of dealing with them. The first course is rightly confined, I think, to a consideration of problems which involve directly only the normal elements of society; but the abnormal elements—by which I mean the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes—play such a part in social evolution, and their treatment is such an important concern in modern communities, that I believe that the study of them and of the methods of scientific philanthropy should follow next in order. There should be made a careful study of their biological and social genesis, of their extent and increase or decrease, of the historical development of their treatment, and of the present scientific methods of treating each particular class. These topics form a year's work at the University of Missouri in two separate, though correlated, courses. In the first semester a course called "Modern Philanthropy" deals with the genesis and treatment of the dependent and defective classes; in the second semester a course called "Criminal Sociology" deals similarly with the delinquent classes. The methods of instruction are practically the same as those employed in the first course, except that papers are now required of students on topics in which they are interested. In all courses in philanthropy it is highly desirable, of course, where the college or university is situated in a large city, to have the class visit the local charitable and correctional institutions.

After there has been a somewhat thorough study of scientific methods of social investigation and of scientific methods of social amelioration, as described in the above two courses, the student is ready for a course in sociological theory. This is sociology in the narrow sense—the theory of the organization and evolution of society; and, in my opinion, it should not generally be taken before the senior year, and should be preceded by courses in psychology as well as by the courses already discussed. If it be said that few undergraduates will take such a course upon such

conditions, the reply is that it does not matter. The first two courses that have been discussed should be taken by all academic undergraduates as a preparation for citizenship, if for no other reason; but the course in sociological theory is needed only by those who, for one reason or another, are specializing in the social sciences.

The course should be both critical and constructive. The divergences in present sociological theories should be pointed out, but points of agreement among sociologists should at the same time be emphasized. Every effort should be made to stimulate the student's own thought. Upon the basis of his already acquired knowledge of facts and principles he should be required to criticize typical sociological theories, and to formulate his own views regarding social organization and evolution. To this end original theses should be required of the class throughout the course. After a semester's work of critical study of sociological theories, more constructive work in interpreting social phenomena should be attempted upon the basis of modern psychology. This work in the psychological interpretation of social phenomena, or social psychology, should be made the goal of the whole previous work in sociology, and from its standpoint all previous positions reached may be reviewed and co-ordinated, so that by the end of the course the student will have, if not a definite system of sociology, at least the materials out of which such a system may be constructed.

What has been said about the plan of the above courses may, perhaps, be summed up by saying that in the study of sociology the study of social facts should precede the study of sociological theory, the theory being allowed to grow out of the facts; that the study of the near should precede that of the remote; and that the study of the normal should precede that of the abnormal.

The three courses outlined are, of course, but the foundation for graduate work in sociology and philanthropy. All of the problems treated in the introductory course should be covered again by graduate courses providing for more intensive study of the same problems and for research work along those lines. The same is, of course, true of all other demographical prob-

lems; and to facilitate the use of the statistical method in investigating these problems there should be provided a statistical laboratory, equipped with modern apparatus. Upon the basis of the course in philanthropy a great number of graduate courses in philanthropy and preventive social work may be developed. These courses will rapidly take on, however, a semi-professional character, and may lead in the direction of establishing a school of philanthropy. Where such semi-professional courses are given they should always be accompanied by practical social work. Finally, as continuing the work in theoretical sociology, graduate courses may be developed in the history of sociological theory, in sociological methodology, in ethnic psychology, and in the social psychology of special phases of the social life, such as art, religion, and morality.

To guard against misinterpretation, I should, perhaps, say that there is considerable greater flexibility in the course of study in my department than is indicated by what has been said above. But this has been secured largely through the addition of another man to the teaching force. The work for the first year is as I have outlined it. The work for the second year may be either the courses in philanthropy, or courses in the detailed study of the social condition of the rural and urban population of the United States. The work for the third year is either the course in theoretical sociology or courses in preventive philanthropy. Then follow, of course, for the graduate work the special courses for research on special problems, and the courses in ethnic psychology, history of sociological theory, and sociological methodology.

In concluding, permit me to say that I do not believe that in our larger universities the work in sociology and philanthropy can be properly organized unless it is divided between at least two men, one to teach theoretical sociology and the other philanthropy. The subjects are so different that they require men of different gifts and different training to teach them successfully; while each is so important that, not one man, but several men, might, in a university which is vitally in touch with the life of the people, be working in each subject.

## DISCUSSION

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When I looked over the programme of this meeting I chose to speak in the discussion on this question because it is the one that interests me most. I hope that in the course of the discussion we shall develop some useful suggestions in regard to it. The fact is, it seems to me, that today there is not anything which it is more important that all young men should learn than some of the fundamental notions of sociology. I use the term now in the broad sense of a philosophy of society, the synthesis of the other things that we sometimes include under sociology; and it seems to me that in all the public discussion that is going on, and in the matters that nowadays seem to interest people more than anything else, what they need is some sound fundamental notions that a sociologist might give them.

For instance, everybody ought to know what a society is. "Society" is a word that has a great many different uses. It is very much confused by these different uses; and at the same time a society is the fundamental thing with which sociology is concerned. The social sciences are all of them connected with particular details of social life, and if people could get an idea of what a society is, and perhaps still more exactly what it is not, it would correct and define a great number of fake suggestions that nowadays perplex the public mind.

Then, again, it is most important in regard to a society that it shall be publicly understood what you can do with a society and what you cannot do with it. People who know what a society is, and what we can do with a society by our best efforts, would know that it is great nonsense to talk about the reorganization of society as a thing that people are going to take in hand as a corrective measure, to be carried out by certain social enterprises so called. What we try to do, and what we want to try to do in class work, is to give the young men and young women (where the latter are concerned) a sound idea of some of these fundamentals that would stop them from going over into a false line of effort and thought.

Now, it seems to me that in doing this one thing, what we want to do is to get down to facts; and we ought to try to stick as close to facts as we can. I don't mean statistical facts, but I mean the realities and the truth of the life around us, the life that is going on, the motives of the people, their ideas and their fallacies, the false things on which they stick their faith, and so on. And the facts all show that there ought to be understood by students of sociology all fundamental facts about society, about what it is, what is possible in it, what is not possible in it, and so on. In our work at New Haven we have that so organized that we try to have the students take courses in ethnography and some related subjects that are of a fundamental character, and form a stock of knowledge that a student of sociology ought to have. If we do not do this, sociology becomes a thing up in the air. We have a lot of abstract definitions and abstract notions that may, of course, have some philosophical value or psychological truth, but the student starting out from them is in great danger, at any rate, of going off into the old-fashioned methods of deduction from these broad notions that he starts with, and the whole thing becomes lost in the clouds. That seems to me the greatest danger that sociology nowadays has to encounter. If we allow

it to become foundationless—I mean in regard to the real fact—make it a matter of thought and deduction, we cannot expect that we shall have great effect on public opinion; we cannot expect that people will pay very much attention to us or care much about what we say. The only way that we can get an influence that we want and that we think we deserve is to keep sociology directly and constantly in touch with common everyday life and with the forms of the social order.

If I were a man forty years old, and was beginning to be a professor in one of our American colleges, I should think that the opportunity to take hold of a department of sociology, and give it shape and control its tendencies, lay down its outlines, and so on, was really the most important thing that a man nowadays could undertake, because of the tremendous importance of these social questions that are arising. There cannot be any doubt of it, and I, at any rate, am perfectly convinced of it, that within the next twenty-five or thirty years the questions that are going to shake American society to its foundations are questions of sociological character and importance. Some have already been referred to; such, for instance, as this race question that has been rising and getting more strenuous every year. It has got some truth at the bottom of it, if we can get at it, and in the end it will have to be settled from the merit that is in it, and the sociologist will have to find the truth that is in this matter. Again, such questions as are involved in conflicts about capital, are unlimited in their influence on the welfare of the American people. And if I were at the beginning of a career, instead of at the end of it, I should think there was nothing that was better worth work than to get into the minds of the young men some notions that were sound in regard to fundamental matters. Then in regard to this matter of divorce, and the way in which it is acting upon the American people. It is a question that ramifies through the whole society, and even the most dithyrambic of our orators have never gone beyond the truth of the importance of this matter to the American people.

My opinion in regard to this is that the way to build a science of sociology is to build it on the same fundamental methods that have proved so powerful in the other sciences. I mean the more or less exact sciences. We cannot pretend that we can ever make an exact science of sociology. We ought not to try. We haven't got the information, and I don't know that we ever can get it in the accurate, positive shape in which it is ascertained in the exact sciences. We are all the time dealing more or less with propositions that under certain circumstances will have to be modified. They are valuable, they are important, but more knowledge, more information, may force us to modify them. That will not do any harm. There have been sciences that have had a long and useful life, although they remained in that form. I don't think that is a fundamental difficulty, but it is one that we want to overcome so far as we can. We ought to be truly scientific so far as possible. We ought to use positive and well-tested methods, and we ought not to trust any others. The methods that we use ought to be such as would be regarded as valid at any time and anywhere, on any subject.

Now, if the young men are to be trained in this, you have got to bring them



up to it by a study of a positive character that deals with facts and information. We have thought that ethnography was at any rate one of the very broadest of these subjects. The books on sociology all refer constantly to certain things as true with regard to primitive or uncivilized people, and we ought to have a stock of knowledge about such matters that is firm and well learned, so that the students know what we are talking about. They would know at once if all the things as asserted are actually and positively true. Then we have also a course in what is called commercial geography, but it branches out a good deal from that into matters of commerce, trade, production, and so on, in different parts of the world. That is, as we think, a very strong basic course for the students who are going to study sociology. It brings them into contact with these matters from the economic side, which is more positive, at any rate, and more practical than the sociological facts as they stand at the present time. Then the economic courses: As has been well said, they have important limitations, but they furnish a convenient and practical introduction to our line of study, and we expect that study. Then, again, there is the great field of history; that furnishes us a vast amount of our material—the material on which we base our deductions and generalizations, so that a student who is going to be a sociologist never can know too much history. And if history is taught well and according to modern ideas and methods, it furnishes a very good introduction to sociological study.

Sociological study at New Haven at present is in my hands, and I have to proceed very largely by lectures, partly for the reason that the essayist has mentioned. If the lectures are made pleasant and easy, the young men will sit very attentively through the hour, and they will get up and go away without any discontent, and all will go on very happily and smoothly and uselessly. But if you are going to make lectures amount to anything, you have got to follow them up, and you have got to have tests, and you have got to apply the tests thoroughly by the old-fashioned recitation method, so that a man who doesn't pay attention and doesn't acquire the matter will suffer for it in the usual academic way. Then they have lessons in the textbook every time that they come, so that they can always turn back to the textbook and verify what ideas they think they have gained, and the matter can be held down as closely as possible to the usual academic methods. I don't know of any better methods than the classes and exercises on which we were brought up in old times. The combination of the lecture with something of that kind seems to be necessary, so that the students are required to write abstracts every five or six lectures. These abstracts are carefully examined, and students get marks for them which tell on the standing and the final academic results, in the usual form.

Now I am about at the end of it. Only one or two more years remain and I am most interested now to know what can be done for the sake of the future, for those who will come after and take up the work and carry it on. I hope we shall get up a discussion here—if necessary, a quarrel—which will develop ideas about this matter that will help. Somebody asked me last evening if this was going to be a gay discussion, and I said it had possibilities of a very gay discussion; and, Mr. Chairman, it is what I hope we shall have in the remainder of the session.

PROFESSOR FREDERICK MORGAN DAVENPORT, HAMILTON COLLEGE, CLINTON, N. Y.

There has never been any question of the necessity of sociology as a training for citizenship since Spencer wrote his chapter on "Our Need of It" a full generation ago, and there never has been any question of the interest which this subject is capable of arousing in the mind of the student since it became evident that sociology is the deepest of the humanities, reaching to the very marrow of the life of man.

As soon as we shall be able to rid ourselves still more fully of that haunting classical fetish that "never flitting, still is sitting on the pallid bust of Pallas, just above" the entrance door of so many of our colleges even yet, we shall be able to begin the study of the science of society earlier than we have hitherto supposed. We are just beginning to appreciate how keen the youthful mind is for scientific truth—how much more easily it is apprehended than unnatural grammar, for example. I expect to see the day when sociology will be taught in the higher grades of the public schools in a simple, straightforward fashion. But whether that ever comes or not, in the college we should introduce it, I think, as early in the course as possible, not later than the last half of sophomore year or the first half of junior year. Biology and psychology should come before sociology, but elementary sociology should precede college inquiry into history, economics, jurisprudence, and politics.

There should be preparation at least in the last half of sophomore year, which shall give the student a grasp on the general principles of biology and psychology which are unquestionably at the foundation of sociological study, in order that he may apprehend the simpler relations between the science of life and the science of society, and especially between the science of mind and the science of society. There is need of preparation in biology, not so much that the student may trace any analogy between the individual organism and the social organism, but in order that he may grasp those fundamental biological truths of heredity and adaptation to environment, of variation, struggle, and survival, that he may become familiar with the evolutionary changes which the human species is undergoing as the result of adaptation to a changing and differentiating social environment.

There is no need for anyone to plead in our time that psychology is the very heart of sociology; that, however much truth there may be in the organic analogy, the psychical view of society is everywhere winning its way. A careful training in the fundamental principles of biology and psychology—then sociology, before history, economics, jurisprudence, or politics.

And why before these subjects? Because the study of history, for example, is revolutionized if there is clearly in the mind of the student, at the threshold of historical inquiry, the great path of social evolution—zigzagging for some populations, lost in the morass for others, but, just as surely as progress goes on, following in the main one steadfast upward way out of horde and tribal life into civilization and progress and democracy. So much is the debt of history to sociology felt in our time that there is no history in our day worth anything which is not written from the sociological standpoint. Not the doings of kings, but the phenomena of social progress. Not the gossip of the court or the spoil of the strong, but the advancing growth and organization of the nation. Who

can understand economics who has not first camped on its sociological frontier? And who jurisprudence who is not familiar with the social sources of the common law? Or who politics who is not acquainted with the social evolution of government and public opinion? Who is competent to judge of the value of proposed practical reform, who can sift a programme of social policy, without that balance, that social standard of judgment, which comes from a broad view of community failures and community successes in the long ages that are gone?

But the question may be asked: Is sociological theory clearly enough defined so that it may be taught as a discipline fundamental to a particular group of studies? I think so. I think we have passed the danger-point. I think there is no longer cause to fear that we may split up into warring sects like the theologians. Our sociological geniuses, though they seem to differ, are in reality only laying emphasis upon important phases of the whole subject. Although no one would claim that we have a complete and authoritative body of principles, enough is clear, I think, to form a simple and beautiful body of theory.

I hope we are agreed upon the unit of investigation in sociology, upon the fundamental psychological character of the subject, that the description of society must be in psychological and not biological terms. I hope we are agreed with respect to the evolutionary nature of the social process, and that it is important to attempt to correlate the social process with the great cosmic process of evolution; that this social process is complicated and modified by the ever-expanding reason of man; that more and more the guide of social progress is intellectual progress. I hope we are agreed upon the general path of social evolution of a population out of horde and tribal darkness into civil organization and liberty and democracy. I hope we are agreed that progress costs in suffering, in injustice, even in degeneration; that society is morally responsible for the costs of its own progress; that the mind of the many must set itself to control economic greed, industrial suffering, and to modify that extreme tension of life which manifests itself in suicide, insanity, pauperism, vice, and crime. I think we have a very beautiful body of theory.

We should begin with simple, straightforward sociological theory—not with the causes of pauperism and the statistics of population, but with sociology as a philosophy of national life and progress. Not that this should be the whole content of our teaching, but the early foundation of it. We should teach, not the disagreements of sociologists—we can thresh them out elsewhere—but well-defined and certain conclusions as they seem to us, and do it as clearly and simply and briefly as we can. I think we should not proceed on the principle that sociological theory is still in a chaotic condition—that very wide inductions are still necessary before there is any talk of principle. I should like to know what Ward and Giddings and Small, and all the rest of our domestic and foreign sociological saints, have bled and suffered and died for anyway except to make the path of sociological investigation easier for each successive generation by setting up guide-posts all along the way.

I believe in a union of theory and history; that each step of the social process should be made clear to undergraduates by a wealth of illustration, a wide survey—but not too wide, not Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, but a far briefer and more definite application of event and fact to principle. A sim-

ple and, as far as possible, untechnical setting-forth of the well-defined principles of sociology, together with a sufficient number of significant examples of the great facts of social evolution—this should, I think, constitute the primary course in the sociological study of the colleges. If only a single course is possible, there is just one thing I should add to the content of it; a free parliament in practical sociological problems of contemporary life—an absolutely open and free discussion between members of the class, and between members of the class and the instructor, upon the social aspect of divorce, of pauperism, of crime, of cities, of settlement work, of factory legislation, of trades-unions and corporations, and other like problems.

If there can be but one course, I should go no farther. But if it is possible to go farther—and it will be increasingly possible in undergraduate instruction—then in a higher course we may proceed to a more intensive study of general sociology, to the criticism of disagreements and discordant elements; we may make use of what we have gained in description, in analysis and classification, and proceed to widen the range of inductive research and generalization—especially by the use of the quantitative form of the historical method—leaving for a later course, or perhaps for graduate study, the delicate inductions of cause and law, and the setting-up of the social standards of judgment that shall guide us in the midst of the complex economic and political programmes of our time.

Sociology has a great future in a nation which depends as much as we do upon the intelligence and the will of its citizenship. Sociology is a fundamental study for citizens, in order that they may substitute for the notion that political conduct must be a matter of log-rolling and compromise, that short views are best, and that life is too brief for remote considerations, that an untrained commonsense is most trustworthy—in order that we may substitute for all these that higher notion that political conduct may be made a matter of scientific prevision, of public control through public reason and public opinion, and that the facts upon which prevision and public opinion may be grounded are to be found by inquiry of what has been, what is, what tends to be in social evolution.

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JEFFREY R. BRACKETT, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF THE SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL WORKERS,  
BOSTON

I venture to speak briefly of instruction in one part of the great field of sociology—that of applied social ethics. I use the word “applied,” for the word “practical” would seem to mean that the study of theories of social activities may not be practical. There is surely no study more practical than the effort by true scientific work to put forth theories and general principles for the guidance of conduct.

Dr. Ellwood has well laid stress on the value of the study of the family at the beginning of a course. I venture to ask if there should not be instruction, by way of preparation for our courses, in such subjects as physiology, psychology, and hygiene, that we may know more of the bodily and mental elements with which we deal, and the effect of physical environment upon them.

The visiting of institutions is doubtless helpful, but I would urge for every student, if time and circumstances allow, some personal work which will bring him or her into intimate touch with at least one family whose condition of living

is very different from his own. For instance, a student whose life has been spent within a narrow circle of prosperity may, through a social settlement, lead a boys' club or be set to follow the activities of a central labor organization. Another, who has had few opportunities and a struggle, may well be placed in some agency, as a civic league, in which persons of opportunities and means are working for the common good. If possible, the work should be with two agencies, under skilled direction, differing in immediate aims. But there is hardly a student near a large community who cannot give at least one hour a week to friendly acquaintance with one family, or with one boy under probation, or with a group of children with a "home library," or to some other such bit of friendly service. It should continue during the academic year, at least.

The object of all such work is chiefly to give the student new points of view, and a larger power of interpretation of conditions and needs.

Work in applied social ethics should approach as nearly as possible to the "case work," which is doing so much in the study of law and medicine. Case work can be brought into the class in the form of detailed study, step by step, of particular problems of needy individuals or of neighborhood work. It should be done, however, by persons who know well, by personal knowledge if possible, the working-out of the particular problems.

The details of such work may seem trivial to some students, even to advanced ones. If so, there is all the more reason why this work should be done. It shows the relation in social ethics of little tasks well done to the larger issues. That is just as true in the study of social ethics as in medicine. General measures looking to prevention of ills, to improved conditions, must rest in large part on the knowledge which comes from detailed work in remedy and cure.

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PROFESSOR ROBERT C. CHAPIN, BELOIT COLLEGE

My point of view is that of the independent college, already so ably represented by Professor Davenport. With all that has been said with regard to the study of sociology as training for citizenship I am in hearty agreement, and shall not try to say it over again in feebler words.

The chief emphasis of the work of the detached college falls upon general, as distinguished from specialized, professional, and technical training. I believe that there is much truth in President Hadley's position that the most important training for citizenship that the college course gives comes from the experience of the student in adjusting himself to the social environment of the college, and finding his place as a good citizen in the sharing of the common burdens and responsibilities of student-life. Yet the formal study of social relationships in the larger world without may be made a valuable means of cultivating the social spirit and the habit of viewing social questions with reference to the common rather than the individual interests involved.

In my own teaching of undergraduates I have found it advantageous to begin with the study of social groups near at hand rather than remote, those present rather than those of the distant past. The college community itself affords a good illustration of many social phenomena, and I have found that students are easily interested in subjecting their familiar organizations and

activities to analysis. I have also been wont to start them upon an investigation of the communities from which they came. Many of them have their homes in rural communities, or in villages of manageable size, and they have often made very suggestive social studies of these. The college town has been studied in the same way, a different aspect of the city's organization being assigned to each member of the class, and the results compared and collated. In these ways the habit of observing the sociological significance of common facts is acquired, and an interest stimulated in those generalizations which apply, not only to small groups, but to the great national aggregates.

My own experience has been that it is difficult at the outset to interest undergraduates in the abstract generalizations of social theory and I should defer theoretical sociology until a good deal of the concrete matter of the separate social sciences had been presented—perhaps leave it for the most part for the work of the graduate school. Even granting that sociology has a body of doctrine as well established as that taught in economics, politics, etc., it is certainly not so large in amount, nor, in my opinion, so well adapted to younger minds as the more concrete data of the specific social sciences. I should therefore advise having the student get as much history and psychology and economics as he can before he undertakes the study of pure sociology. On the other hand, I should stipulate that these studies be taught from the sociological point of view, and not as mere matters of refinement of technical processes of research.

On one point further I must express dissent, although with diffidence, from what has been said. It seems to me that the study of pathological conditions—of pauperism and crime—lies outside the limits of the college course. I believe that more can be done for students, even in the way of preparing them to deal with these problems in after-life, by giving them a good understanding of normal social structure and its processes, and by inculcating the broad social point of view, than by initiating them into the detail of abnormal phenomena.

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PROFESSOR J. ELBERT CUTLER, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

My experience in the teaching of sociology, mainly in a Massachusetts college for women, has impressed upon my mind the desirability of field-work in connection with the teaching of the subject. The possibility, the practicability, of such work varies with the character, the situation, and the surroundings of each institution where the subject is taught. But it is my belief that wherever possible, and to the utmost degree to which it is possible, field-work in connection with the teaching of sociology is extremely desirable. By field-work I mean, in general, expeditions to institutions and to districts and places illustrative of points discussed in the classroom, with reports, oral or written (or both), embodying the students' impressions and ideas.

This work I believe to be desirable for at least three reasons:

1. This requires of the student work that is at once interesting and valuable—interesting because of novelty of experience, if for no other reason; valuable because of the kind of training that it gives. To observe intelligently, to record accurately, and to generalize cautiously and prudently, are requirements in the attainment of which all the powers of the mind are brought into use, and they

are thus trained and subjected to the discipline that is necessary for complete development. It is therefore in accord with the end and purpose of a collegiate course.

2. The present stage of the science of sociology justifies only a minimum amount of generalization in the teaching of the subject. The generalizations that are used must be regarded as working hypotheses merely. This, I think, the student should be given to understand at the outset. If this is done, then the student may rightly be encouraged to test these hypotheses, to find material that is illustrative and corroborative, or to find instances that apparently do not support the principles that have been advanced. This method of approach, it seems to me, is productive of the deepest interest in the subject on the part of the student.

3. Field-work has a broadening and deepening influence on the student's sympathies; it trains for citizenship. Class feeling and social prejudices, at least if very pronounced, are believed to be harmful in a democracy. There is no more effective way, during the college course, so far as the work of the teacher is concerned, of promoting the development of a democratic spirit, a spirit of good citizenship and public service, and of dispelling the ominous clouds that arise out of narrow-mindedness and ignorance, than by carefully directed sociological investigation.

Students of sociology have shown a marked tendency "to go off on a tangent," as I call it—to become to all intents and purposes individuals of one idea. They seem to be prone to seize upon a single evil or some particular instance of social injustice, or perhaps some special form of social betterment; and soon they are out on a tangent and have lost their bearings, so far as sociology as a whole is concerned. This is almost sure to happen frequently, it seems to me, if students receive their instruction in sociology somewhat as if they were shut up in a cloister. For the student of sociology it is very desirable that his first attempts to solve the problems of modern society be made under close supervision and direction.

To my mind socialism, which most students have a desire to know something about, and to which some consideration must be given in one way or another, cannot really be understood or altogether satisfactorily studied in the classroom alone. Field-work in sociology, intimate acquaintance with the hard facts of everyday experience, not merely in one group or class, but in various groups, under various conditions, is what enables a student to understand the powerful appeal, the force and vitality, of socialism as a doctrine, as propaganda. On the other hand, it also enables a student to realize the limitations of socialism as a practical programme, the very great difficulties that must be overcome in making a practical application of the principles of socialism.

I would not, however, minimize the importance of a study of the historical development of social institutions. That is highly important, indeed indispensable. I would merely add that that is likely to leave the student in the dead past, bewildered before the living present, unless it be supplemented by a first-hand knowledge and analysis of present-day conditions and problems.

There are only one or two serious objections to field-work in connection with the teaching of sociology:

1. Possible notoriety. Where classes are large, students must carry on field-

work in groups. Often the instructor must accompany the students. Students doing field-work under such circumstances are very apt to attract the attention of newspaper reporters and become a target for their witticisms. I can only say that, so far as my experience goes, notoriety can be avoided. For two years, once every two weeks, groups of my students were more or less publicly studying sociology, for a half-day or more at a time, outside the classroom. Only once in the two years did we become the prey of the reporter, and on that occasion it was the result of a misunderstanding which caused my plans to miscarry.

2. The baneful effect on the individuals who are visited and whose character and surroundings are studied. Here again my experience leads me to think that their feelings need not be disregarded or in any sense outraged. In some cases I found it possible to establish perfectly natural relationships through co-operation with settlement workers. I have also found city and state officials very courteous and obliging in the matter of permitting students to study their methods of administration.

3. The time required on the part of both student and teacher. This I admit to be a serious objection. It is the most serious of all, I think. But through co-operation with settlement workers, with public officials, with alumni, it is possible to minimize the time required. In any case, the value of a method must be judged according to the results that it gives; and I believe the results obtained from field-work, in general, to be worth all the time and the effort.

A friend with whom I was conversing while on the train coming to Providence said that he was endeavoring to use the case method in his courses in sociology—the case method not merely in the study of what may be termed the pathological conditions of society, but in the study also of what may be called the ordinary, normal, and typical conditions. That, in a word, is what I have in mind and what I advocate. It is desirable at the present time to use the case method just as far as possible in the teaching of sociology.



## WESTERN CIVILIZATION AND THE BIRTH-RATE

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PROFESSOR EDWARD A. ROSS

University of Wisconsin

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A century ago Robert Malthus showed that the spontaneous fecundity of man is such that, with a purely natural mortality, population doubles in twenty-five years, whereas the subsistence obtainable from a given area cannot be indefinitely increased. He showed furthermore that, since the reproductive instincts are in no wise correlated with man's power to increase the food-supply, population *tends* to increase even when additional numbers can no longer be supported. Under such circumstances the equilibration of population with resources is brought about by war, misery, plague, famine, and vice, which raise the death-rate until it equals the natural birth-rate. Although this cruel mode of equilibration has prevailed through human history, a milder mode is possible if, by taking thought, men will restrict reproduction until the births no longer exceed the deaths. This, however, presupposes more foresight and self-control than can be looked for in the average man, so Malthus saw no prospect of the abolition of poverty, cherished little hope for the laboring masses, and painted the future of society with a somberness that gave economics its nickname of "the dismal science."

It is nothing to the discredit of Malthus's doctrines that he did not foresee certain social transformations—democracy, the emancipation of women, the replacement of custom imitation by fashion imitation—which have generalized his "preventive check" until the birth-rate of entire populations betrays the domination of the instincts by the will. Although the population of Europe leaped from 187 millions to 400 millions during the nineteenth century, the last thirty years show a steady decline in the birth-rate.

TABLE I  
BIRTHS PER THOUSAND OF POPULATION

	1876-80	1896-1900	Fall in 20 Years	Fall to 1902-3
Norway.....	31.5	30.4	1.1	2.9
Austria.....	38.8	37.1	1.7	2.2
Denmark.....	32.1	30.2*	1.9	2.8
Switzerland.....	31.3	28.7*	2.6	3.6
Ireland.....	25.8	23.2	2.6	2.7
Italy.....	36.8	34.0	2.8	3.5
Belgium.....	31.9	28.8	3.1	2.2
France.....	25.4	22.4	3.2	3.8
Germany.....	39.2	36.0	3.2	5.3
Sweden.....	30.2	26.9	3.3	3.8
Holland.....	36.4	32.5*	3.9	4.8
Hungary.....	44.1	39.7	4.4	5.3
Scotland.....	34.7	30.2	4.5	6.1
England and Wales.....	35.4	29.3*	6.1	6.8

\* 1891-1900.

That the tendency is not due to a darkening of the economic horizon appears from the similar behavior of the prosperous Australasian peoples.

TABLE II  
AUSTRALASIAN BIRTH-RATES

	New South Wales	Victoria	New Zealand
1871-75.....	39.0	35.6	40.0
1876-80.....	38.5	31.4	41.3
1880-85.....	37.6	30.7	36.5
1886-90.....	36.3	32.7	31.2
1890-95.....	32.9	30.0	27.6
1896-1900.....	27.9	26.2	25.7

Few American states register births, but the proportion of children revealed by successive censuses discloses in what direction we are moving.

TABLE III  
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER FIVE YEARS TO 1,000 WOMEN OF CHILD-BEARING AGE

1850.....626	1880.....559
1860.....634	1890.....485
1870.....572	1900.....479

The fecundity of the foreign-born element, stronger now in our population than in 1850, obscures somewhat the tendencies prevailing among native Americans. What these are appears from the following table:

TABLE IV  
NUMBER OF OFFSPRING BORN IN FAMILIES OF COLLEGE GRADUATES

	Middlebury College	Wesleyan University	New York University*
1805-09.....	5.6	...	...
1810-19.....	4.8	...	...
1820-29.....	4.1	...	...
1830-39.....	3.9	4.5	4.0
1840-49.....	3.4	3.3	3.2
1850-59.....	2.9	2.2	2.9
1860-69.....	2.8	2.6	2.5
1870-74.....	2.3	...	...
1875-79.....	1.8	...	...

\*The figures for New York University are for the decades 1835-44, 1845-54, etc.

Let it not be imagined that the reduction in fecundity has been at the expense of the natural increase of population. The death-rate has fallen even more than the birth-rate, so that during the nineties the European peoples grew at the old rate of 1 to 1½ per cent. per annum. Since, however, the influences lowering the birth-rate are by no means the same as those lessening mortality, it is likely the former will continue to operate after the latter have spent their force. This is why we may look in the near future for a retardation in the numerical growth of the occidental peoples.

A phenomenon so widespread and striking is a challenge to the tyro and the fanatic, and hence all manner of silly, cheap, or partial explanations compete for public credence. Some attribute it to physiological sterility induced by alcoholism, city life, and high pressure, forgetting that the child crop of sober, rural communities is often scantier than that of intemperate mining or industrial towns, and that the falling-off in the birth-rate seems due to smaller size of families rather than to the greater frequency of childless couples. New South Wales, with a lower birth-rate than England, has less than half the proportion of sterile unions. What means it, moreover, that the Australasian population, with its surpassing physique and vitality, shows in recent years an abrupt decline in fecundity?

Some lay the phenomenon to the industrial emancipation of women and the comfortable celibacy of cities, neglecting the statistics which show there is no marked weakening of the inclina-

tion to marry. The true cause is one that will make clear why, for example, the native married women of Massachusetts bear only seven-elevenths as many children as women coming from Germany, seven-thirteenths as many as those from Ireland, and half as many as those from French Canada. Others blame the broadening freedom of divorce, unmindful that divorceless Ireland has only four-fifths the birth-rate of easy-divorce Switzerland, that teeming Germany is five times as inclined to break the conjugal bond as Canada where the size of the family shrank a twentieth during the nineties, and that prolific Japan leads the world with nearly twenty times the divorce-rate of stationary France. Still others blame the postponement of marriage, pointing out that marriage at 24.5 years as with English brides, at 25.5 as among those of Massachusetts, or at 26.5 as among college-bred women, cuts deeply into the fecund years. But they overlook the fact that the last child in the average family arrives seven and a half years after marriage, so that even the woman who weds at 26.5 years ceases child-bearing with yet many fertile years before her.

In the face of the hobby-riders I maintain that the cause of the shrinkage in fecundity lies in the human will as influenced by certain factors which have their roots deep in the civilization of our times.

One master-trait of contemporary society is democracy. The barriers of caste are down, and less and less is a man's place in society fixed by his origin. The more flourishing peoples grade men according to something that can be acquired—wealth, efficiency, knowledge, character. Wide stairways are opened between the social levels, and men are exhorted to climb if they can. In such case prudence bids each avoid whatever will impede his ascent or imperil his social standing. To the climber children are incumbrances, and so the ambitious dread the handicap of an early marriage and a large family. When, as so often in these days of anti-child-labor laws and protracted schooling, the additional child is a drag on the social advancement of the family, that child is not likely to be born.

With the wiping-out of sharp class lines, inherited standards

of living lose their grip. Wants and tastes once confined to the social élite spread resistlessly downward and infect the masses. Tidal waves of imitation carry the craving for luxuries, hitherto looked upon as the prerogative of the rich, among millions of people of limited means, and these in their endeavor to gratify their newly awakened wants learn to economize in offspring. The little stranger trenches on raiment, bric-à-brac, upholstery, travel, entertainment. Here the decencies, there the comforts, yonder the refinements and vanities of life compete with the possible child and bar it from existence.

Another factor is the emancipation of women. Every child taxes the father's purse, but the mother's body. A reputed inferiority of women, as in the Orient or in eastern Europe, degrades her to a passive instrument of man, subordinates her entirely to wifely functions so that her birth-pangs do not count. The great movement that has burst the fetters on woman's mind, and opened to her so many professional and industrial careers, raises her value and weight in the marriage partnership and causes the heavy physiological and personal cost of excessive maternity to be more considered by husband as well as by wife. When the size of the family is determined from the man's view-point alone, the controlling consideration is pecuniary; and hence Malthus drew his pessimistic conclusion that the prosperity of the masses tends constantly to defeat itself by stimulating the growth of numbers until poverty again reigns. But when spouses come to the woman's point of view, the pain-and-worry cost of enlarging the family remains a bar even when the money cost needs no longer be considered.

Something, too, must be said of the decay of religious beliefs. Parents who "trust in Providence" and hold, with Luther, that "God makes children and he will provide for them," are rare nowadays. More and more the age chimes in with Matthew Arnold when he says:

A man's children are not really *sent*, any more than the pictures upon his wall, or the horses in his stable are *sent*; and to bring people into the world, when one cannot afford to keep them and oneself decently and not too precariously . . . is . . . by no means an accomplishment of the divine

will or a fulfilment of Nature's simplest laws, but is . . . contrary to reason and the will of God.

Piety, moreover, promoted parentage by reconciling woman to her lot as mother and drudge. The struggle of woman to realize an individuality has obliged her to rebel against her Biblical status and to spurn the counsel of submission to the curse of Eve; so that the progress of unbelief is not without a bearing on the decline of the birth-rate.

Powerful as are the motives arrayed against superfecundity, they operate only in so far as they are coupled with foresight and self-control. In the modern world parents may not rid themselves of the unwelcome child, so that it is only by being foreseen and anticipated that the ever-more-acutely-felt burden of that child can limit the size of the family. Every influence, therefore, that enlightens, or enthrones reason over impulse, helps to break the scepter of Ishtar, the cruel goddess that has so unspeakably tormented mankind. In this direction work the universal instruction, cheap press, free libraries, and voluntary associations, that are irradiating the social deeps. Moreover, industrialism, with its enormous pressure and harsh penalties, is compelling the ignorant, the careless, and the animal to *think*; so that, in fact, the principal features of the life of today are accomplices in the restriction of fecundity.

Our age glories most that Science and Technique are able to develop resources to meet the demands of a swelling population. Ought we not rather to glory in the fact that the civilization wrought out within the memory of living men is the first that ever really solved on a great scale the problem of painlessly equilibrating population to resources? The civilization of the Orient failed to lift up woman or bid the lowly aspire, and hence it was never able to deliver man from nature's grim agencies for adjusting numbers to the food-supply—war, famine, misery, plague, and vice. The civilization of the Middle Ages succeeded no better, and the surviving peoples of that type in eastern Europe show a prolificacy that scourges them with misery, hunger-migration, and an appalling infant mortality. Latter-day occidental civilization alone has solved the riddle of the Sphinx,

and it has been able to do it because it is *democratic, individualistic, feminist, secular, and enlightened*.

What, now, are the effects of reducing the size of the average family?

One effect is that diffusion of economic well-being which registers itself in a rising plane of comfort, a growth of savings, and a wider diffusion of ownership. Striking, indeed, is the contrast in condition between the prudent French peasantry and the reckless mining or factory towns of central Europe, or the spawning rural communities in Russia and Roumania. Among the west European peoples not only is the mean duration of life rapidly rising, but an increasing proportion of lives are rounded out to the term allotted by the Psalmist. This gain in longevity is partly due to the better support and care of the aged, who no longer need compete for attention with an overlarge brood of wailing infants. Again, a decline in fecundity lessens infant mortality; for often the sole effect of prolificacy is to fill the cemetery with tiny graves. The French Canadians, famed for their quivers of twelve, thirteen, or even twenty, do not show the census-taker larger families than the other Canadians. Among the working classes babies that come close together lack greatly in feeding, care, and medical attention, so that the restricted family may rear the larger number. When, as in certain teeming districts of Russia, the mother must go to work in the fields, leaving the hungry nursing to suck poultices of chewed bread tied to its hands and its feet, a barbarous birth-rate of 52 per thousand is shadowed by the death within a year of a third of those born. A great city at best is not benign to infancy; yet, in 1902, the death-rate in Moscow for children under one year was more than three times that of Rome, Paris, or Edinburgh. The difference during the first year alone amounted to a full fourth of all born. Consider, moreover, the significance of the fact that Russia, with 49.5 births per thousand, loses 31 per cent. the first year; Bavaria, with 36.8 births, loses 24 per cent; Norway, with 30 births, loses 9 per cent. These aborted lives add nothing to national or racial strength; they are simply sacrifices of the innocent to the Moloch of immoderate maternity.

After all, however, the master-consequence of a restricted birth-rate, the one result that dwarfs all others, is that with the intelligent adaptation of numbers to prospects ceases population-pressure, the principal cause of war, mass poverty, wolfish competition, and class conflict; for, in the words of Huxley, so long as unlimited multiplication goes on, no social organization which has ever been devised, or is likely to be devised, no fiddle-faddling with the distribution of wealth, will deliver society from the tendency to be destroyed by the reproduction within itself in its intensest form of that struggle for existence, the limitation of which is the object of society.

Once it seemed as if man's propensity to multiply foredoomed the race to live ever in the presence of vast, immedicable want and woe. However smiling the gardens of Daphne, they had always to slope down into a huge, malodorous quagmire of wretchedness. The wheel of Ixion, the cup of Tantalus, symbolized humanity striving ever by labor and ingenuity to relieve itself of a painful burden, only to have that burden inexorably rolled back upon it by its own fatal fecundity. The unlooked-for promptness with which, under the influence of democracy and public education, the masses have acquired a sense of responsibility in the matter of family, bids us look for a time when the specter of over-population, with strife, misery, and famine in its ghastly train, will be finally laid, and society will for the first time become master of its destiny.

But there are disquieting effects which must be taken into account.

The sway of the will in a matter hitherto left to blind instinct works a veritable revolution and cannot but breed certain harms of its own. At first the new foresight is used wantonly and destructively. The same individualizing influences that have genially tempered the general fecundity prompt some couples to a selfish evasion of all duties to the race. Salutory is restriction so far as it springs from a wise solicitude for the true welfare of offspring; but when it springs from personal cravings and ambitions, it may go too far. No one can tell where it will stop. The refusal to be encumbered in the pursuit of vanities might, if it became general, cause population to dwindle in the midst of an



Eden. The fall of the birth-rate in roomy New South Wales from 37 to 27 in fourteen years is a portent. Shall we live to see the mother of more than three regarded as a public benefactor and placed on the pay-roll of the state? This exaggerated individualism, that avoids marriage or else dodges its natural consequences, forebodes the extinction of the class, the people, or the race that adopts it. The false ideals behind such race-threatening frivolity need to be combated in the name of real values. Nor may we blink the fact that in order to control the size of the family some have resorted to means fraught with grave and insidious injury to health.

In the matter of reproduction it is not yet possible to substitute intelligence for instinct without creating a mental attitude responsible for numerous one-child and two-child families, where both parents and children miss many of the best lessons of life. The children reared in such stunted families, instead of surpassing in stamina and character, fall below the average. The type to be standardized is not the family of one to three, but the family of four to six. The one-child or two-child ideal growingly in favor with the middle class would, if popularized, hurry us to extinction. In such families prodigious pains are taken to keep breath in defective or sickly children. Instead of being weeded out in infancy by natural process, the weaklings are kept alive by lavish care, and the national vitality is lowered.

Since it is the rising that first feel the individualizing influences, these check their increase while yet the stocks below them breed at the old reckless rate. The outcome is a numerical gain of mediocres over capables, threatening an eventual dearth of ability in the race thus impoverished at the top. This untoward phenomenon is, however, but a passing phase. The lower strata are coming *or may be brought* within reach of the influences that moderate multiplication. If we speed up the individualizing agencies till the unthinking and brutish have become a mere remnant, the danger will disappear. Furthermore, the closer legal restriction of child labor, by making offspring expensive instead of profitable, may check the free propagation of stocks deficient in capacity or parental altruism.

It needs to be pointed out that the people that practices restriction sooner than its neighbors must resign itself to seeing its more fecund rivals outstrip it in colonizing the waste places. Says the New South Wales Commission on the Decline of the Birth Rate:

Public men . . . have referred hopefully to the day when Australia with her teeming millions will hold a commanding place among the peoples of the world. The patriotic ardor inspired by this hopeful anticipation is, however, destined to be cooled in the contemplation of the fact that, while Russia and Japan, prospective rivals of Australia for supremacy in the western Pacific, are already seeking outlets beyond their own borders for the energies of their ever-growing people, it will be forty-six and a half years before Australia, with her three and three quarter millions of inhabitants, and dependent alone on her natural increase (if this even be maintained at its present rate) will have doubled her population; and one hundred and sixty-eight years before her numbers will have reached the present population of Japan.

Nevertheless, the equilibrium may be restored by the overprolific people adopting the standards of the less prolific. Even if births are too few in Australasia, it is noteworthy that Japan is taking measures—e. g., the higher education of girls—against her superfecundity, and it is certain the masses of Russia will not much longer pullulate in the pit of mediaevalism.

Again, it is possible that the fair prospect opened to the masses of a people that restricts increase may be darkened by the pressing-in of hunger-bitten hordes from the man-stifled neighbor lands. More than a million and a quarter Italians, Basques, Germans, and Belgians have been drawn into hollow and prosperous France by the lure of high wages. Coolies from overstocked China reach avidly for the opportunities that Australians, Canadians, and Americans are wisely holding open for their children. If the low-pressure society slams its doors upon the indraught, it may later have to reckon with an armed invasion from some quarter where cannon food is cheap. Numbers tell. France dreads prolific Germany. Germany trembles before yet more prolific Russia. Europe fears the awakening of the teaming yellow race. In South Africa the whites stand aghast at the rabbit-like increase of the blacks. Until backward mankind has

clambered up, or been lifted up, from the animal plane. the sunny spots created by scientific industry coupled with prudent parentage will be menaced by an influx, peaceful or armed, from the crowded areas, and the bristling frontiers between peoples and races will have to remain.

It is, moreover, questionable if the slackening of increase in the white race is not premature. Much of the globe lies underdeveloped and capable, under the vivifying touch of the cunning hand, of maintaining in comfort many additional millions. For some time yet overflow currents may well stream out from the seats of the white race to occupy and develop the backward lands. If these dry up now, the void will assuredly be filled with the children of the black, brown, and yellow peoples, and the type that has so far achieved the most will contribute less than it might to the blood of the ultimate race that is to fill the globe.

The revolt against senseless parentage is a colossal secular phenomenon of varied aspects, and few of its appraisers are competent to judge more than the one or two aspects that appeal to them. No one who envisages all the aspects of this pregnant thing, who succeeds in seeing it steadily and seeing it whole, will laud or condemn it in unqualified terms. Granted; but the question forces itself: Is the core of the thing good or bad? Is the dethronement of Ishtar as mistress of social destiny a blessing with incidental harm, or an evil with incidental benefit? So pressed, I would answer: *Restriction is a movement at bottom salutary, and the undoubted evils in its train appear to be minor, or transient, or self-limiting, or curable.* I shall have against me mystics, clerics, *a priori* moralists, sentimentalists, aesthetes, militarists, capitalists, and politicians; but, nevertheless, I take my stand with those who hate famine, war, saber-tooth competition, class antagonism, the degradation of the masses, the wasting of children, the dwarfing of women, and the cheapening of men.

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## DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR FRANK A. FETTER, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

The famous proposition of Malthus concerning population is always fallacious and always confusing in social inquiry, and ought therefore to be laid away finally in the collection of outgrown illusions. The proposition that popula-

tion tends to increase faster than the means of subsistence is ambiguous nonsense. The word "tendency" has two meanings, varying according to the context. As applied to a force, "tendency" indicates merely the direction in which the force is exerted, no matter in what direction the body moves. Thus gravitation has a tendency to bring down the rising balloon, and wind has a tendency to check the motion of the advancing steamship. In this sense the reproductive power of mankind has a tendency to increase the population. But this tells nothing of the actual movement of population. That is the resultant of many forces tending in various directions. In this sense "tendency" cannot correctly be applied to population as the number of persons. As applied to a thing passively acted upon, the word "tendency" indicates the predominating direction of movement. In this sense "tendency" is properly applied to population, but only when in fact the number is increasing or decreasing. The mischievous confusion of the Malthusian proposition lies in its mingling of these two inconsistent meanings; population with a power of reproduction tending to increase the birth-rate is easily shifted in meaning to population as an arithmetic resultant pushed inevitably over the precipice of misery and starvation.

It is time to do away with this old jugglery of words, and look at the subject in the clearer light of the doctrine of biologic evolution. Nature has provided a "factor of safety" in the reproductive power of mankind. Impulse and physical capacity are greater than is needed to maintain or slowly to increase the population under favorable economic conditions. This surplus power has insured two results for humanity: first, it saved capable families and tribes from extinction in the vicissitudes of war, pestilence, and famine; secondly, it gave an excess of births in the more capable strains, and thus secured an indispensable condition of progress. Broadly viewed, this factor of safety has been none too large for these tasks. With greater security of life it now is excessive in many individuals, and must to a large extent be sternly repressed, or tempered by education and by selective breeding of the race.

This suggests the main criticism which I should like to make upon the leading paper. That paper dismisses too lightly the thought that the birth-rate is limited, roughly speaking, in proportion to the ability and cultivation of the families. The ignorant, the improvident, the feeble-minded, are contributing far more than their quota to the next generation. Professor Ross recognizes somewhat this danger, but leaves a far too comforting final impression. We ought not to underestimate this danger, or overestimate the likelihood of automatic remedial forces. To Professor Ross the problem seems but a passing one, and "the lower strata are coming or may be brought within reach of the influence of moderate multiplication." He concludes with the soothing assurance that "the undoubted evils in the train of restriction appear to be minor, or transient, or self-limiting, or curable."

This opinion can be indorsed only when the emphasis is placed strongly upon the purposeful action of society, and not upon automatic relief, upon "may be brought," and upon "curable," and very little upon "are coming," "transient," and "is limiting." In barbaric times the stronger and swifter conquered and survived; and the early social institutions of polygamy, patriarchal concubinage, war, and the capture of women favored the survival of ability. But today

superior intellectual and economic power contributes, not to offspring, but to sterilized scholarship, barren selfishness, and social display. It is more true today than ever, as the Frenchman said, that all the big families live in little houses and all the little families live in big houses.

In the lower strata of society it is the abler individuals that are reached by the appeal to ambition. Democracy hastens their extinction by enabling them to rise from the prolific ranks where caste has held them, to those circles where success or frivolous enjoyment limits the family burden. The practice of limiting families spreads downward in the same way and at the same rate that the mountains are being washed into the ocean. Before either process is effected, the world will end.

The paper mentions but one recent social change which tends definitely and positively to reduce the families of the unskilled classes, namely, child-labor legislation. Such laws as these incidentally and unintentionally have operated in that way. It is to the extension of such purposeful regulative measures that we must look for a remedy and not to the "economic harmonies." The whole structure of civilization is in a sense artificial, and the whole social process of limiting the physiologically possible birth-rate, is artificial. Its regulation in the future must be by artificial social agencies consciously chosen. Unless effective means are found to check the degeneration of the race, the noontide of humanity's greatness is nigh, if not already passed. Our optimism must be based, not upon *laissez faire*, but upon the vigorous application of science, humanity, and legislative art to the solution of the problem. Great changes of thought are impending, and these will include the elimination of the unfit, the establishment of qualifications for marriage, the education of parents, and the conscious improvement of the race. Under the touch of the new science of eugenics, many of our most perplexing social problems will disappear, making possible that better democracy which we are just beginning to seek.

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PROFESSOR WILLIAM B. BAILEY, YALE UNIVERSITY

Emphasis seems to have been placed on the proper point when great weight was given to the growth of the spirit of democracy as affecting the birth-rate. When status instead of contract determined the position of the laborer, there was little incentive to foresight, since social advancement was extremely difficult. One by one the ties which bound men to the soil or to their occupation were cut away, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century labor became mobile. By the application of steam power to transportation and manufacture, the ability of the laborer to change his residence or occupation was increased. But while this growth in freedom brought many rights to the individual, he incurred at the same time certain duties. While he had been freed from the payment of dues to a superior, he had lost all claim to his bounty. His social salvation lay in his own hands.

With this increase in the responsibility of the individual has come an enlargement in the field for ambition. The great prizes in life are open to all, but for their attainment great sacrifice is required. Present enjoyment must be deferred and every energy strained to gain the final goal. Every handicap must be thrown aside in order to reach the next round of the social ladder. The

more ambitious the individual the greater the sacrifice demanded. To a considerable proportion of the population of the western world the presence of a large number of children in the household is considered one of the greatest barriers to social and economic advancement. Therefore, either by deferment of marriage or by restriction of fecundity, the size of the family must be kept within the limits granted by the courtesy of ambition.

In a new country, where agriculture is profitable and land plentiful, the action of this motive is for a time obscured. For the clearing of forests and the planting and harvesting of crops, where hired labor is obtained with difficulty, a numerous family is an economic utility. When the land under cultivation is found insufficient to utilize the laboring force of the growing community, or the sons wish to establish households of their own, they can take and clear adjoining land and gain a position as good as that of their father. Such a population is usually virile, fecund, and prosperous. As the country becomes populated, cities spring up to meet the demands of commerce and manufacture. Many who are not fitted for or attracted to agriculture find ample field for their ambition in urban life. The presence of this vast New World enabled Europe to preserve its customary high birth-rate without accompanying famine and pestilence. Millions of the surplus and more energetic population left for the new lands. At the same time the development of transportation enabled the Old World to obtain its food supplies from the immense stretches of fertile land over-sea, while utilizing much of its natural increase in the development of manufacture. One result of this system has been to render farming unprofitable in many sections of the Old World, and to increase the migration toward the cities, causing in places an actual depopulation of the rural districts. This is apparent even in the North Atlantic section of this country.

Such a complete change in the economic condition of Europe caused the world to doubt for the time the existence of the laws of Malthus. But they were still on Nature's statute-book, although there was little cause for their enforcement. While we were beginning to wonder why the old repressive measures had lost their force, we saw that man was taking the solution of the problem into his own hands. It seems unlikely that the more highly civilized nations of the western world will ever again allow famine to limit the numbers of the population.

But the members of the different social groups do not reproduce with equal rapidity. There seems to be grave danger that too great a proportion of the increase of the population shall come from the lower classes. The size of the family seems to vary inversely with the social ambition. When the individual is keenly alive to the opportunities for advancement, and anxious that the position of his children shall be at least equal to, if not better than, his own, the number of children will not be so great that it will be impossible for him to equip them properly for their life-work. But where a spirit of hopelessness and sullen resignation is widespread, there is but little thought given to the prospects of the next generation; for the children could not easily be worse off than the parents. The need or cupidity of the parents forces the children into the mines or factories at the earliest possible age, regardless of the effect upon the intelligence or health of the coming generation. As a consequence of this

short-sighted action on the part of the individual, society has been compelled to abandon its *laissez-faire* policy, and pass certain paternalistic measures. The result of the sanitary and factory legislation of the past half-century has doubtless tended to reduce the size of family among the lower classes. There will continue to be thousands who will breed blindly, regardless of the future of their children; but compulsory education and the opportunities which are offered at present for intellectual improvement should make the coming generation realize more fully the duties which they owe to themselves and their children.

The result will doubtless be to reduce the birth-rate still further. It may be that, since the burden of rearing a family has been increased by lengthening the period of compulsory education and extending the time which must elapse before a child may enter the factory, society will feel bound to assist those parents who find the burden too heavy. This would probably be the case if the increase of the population should be greatly retarded. It would, at any rate, demand that whatever children were born should receive proper care that they might reach maturity. In that country in Europe where the natural increase is the slowest the assistance to parents in the nourishment and care of their children is the greatest. Since society insures from want all children who have no means of support, it is but natural that it should place certain safeguards about parentage, and it is probable that additional legislation will be passed to prevent the marriage of defectives.

We have been told by Professor Ross that those countries with the teeming millions, where the population is at the limit of the food supply, will be irresistibly impelled to go forth and possess the uninhabited portions of the earth. This is doubtless true, and they are welcome to them. When the European states began their policy of colonization, the force of the preventive checks to the growth of population was little appreciated. It was felt that some outlet must be found for the surplus population, and it was thought that trade followed the flag. Already the masses of the people are beginning to groan under the burden of taxation caused by the expenditure upon these colonies and to question their utility. There is no assurance that the country which is the biggest is the greatest or the happiest.

But when we come to consider the possibility that the vast hordes may descend upon the civilized nations more happily situated than themselves, and wrest from them the favored locations they enjoy, this is a different matter. True, food for cannon is cheap. But cannons are not cheap. And a nation which is at the limit of its food supply, with the misery and burdens which this implies, is not in a good position to endure the tremendous expenditure which a modern campaign demands. In this struggle the nation which enjoys a safe margin from want possesses a decided advantage.

There are certainly dangers connected with a too great restriction of the birth-rate, but they are small compared with those of an excessive rate, and he who is not confident that an equilibrium will be somehow established, with less misery than the earlier dispensation demanded, underestimates the power of the genetic force.

MRS. ANNA GARLIN SPENCER

I find myself disagreeing with some of the contentions of Professor Ross in the paper which we are set to discuss, and I will call the mind of the audience back to what I understand is the most important conclusion of that paper in the author's mind. He tells us that he believes that intentional restriction is a movement at bottom salutary, and the undoubted evils in its train appear to be minor or transient or self-limiting or curable.

I feel it my duty to draw the attention of the audience to certain evils, not previously mentioned, which are connected with a low birth-rate, and also with a high infant mortality, which are curable, we must believe, but which have not as yet been attacked with any such force, directness, and effectiveness as are necessary for even their partial removal. I refer to certain pathological conditions in society which themselves affect both the birth-rate and the rate of infant mortality.

Dr. Prince A. Morrow, president of the American Society of Sanitary and Moral Prophylaxis, has recently published an epoch-making book, entitled *Social Diseases and Marriage*. In that book, for the first time, is registered, and registered by one for whom all must feel both reverence and the highest sense of gratitude, the beginning of a movement by the medical profession toward the curing, or at least the lessening, of one of the greatest of the evils which affect the birth-rate and the death-rate of children. I refer, of course, as the title of the book named would denote to the audience, to the ravages of diseases in society—diseases due specifically to social vice. Dr. Morrow's book sums up the evidence from those who should know—the only ones capable of learning—that, at least by estimate, one of the great producing causes for the low birth-rate among persons subject to the life of our large cities and what we call our highest civilization, and, again, one of the serious causes of infant mortality, not among those classes known canonically as the lower classes, but running all through the lower to the higher grades of life—one of the great producing causes of these evils is the element of disease due to sexual vice.

It seems to me that in any serious study of the birth-rate, and of the attendant subject inseparable from it, a high infant mortality, you must consider this cause as an evil and only as an evil. It is to be considered curable if we believe in the possibility of the human race advancing toward a higher stage, and it is now for the first time, as I have indicated, seriously entered in the list of things preventable—diseases which we are to make war against.

A recent important movement in Germany, reported in several of our American magazines and papers, shows a great inquiry being made by the German government as to the reasons for infant mortality—why one-fifth of the babies born in Germany die before the age of five. In the list of subjects to be considered—and the list is very long and exhaustive—there is an item "tuberculosis and infant mortality." That is an indication, and one indication of many, of the fact that we are now making war upon tuberculosis, the "great white plague," as an enemy of human life. We are asking: What has tuberculosis to say, in all this pathological testimony, to causes of low birth-rate and high infant mortality? There should certainly be put beside the great white plague the great black plague as a cause of degeneracy which shows itself, not only in



conditions of the adult population, not only in its last and worst state in the defective children who fill our asylums for the defective, and, worse yet, in those who are not put into asylums, but are left to produce children—not only this, but in its effect upon the birth- and death-rates, especially the death-rate of children.

Now, I submit to the members of this association that, before we feel quite comfortable in viewing the "salutary elements of restriction," we should attack with far more force, far more bravery, far more concentration of purpose, these pathological conditions which are evil and only evil, and evil continually, and which the physicians, who are the only scientific observers able to testify on the subject, declare to be the cause of from 30 to 50 per cent. of undesired sterility in married women. Also we should heed the fact that all these diseases are not solely, perhaps not chiefly, the diseases of the lower classes, certainly not the diseases alone of the degenerate classes, although they make for degeneracy. We should put beside these facts that other fact that all forms of venereal diseases are largely contracted in youth—70 per cent. at least, the physicians tell us, between the ages of twenty and twenty-five—often contracted in ignorance of the result, contracted largely because of the working-out of a double standard of morals, which subjects our boys to temptation and to conditions of life unfavorable for the development of character, while protecting our girls, as if the virtue of women alone could save the world. When we consider this, we must understand that there is sterility which shows itself above as well as below, in society; above, not in the sense of being limited to one class, but above in the sense of striking all classes. To lessen this evil we must establish not only the principle of eugenics, not only the scientific study of problems of marriage and birth-rate such as we have heard this afternoon; but this also we must secure, namely: the strict, forceful, and effective holding of all society to a single standard of morals and that standard the purity and self-control which lead to personal health and social well-being.

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The selective action of a birth-rate which is decreasing rapidly at the top is, of course, a most familiar subject. To that is added, in our country, the fact that the selection is not only a selection in favor of lower economic and social classes, but also very markedly a selection in favor of the foreign blood. Already in the United States the white population of native parentage is only just over half for the whole United States, counting equally and including the states which receive little emigration as well as the states which receive much. Now, within this body the native-born have fewer marriageable women; the marriageable women marry later; fewer of them marry at all; many of them are childless; those of them that have children have fewer children—not only have fewer children, but have fewer surviving children. The death-rate lessens the difference between the number of births, but it does not wipe it out. It still remains true that the native woman rears fewer children than the foreign-born. The figures of the new Massachusetts census, which are published only in part in the preliminary bulletin, are growing to be extremely foreign, and one interesting point is brought out in regard to the shorter child-bearing period of the native

women. This period is for the foreign-born women over eight years, and for the native women only five years. Respecting the influence which Mr. Ross has given the family factor, limited even when the number of children desired are present, one element is that the lower birth-rate may generalize itself, and there are reasons to expect this in homogeneous countries, like England where this has already taken place to a considerable degree, the rural counties and smaller places feeling the effect of this new change very markedly. In Germany it has not yet taken place. There the effect is maintained very nearly in the great centers; but there is no reason why it should not spread to the country and the poorer classes, because the population is essentially homogeneous. With us there is not only all that, the higher birth-rate among the lower social and economic classes, the reasons of which I will not discuss because we all have it in mind, but there is also a racial and religious stratification running with the economic and social. Of course, that is particularly true in a population like that of Massachusetts, where the population is so much diversified. Where the Germans and Scandinavians make the population the number of them is less.

But the principle which influences this more is very strong in the direction of the lower and higher birth-rate. I have had very interesting talks with some of my foreign friends. I asked one of them if they approved of large families. "Yes," he said; "why, our women despise the American women because they have such small families." And because they have that point of view they are going to have the large families.

I remember a brilliant and interesting book which came out, perhaps in 1892, in which the author brought forward a very fascinating theory that the city was always fed by an updrift of population from the country; that there was always a process by which the country fed the town. The country boys go to the city, they work to the top, and in the third generation they are the successful men; some went down; those that succeeded came up, and your great men, your successful men, the men at the top, are your country men who had succeeded. Then they burn themselves out and are constantly replaced; that typically this was what happened in our population. While there certainly is not proof of it, I do think it points to a certain current of actual change which probably has been going on to a greater or less degree in our civilization. I do not believe that this steady increase of selective reproduction unfavorable to the upper class is a perfectly new factor. What is new is the enormous intensification of it by the fact that there is brought into play the voluntary choice in the matter in the sense of degree. I do not agree with Professor Ross in believing that is the whole explanation.

I think there must be in everybody's acquaintance someone to suggest that there are a great many childless families involuntarily—a great many families of a few children where more children would be most heartily welcome. It is a well-known fact that when the habits of any animal are disturbed its fertility falls off, so that many animals do not continue to breed in captivity. It seems to be a parallel fact that all types of men are not fertile under civilization. Possibly men are not naturally, quite apart from any other interference, highly fertile under the most highly civilized conditions. What are you going to do about it? We have some extremely interesting suggestions in the discussion which

has recently been going on in the *London Times*, Sidney Webb starting it last March, which brought the whole question on the carpet again so vigorously. Sidney Webb, of course, lays great stress on the economic factor, and believes that society should take a share, and that we should quickly come to social endowment of motherhood. Now it seems to me obvious that, in the shape in which Mr. Webb proposes that, it would be really by no means an improvement, as far as the selective aspect of the matter goes. If you believe that the decrease of the birth-rate has gone so far that it is a serious matter as a total, then, of course, if you want simply to have more people, to have any kind of people, deprived people quite as well as any other class, measures like this, like feeding school children, are a good thing; but if you believe it is important to have not only more people, but most particularly to have more of the right kind of people, then any measure of encouragement should be most carefully selective in character.

The first meeting of the sociological society in England, as you are doubtless aware, was largely given up to the discussion of eugenics by Francis Galton. He discussed the matter in a most conservative and at the same time suggestive way. One of the newspaper correspondents, following on this general discussion, suggested that anybody who chose, nobody to be compelled, but any persons who voluntarily chose might present themselves at an office for examination and get a marking and get themselves rated on intelligence, and in proportion to this rating get a subsidy for children, each subsidy to be for each child, but the rate varying according to their rating. Obviously we are in Utopia when we discuss anything like that as an immediate policy. But it is a kind of thing that people are certainly going to have to take into account in the future.

It does seem to me that there is a certain turn of the tide already in the upper layer, measuring by social and moral refinement; that there is a good deal of force making for a greater desire for marriage, and happiness in marriage, and for larger families. It seems to me that there is a certain element of thinking, a certain tendency, perhaps, to think the profession, the life, of the married woman in some degree less intellectual or less tremendous in its possibilities than that of the unmarried woman at its best. This, it seems to me, comes through the fact that the modern woman of the highest type has quite definitely turned her force in the other direction; and her new utilization of health and love of it, not health as not being sick, but health as being a splendid living creature; her new interest in children, not only in the quite simple, inevitable way, but the tremendous interest in them that child-study points to, and the tremendous sense of their being the future citizens—all that means a new value and a readiness to sacrifice anything to it. It seems to me that there is a new sense in the community of approbation of and admiration for a happy father and mother and a big and happy family. All of this does not mean, by necessity, enormous families, of the Plymouth graveyard type, where I once noticed a stone which said: "Here lies So-and-so with twenty small children." It is obvious if, say, nine people out of ten married, that is, you had forty-five married couples in every hundred of the population, and say five of the forty-five had no children, and the others had each raised on an average five children, you would have double your population in a generation. And we have left a margin for the people who are not fitted for marriage, or who are not capable of marry-

ing, or who have had life-histories and do not care to marry; and the people who had one or two children could easily be balanced by the people who had six or seven children. It does not mean necessarily, to have a birth-rate which shall keep the margin growing, but should keep a margin which is necessary, not only to colonize the waste places of the earth, but to supply a certain contingent element, which, so far as we can see, until we get very much farther on in volition, we are going to need as an element pushing us all forward toward progress.

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RT. REV. HENRY C. POTTER, BISHOP OF NEW YORK

It is a misfortune, to me of pathetic proportions, that I am obliged to add these few words to this discussion without the best of all preparations for uttering them—I mean the privilege of having heard those who have preceded me; and I desire, therefore, first of all to express my keen regret for the blunder—the fault of it is no one's but my own—which has unexpectedly deprived me of the privilege of being here a listener. For no graver problem could be presented for discussion by a sociological society than that which concerns our “western civilization.” There was a time when that phrase had hardly any other than a playful signification. If there was a civilization that was western rather than eastern or southern, it was supposed to be that British civilization which has had its triumph and has won its wonderful victories by other forces—racial, civic, ethical—than those which are supposed to be peculiar to these shores; and it must be remembered that when, after the Revolutionary War, our ancestors undertook to construct, out of the original colonies, a republic, there were estimable and not unfriendly observers in older lands who were not slow to prophesy the speedy extinction here of *all* civilization. It did not happen. There were three great strains that mingled in the settlement of the parent colonies, and their influence cannot easily be exaggerated. One of these was Dutch, another was British, and another was French-Huguenot; and all of these stood for certain great ideas which, whatever may be the ultimate development of this republic, laid its foundations. And in each of these, in time, there was a clear and profound conviction as to the august office, authority, and origin of the family. I do not know that, if the founders of the republic could have seen so far forward as the modern doctrine of evolution, they would invariably have challenged it; for men of science then, who were very far from being agnostics, recognized—some of them, at any rate—the inexorable operation, ordinarily, of great natural laws. But behind the natural laws they saw a divine law and a divine Mind; and in the Bible they believed that they had an expression of that Mind at once authoritative and infallible. Well, they read in that Bible: “Children and the fruit of the womb, are an heritage from the Lord: Happy is the man who has a quiver full of them” (Psalm 127:3-5). And so a large family—fatherhood, and especially motherhood—came to be regarded as part of a sacred calling and the great households of children with which American tradition is familiar were a note of republican glory and virtue.

That those earlier ideas and ideals have widely ceased to prevail there can be no doubt; and that they had in them theories of obligation, or privilege, that were not wholly true there can, I think, be as little doubt. In the begetting and

rearing of children, as truly as of inferior creatures, there may be a valid place for the precept *Multum, non multa*; and the first question for the citizen is not so much, How many children are born in the republic? as the question, Under what conditions are they being born and reared, and what is the promise of their maturity to the well-being of the state?

And this brings me to the peril which, as you will doubtless have heard long before these words are read to you, menaces our land today. We are told, on the one hand, that the republic is being inundated with immigrants from all parts of the world, who are fertile, but not intelligent; material in their hungers, but ignoble in their aspirations; the product of conditions often cruel and brutal in other lands; and not likely to be unselfish or spiritually minded here. We are told that, multiplying like rabbits, they will soon outnumber the native stock, and that no more urgent sociological question can challenge our best intelligence than that which confronts us here.

I partly believe it; but I do not despair either of the republic or of the maintenance in it of the higher ideals of the family. It may be that we shall strive in vain to re-erect upon its throne that august sovereignty of the family which deified fatherhood, and which slaughtered women in the interest of bearing sixteen children! I am not prepared, at any rate, to say that some of those earlier theories of huge families were anything better than the selfish incarnation of unconsciously hypocritical ideas (for there is such a thing as "unconscious hypocrisy") disguising itself as religious duty. But, the moment that this is said, it must also be remembered that what somebody has aptly called "shirking the penalties of marriage" has begotten among us a group of nameless vices, of which prenatal infanticide is only one, and which deserve alike our indignant reprobation and our hostility.

And then, let us remember that, in order to secure worthy American children for the republic, we must have worthy parents. If it be true that there are swarming to these shores multitudes out of many lands, whose conception of life is little more than the merest animalism, we may not forget that these, of whatever race or blood they are, are our brothers and sisters, and that ours must be the sacred office of striving to lift them up. You and I believe that this is a land, not only of great ideals, but of the greatest. Let us show that we believe in them, by making them to live and burn in the breasts of all who touch these shores.

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MR. I. M. RUBINOW, WASHINGTON, D. C.

It is hardly necessary to say that in his able paper Professor Ross has touched upon one of the most important problems of society, and one of the most difficult to solve. The speaker is certainly to be congratulated upon the fearlessness with which he has attacked the problem, not hesitating to call a spade a spade.

On the other hand, one cannot help thinking that he may have exaggerated the extent of the opposition which his views will create; for, while the numerous classes he has mentioned in the end of his paper may have a great deal to say against his theories, the undisputed fact is that it is these very classes which, in this country at least, have made Neomalthusianism more than an abstract theory.

The facts quoted in the paper are undisputed; the decreasing birth-rate is admitted by all statisticians; nevertheless, it seems to me that in trying to prove his point Professor Ross has overestimated one cause and minimized all others. That the decreasing birth-rate is partly due to the exercise of the human will in marital relations cannot be denied, but is this the only explanation? Can it really be asserted that there is no marked weakening of the inclination to marry, if in this country the percentage of unmarried women between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four has increased within the short period of ten years (1890-1900) from 16 to 18 per cent.?

Another important fact is waved aside, and to my opinion unjustly, namely the effect of the postponement of marriage. That this factor, by reducing the limits of the child-bearing period, necessarily reduces the possible maximum of births, needs no demonstration. The family of twenty children can no more be met with. But it is also a well-known physiological fact that the chances of conception are very much smaller with women who remain unmarried until thirty, and that among them the proportion of sterile marriages is considerably higher. While it may be difficult to calculate the force of these factors exactly, there can be no doubt that they exist, and are becoming stronger, so that the birth-rate of civilized nations is limited by other factors than that which Professor Ross emphasizes.

Now, are these other factors sufficient to obtain the results necessary from the Malthusian point of view? I meet this with another question: Is it really necessary to obtain such results? Professor Ross accepts the Malthusian doctrine in its entirety; and that seems to be the weakest point in his argument. It is hardly possible to enter here into an extensive examination of that doctrine, nor is it necessary, after the interesting analysis given by Professor Fetter; but many of the statements made in the paper are somewhat startling.

I wonder how many students of history will agree with the generalization that most of the wars have been caused by overpopulation, or that poverty and class antagonism are due to an excessive birth-rate, and that these evils could be cured by reducing the birth-rate. Surely there is no dearth of class-antagonism in France, where the reduced birth-rate has become a grave national problem. The poverty of the Russian peasant can hardly be ascribed to overpopulation, especially in the Malthusian sense of insufficient food-supply, so long as Russia continues to export millions of bushels of grain to feed half of prosperous Europe. No matter what the advantages of Malthus' views as an abstract theory in mathematics, their invocation is peculiarly out of date after a fifty-years' period of falling prices of cereals, from which the agriculture of the world is just beginning to recover. And when one thinks of the barbarous condition of agriculture throughout the world, the danger seen by Malthus vanishes into the dim future concerning which speculation is as fruitless as it would be to worry about the possible exhaustion of the coal supply.

Thus the advantages of a reduced birth-rate from the economic point of view are problematic, to say the least. On the other hand the disadvantages and dangers have already assumed a very serious aspect. First there is the danger of depopulation. That a falling of the birth-rate below the death-rate is undesirable, Professor Ross admits; but he meets the difficulty in a rather arbitrary

way. "The family to be standardized," he says, "is not the family of one to three, but the family of four to six children." This, however, begs the entire question. For it is not a theory, but a condition, which confronts us. And the condition is that where Neomalthusianism is actually practiced, the family hardly ever reaches four, and never six, children; that two children, or even one child, if not absolute sterility, becomes the ideal; and that the number of children in the Neomalthusian family can be measured only by the frequency of breaks in the family system. This is the condition that France has to deal with; and this is the condition that we in this country have to deal with—only in this country the enormous immigration and the admixture of races of more normal habits obscure the actual gravity of the situation.

No less lightly does Professor Ross meet the great danger of deterioration of the type. "Let the lower nations and the lower races also become adherents of Neomalthusianism," he says. How probable the conversion of the African or the Asiatic to this scientific practice may be, is a question not to be answered at once; but if the gradual introduction of these methods has so rapidly reacted upon the growth of population, what will be the results if the methods are to become universal?

Finally, a great, and perhaps the greatest, objection remains that which the physiologist and the physician would indicate. It is to be regretted that some prominent representative of the medical profession is not here to discuss this problem in the light of medical experience. But even the every-day family physician knows the evils of Neomalthusianism. They are not accidental, but inherent in the practice. No preventive device is secure and harmless to the man or the woman, or to both; and it may be said, as a general rule, that the poorer the family, the more injurious are the methods used. Thus Neomalthusian artifices are already filling the reception rooms of our gynecologists, of our alienists, and even the wards of hospitals for the insane. The layman will find a good picture of this aspect of the problem in Zola's great novel *Fécondité*; for, while the portrayal there is somewhat concentrated, it contains not a single incident that every family physician has not met in his practice.

The desire to prevent conception has become dominant among women of the great middle class of this country, and in my own medical experience, which lasted only four years, I met hardly a single middle-class family in which this was not general, often before the first child was born, and invariably practiced after the coming of the first-born. Moreover, the growing desire to escape the natural consequences of normal marital life has created a new mental disease, the fear of conception, which makes a mental wreck of many a normal and healthy woman. Last but not least, since our form of marriage has not even begun to adjust itself to this almost universal fear of parenthood, unsatisfactory marriage relations at home lead by a narrow but hardly straight path to prostitution, and it is no secret to the specialist in venereal diseases that the social evil in this country is supported by married men no less than by the unmarried. All these are conditions to which the sociologist has no right to close his eyes, if he advocates the so-called self-control which reduces the birth-rate.

The sociologist must meet the situation squarely. The practice of limiting the number of children is bound to spread, for in modern society the causes of

this tendency are incurable. Children are an impediment, not only to the climber, to whom the first child is often a greater hindrance than the fourth, but to every man aiming for a higher standard of living. The disadvantage of parentage is still greater for woman, to whom it means danger to life, bodily injury, and a long life of toil and worry; and the problem is especially acute now for the middle-class woman, because in earlier days the hired service of other women helped her to shift most of the burden of motherhood upon other shoulders. For all these causes modern society knows no relief.

But in discussing as large a problem as this, one need not limit himself to the immediate future. Present tendencies are undoubtedly all toward a further reduction of the birth-rate, no matter what the harm to economic society, no matter what the harm to the race, no matter even what the dangers to the physical well-being of the individual. The remedies usually proposed are too weak to deserve serious discussion, except as an indication of the gravity of the dangers.

The constant danger of an excessively large family, to be avoided at the expense of one's health, on the one hand, and on the other a constantly growing number of sterile women—that is the situation today. And to appreciate the tragedy of woman's situation, it is necessary to bear in mind the important physiological fact that the sexual instinct is not only very much weaker in most women, but is altogether absent in a growing proportion of them. Thus woman is forced to resort to disgusting and harmful practices, not because *she* wants to enjoy sexual life without meeting the responsibilities of motherhood, but because her husband wants to enjoy sexual life, and she is forced to meet her contractual obligations, under the threat of losing her right to support. Surely our civilization cannot be called very feministic, if the husband still preserves the right to enforce the constant danger of child-bearing, harmful practices, and neurasthenia upon an unwilling wife who is often devoid of all sexual instinct.

The motherly instinct, however, is almost universal. But this instinct does not demand a very large number of children; and economic conditions, arbitrary regulations, and conventional morality force a great many women into a celibate or childless existence.

If a purely theoretical solution to this grave problem were desired one might say that, if sexual life were not enforced upon the unwilling woman, as it was in the days of savagery with a club, and in our days of western civilization by means of the marriage contract, there would be no need of the fear of overpopulation; and were the maternal instinct of all women satisfied with a limited number of children, there would be no danger of depopulation. These suggestions may sound shocking, but they are not new. For the right of motherhood *per se* has already been advocated by German feminists, and the onerous obligations of enforced wifedom are silently objected to by thousands of women.

This solution is, of course, worthless under modern social conditions, based upon the economic and sexual dependence of woman upon man. The modern family, under the disguise of a sanctified ideal of marital fidelity, as flippant Bernard Shaw has effectively expressed it, permits a husband to commit rape upon his wife. The scientific sociologist, however, need not be told that modern society and the modern family do not possess the virtue of absolute finality.



PROFESSOR C. W. A. VEDITZ, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Two points have been merely touched upon which occur to me as having a fundamental bearing upon the subjects discussed in Professor Ross's paper. The first of them is so plain as to require nothing more than statement.

When in any family the number of children is so great as to exceed the number which could be properly fed, properly clothed, and properly cared for, this excess of numbers is apt to mean, not merely the extinction of the surplus children, but the underfeeding and undertraining of all of them. If, for instance, the income of a given family is just sufficient to rear decently three children, and five are put into the world, the probable consequence is not the total neglect of the two extra children, but insufficient care for all five. Too large families, therefore, mean, to say the least, an economic waste greater than that involved in the ultimate extinction of the excessive members. Professor Ross, however, appears to suggest that the presence of a large number of children in a poor family entails a selective process which weeds out the physically and mentally unfit and results in the survival of the fittest. I do not think that this is the case either in the large families or in the small families, or that it is mainly in the richer families with few children that the weaker offspring are given the special care that insures their survival. For whether the family is large or small, whether it contains three children or ten, whether the parents are rich or poor, it is as likely in the one case as in the other that the physically and intellectually weak are not weeded out in infancy, but kept alive by dint of lavish care, which in the case of a family of ten children with poor parents necessarily involves a corresponding neglect of the naturally stronger and brighter children.

The second point of equally fundamental importance is the manifest conflict of interests between the individual family and the community at large. The community wants soldiers, it wants laborers, it wants numerical strength. In France systematic endeavors have long been made by both private and public organizations to prevent depopulation. But it has frequently been noted there that the very leaders of the movement for raising the birth-rate are among those who in their private lives pursue that policy of "intelligent egoism" which limits the family to one or two children. They want the population to be increased, but they prefer that their own families remain small and that their fellow-citizens "save the nation from extinction." This conflict of interests has been strikingly brought out in recent French literature by a score of novelists and playwrights, of whom the foremost is probably Henri Brieux, the author of *Maternité*. If it be in the interest of society to have a relatively higher birth-rate, I fail to note any fallacy in the argument that if society is to reap the advantages from large families, then society should at least bear a large part of the burden involved by large families.

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PROFESSOR WALTER F. WILLCOX, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Professor Ross's paper suggests the possibility of agreement among sociologists upon certain fundamental points involved in the problem of population. There is no time now to elaborate or discuss these points, which, it will be seen, lead us up to the question which the British Sociological Society has been con-

sidering the last two years, and which Francis Galton has done so much to bring within the range of serious discussion. These points, as I see them, are briefly as follows:

1. The increase of population among peoples of European stock during the last two centuries has been enormous and unprecedented.

2. This increase has not been due to any increase in the birth-rate, but rather to a decrease in the death-rate.

3. The decrease in the death-rate has been due to two main causes: first, an increased production of food, not only in Europe, but especially in other lands made tributary to European peoples; and, secondly, an increase in human control over diseases and causes of death not connected with the food supply.

4. While the second great cause of a decreased death-rate may continue to operate with undiminished vigor, the first seems likely to become less potent.

5. During the last half-century the birth-rate among peoples of European stock has tended to decrease, this tendency beginning to operate at different dates in different countries and in different classes of society, but being now well-nigh universal among the carriers of western civilization.

6. The primary cause of this decrease is that within the last half-century the western peoples have acquired for the first time the power to control the birth-rate and have exercised that power in accordance with their individual judgment.

7. In the decrease of the death-rate the interests of the individual striving to prolong both his own life and the lives of those dear to him, and the interests of society striving to reduce the sum-total of death in the community, have co-operated effectively toward a common end.

8. In the decrease of the birth-rate, on the other hand, there always may be, and doubtless often is, a conflict between the apparent or real interests of the individual or family and the real interests of society, the former often indicating a balance of individual or family advantage in favor of a small family, the latter always indicating that it is for the welfare of man, as of any other form of life, to continue the species, so far as possible and as a rule through the agency of its best individuals.

9. This conflict of interests makes it possible, if not probable, that the decrease of the birth-rate resulting from considerations solely or mainly of individual or family welfare may be more rapid, either in the entire community or in parts of it, than the welfare of the society as a whole or of humanity justifies.

10. Under present conditions it seems probable that a nation may increase mainly from its weaker lines of descent, or at least may not gain as it might and should from its best lines. This change may extend even to races, and the white race lose the numerical predominance it has so recently acquired.

11. This possibility or probability raises a question of great sociological importance, whether a readjustment both ethical and economic is not needed and imminent, whereby the present and future birth-rate of the entire community or of the classes of pre-eminent social worth may be controlled less exclusively by the interests of the individual or the family, and more by the general interests of society, or whereby society may gradually modify the interests of the former class into closer agreement with its own.

## POINTS OF AGREEMENT AMONG SOCIOLOGISTS

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PROFESSOR ALBION W. SMALL  
University of Chicago

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When the secretary asked me to read a paper at this meeting, my answer was that I would start an informal discussion, but that the one thing needful to make such conventions as this a success was the banishment of "papers" altogether. Then, like thousands before me, I followed the line of least resistance, and before I had stopped jotting down the points which I should like to expand, I had scheduled twenty propositions, with somewhat extended comments. They amount to a rather cogent piece of evidence that my creed was better than my practice.

If I had anticipated what occurred last evening, I should have added another ingredient to my prescription for a successful meeting—viz., the abolition of presidents who put into their inaugural addresses all that can be said by the subsequent speakers. Professor Ward last evening covered the ground so completely that what I have to offer is already out of date. The only criticism I could pass on his address, if I wanted to pick a quarrel with him, is the exact opposite of the most obvious fault with the remarks I shall make. I thought he claimed a little too much for sociology up to date, while I shall claim much less than the facts bear out. I shall not attempt to sum up all the points on which sociologists agree. I shall not venture at all into statements of social principles. The twenty propositions which I shall recite, with such comments as time permits, might indeed be compressed into the apparently trite observation that *the sociologists are fairly well agreed about their point of view*. Anyone who has looked below the surface of the history of science knows that when a group of scientists have gone so far they have potentially solved their major problems. Whatever else sociology is, we all see that it is important first of all simply as a point of view. We have taken possession of our standing-

ground, and we shall now proceed at our leisure to move the world.

1. *My first proposition is that for the purpose of this discussion we may confine ourselves to consideration of scope and method.*

Nobody is more thoroughly aware than I that for the spirit's daily food mighty little sunshine can be abstracted directly from the methodological cucumber. Methodology is merely the algebra of knowledge. On the other hand, knowledge cannot grow from scrap perceptions to coherent generalizations without valid mental method. As knowledge advances from the accretions of casual experience to the accumulations of planned research, incessant criticism of method is indispensable. When we are at the stage of deliberate investigation, the methodologist must run the lines of preliminary survey, and he must account for the inaccuracies and the discrepancies in first results. Progress in science depends on development of method not less than on multiplication of data. No one whose judgment has weight can lightly esteem any evident tendency among investigators toward consensus about delimitation of problems and competence of methods. The methodologist is not the sociologist *par excellence*, but the sociologists are far enough advanced to have recognized the necessity of constant vigilance in criticizing their own methodology.

2. *In the second place, "agreement," in this discussion, is a relative term.*

Fortunately we are not so contentedly agreed about anything that there is likely to be an arrest of progress among us in the near future from lack of sparks to keep our motors moving. What I refer to as "agreement" in a given case might perhaps be more accurately phrased as "inclination to emphasize," as contrasted with utter absence of settled usage one or two decades ago. If any of us, for example, employ biological metaphors for sociological relations, we all understand that they are metaphors, even if we have no precise common denominator for expressing the facts literally. Again, if we differ widely in our terminology, it is increasingly evident that these variations stand

for convergent efforts to formulate one and the same thing. The margin of difference between us represents in part our search for slightly different types of relations when we appear to be after the same things; in part our failure quite to make out the exact relations that we are running down; and in part mere conflicts of judgment about the systems of notation to be used in recording what has been ascertained.

3. *We agree to discriminate between the axis of sociology and the center of interest chosen by any individual sociologist.*

A dozen years ago the dispassionate observer would have had the general appearance of things rather uniformly on his side if he had said that each sociologist thinks the head of the table is where he sits, and that unadulterated sociological food is served only from his porringer. At peril of further snarling this tangle of tropes, I may say that the sociologists are today employed in many divisions of labor, but we are rapidly outgrowing the foible of considering our division either the sole measure of sociological value or the Greenwich meridian for all the rest. Our conception of the scope of sociological problems excludes the presumption that a single investigator, or a single group or type of investigators, can control all the conditions that enter into the problems. Our work will be abortive unless in spirit and in effect it is co-operative. Each of us is not only better able than a few years ago to see that his own contribution to the final result can be but a fragment at best, but each of us feels an intelligent respect for the importance of his neighbor's work. Sociology is no longer to our minds merely, or even principally, the particular phase of theory or practice which chiefly engages our individual attention. It is the correlated system of positive inquiry into human relations in which every variation of approach to real knowledge of social experience will ultimately find its place.

4. *We agree to differentiate sociology from antecedent psychology or cosmology or metaphysics.*

For purely conceptual purposes sociology is one thing—viz., the inclusive and co-ordinated system of knowledge referred to in the last sentence of 3; for practical working purposes it is

an assemblage of very different things. In the former aspect sociology is a much-to-be-desired organon of all the discoveries and all the indications about social relations which are presumably within the reach of all the actual and hereafter-to-be-differentiated sciences that relate to society. It is "the far-off divine event" at the terminus of the human pursuit of self-knowledge. With this primarily schematic organization of knowledge, into which the positive social sciences are slowly putting a content, the more general questions of methodology must be concerned. We need not here discuss any of them in detail.

Sociology as an actual investigation of concrete relations in society, on the other hand, is some sort of dealing with the phenomena of cause and effect in associations of two or more human persons. Now all the phenomena of association between persons are conditioned both by the qualities of the individuals associating, and by the underlying mundane and cosmic order which sets the stage for the human drama. It is almost axiomatic, therefore, that reflection upon the most familiar forms of societary relationships may at any moment press men of philosophic bent back toward antecedent problems of psychology, or cosmology, or metaphysics. It has not seldom happened that men have proposed sociological problems, or have started from some sociological preconception, but have ended by doing the bulk of their work upon problems which were not directly sociological in the second or narrower sense. They were pre- or sub- or super- or supra- or circum-sociological. Yet they have not unlikely urged their claim to be rated as pre-eminently sociological. In the former of the two senses they may have been. At a given moment a contribution to psychology, or to physical science, or to metaphysics may do more toward constructing the ultimate system of knowledge about society than any contemporary contribution by investigators of strictly social relations. The person who makes the former contribution, however, is no more a sociologist in the second sense than the stonemason who lays the foundation of a house is the wood-worker who helps to finish it. We are getting away from the supposed

necessity of appropriating to our particular occupation every title that carries credit. We realize that questions of rank and dignity are not at issue. We are distinguishing between types of work upon types or phases or sections of problems, and we are more willing to call them by their appropriate names. The more sociological we are in spirit, the more scrupulous we are to be sure, and to make others sure, that in practice we are aware when our operations are primarily within one division of research or another. We are thus becoming more amenable to the specific logical and methodological discipline requisite for the validity of our processes in our actual scope of investigation. This means much in the way of graduation out of amateurishness, not to say quackery, and advance toward responsible scientific procedure.

5. *We agree that the primary task of sociology is to discover and to formulate the laws of those processes in human association which differ, either in degree or in kind, from processes that occur in antecedent orders in the scale of evolution.*

So long as the Aristotelian static interpretation of the universe was the major premise in human thinking, we did not question that we were on the track of reality when, in trying to classify knowledge, we added another to the always futile attempts to mark off the boundaries of the sciences geometrically, like the squares of a chess-board. The majority of the small fraction of the human race who think at all are still fondly sure that one segment of the sphere of knowledge is the preordained preserve of geology, another of biology, another of history, and so on. The few people who are beginning to make out the meaning of the perception that all reality is the interplay of all the forces which multiply causes and effects in the universe, are rapidly discovering the foolishness of the time-honored attempts at schematic classifications of the sciences. We see that those attempts were like children's building of alphabet blocks into houses. The blocks are not real building materials, and the houses are not real houses. Except in so far as we are referring to mere collections of material, data, evidence, demarkation of sciences is not a problem of areas of substances, but of relations

of forces. The problems of every science are problems of the action of all the forces that are organized into the phenomena which present the problems. A given problem encountered by the chemist, for example, may prove to be equally a problem for the physicist, and the geologist, and the astronomer. That is, it is a question of what forces are at work, in what proportions each is employed, and in what manner they join in resultant action. So of the psychical sciences.

Accordingly, we have a perfectly intelligible index of the distinction between sociological and ante-sociological problems, not in a monopoly of a certain superficial area of material, but in reserve of distinctive types of problems. The questions for investigation which we group for convenience under such titles, for example, as physics, and chemistry, and physiology, and psychology, are not separated from the unanswered questions of sociology by the fact that the forces and the reactions considered by the former are absent from the situations studied by the latter. The difference is that each of the ante-sociological sciences attempts to generalize the actions of particular types of forces, each in its turn making whatever allowance is necessary for the conditioning action of the other types of forces. In the same way sociology, using the term now in the second of the two senses explained in 4, attempts to generalize the action of forces peculiar to human association, all the while carefully calculating the allowance which has to be made for the specific action of forces which it is the task of ante-sociological sciences to investigate.

For example, the problems of heredity belong primarily to biology, not to sociology. Before the biologist learns all about heredity, however, he will have checked up all the types of phenomena in the life-history of the different orders, from the humblest infusoria to Europe's proudest royal families. The biologist does not thereby become a sociologist, because his search is not for social phenomena as such, but for phenomena of heredity, in whatever orders of life they appear. On the other hand, the sociologist may be studying, for instance, the tendencies in the birth-rate of a selected civilized nation. A



primary problem is the extent to which the phenomena are physiological on the one hand, and psychical or moral on the other. The hereditary factors involved are elements in the sociological calculation just so far as they affect the birth-rate. Possibly it becomes necessary for the sociologist to undertake a study of the physical relation of the ancestors of the given population to the fecundity of the present generation. That would, of course, be a special problem in heredity. If scientific investigation went on according to a strictly logical plan, the sociologist would start upon such a problem only under conditions like those which would send the artillery corps of an army scurrying over the country after forage—viz., when the commissary department had failed to do its part. When the sociologist studies the relation of sexual abnormality in ancestors to the fertility of offspring, it is not because the problems of heredity fall within his proper scope, nor because he is interested in problems of heredity as such. It is because he is interested in heredity *in so far as it conditions social relations*, or at most in variations which are peculiar to human societies.

We may add an illustration showing the same distinction between problems of psychology and sociology. I will not try to tell just where psychological problems end and where sociological problems begin, because the chances are that I should fail. In the rough, however, psychology attempts to generalize the phenomena of consciousness—i. e., stimulation, attention, the formation of images, valuation, volition, etc. The primary problems of psychology refer to the relations of stimuli and modes of consciousness to each other, abstracted from all further significance of the external stimuli which may start the consciousness process, or of the subsequent effects of consciousness processes. Returning to the problem of the birth-rate, for example, the sociologist encounters phenomena of consciousness in the facts of human propagation, and perhaps he demonstrates that in a given case these are relatively more decisive of the birth-rate than hereditary factors. His concern with these consciousness factors, however, is not as variations of the phenomena of consciousness, but as factors of social influence. He may have to

analyze them beyond the point at which the psychologists have left them, or he may not. In the former case it is another analogy with the foraging expedition. It is merely incidental to the proper pursuit of the sociological interest—viz., the specific reactions in consciousness which are due to the presence and activity of our fellows. When he is clearly in his own specialty, instead of making requisitions upon researches that bear the psychologists' brand, the sociologist is after exact knowledge of combinations of which activities of consciousness are factors, but he deals with them distinctively in the forms in which they appear in the composite units, human persons. He inquires into the activities of persons in the direction of reciprocal influence upon each other, rather than in the direction of analysis of the subjective process through which those objective combinations are mediated. For instance, he asks how individuals influence and are influenced by customs, traditions, social standards, authorities, conventions, rivalries, alliances, etc. As a sociologist, he takes for granted the cycles of activity in consciousness through which these influences are exerted.

6. *If 5 does not seem to correspond with the activities of some sociologists, it is because we do not find the laws of antecedent phenomena worked out minutely enough to be taken over bodily into sociology from other sciences, and we plunge into preliminary work, instead of dealing with sociology proper.*

This proposition is merely a restatement of the situation illustrated in 5 by excursions of sociologists into biology and psychology. Relatively little has been done from the sociological point of view upon the specifically societal action of forces which emerge much lower down in the evolutionary order. The hiatus in part accounts for the amount of work labeled sociology which has been attempted by sociologists merely because they see that it is essential to sociological investigation, but that it has been overlooked by the people whose proper work includes the class of problems to which it belongs.

7. *We may acknowledge disagreement upon a fundamental conception and corresponding methods; viz., starting with some variation of the formula, "Sociology is the science of society,"*

*we differ on the question whether society has been produced chiefly by the same forces that have produced the flora and fauna of the earth, or chiefly by forces by virtue of which society is something essentially different from flora and fauna.*

Accordingly we tend to make our "science of society," on the one hand, a more generalized botany and zoölogy, or, on the other hand, a mere generalized psychology. We might express the one extreme by pressing into use a word in its technical economic sense, and saying that society is wholly a product of "land." We might represent the other extreme by asserting that society is wholly the product of mind. As I shall show more fully in a moment, this divergence is not properly a schism in our sociology, but rather a reflection of our inherited prejudices in cosmic philosophy and in methodology.

8. *We are agreed that it is hypercritical to raise questions of metaphysical dualism or monism in connection with the difference in 7.*

The prejudices which we inherit or imitate may once have had actually dualistic or monistic connotations in a sense which sociologists today feel themselves at perfect liberty to waive. Our concern is with forces which our present state of knowledge most conveniently groups as "physical" and "psychical." We are not bound to venture any ontological assumptions about the ultimate nature of those forces. So far as they demonstrate themselves in social reactions, they are qualitatively unlike enough to be treated as quite irreducible factors. In frankly accepting them accordingly, and in analyzing their operations so far as they appear above the line of our horizon, we are acting strictly in accordance with the proprieties of our division of labor. It is not our business to push analysis back into metaphysics.

9. *Even the difference in 7 is converging toward agreement.*

Recognizing both physical and mental factors in every stage of the evolution of human association, our sociological methods are tending toward fixity in one of three ground forms; viz., first, an attempt to reduce the phenomena of human association to terms of physical factors; second, abstraction of those types

of association in which the determining factors are psychic, and concentration of attention upon the contents and variations of associations as purely psychic situations; third, a calculus of the ratio of the physical and the psychical in the various types of association.

It requires no gift of second sight to foresee that these three methods must eventually become one. I take slight risks of wandering far beyond the confines of our agreements when I speak for a moment of their near future.

10. *Our mental limitations being what they are, frank recognition of these three tendencies, and open avowal of allegiance to one or other of them, is more and more probable and desirable.*

Very few men are likely to be equally capable of the highest efficiency in physical and psychical research. Most of us must choose between being experts in one and laymen in the other, or without our choice we shall rate as dabblers in both. Some men may be able to do very little first-hand investigation either of physical or of psychical elements, yet they may do good work in verifying estimates of the proportions of those elements in typical situations. Provided men of these types are working within hailing distance of one another, and are keeping tab on one another's performances, it is in the interest of the economy of effort that each type shall work upon its specific clue to the limit. Let the men who believe that language, and art, and science, and politics, and love, and religion, are merely the finished products of the same forces which have reached an equilibrium in the forms of matter that are apparent to our senses—let them work away upon their hypothesis, until all the evidence within reach is brought to the support of their theorem. Let the men who believe that mind rather than matter determines the phenomena peculiar to human society—let them also summon the evidence and display it for all it is worth. Let the men who are attorneys neither for physics nor for psychics continue to hold the balance between the opposing claims, and to find a place in the reckoning for each new factor, or power of a factor, which either of the other types has overlooked or underrated. Instead of causing schism among us, that definite grouping and

method will turn out to be in the interest of ultimate agreement. We shall not only live more comfortably together when we learn to bid godspeed to one another in following out these contrasted schemes, but we shall be in the way of accelerated motion toward concentration of these tentative conceptions into a unity.

11. *Speaking for the moment as an adherent of the second tendency, in contrast with the first, I would say that, so far as our type of sociologists has become self-conscious, we are agreed that nothing is social which is not psychical.*

Climate, topography, soil, have the same relation to human association that the temperature of a hall has to the rendering of a symphony. Temperature is not music; it does not cause music; it is not transmutable into music; it cannot express the essence of music. It is a condition in varying degrees favorable or unfavorable to the production of music. The psychological sociologists are virtually agreed that physics, in the widest sense of the term, has no more intimate connection with sociology than thermodynamics has with thoroughbass and counterpoint.

12. *Speaking still for the second, or sociological, type of method, I would further define our agreement about our particular problems by saying that they are all primarily inquiries into the reactions of associates upon each other.*

Indulging my own preference among psychological terms, I would resolve every sentient act into the three essential elements: attention, valuation, and volition. Given a hypothetical non-socius, with foothold on the earth, but with no contacts with other individuals of his kind, sentient action on the part of such solitary individual is conceivable under stimulus of physical need. Attention, valuation, and volition might co-operate in a rudimentary way in the process of adjusting conduct to the physical conditions, in utter absence of spiritual environment. Whether such hypothesis has any uses in psychology, it is obviously *obiter dictum* for sociology. In our division of labor the individual, whether real or hypothetical, is supposed to be taken for granted, and our special type of work is with individuals involved in the processes of action and reaction upon one another.

In particular the primary sociological question may be resolved

into these details: What are the variations, and the laws of variation, of the reactions exerted upon associates by their discordant and concerted attention, their discordant and concerted valuations, and their discordant and concerted volitions? These are the stuff out of which all social phenomena are composed. We are agreed that social situations are permutations of the ways in which given collections of associates attend to the same things, or different things, value the same things or different things, and will the same things or different things. We are agreed that social processes are variations of the ways in which the attention, valuation, and volition of members of groups are modified in direction and in kind by the direction and kind of attention, valuation, and volition exercised by other members of the group.

13. *We are agreed that sociology itself is a sentient act, with each of the factors of sentiency raised to the nth power.*

Speaking literally, the scope of sociology includes divisions analogous with the cardinal phases of a sentient act in the consciousness of an individual; i.e., sociological consciousness is in part knowing what is or has been in typical human associations; it is concurrently evaluating what is or has been with reference to what we know about the evolving interests of persons; it is all in all willing so as to realize the things ascertained to be worth while.

We are consequently agreed in hoping that modern activity psychology may magnify its office by clarifying our perception that this tripartite composition is involved in complete science, just as it is involved in the simplest complete sentient act. As the individual act is either a resultant of knowing, feeling, and willing, or it is neither knowing, feeling, nor willing—that is, it is not a proper sentient act at all; so professed knowledge or norm or choice is an empty algebraic form of mental gesture unless it is validated by functioning at one and the same time as knowing and valuing and willing.

This does not signify that in our formal organizations of sociology we must develop arbitrarily bounded divisions of sociological knowledge (science?), sociological valuations (ethics?), and sociological technique (constructive programmes). Whether

this shall occur or not is a detail, and it will be settled by experience. This essential perception is that real knowledge of human association is complete only when it expresses itself as a whole with these constituent phases. The closer the sociologists keep to reality, the more certainly will sociology develop as an activity of the three dimensions—cognitive, ethical, and constructive.

14. *The attempt, under propositions 11, 12, and 13, to speak solely for the psychological method illustrates the impossibility of keeping within the limits of reality if we assume a realm in which psychical influences are insulated from physical factors.*

At best, or worst, our efforts to claim everything for psychics concede something to physics. To that extent they advertise our gravitation toward agreement upon the third, which we may call the synthetic method. This proposition harks back to the view indicated in 4.

15. *We are agreed that the structural or static phase of social occurrences is a sort of mirage.*

That is, our mental limitations force us to take refuge in provisional static representations of social occurrences, but the reality which we partially apprehend under these static forms is a tension of forces constantly rearranging the relations of the associates who compose the situation. The relatively permanent elements in association are not the structural phases but the dynamic factors. Analysis of societary forms is therefore a relatively superficial phase of sociology: analysis of societary forces is the ultimate process of pure sociology.

16. *We are agreed that it is no longer profitable to discuss the question whether this, that, or the other is "sociology."*

The profitable methodological question deals not with definition, nor with form, but with effect. Is a given inquiry of any use toward enlarging and informing our social consciousness? If it is, it is bound to find its place in the sociological encyclopaedia in proportion to the kind and degree of its service in correcting or co-ordinating our social knowing, and valuing, and willing.

17. *We are agreed that it is no longer profitable to attempt*

*to assign divisions of labor in sociology by a priori distribution of functions.*

Most of the work that we shall do for a long time to come is likely to be in effect qualitative rather than quantitative. We shall be getting problems into shape for our successors to work on. We shall be discovering how one sort of problem depends upon another. We shall be working out an algebra of the social forces, and meanwhile learning a little about relations of less and more in concrete social cause and effect. Meanwhile, we are likely to look with decreasing favor on analogues of the trade-union policy of forbidding a spare carpenter to help unload material, because that is the teamster's job, or a spare plumber to lend a hand in lifting a step-ladder, because that is the plasterer's job. If our inquiry, for example, starts with social technology, and takes us back and forth from social description and interpretation to the application that we are trying to invent, there will be fewer sociological walking delegates to bar our way. On the other hand, we are entering on a period in which sane science is likely to be promoted best by men who will incidentally point the ways in which valid knowledge and feeling and willing about social relations are dependent upon one another. That is, to repeat the conclusion of 13, we are agreed that social science, of whatever name, is abortive as knowledge, unless it is making toward the common goal of apprehending the meaning of human experience for our threefold activity of cognition, valuation, and volition.

18. *We are agreed that, whatever our particular part in the process of accumulating social knowledge, our perception of the oneness of social knowledge, and of the futility of all pseudo-science which is unaware of this oneness, delegates to us a distinctive office among students of societary phenomena.*

Irrespective of our special divisions of labor, we are united in the purpose of showing that all divisions of labor in the social sciences are intelligent in the degree in which they are conscious of their subordination to the inclusive labor of discovering the whole meaning of human experience. We are essentially prophets of scientific synthesis, however special may be the province



in which we are carrying on our particular sort of analysis, or however concrete may be our attempts to apply sociological knowledge to practice.

19. *We are agreed that our distinctive center of attention and our principle of synthesis is personality.*

This proposition marks the strategic point in our campaign for recognition of the sociological point of view. We have made far too little of the difference in this respect between the outlook of the sociologists and that of men who approach societal relations from other points of departure.

Our attempt is to promote knowledge of human experience in terms of the make-up of the persons who enact the experience. We are trying to interpret what was, and is, and is to be in human association, both as phases and functions of the simple forms of personality in the individual units and as phases and functions of the composite personality in associations.

Whether we are aware of it or not, this is a radical differentiating principle between the essentially sociological and the non-sociological. The whole difference between atomism and co-ordination depends on whether we assume evolving individual and associated persons as our center of interpretation, or take selected institutions or products of persons as the center. In the former case, every occurrence finds its meaning, whether as cause or as effect, only as it is referred to its functional place in the process of evolving types of individuals and of associations. In the latter case, each institution, domestic, ceremonial, political, ecclesiastical, professional, industrial (to adopt Spencer's familiar rubrics for convenience), is by the method of procedure promoted in turn to the rank of center of attention. This rank is conferred not by the abject necessity of a serial order in the exercise of attention. It is conferred by mobilizing a principle of dissociation of ideas, instead of transferring attention from one class of objects to another while anchored to a common center of correlation.

When, for example, we project a "science of wealth" or a "science of government," we take a step in the direction of scientific anarchy. If followed up by as many steps in the same

direction as have been the rule rather than the exception, the procedure becomes, not only in principle, but in effect, scientific anarchy. That is, it does not merely propose to isolate a function or a product of human activities from the whole scheme of activities *for temporary examination as an incident of those activities*. It rather selects that particular function or product—say government, or wealth—and arbitrarily imputes to it, for “scientific” purposes, the character and value of *an end unto itself*. The essential question of such a presumptive science thereupon becomes: “What is the meaning and value of anything and everything, persons included, as determined by their relations to the status or development of this posited end, government, wealth, religion, morality, etc., etc.?”

Even if a “science” so abstracted is understood at the beginning to be centered at last not in itself, but in a containing scheme of things, as the science of wealth evidently was in Adam Smith’s mind for instance, it nevertheless accepts an almost impossible handicap at the outset. It starts off with the working assumption that the actual scheme of things may with impunity be treated as though it were what it is not—viz., a disjunction of an indefinite number of ends unto themselves. The longer that lead is followed, the more certainly will it tend to splinter knowledge into a litter of unintelligible fragments.

This is precisely the condition in the social sciences which it is the central function of the sociologists to correct. The question, “What is the meaning and value of anything and everything for any abstractable phase or product of life whatsoever?” is never scientifically legitimate, except in so far as it is held instantly subordinate and answerable to the one central question, “What is the meaning and value of anything and everything as determined by its relations to the evolution of persons?” Personality is the final normative principle within the range of our knowledge. Any science is falsely so called in the degree in which it feels licensed to suspend that norm of correlation, and to act as though there were alternative principles of interpretation.

20. *We are agreed that, whatever degree of emphasis the*

*inadequacy of our knowledge requires us to put on the cognitive or the evaluating phases of the sociological process, these phases must always rank in the last analysis as provisional and tributary, while we must regard the volitional, constructive phase as ultimate.*

From one point of view the tasks of life may be divided into four groups: We have, first, to make the earth yield its increase in the largest abundance, or, more generally expressed, to get control of physical material and forces. We have, second, to remake and reapply these natural resources so that they will serve the largest number and widest range of human purposes. We have, third, to distribute the benefits of these natural and acquired resources in such a way that the permanent interests of society will be most equitably conserved. We have, fourth, to apply these distributed resources in such a way that they will do most toward realizing the spiritual possibilities of human beings and toward developing higher types of human association. As we have come to the conclusion that the dynamic phases of life are the final terms for our intelligence, it follows that we must regard all phases of ability or knowledge as relatively tentative until they have yielded their meaning for this fourth and final division of human interest.

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## DISCUSSION

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The sociologists ought to be under obligation to Professor Small for what he has done in his *General Sociology* in analyzing the work of sociologists to find what is held in common by them. Whether we agree with him or not that there is a large body of truths held in common by sociologists, his method and work are the most hopeful promise that sociologists may soon come to a realization of their agreements rather than their differences.

Sociology cannot be said to have made much progress so long as the writers of general treatises on the subject feel compelled to fill a fair portion of their works with the discussion of such topics as definitions of sociology, method of sociology, scope of sociology, purpose of sociology, social laws and units of investigation, to say nothing of the fruitless attempt to solve the riddle: "Is sociology a science?" The appearance of these topics in the foreground is the surest evidence of the unsettled state of sociological investigation. Until writers on the subject can make certain assumptions as to point of view of sociologists and the general nature of social phenomena, and proceed without a preliminary

digression to an analysis and discussion of the data, sociology will not make much headway. On this account, treatises like the one referred to and discussions like the present are of paramount importance.

The principles laid down by Professor Small in the paper are so numerous that it will be impossible to discuss at length many of them.

The differences between sociologists are frequently due to differences in centers of interest, as Professor Small intimates. The bias of the individual investigator, whether biological, psychological, or economic, is responsible for the chief differences in view and in method. As sociology is a new science, most of the contributors to it have come from some other department of learning. If the investigator is a biologist, he is somewhat inclined to apply to sociology the laws deduced "from processes that occur in antecedent orders in the scale of evolution." If the writer is a psychologist, he is apt to emphasize psychical phenomena as the cause of group-relationships. If the investigator is an economist, he is quite likely to find in the physical environment, in "land," to use Professor Small's terminology, the chief causes of social organization and progress. The scientific bias in approaching the subject, which it seems almost impossible to avoid, is chiefly responsible for the failure to agree on fundamentals.

I agree fully with the writer of the paper in what he says of the need for properly appraising the physical and psychical causes in social study. I cannot agree with him, however, in his contention that the interests of science will be best served, and that "the two groups will live together more harmoniously," if those representing each of the contrasted views would work out their theories of social forces and causes to the exclusion of the views held by those in the opposing camp. This is what sociologists have been doing, and this is why there is lack of harmony between them.

No matter what his preferences are, the sociologist should admit the existence of the two forces and attempt to assign to each its proper rôle as a social cause. Professor Small himself, then speaking avowedly as an adherent of the psychical causes, says that "climate, topography, soil, have the same relation to human association that the temperature of a hall has to the rendering of a symphony." It seems to me that this conclusion is one of the best evidences of the short-comings of a method which follows out one class of causes exclusively to its own logical consequences; and, moreover, this point of view does not contribute very much to the harmony of the two groups, which is assumed to be desirable. Climate, topography, and soil have very much to do, fundamentally, with human association. If we will take an extreme situation, such as the life of the Kentucky mountaineer, it must be admitted, I think, that the three forces named are very largely the determining factors in the association, life, and character of these people. This is said without wishing to be open to the charge of assigning too much importance to the physical as against the psychical causes in human association. Admitting the rôle of the two classes of causes in determining social phenomena, the attempt to interpret those phenomena by one class of causes will lead to conclusions which are unsound.

"Analysis of societary forms is, therefore, a relatively superficial phase of sociology. Analysis of societary forces is the ultimate process of pure sociology." The acceptance of these conclusions, stated in the paper, means much

for the advancement of sociology. A description of social structure is valuable, but it is not the ultimate thing in sociology. But what is to be our method? How are we going to appreciate societary forces and get at the ultimate causes?

I agree with the writer of the paper "that our distinctive center of attention is personality;" that "our attempt is to promote knowledge of human experience in terms of the make-up of the persons who enact the experience." We have been interpreting and reasoning too much in sociology at long range. We have been applying principles and laws deduced from other fields to human association without verifying them. We have neglected to study the associating person, to learn about his impulses, his wants, and the forces that control him. If sociology is to be put on a plane with other sciences, we must find its phenomena in human association, and we must study these phenomena at first hand. The student of sociology should have training in biology, psychology, economic geography, and history, in order that his view-point may be broadened for social interpretation. In the university with which I am connected our students are urged to take courses in biology, psychology, economic geography, and history, and we recommend especially that they do work in settlements, and, if possible, reside in a settlement. Work in a settlement, or in any capacity which brings the student intimately in contact with the life of people outside of his own group, is the most valuable training for the sociologist. It must be admitted that most of us who are now teaching sociology have been inadequately trained for our work. Hope for agreement lies with the sociologists of the future. When our students appear who have the capacity to know and understand people, who are trained to be sociologists, we shall have some promise of agreement among sociologists.

Professor Ross has said somewhere that what sociology needs is body and content, and that we should go to history and ethnology for material. I am in full agreement with him on this point, but unfortunately, history has not been written in such a way as to be of much value to the sociologist. The neglected factors of history are needed most by the sociologist. For some time the sociologist will need to do a great deal of descriptive work. We should have a social history of the various commonwealths written by men trained in sociology.

Until work of this kind is done, and until more detailed work is done in studying social groups of various kinds, the sociologist is not likely to make much headway. When this work is done, sociologists will have much less reason to quarrel with each other because of a lack of real subject-matter; they will be in a better position then to explain the laws of human association and to interpret social progress.

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The excellent paper of Dr. Small's, with its statement of numerous points of probable agreement among sociologists, shows one resemblance at least between sociology and theology. Writers in either branch, when they emphasize their differences, seem very far apart, but are in close harmony when agreements are emphasized. This is especially true when by "agreement" is meant "inclination to emphasize." Probably most who have followed the development of

sociological thought in recent years would go almost to the full length with Dr. Small in his statement of agreements.

We have passed through the biological stage and now have grave doubts in regard to organic analogies. We are all members of the psychological school of sociology, but place greater or less emphasis on physical or economic factors as conditioning the development and activity of mental factors. There is perhaps a proper distinction between the static and the dynamic in sociology worth emphasizing; yet, after all, the dynamic processes and societary forces are increasingly attracting attention. Dr. Small rightly emphasized the unity of all social knowledge. The special social sciences are too often treated as discrete studies, and their unity is neglected. I for one am in hearty sympathy with the speaker in his assertion that ultimately the volitional constructive phase of sociology will prove worthy of the fundamental emphasis. The constructive aspect of sociology is appealing to human minds like a new gospel. After all, whether we dream, with the utopians, of a coming perfection, or, with Spencer, grind it out slowly at the mills of the gods, we look forward to the time when human personality, developed through wisdom, forethought, and volitional energy, may expedite the natural processes of evolution, and bring about a social organization dominated by ideas of justice and fraternity.

Brown University has now had a sociological department for sixteen years. About three thousand different students have taken one or more courses during that time. At first we taught concrete studies, such as charity and crime, and then took up principles and theory. For the past ten years we have reversed this process, and are well satisfied with the results. Every year we put about 175 sophomores through a course in the principles of sociology; after that they may elect concrete studies. We do not desire to turn out "social reformers" so much, as men familiar with the broader principles of social development. Fix the principle in the mind, and the application of it will follow.

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Of all the features in Professor Small's paper which are provocative of thought I select for discussion that which he mentions, not as a "point of concurrence," but of divergence, among sociologists; for it presents a problem. I refer to the question he raises concerning the place in sociology of physical and psychic phenomena respectively.

It seems probable that a large part of the divergence and uncertainty concerning the scope of sociology has been due to a reluctance to treat the problems of human life and activity by strictly scientific methods. The splendid promise of sociology rests largely on the fact that we are at last getting ready to apply to the problems of human life methods of investigation like those which have long proved their fruitfulness in the explanation of physical phenomena. The *a priori*, philosophic method, by which it has been customary to treat the problems of man's life and conduct, consisted in pondering hard questions until there were evolved in the thinker's mind answers that harmonized with each other, with such information as he chanced to have, with his disposition and prejudices, and with the practical interests which he regarded. The scientific

method consists, not in closing the eyes to ponder, but in opening the eyes to look! And the first essential question in coming to agreement as to the scope of a science is: What is it out there at which we should all be looking?

When sociologists attempt to answer this question, their formulas differ exceedingly. But it may not be too much to say that, when they have made valued and accepted contributions to sociological knowledge, it is because they have been studying *prevalent modes of activity* that go on among men. These activities, I think, are the phenomena at which sociologists must look. Human activities include all the believing and desiring, the suffering and enjoying, the struggle and striving, which together make up the content of the life of men and of civilizations—a psychic world with its problems of the evolution and of the continuous conditioning of its phenomena. The descriptions of sociology must become analytic; not like a traveler's description of landscapes, but like a scientist's report of a collecting expedition, where each flower-clad hillside has been seen as an assemblage of identifiable varieties of plants, and each plant as one of a species. The complex activities of peoples and epochs are composed of numerous simple modes of activity, repeated by many individuals; no activity of one individual is *exactly* repeated by another, but the differences between individual activities of the same mode may be compared with the differences between individual plants of the same species. The life of a person considered as a whole is complex and unique, but the simple modes of activity are repeated in the lives of thousands within the group, and usually also of other thousands in other groups. The prevalent modes of activity weave and interweave, and together constitute the vast streaming of *the social process*.

Professor Small suggested a necessary step toward the agreement sought when he said that sociology has nothing to do with any metaphysical concepts that may be thought to underlie social phenomena. Sociology has to do only with phenomena and with relations among phenomena. Activities are psychic phenomena, and as truly phenomena as material things. The difference between physical and psychic phenomena that is of significance for sociology lies mainly in the way we know them—my own activity arises in my own consciousness, but I cannot be *conscious* of a hitching-post, I can only become *aware* of it, through intervention of the senses. Every activity included in the social process goes on in the consciousness of some individual. But the fragment of the whole process which goes on in the consciousness of any *one* individual is infinitesimal, so that the social process as a whole is as objective to any single observer, as mountains, rivers, seas, and prairies are; and becomes accessible to observation only as it is disclosed by the bodies and material works of men, which may be called the *socio-physical* phenomena. If all this be true, then the task of sociology is to identify, describe, and explain the prevalent modes of human activity, as they are disclosed by the socio-physical phenomena.

In order to secure agreement as to the scope of a science, it is first necessary to agree as to what phenomena the science is to describe and explain, but it is no less necessary to agree as to what is meant by explanation.

I share in the high hopes that have been expressed concerning the prospective usefulness of sociology, but it seems to me that the service of a science

must consist in the intellectual comprehension which it affords. It is only by explaining how things are caused that we acquire ability to cause anything desirable; by such enlightenment we are enabled to discern the courses of action that lead to good and those that lead to evil, and are supplied with motives to pursue the one and shun the other.

I wish to protest against the idea that we can explain social phenomena by referring them to various "social forces." The habit, almost universal among sociologists, of referring frequently to "social forces" I believe is a bad one that ought to be broken. The phrase is often equivalent to "motives;" but referring activity to a motive does not constitute a sociological explanation; whether by that word is meant an idea, a desire, or a compound of both, a prevalent motive is itself a social phenomenon to be explained. When it does not mean motive, the phrase "social force" may refer to a class of social activities or a form of conditioning relations, as in the expressions "force of custom" and "force of imitation;" or to congenital properties of human nature. The temptation to use it lies in its metaphysical quality of drugging the mind's hunger for explanation with a false satisfaction by yielding the complaisance of understanding without the labor of obstinate analysis. Sociology, I believe, has nothing to do with any "social force" any more than biology has to do with a "vital force."

Explanation of the phenomenon  $x$  (in the case of sociology a prevalent mode of activity) consists in showing the phenomenon  $x$  in its relations to the conditioning phenomena  $a, b, c$ , etc., in the presence of which  $x$  emerges, by the increase of which  $x$  increases, and by the diminution of which  $x$  diminishes. Of course, this expression is schematic, as for brevity it must be here; there are counteracting as well as promoting conditions, and other changes in phenomena than changes in mere prevalence; and *types of change* in human activities are susceptible of similar explanation, and their explanation is implied in the explanation of prevalent modes of activity. It is only prevalent (or recurrent) phenomena the explanation of which can be stated in the form of a law; and a scientific law is—is it not?—*a statement of the regular relation between recurrent phenomena and the conditions in the presence of which they emerge*. Sociological explanation can relate prevalent modes of activity to the conditions by virtue of which they become prevalent at one place and time and not at another, with the increase of which, in passing to another place or time, they increase in prevalence, and with the diminution of which they diminish in prevalence.

In order to agree as to the scope of a science, it is necessary to specify what the science is to describe and explain, and what is meant by explanation; and also—if there is to be a science at all—it is necessary to agree that the phenomena to be studied are capable of explanation—that is, that they are caused. The prevalence at any given time or place of any given activity—good, bad, or indifferent—is as truly caused as any other natural phenomenon; that is, it is conditioned by other related phenomena. We may never be able to predict which individual will become a drunkard, but we can tell that with variation in certain conditions of climate, diet, domicile, employment, social approvals and



beliefs, the prevalence of drunkenness will vary. We may not be able to predict which *individuals* will act in a certain way, any more than the actuary can predict which man out of a thousand will die within five years, though he does know that the average death-rate for five years will fall within certain limits; or any more than the student of physiology and hygiene can predict which individual in a neighborhood will die of typhoid fever, although he does know that the prevalence of typhoid fever in that neighborhood is due to certain conditions, and that the abatement of such conditions would diminish its prevalence or stamp it out entirely. The importance, both practical and scientific, of similar knowledge with reference to social phenomena is not to be disparaged.

In accounting for the prevalence of different modes of social activity, physical and psychic conditions are *alike* to be considered. Indeed, one who seeks for the explanation of social phenomena must be on the watch for conditioning phenomena of four classes: first, climate, natural resources, etc.—in a word, *geographic* conditions; second, domiciles, railroads, other accumulations of capital, in general, the material products of man's work—in one word, *technic* conditions; third, physical health and strength, temperaments and capacities, whatever can be passed on by biological heredity, including predispositions of nerve and brain for thought and action, sometimes referred to as the "social force," but all of which together may better be named *biologic* conditions, hereditary and acquired; fourth, the other activities in the presence of which the activity to be explained goes on—that is, the *psychic* conditions.

Would not an adequate basis for a working agreement among sociologists be afforded by concurrence as to these three points? First, the phenomena studied by sociology are explicable; that is, a sociological phenomenon—as really as any—is conditioned by other phenomena; second, to enable us to see the sociological phenomena in their relations to the conditioning phenomena is to afford the explanation sought; and third, the phenomena to be identified, described, and explained are the prevalent modes of human activity, which make up the social process. As to the place in sociology of physical and psychic phenomena—the prevalent modes of activity included in the social process, all go on in the consciousness of man, that is, they are psychic phenomena; but they become accessible to observation as disclosed by the bodies and material works of men, which are the socio-physical phenomena; and in the explanation of the psychic phenomena thus disclosed it is necessary to regard alike conditioning phenomena which are physical and others which are psychic—namely the geographic, technic, physiologic, and psychic conditions.

## THE FINE ARTS AS A DYNAMIC FACTOR IN SOCIETY

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Before beginning my subject proper I must explain the term "dynamic" as used in my title. It is borrowed from Professor Ward's *Dynamic Sociology*, and is used in the same sense as it is used in physics, namely as denoting force, a propelling agent. The thesis of this paper is based upon the theory that the feelings, emotions, and passions of mankind constitute the propelling agent or dynamic element in society, corresponding to the physical forces in the lower realms of nature, and that they can be controlled and guided into beneficial channels by intelligent foresight, just as the physical forces (wind, water, fire, electricity, etc.) are being so controlled and guided by the inventions of men. My second point is that in the fine arts, including drama and fiction, this dynamic element finds its most perfect expression, and could, if thoroughly understood, be made use of by, and become a powerful aid to, the sociologist.

The paper was inspired by the belief that this is not generally recognized by the sociologists, but that they, on the contrary, consider the fine arts as entirely outside of their domain, as belonging to a side of human mind with which they, as sociologists, have nothing to do—viz., the aesthetic faculty, which derives pleasure from the contemplation of beauty and harmony, but has no part in the improvement of society, indeed turns away with impatience and pain from the disharmonies and stupidities of life to dwell in an ideal realm, where beauty and happiness reign. "There is nothing dynamical in the influence of the fine arts," says Mr. Ward in *Dynamic Sociology*.

Enjoyable in themselves, and therefore sources of happiness, their influence is confined to the immediate present, and is incapable of contributing any permanent aid to social progress. Their study belongs entirely to the department of social statics, and this brief notice is merely intended to fix their true position and exhibit their negative character.

In *Pure Sociology* he says :

It has been said that art is nonprogressive; that it serves no useful purpose in the world; that it does not raise the moral tone of society; that it adds no new truth to man's stock of knowledge; that it makes man no more comfortable, no better, no wiser. This might almost be true without constituting an argument against the cultivation of the aesthetic faculty. Love of the beautiful and its pursuits do not claim to constitute either an ontogenetic or a philogenetic force in society. They constitute a typical sociogenetic force. Art is a socializing agency. It is an agency of civilization as distinguished from preservation or perpetuation. It is not a necessity; shall we call it a luxury? It is much more. In a pain-economy it may be a luxury, but above that it becomes a utility. It finally becomes a spiritual necessity. As soon as the class of wants which may be distinguished as needs are satisfied, this spiritual want, which, as we have seen, is planted deep in the animal nature, at once asserts itself; and the satisfaction of a spiritual want is as important as that of a material want. It serves to swell the volume of life. Men have aesthetic interests as well as economic interests, and their claims are as legitimate.

While thus fully recognizing the fine arts as civilizing agencies, he yet considers their influence restricted to one class of wants, the aesthetic desires of mankind, and holds that they neither have nor desire to have any share in the improvement of society, except in so far as they add to the volume of life. As to the origin of the aesthetic faculty, it is to be found far back in animal and plant life, where it arose as an aid to the reproductive forces; pleasing forms, colors, sounds, and perfumes in plant and animal being produced in response to a desire to please and attract the other sex. *It originated as a means to a very important end—an end without the accomplishment of which the race or species would have perished.* But in the human race it gradually became an end in itself. The aesthetic faculty or appreciation of beauty having been firmly established, its satisfaction finally became the only end. "It actually creates desire in order to satisfy it," says Mr. Ward. Now, this attitude toward art fully explains the comparative indifference of the sociologist and of all who have to deal with social phenomena. If the aim and object of art is merely to please and gratify an aesthetic sense which has nothing to do with the problems and difficulties of life, then art lies outside the domain of the sociologist. But

is this true? Have the greatest artists of the world been satisfied merely to please and entertain men? It is true probably of the art of primitive peoples, and of a great and important branch of art today. We might call it the idealistic as compared with the realistic art. Not that I consider this a perfectly correct terminology; for the idealistic art should also be realistic or true to nature, and the realistic art is often far more idealistic than the other; yet it will do for our present purpose. This idealistic art, which indeed is an end in itself, is by many of the profession as well as the laity still regarded as the only proper and legitimate art, and its end, the desire for beauty and harmony, the only legitimate end, finding expression in the motto: "Art for art's sake." Some, indeed, claim that this is the highest and noblest aim art can have; namely, to soothe and delight the tired mind, to make man forget the worries and troubles of life, to create for him an ideal of harmony and happiness, and bring him nearer that heaven of fable which man has ever dreamt about, but has never reached, and which art alone can make him at least fancy for a moment to have entered. But what shall we say of that other art, generally called "realistic," which has had some of the, if not *the*, greatest geniuses of the world as its exponents? What shall we say of the art of Tolstoy, Ibsen, Hauptmann, Sudermann, Bernard Shaw, Zola, Flaubert? What of the paintings of Veretchagin, Sleevogt, Uhde; the sculptures of Meunier, Rodin, Sinding; or the music of Wagner, Berlioz, Grieg, or Glazounoff? I know that some critics maintain this to be no art at all, but vagaries of disturbed minds or the gloomy pessimism of unsuccessful men. But this is the shallowest of criticisms. The fact is that the greatest artists of all time have not merely wished to please; they have more often shocked us. Their object has been to be *true*, and by this very truth to arouse men; to awaken their intellect; to stir their emotions, to bring a sluggish and lethargic mankind to a realization of the wrongs, the injustice, the cruelty, and the indifference that reign in society.

Let us look at a country which, more than any other of the civilized countries of the world, is suffering immeasurable wrongs under the indifference, greed, cruelty, and stupidity of its so-

called upper classes, and let us see if its art can be called a luxury; if in it we do not rather hear all the passionate longing, the infinite horror, the dull pain and misery, on the one hand, and, on the other, the revolutionary frenzy, the imperious call for justice, the ever-renewed appeal to the intelligence of the people to right their wrongs. I speak of Russia. I wish I could have brought with me an orchestra to play for you the wildest compositions of Tschaikowski, Rachmanikoff, Glazounoff, and you would not think that music merely wants to please. In music all the emotions of a people—its longings, aspirations, passions, all the wants and desires that cannot or dare not find expression in words—are expressed; but also its joys, its triumphs, its happiness and delight. If, as Mr. Ward says, "we must admit the right of feeling, or, if you please, of passion, to rule the world," then this dynamic factor, these surging emotions, as yet inarticulate and with no intelligence to guide them, find expression in music, are, as it were, brought to the consciousness of people, are reinforced in the passionate strains of harmonic art.

Says Tolstoy:

What is music? What does music accomplish? And why does it accomplish what it does accomplish? One is told music elevates the soul. Nonsense. A lie, a villainous lie! Yes, it has an effect—I speak of myself; it has a mighty effect, but not a soul-elevating one. Its effect is neither elevating nor lowering. Its effect is directly upon the soul; in other words, it is a psychical exciter. How can I explain this more clearly? Music compels me to forget my true position. It exiles me from my proper one, forces me into a strange one; in fact, under the impression which music has upon me, I feel what I really do not feel. I understand what I really do not understand. I do what I really cannot do. The way I explain this to myself is as follows: Music is like yawning, and acts like yawning or laughter. I am not sleepy, but I yawn when I see others yawn. I have no reason to laugh, still I laugh when I hear others laugh. Music transports me into the psycho of the composer, and upon my mind is made the same impression as was created upon the author's. Our souls come together, and I allow him to carry me along from one tendency to another. Why I do that I do not know. He who writes music knows why he is in that particular aptitude. It can be attributed to certain actions; therefore the tendency has an importance for him, but not for me. Therefore music is not only exciting and stimulating, but it leads to conclusions. A military march, for example: the soldiers march to it, and the music leads to a conclusion. The dance, I dance:

the music leads to a conclusion. The mass at church—I speak of the holy sacrament—the music led to a conclusion.

This is exactly to the point. Music stirs the emotions, and the emotions must find vent in action; whether that action is for good or evil is a question. Nobody would claim, I suppose, that the flood of cheap music that is inundating America has an elevating influence on the people. Neither can music that cannot be understood. In interpreting music that stands for ideas, some explanation of these ideas should be given. Some attempt at least should be made at intelligent control, and the flood of emotions, aroused or set free, be prevented at least from running into dangerous channels.

But music is only one of the arts. Let us look at painting. Having taken Russia for illustration, we will take one of the most famous Russian painters, Veretchagin, whose pictures aroused a storm of protest, of indignation, of enthusiasm, of wildest feeling, all over Europe and even in America. He was accused of attacking religion, morality, patriotism—all the virtues upon which the welfare of a nation is supposed to rest.

A good deal has been written about my works [he says]; many were the reproaches brought against my paintings, those treating of religious subjects as well as those treating of military. It was a very well-known Prussian general who advised Emperor Alexander II to have all my military paintings burned as objects of a most pernicious kind. There were still more inimical commentaries on those of my pictures which treat of religious subjects. And yet they were all of them painted without any preconceived idea—were painted only because their subject interested me. The moral in each case appeared afterward, coming up of its own account, from the very *truthfulness of impressions*.

And this moral was an effective one. Never perhaps have the horrors of war been brought home to the people more convincingly than in his paintings. Says a London paper, the *Christian*, of December 2, 1887:

These paintings are the work of a Russian, Veretchagin—a painter equal to any of his contemporaries in artistic ability, and beyond any painter who ever lived in the grandeur of his moral aims and the application of his lessons to the consciences of all who take the least pains to understand him. He who misses seeing these paintings will miss the best opportunity he will

ever have of understanding the age in which he lives; for if ever the nineteenth century has had a prophet, it is the Russian painter Veretchagin.

But Veretchagin claims even more for his art than the mere arousing of people's conscience. He claims that it can help to solve the social problems, to save the people from destruction.

Suppose [he says] the day comes when the priests will entirely lose their hold upon the people, when the soldiers will turn their guns muzzle down—where will society look for bulwarks then? Is it possible that it has no more reliable defense? Certainly it has such a defense; and it is nothing else but talents and their representatives in science, literature, and art in all its ramifications. Art must and will defend society. Its influence on the minds, the hearts, and the actions of the people is enormous, unsurpassed, unrivaled. Art must and will defend society, with all the more care and earnestness because its devotees know that the “regulators” [by whom, I suppose, he means the socialists, whom he judges not quite fairly] are not disposed to give them the honorable, respectable position they occupy now—since, according to them, a good pair of boots is more useful than a good picture, a novel, a statue. Those people declare that talent is luxury, that talent is aristocratic, and that consequently talent has to be brought down from its pedestal to the common level—a principle to which we shall never submit.

We must admit that there is truth in these statements, and that, if we consider art as merely a gratification of the aesthetic sense, we cannot even blame the socialists for wishing to dethrone it, especially if we are still living in what has been called by sociologists a pain-economy—i. e., a condition of things where, for the majority of people, the pains and miseries of life outweigh its satisfactions. And such a country Russia no doubt still is. But, as I am trying to show, its art is not a luxury. Veretchagin's prediction has in a great measure come true. Art has done more perhaps than any other single influence to arouse the Russians from their torpor, to show them the depth of their misery; but also to reveal to them the cause of this condition of affairs, to awaken them to a sense of the necessity of action and of the great labors of reconstruction before them.

But it was mostly art in its highest manifestation, the drama. Says a writer for the *Cosmopolitan* for April of last year:

In no country are the favorites of the stage more acclaimed and more beloved than in Russia. The audiences of Paris, Berlin, or even Vienna

seem stolid and apathetic beside those of the chief Slavic cities. Though a large and concentrated student body is partially responsible for this condition, the rank and file of playgoers are singularly impressionable and enthusiastic. Ovations, such as among us take place only on the rarest occasions, are of frequent occurrence in the theaters of Russia. Hence it is natural that the social and political as well as the purely artistic influence of the theater should be particularly important throughout the empire. Though officialism and bureaucracy have for years been paramount in czarism, it is refreshing to realize that the stage in Russia is in the hands of no clique or caste. Managers, actors, and singers alike are recruited from every walk of life. A princess is the lessee and star of one of the leading theaters of St. Petersburg, and an ex-manufacturer and merchant of Moscow is Russia's foremost producer and stage director. Yet it must not be taken for granted that the personal vogue of an opera-singer, however great, or the enthusiastic scenes enacted in crowded concert-hall, are the most important achievements of the contemporary Russian stage. The real social significance of the theater in Russia is best exemplified and can best be studied in a series of remarkable plays produced, for the most part, during the past half-dozen years in Moscow, and performed with unprecedented success on every available stage in the empire. It is obvious to any student of Russian affairs that the drama is today relatively accomplishing what the novel did during the fifties and sixties. We have Gorky's own words to the effect that fiction has largely ceased to be a vital form, and it only remains to add that the play is proving its logical successor. Within the decade a new race of prophets has sprung up, *using the actor as their mouthpiece and the stage as their battleground*. While the pages of Turgenev, Dostoevski, and Tolstoy will always palpitate with pity, will always evoke a haunting, troubled beauty, their specific task has been fulfilled; the serfs have been freed, and though the reconstruction was not consummated, it was at least fearlessly outlined. Today it is no longer these issues, but the struggle for a constitution, the extension of suffrage, common humanity to the Jews, and the obliteration of autocracy, that have burned themselves into popular consciousness. About certain of these themes have been written, with more or less explicit intent, dramas depicting in relentless accents existing social conditions. Regarding, as we comfortably do, the theater as a place of diversion, as a convenient escape from business or from boredom, it is difficult for us to comprehend the vital influence on the Russian public of such productions as Chekow's *Sea Gull*, Gorky's *At the Bottom*, Naidyenow's *Vanyushin's Children*, or Chirikow's *Chosen People*. It should, however, be remembered that the average Russian takes art seriously. He preaches no such insipid cant as "art for art's sake." His best novels and his best plays are dedicated to a broader, deeper passion than the mere craving for aesthetic stimulus; and not until most of the country's wrongs are righted, or her bleeding wounds healed, will fiction or the drama settle down to a trivial dilettantism.



Such, then, seems to be the mission of art in a country where the people are struggling with titanic effort to bring about a better condition of things. And it seems almost as if such conditions were necessary to bring out the real sublimity and power of art. It seems as if, as soon as a nation has attained a certain prosperity and apparent content, its art declines. We hear Richard Wagner fifty years ago raise his voice in infinite scorn about the condition of art in Europe. He contrasts it with the art of the ancient Greeks.

With the Greeks [he says] the perfect work of art, the drama, was the abstract and epitome of all that was expressible in the Grecian nature. It was the nation itself—in intimate connection with its own history—that stood mirrored in its art work, that communed with itself, and, within the span of a few hours, feasted its eyes with its own noblest essence. All division of this enjoyment, all scattering of the forces concentrated on one point, all diversion of the elements into separate channels, must needs have been as hurtful to this unique and noble art work as the like-formed state itself. . . . Such a tragedy day was a feast of the god; for here the god spoke clearly and intelligibly forth, and the poet as his high-priest stood real and embodied in his art work, led the measures of the dance, raised the voices to a choir, and in ringing words proclaimed the utterances of godlike wisdom. . . . But what is art as it now fills the civilized world! Its true essence is industry, its ethical aim the gaining of gold, its aesthetic purpose the entertainment of those whose time hangs heavily on their hands. . . . Its pleasance it has set up in the theater, as did the art of Greece in its maturity. And, indeed, it has a claim upon the theater; for is it not the expression of our current views of present life? Our modern stage materializes the ruling spirit of our social life and publishes its daily record in a way that no other branch of art can hope to rival; for it prepares its feasts night in night out in almost every town of Europe. Thus, as the broad strewn art of drama, it denotes to all appearances the flower of our culture, just as the Grecian tragedy denoted the culminating point of the Grecian spirit; but ours is the efflorescence of corruption, of a hollow, soulless, and unnatural condition of human affairs and human relations.

This is sharp and bitter criticism, but I believe it was justified at the time Wagner wrote, and I almost think—I say it hesitatingly, but I feel it deeply—it is true to some extent of America today. Are not the conditions here somewhat as Wagner describes them? Are not almost all the theaters in the land in the hands of a corporation, a syndicate that openly avows that

the theater is a place of amusement, of entertainment, and not of education or elevation, and whose only aim is the gaining of profits?

There are even some of our most popular artists [Wagner goes on] who do not in the least conceal the fact that they have no other ambition than to satisfy this shallow audience. They are wise in their generation, for when the millionaire leaves a heavy dinner, the banker a fatiguing financial operation, the workingman a weary day of toil, and go to the theater, they ask for rest, distraction, and amusement, and are in no mood for renewed effort and fresh expenditure of force. This argument is so convincing that we can only reply by saying: It would be more decorous to employ for this purpose any other thing in the wide world, but not the body and soul of art. We shall then be told, however, that, if we do not employ art in this manner, it must perish from out our public life; i. e., that the artist will lose the means of living. On this side everything is lamentable, indeed, but candid, genuine, honest—civilized corruption and modern Christian dullness.

Does not this fit our case? The artist must live. Perhaps he would rather play noble, elevating plays, but the public does not want them. "What will you?" says the syndicate. "We have put great plays on the stage, we have employed the best artists, but they play to empty houses; the people do not want them, the American public is not educated up to the finest productions of artistic genius; they require cheap melodrama and sentimental trash." We have here, it seems, the same vicious circle that sociologists complain of in the social problems. Some say: "It is no use trying to change conditions, if human nature remains the same; it is human nature that must be changed before your proposed change in conditions will do any good." The others maintain that it is environment which makes character; that man, like the rest of nature, is the result of causes, and that, if you change the causes and conditions that make man, his character will change as a logical result. So between the two factions we do not make any progress. The same seems to be true of art. Unless we give to the people what they want, the artist cannot live; and unless he lives and prospers, he cannot create great works. I do not propose to solve the problem; I merely maintain that it is a problem for the sociologist to consider; that

there is a chance for sociologist and artist to co-operate; that the social and the artistic problems are one.

So long [says Wagner] as—with the prevailing character of public life, and the necessity it lays upon the theatrical director to deal with the public in the manner of a clever commercial speculator—we look upon a theatrical institution as a mere means for the circulation of money and the production of interest upon capital, it is only logical that we should hand over its direction—i. e., its exploitation—to those who are well skilled in such transactions; for a really artistic management, and just such a one as should fulfil the original purpose of the theater, would be but poorly fitted to carry out the modern aim. For this reason it must be clear to all that, if the theater is at all to answer to its natural lofty mission, it must be completely freed from the necessity of industrial speculation. Since already the service of the state, the military service, is no longer an industrial pursuit, let us begin with the enfranchisement of public art, for, as I have pointed out above, it is to it that we must assign an unspeakable lofty mission, an immeasurably weighty influence on our present social upheaval. More and better than a decrepit religion to which the spirit of public intercourse gives the lie direct; more effectually and impressively than an incapable statesmanship which has long since lost its compass, shall the ever-youthful art, renewing its freshness from its own well-springs and the noblest spirit of the time, give to the passionate stream of social tumult—now dashing against rugged precipices, now lost in shallow swamps—a fair and lofty goal, the goal of noble manhood. Is it your *real* object, *ye honorable* statesmen, confronted with a dreaded social overthrow, to graft upon this mighty change a strong and living pledge of future nobler customs? Then lend us all your strength to give back art unto itself and to its lofty mission.

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## DISCUSSION

GEORGE WILLIS COOKE, WAKEFIELD, MASS.

In ten minutes one must give conclusions and not reasons for those conclusions; therefore he must speak more or less dogmatically; and I shall for that reason confine myself to one or two phases of the subject which has been presented to us.

Art does not begin in sensual selection and in none of its forms whatever has it in that way been created. Art is the result of the plain instinct—of the demand for expression, because the whole nervous organization of man requires some safe utterance which shall be harmonious and symmetric. The aesthetic sense originated, undoubtedly, in the same direction from the same cause, not because of sensual selection. The art impulse is essentially a social impulse. All the great art of the world in the various art forms has been of the nature of social expression or social interpretation, or can be really understood only from the point of view of social interpretation. If you study the primitive clan,

you discover the people of that clan beginning with the dance. And in order that there shall be harmony of step, they associate the voice in song, repeating at first only syllables and gradually from that going forward to the expression of communal emotions. This enlarges into point and into music. And these are the primary arts—the arts especially of social creation: and if one starts from this point of view and follows art to the present time, he will find that in all phases of society, from the clan to the international social life of today, art has found its expression, not in individual genius, but in the social demand of the people whose life it manifests. And social changes have brought about changes in art creation. I think if one puts aside the established convictions in regard to art—what might be called the art prejudice—and looks at the subject openly and with broad mind, he will discover that all art in all forms has been essentially a social creation. It has grown out of those common emotions and convictions of a people which have demanded some form of expression that would appeal to the whole associative life of the people; and the result of such study, it seems to me, might lead one to believe—and in this I know that I entirely contradict the conventional prejudice in regard to art—that no form of art has ever been essentially the result of individual genius but of social demands for associative expressions; and what leads me—what justifies me in this conclusion—is that all forms of art which have become universal—every art creation that has appealed to the universal life of mankind, has underlying it some great social emotional conviction of a people that has grown up and shaped itself through succeeding generations until it has become the social possession and the social interpretation of a people. And then, after it has essentially established itself in a people's life, it is taken up by him whom we call Homer, or by Dante, or by Shakespeare, or by Goethe. Now I ask you to consider that every great world-wide art, without exception, has voiced not Dante, not Homer, not Shakespeare, not Goethe, but, growing by succeeding changes, change upon change of social conviction, of social interpretation, until it became a mythological conviction, a conception of life, the idealizing of life, the shaping of life into the form of the mother and the child, and then the artist with a brush or with a pen is able to voice what the people have come to believe, what essentially the people have created. That is the basis of all art that is world-wide in its results and its convictions, and I believe that no great art can ever possibly be created under any other forms than dogmas.

Now the reason why the Russian people have a great art as contrasted with the American people is not that they are in a revolutionary stage, but that they are still essentially in a second stage—in a communal stage—where there is a consciousness of the life of the people, and the artist voices that life of the people. Now in America we have no great art because we have a great commerce—because we have a great individualistic form; and the building-up of democracy throws down all possibility of art; not because democracy is essentially opposed to art, but because the artist sets out with the conviction which is in the mind of every artist in America today, that he has to voice his own emotions—that what he speaks for isn't the life of his time, isn't the life that has been created through succeeding generations of conflict—but he aims to voice his own notions—his own emotions.

Now look at the poetry of America today: artistical in its capacity for elaborating the art-form in poetry, it exceeds any poetry that the world has ever known, and yet how completely abortive is American poetry, because all these little poetlings are not speaking for America, they are not speaking for any American condition, they are not speaking for any high conditions of American life that have been developing through successive ages; they are only speaking for themselves. And so long as we have in America no social consciousness of American life, there can be no art-form that will be dynamic.

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PROFESSOR LESTER F. WARD, BROWN UNIVERSITY

I hold in my hand a letter from Professor Poland which I will read to the society, and I am sure you will all regret its contents along with myself. (Reads letter.)

I am especially sorry that Professor Poland could not discuss the paper, because he would have done so, of course, from the point of view of the professional artist. What his views would have been I am not fully informed, although I had some conversation with him on the subject, and I am quite sure that his ideas were at least sympathetic. Certainly they would have been enlightening.

While I am on my feet, if I may be permitted—not at all as a substitute for Professor Poland, but more growing out of the presentation of the paper by Mrs. Unger, as I have now heard it—even after having read it, new thoughts have come to my mind, and I might in a moment or two, perhaps, make a suggestion which would be something of a contribution, not claiming any right to speak on this subject at all in the general discussion.

I must, of course, speak entirely from the sociological view-point, and the main thought that has occurred to me and one upon which I have been reflecting considerably of late is this: I want to say before beginning, though, that I bow to the withering criticism of Mrs. Unger upon the passages of my works which she has read to you, and that I am not going to attempt to defend them. On the other hand I am going to see whether I, even, cannot say a little something on her side of the matter.

It is a somewhat general sociological principle that I am going to try to present to you in a word; and I might formulate it in these words: that in almost all the operations of mankind, the institutions of mankind and the activities of mankind, we find a law to exist, if we study and trace any of them back far enough—a law or principle which may be expressed in these words: that whereas most of these things began as ends there has been a universal tendency for them to be converted into means. A number of examples occur to me even now, without much reflection. If we take architecture, for I am going to pass over a great many others that might be looked upon from the same point of view to illustrate the fact; but passing to architecture, it is obvious to anyone who has traveled at all about this world that architecture primarily was a fine art and it has become a useful art only by the process that I have been speaking about—the general tendency of that which started as an end to become a means. And if you travel in certain countries now: you need not go off of this continent on which you live—travel through the country of Mexico as I have myself, and you

will see them prominently standing forth—the only great, beautiful architectural buildings in any of the Mexican towns that I have ever visited are the churches, gilded and adorned and furnished with all the attributes of fine pieces of architecture. The human habitations are awful; and the contrast is striking to anyone from America—from the United States or from the North. But without elaborating that which all of you can see much more of than anything I have said, let us make a great leap and consider another art—the art of literature. In the eighteenth century, I might go back and repeat what is well known to all scholars, that poetry preceded prose and was accompanied with music and the dance—as Mr. Cooke has said, *terpsichorean*—but passing over even those earlier phases where even the laws were written not in rhyme but in poetry, we come down to modern literature. Take the literature of the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century, especially in France, literature was a fine art—it was nothing else. It was an end. It was largely so in other countries; and as the center or the van of civilization advanced, the epoch in which literature was an end simply moved its position from one country to another. What is literature today? It is scarcely anything more than a means, and the only object in the world of fine writing is to express ideas. We admire the writings of a Huxley simply because they constitute a vehicle by means of which he was able to express the greatest thoughts of the age; and so with every other great literary man today. He is of no particular importance from a literary point of view except as he is more capable of expressing ideas and carrying thought from mind to mind than other men are. Need I carry it any farther? Need I refer to the other arts—for example, to painting? We speak of the declining arts—especially of sculpture. Doubtless they are declining, and my implication is simply in so far as they fail to become means and insist upon being ends in themselves there is no demand for them. But there is demand for an artist like Millet, who can paint an “Angelus” or a “Man with the Hoe,” because those paintings carry ideas—not all intellectual ideas, but mental ideas. And any great art today, whether it be painting, sculpture, or any other kind of art, that can carry emotions or carry elevating influences through society will be in demand; and that kind of art will be capable of subsisting, of surviving; all other kinds will fail under the law of the survival of the fittest. I was trying to think if there was another; and certainly there is, as Mrs. Unger has said. I cannot speak of music. She can. But I can speak of the drama, because everybody knows what that is; and of fiction, because everybody knows what the influence of that is. In speaking of fiction I am almost going back to what I said about literature, but it is the great modern renaissance as it is called—the great realistic drama and realistic fiction; and the great works, if there are any today; and the great works of nearly the last century—certainly the last half-century—have all been great, or recognized as such, simply because they are what Mrs. Unger has called *dynamic*. And what do we recognize as having value in any great work of fiction or in any great drama unless it is some social power to influence, and not only to influence but to benefit mankind?

Viewed in this light then, which is certainly a true light, it is obvious that the fine arts not only may become, but in a great degree have already become, a dynamic factor in society.

DR. FRANKLIN H. SARGENT, PRESIDENT AMERICAN SOCIETY OF DRAMATIC ART,  
NEW YORK

I hope you will take the letter read a moment ago as though it had been written by myself, because I am exactly in that gentleman's state physically. I am here only in the spirit. I could not keep away, because the subject was too interesting, too important, too suggestive. Important because it is a subject which is so ignored by scientific minds, and it is the one subject which seems to demand scientific men's investigation more than any other that I know of. Those subjects drift about—of the fine arts—without helm and without captains, and insurrection, as they call it, of impulse and conviction and sentiment takes possession in place of pure logic; and I am sure that if I were an artist, I should have the right to speak for the artists in asking those minds—like yours, ladies and gentlemen—that are needed to investigate this particular subject.

I confess that at the outset I am rather perplexed and troubled that the state of degradation which I am told the art of this country is in has not been proved by anything that has been said today. We have had statements; we have had a very fine, beautiful, and learned exposition of the Russian and German state of affairs; but I have heard nothing which has proved to my mind that the art of this country is in such an awful state. I wish to have that proved before I attempt to speak of it. Visit an exhibition such as I did the other day, in New York, and go across the water and visit the great technical schools in France, and you will find here more ideas, more significance in painting, and, in some cases, better technique than you will there. I may be going beyond my province as an observer, but I simply wish to sound my voice in opposition to that statement. I can only stand up boldly in defense of the drama. I might say for the drama, if the fine arts are in that awful state that you speak of, it is the fault of the country in which that art exists. I mean to say that the theater and drama are merely a mirror of the life which exists, and if you have anything to say against them at all, you are also speaking against the life which it reflects. Until you sociologists can form plans by which the life of this country ceases to be barbaric and uncivilized; until you can get past this terrible wail of money, graft, and the like, of which the air is full, you will find the plays will treat of the things which will entertain and interest people, because people are in a very floating state of mind—not able, in the hurry and scurry of the life in this country, to settle down and have the comfort and luxury of looking upon plays as instruction, and they continue to go to the plays for amusement, and will continue to as long as the country is as young as it is.

I felt an anxiety that was not fulfilled. I have felt and desired that we should find some fundamental thing—something that we could stand upon. Now I am upon a foothold and know where I belong in this matter. For instance, in regard to the drama. As I listened I jotted down a few headings. I felt that in the theater the audience, aside from being phonographs and cameras, that receive impressions from the plate and from the actors that go into their minds and their souls, and that become permanent with them—not so much, perhaps, but to some extent like the experiences we have in real life—aside from that, I said to myself, it seems to me that the audience are like children at play, they are like bystanders; their enthusiasm, their listening and applause as the play goes on,

show that they are taking part. In short, it shows that it is a higher kindergarten. People have tried to find the place where the kindergarten could be carried up onto a higher plane. It seems to me we have that in the theater. It has the same valuation. It isn't a thing to be ignored, as most speakers on the subject of the so-called fine arts attempt to do, or a thing to be patronized; but, being a mirror of ourselves and of the lives we live, it is a thing to be studied and thought about; and that is what the scientific minds have not done. They have looked upon it as a mere side issue, hardly worth the trouble; treated as a child which either has to be confined in the room and not allowed to go out at all, put in the corner perhaps, as in the new college curriculum; or, if allowed to go out and play, allowed to do what they like as long as they are not too noisy and do not interfere with their elders, which is the idea of the theater as it is viewed by many scientific minds.

Now, there is a very interesting point, I believe, with regard to the educative effect of the theater, and it is the educative side which I understood was to be treated of especially here. The point is this: What the actor gives is not a complete thing; he suggests merely what the auditor or spectator completes. I believe that in nine cases out of ten the auditor supplies 50 per cent. of the imagination, of the thought, the feeling and the various activities of the faculties that are produced when the play is going on. As an illustration of this—for an illustration seems rather necessary to prove that—I remember how years ago a very famous actor went on in a part requiring great pathos. He had the rôle to play of a very pathetic speaker. He gave it so completely, with such complete surrender, that he broke down, his voice was mournful and full of sobs, and he was hardly able to stagger off the stage; and everybody laughed. I went to him and said: "When you go on next time, simply suggest that; we know what the motive is; simply suggest it and let us do the rest." He did as directed and went through it with intended coldness and callousness, giving the words and just the suggestion of the feeling; and the audience was broken down with sobs and tears—showing a very decided fact, that in that case the audience wanted to supply the feeling and emotion, but were not allowed to do so in the first case because it was all accomplished for them, which they resented.

In this whole matter, whether we call it educative, dynamic, or whatsoever words you may use, the important thing, I believe, I am right in saying—not being learned as an educator, perhaps—but I believe that it is the feeling we are after today. It isn't merely cramming the mind with facts, but arousing the feeling of the pupil. Now, in what way, in what place, can it be done so thoroughly, what school is it in which it can be accomplished so thoroughly, as in the theater? It seems to me that the word "dramatic" simply means a new synonym for life; that there are a great many functions at which, if you ladies and gentlemen with scientific minds would look into them, I believe you would be amazed: how the great majority of actors, being exceedingly illiterate, having no breeding or education, in a very few years have a learning and scholarship, superior at times to that of people who have been through college, in certain branches, in matters of history, in matters of literature even, and in various other studies. They learn wonderfully quickly, like children, by short-cuts; and I believe in this whole educational problem there are short-cuts. They have been



forced to learn as children learn. I recall at this moment being away where there was a professor in Brown University, a friend of mine, a professor of Greek—I won't say how many years ago, because you might recognize him—who was consul at Athens. I called to see him, and he was out. There came to the door a young girl who talked nothing but what they called Greek, and I was nonplused. I thought I knew something of Greek; I had been taught it in college; but it was all "Greek" to me. A little girl, the consul's child, very young, able to speak only certain phrases, came toddling along and asked me in a childish way what I wanted, and I spoke to her in English. I told her I wanted to see so and so, and she turned to the girl and spoke to her in Greek—had quite a lengthy conversation in Greek; and then she came back to me and translated what she said. I spoke to the father later, and he said: "I have been a student of Greek all my life, and this child has been a few months in this country, and she is able to talk Greek and translate it to me." This means there is a method of learning which the child gets which by the college process we do not get.

Speaking of Greek, I remember that I was a very bad Greek scholar; my degree coming very near suffering for it; and when I was called on not very long after to put on a Greek play at Vassar, in getting at the sentiment, the modes, and characterization of that play, I found, when I faced the cast for the first time, that I was prompting them in Greek, that I was speaking to them in Greek words, using Greek explanations; that the language to me was a live thing which I understood for the first time; and I never had understood it during the four years when I was in college.

Now, there are ways of learning, and the actor has those ways, and I believe other artists find those ways; and I only wish there could be founded for this work of the theater a dramatic science as well as a dramatic art.

I am afraid I am running over the time. I want to say only a very few words more. It seems to me that the greatest study, the greatest book of all, is the book of life; and that is so much ignored. I believe that a great deal of the so-called scholarship is a mistake. It has no living value to us; we cannot use it, and it never ought to be taken up unless it has a valuation—practical use in our lives that we can put it to. The actor learns and the artist learns to study from life, to go out and study life, to study the character—all the faculties of human nature, all their manifestations, and so on; he learns a great deal more, and a great deal more quickly, than by the so-called academic method. I believe that literature should be and can be taught in that way. There again I am out of my field. But I cannot see why literature and all that is taught in rhetoric and grammar cannot be acquired through life-study in the theater. There is a peculiar thing which is not recognized. We know very well that there has been a revolution from the old mediaeval style to the development of the individual power, in studying individual temperament and character. In the theater a great deal that is causing some of the prejudice, and statements that have been made in regard to the drama today, can be answered by this peculiar fact: we have passed through, or we have partially passed through, a period, but we have hardly outgrown the mediaeval period. All remember, not many years ago, when the so-called stock companies were purely labor guilds, and when the whole process

of production and plan of workmanship were by pure authority, not by the study of the individual needs or abilities. That exists today to a certain extent, and is partly the cause of any weakness that may exist in our work. But, on the other hand, we are passing now rapidly out of that, and realizing that it is the development of the individual that is the great thing in the stage as well as in every other thing. And there is such a thing as education in the theater and for the actor. The ideal drama, of course, is in a very mixed state. We have all styles: we have the old-school actor brought up in the old mediaeval way; we have the modern actor brought up in an original way; and we have all styles mixed up in every way that we see. We don't know what it is that annoys us, but it is probable they are like a mixture of colors that do not harmonize.

I think this poor thing which is generally spoken of in that way, the poor child called the drama, cannot be treated in the old-fashioned way by spanking, by being sent into the corner as a poor, miserable thing that has to exist, but will have the honor of the attention and thought of your learned scientists.

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PROFESSOR CHARLES H. MOORE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

I have had no opportunity to read Mrs. Unger's paper in advance of this meeting. Moreover, your secretary invited me to present, if I saw fit, a separate and independent paper upon the general topic of this session; and this is what I have prepared to do. In the following remarks I have in mind the arts of architecture, sculpture, and painting primarily; but the case is with them the same as with music and the drama—which have just been more particularly considered.

Whether the fine arts have any power for good must depend on the spirit in which they are practiced, and the ideals they embody. The fine arts are mainly addressed to the feelings and the imagination. Their primary function is not to teach, but to give pleasure, and the kind of pleasure they may give will correspond with the motives by which they are inspired, and the feelings with which they are regarded. It follows that the influence of the fine arts may be evil as well as good, and thus whether they tend to advance or to retard the well-being of society will depend on their quality.

But the fine arts are not so much a moving force as a result of moving forces, since they are necessarily the expression of the moral and spiritual conditions under which they are produced. Therefore it is with these conditions that we need to concern ourselves primarily. Where people have artistic aptitudes, have reached a high plane of moral, intellectual, and civil life, and keep their higher interests dominant, they naturally produce noble art. Where such conditions are wanting noble art is impossible, and such arts as may be produced will have no good effect. The important question is, then, not so much how to utilize the fine arts, as how to make possible their existence in their best forms, and how to bring about in society capacity for their enjoyment—how to make people responsive to the appeal of noble art. The utility of the fine arts will take care of itself under right conditions.

With all that is admirable in our civilization, we yet appear to be far from realizing such conditions, and we shall not accomplish much for the good of society through the agency of art until we shall have laid a better foundation.

We are going too fast in attempts to popularize the fine arts for the benefit of society. We are in danger of encouraging the acceptance of specious and spurious art instead of that which is genuine. Our present activity in lecturing, in the placing of works of art in schools, in the multiplication of schools of design and museums of art, is largely ineffectual for good because it lacks discrimination, and overlooks the need for preliminary efforts to prepare the way for right artistic feeling. This activity does not enough regard the motives by which the arts are inspired. It proceeds too much on the notion that any kind of artistic interest will be salutary.

I believe that only good art can be of use to society, and good art is that which is inspired by wholesome conditions and high ideals. Therefore, as I have said, the way to make the fine arts useful to society is first to bring about conditions out of which good art can come. In advance of this all efforts to encourage and to popularize the arts will be futile as to results in the popular well-being. In advance of this the people cannot know what good art is. The present bewildering confusion of thought as to what is best in art is due primarily to the fact that this principle is not enough recognized and made the basis of judgment. It will be well, then, briefly to consider by what means it may be possible to do something to bring about the requisite conditions.

Without enlarging on obvious truisms as to the primary necessity for right motives, and right conduct of life, as the only basis of human action, and the only means of opening the mind to good influences of any kind, I may say that in my opinion one of the first steps toward better conditions must consist in the inculcation of a keener sense of public and private seemliness in our surroundings. So long as the approaches to our cities and towns are made unsightly by the dumping of refuse, by squalid settlements, and by a slatternly condition of grounds about manufacturing establishments; so long as offensive advertisements are flaunted from the walls of houses, and along entire lines of railways; and so long as streets are lined with pretentious buildings in jangling discord of numberless irrational travesties of architectural design, there can be little hope for much popular appreciation of the meaning and the worth of beauty, or for sterling artistic production. The state of mind which makes these things possible is incompatible with that to which noble art appeals. Eyes habituated to such sights, and feelings blunted by indifference to their deformity, must be incapable of responding to the influences of good art. Few of us escape the deadening influence of the appalling sights that thus disgrace our civilization.

A second step toward the creation of better conditions should consist, I think, in the cultivation of the sense of beauty by observation of the beauty of nature, and of good works of art where such works are accessible. The discrimination necessary to distinguish what is best will come through observation and comparison, if we study in a right spirit; for, though the best in art and in nature assumes a great variety of forms, it is one in essential character, and that character becomes discernible through the habitual effort to distinguish between good and bad.

Nothing conduces so effectively to this culture as the practice of drawing, if it be steadily directed to this end. I would therefore make drawing, not for its utility for mechanical or industrial ends, or with a view to any kind of artistic production, but as an aid to the apprehension of beauty, a very consider-

able part of the school training of youth. And I think we ought to regard any school programme as seriously defective which does not include this most humanizing exercise.

A further prerequisite for conditions favorable to the existence of art from which salutary influence can proceed is a constant and unqualified aspiration for excellence. All good art is based on good craftsmanship in best materials—on fitness for use and endurance in architecture, and on best possible carving, and drawing and painting, in the plastic and graphic arts. Without such conditions it is impossible for a people to produce any fine art worthy of the name, and only in so far as they can be made to prevail will it be possible for the best art to have any salutary social influence. Mere contact with even the noblest art counts for little where a people's engrossing interests lie in other directions, as is abundantly shown at the present time in those European countries which have the richest inheritance in noble works of art.

The great obstacle to a general prevalence of the finer influences of art among us, and the chief cause of popular indifference to the unsightliness of our surroundings, lie in our excessive material ambitions and activities. People always succeed best in those things for which they care most. If we consider what the great American people at present care most for, we shall hardly find that it is for those things which make for an appreciation of the worth of beauty. It is very clear, on every hand, that mechanical, commercial, and even scientific ends, with a primary view to material profit, and material comfort and convenience, are what now mainly animate our activities to a degree that is incompatible with openness to the finer influences of beauty. Whatever aspirations for better things there may be are, with the great majority of people, so subordinated to these material interests that they have no appreciable effect on the prevailing trend of thought and feeling.

The aspect of every thriving American city affords abundant confirmation of this. Consider, for instance, the appalling aspect of the city of New York at the present moment, as one views it in passing through the East River. Yet New York is our chief artistic center. She has her great Central Park, she spends many millions of dollars on ornate public and private buildings, she has a great Museum of the Fine Arts, and contributes largely to the support of music and the drama. But for how little good do these things count in the general make-up of the metropolis—which as a whole is hideous beyond any power of words to describe! There never was before in the world a great city of such appalling aspect.

I would not draw an exaggerated picture, and I take no pessimistic view. I believe that things are coming out right in the end. Nor would I imply that no signs of better things are discernible, that no excellence of achievement is manifest in contemporaneous art, or that no good influence now goes forth from this art. Much less would I deny that fine aptitudes for artistic enjoyment and artistic production are latent in the modern world and in the American people. But I would call attention to the fact that artistic aspirations, artistic ability, and the good influences on society which they should exert, are heavily handicapped by present conditions. And it is this state of things, it seems to me, that should deeply concern the American Sociological Society, and every modern community.

## SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

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PROFESSOR CHARLES H. COOLEY  
University of Michigan

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### SOCIAL MIND IN GENERAL

Mind is an organic whole made up of co-operating individualities, in somewhat the same way that the music of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds. No one would think it necessary or reasonable to divide the music into two kinds—that made by the whole and that of particular instruments; and no more are there two kinds of mind—the social mind and the individual mind. When we study the social mind, we merely fix our attention on larger aspects and relations, rather than on the narrower ones of ordinary psychology.

The view that all mind hangs together in a vital whole, from which the individual is never really separate, flows naturally from our growing knowledge of heredity and suggestion, which makes it increasingly clear that every thought we have is linked with the thought of our ancestors and associates, and through them with that of society at large. It is also the only view consistent with the general standpoint of modern science, which admits nothing isolate in nature.

The unity of the social mind consists, not in agreement, but in organization, in the fact of reciprocal influence or causation among its parts, by virtue of which everything that takes place in it is connected with everything else, and so is an outcome of the whole. Whether, like the orchestra, it gives forth harmony may be a matter of dispute, but that its sound, pleasing or otherwise, is the expression of a vital co-operation, cannot well be denied.

### SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In the social mind we may distinguish—very roughly, of course—conscious and unconscious relations. The unconscious are those of which we are not aware; which, in one way or

another escape our notice. A great part of the influences at work upon us are of this character. Our language, our mechanical arts, our government and other institutions we derive chiefly from people to whom we are but indirectly and unconsciously related. The larger movements of society—the progress and decadence of nations, institutions and races—have seldom been a matter of consciousness until they were past. And although the growth of social consciousness is perhaps the greatest fact of history, it has still but a narrow and fallible grasp of human life.

Social consciousness, or awareness of society, is inseparable from self-consciousness, because we can hardly think of ourselves excepting with reference to a social group of some sort, nor of the group except with reference to ourselves. The two things go together, and what we are really aware of is a more or less complex personal or social whole, of which now the particular, now the general aspect is emphasized.

In general, then, most of our reflective consciousness—of our wide-awake state of mind—is social consciousness, because a sense of our relation to other persons, or of other persons to one another, can hardly fail to be a part of it. Self and society are twin-born, and we know one as immediately as we know the other.

This view, which seems to me quite simple and in accord with common-sense, is not, so far as I can discover, the view most commonly held. Psychologists, and even sociologists, are still much infected with the idea that self-consciousness is in some way primary, and antecedent to social consciousness, which must be derived by some recondite process of combination or elimination. I venture, therefore, to give some further exposition of it, based in part on first-hand observation—too detailed for this paper—of the growth of social ideas in children.

Descartes is, I take it, the best-known exponent of the traditional view regarding the primacy of self-consciousness. Seeking an unquestionable basis for philosophy, he thought that he found it in the proposition, "I think, therefore I am" (*Cogito, ergo sum*). This seemed to him inevitable, though all else might be illusion.

I observed [he says] that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, *I think, hence I am*, was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the skeptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.

From our point of view this statement is unsatisfactory in two essential respects. In the first place, it seems to imply that "I"-consciousness is a part of all consciousness, when, in fact, it belongs only to a rather advanced stage of development. In the second it is one-sided or "individualistic" in asserting the personal or "I"-aspect of consciousness to the exclusion of the social or "we"-aspect, which is equally original with it.

Introspection is essential to psychological or social insight, but the introspection of Descartes was, in this instance, a limited, almost abnormal, sort of introspection—that of a self-absorbed philosopher doing his best to isolate himself from other people, and from all simple and natural conditions of life. The mind into which he looked was in a highly technical state, not likely to give him a just view of human consciousness in general.

Introspection is of a larger sort in our day. There is a world of things in the mind worth looking at, and the modern psychologist, instead of fixing his attention wholly on an extreme form of speculative self-consciousness, puts his mind through an infinite of variety of experiences—intellectual and emotional, simple and complex, normal and abnormal, sociable and private—recording in each case what he sees in it. He does this by subjecting it to suggestions or incitements of various kinds, which awaken the activities he desires to study.

In particular he does it largely by what may be called *sympathetic introspection*, putting himself into intimate contact with various sorts of persons and allowing them to awake in himself a life similar to their own, which he afterward, to the best of his ability, recalls and describes. In this way he is more or less able to understand—always by introspection—children, idiots, crimi-

nals, rich and poor, conservative and radical—any phase of human nature not wholly alien to his own.

This I conceive to be the principal method of the social psychologist.

One thing which this broader introspection reveals is that the "I"-consciousness does not explicitly appear until the child is about two years old, and that, when it does appear, it comes in inseparable conjunction with the consciousness of other persons and of those relations which make up a social group. It is, in fact, simply one phase of a body of personal thought which is self-consciousness in one aspect and social consciousness in another.

The mental experience of a new-born child is probably a mere stream of impressions, which may be regarded as individual in being differentiated from any other stream, or as social, in being an undoubted product of inheritance and suggestion from human life at large; but is not aware either of itself or of society.

Very soon, however, the mind begins to discriminate personal impressions and to become both naïvely self-conscious and naïvely conscious of society; that is, the child is aware, in an unreflective way, of a group and of his own special relation to it. He does not say "I," nor does he name his mother, his sister, or his nurse; but he has images and feelings out of which these ideas will grow. Later comes the more reflective consciousness which names both himself and other people and brings a fuller perception of the relations which constitute the social unity of this small world.

And so on to the most elaborate phases of self-consciousness and social consciousness, to the metaphysician pondering the ego, or the sociologist meditating on the social organism. Self and society go together, as phases of a common whole. I am aware of the social groups in which I live as immediately and authentically as I am aware of myself; and Descartes might have said "you think" or "we think," *cogitas* or *cogitamus*, on as good grounds as he said *cogito*. I have explained this point of view more fully in "Human Nature and the Social Order," New York, 1902.



But, it may be said, this very consciousness that you are considering is, after all, located in a particular person, and so are all similar consciousnesses, so that what we see, if we take an objective view of the matter, is merely an aggregate of individualities, however social those individualities may be. Common-sense, most people think, assures us that the separate person is the primary fact of life.

If so, it is because common-sense has been trained by custom to look at one aspect of things and not another. Common-sense, moderately informed, assures us that the individual has his being only as a part of a whole. What does not come by heredity comes by communication and intercourse; and the more closely we look, the more apparent it is that separateness is an illusion of the eye and community the inner truth. "Social organism"—using the term in no technical sense, but merely to mean a vital unity in human life—is a fact as obvious to enlightened common-sense as individuality.

There is, then, no mystery about social consciousness. The view that there is something recondite about it, and that it must be dug for with metaphysics and drawn forth from the depths of speculation, springs from a failure to grasp adequately the social nature of all higher consciousness. What we need in this connection is only a better seeing and understanding of rather ordinary and familiar facts.

#### PUBLIC OPINION

We may find social consciousness either in a particular mind or as a co-operative activity of many minds. The social ideas that I have are closely connected with those that other people have, and act and react upon them to form a whole. This gives us public opinion, in the broad sense of a group state of mind of which the group is more or less distinctly aware. The unity of public opinion, like all vital unity, is not one of uniformity, but of organization, of interaction and mutual influence. It is true that a certain underlying likeness of nature is necessary in order that minds may influence one another and so co-operate in

forming a vital whole, but identity, even in the simplest process, is unnecessary and probably impossible.

The consciousness of the House of Representatives, for example, is by no means limited to the common views, if there are any, shared by its members, but embraces the whole consciousness of every member, so far as this deals with the activity of the House. It would be a poor conception of the whole which left out the opposition, or even one dissentient individual.

That all minds are different is a condition, not an obstacle, of that unity that consists in a differentiated and co-operative life.

Here is another illustration of what is meant by individual and collective aspects of social consciousness: Some of us possess a good many books relating to social questions of the day. Each of these books, considered by itself, is the expression of a particular social consciousness: the author has cleared up his ideas as well as he can and printed them. But a library of such books expresses social consciousness in a larger sense; it speaks for the epoch. And certainly no one who reads the books will doubt that they form a whole, whatever their differences. The radical and the reactionist are clearly part of the same general situation.

A group "makes up its mind" in very much the same manner that an individual makes up his mind. The latter must give time and attention to the matter; he must search his consciousness for pertinent ideas and sentiments, bring them together, and work them into a whole, before he knows what his real thought about it is. In the case of a nation the same thing must take place, only on a larger scale. Each individual must make up his mind as before, but in doing so he has to deal, not only with what was already in his thought or memory, but with fresh ideas that flow in from others whose minds are also aroused. Everyone who has any fact, or thought, or feeling which he thinks is unknown or insufficiently regarded by others, tries to impart it; and thus not one mind only, but all minds, are searched for pertinent material which is poured into the general stream of thought for each one to use as he can. In this manner the minds in a communicating group become one mind, a single organic

whole. Their unity is not one of identity, but of life and action—a crystallization of diverse but related ideas.

There may be quite as much difference of opinion as there was before, but the differences now existing are comparatively intelligent and stable. People know what they really think about the matter, and what other people think. Measures, platforms, candidates, creeds, and other symbols have been produced which serve to express and assist co-operation and to define opposition. There has come to be a relatively complete organization of thought to which each individual or group contributes in its own peculiar way.

Take, for instance, the state of opinion in the United States regarding slavery at the outbreak of the Civil War. No general agreement had been reached, but the popular mind had become organized with reference to this matter. It had been turned over and regarded from all points of view by all parts of the community, until a certain ripeness regarding it had been reached, revealing in this case a radical conflict of thought between the North and the South, and much local diversity in both sections.

One who would understand public opinion should distinguish clearly between a true or mature opinion and a popular impression. The former requires earnest attention and discussion for a considerable time, and when reached is significant, even if mistaken. It rarely exists regarding matters of temporary interest, and current talk or print is a most uncertain index of it. A popular impression, on the other hand, is facile, shallow, transient, with that fickleness and blatancy that used to be ascribed to the popular mind in general. It is analogous to the unconsidered views and utterances of an individual, and the more one studies it, the less seriously he will take it. It may happen that ninety-nine men in a hundred hold opinions today contradictory of those they will hold a month hence—partly because they have not yet searched their own minds, partly because the few who have really significant and well-grounded ideas have not had time to impress them upon the rest.

It is not unreasonable, then, to combine a very slight regard

for most of what passes for public opinion with much confidence in the soundness of an aroused, mature, organic social judgment.

#### SOCIAL WILL

Social will differs from public opinion only in implying a more continuous and efficient organization. It is merely public opinion become an effective guide to social development.

It is quite plain that the development of the past has been mostly blind and without human intention. Any page of history shows that men have been unable to foresee, much less to control, the larger movements of life. There have been seers, but they have seen principles rather than processes, and have almost never been men of immediate sway. Statesmen have lived in the present, having no purpose beyond the aggrandizement of their own country, their order, or their family. Such partial exceptions as the framing of the American Constitution by the light of history and philosophy, and with some prevision of its actual working, are confined to recent times and excite a special wonder.

Will has been alive only in details, in the smaller courses of life, while the larger structure and movement has been subconscious, erratic, and wasteful. The very idea of progress, of orderly development on a great scale, is of recent origin and diffusion.

At the present day, also, social phenomena of a large sort are for the most part not willed at all, but are the unforeseen result of diverse and partial endeavors. It is seldom that any large plan of social action is intelligently drawn up and followed out. Each interest works along in a somewhat blind and selfish manner, grasping, fighting, and groping. As regards general ends most of the energy is wasted; and yet a sort of advance takes place, more like the surging of a throng than the orderly movement of troops. Who can pretend that the American people, for example, are guided by any clear and rational plan in their economic, social, and religious development? They have glimpses and impulses, but hardly a will, except on a few matters of near and urgent interest.

In the same way the ills that afflict society are seldom willed

by any one or any group, but are by-products of acts of will having other objects: they are done, as someone has said, rather with the elbows than with the fists. There is surprisingly little ill intent, and the more one looks into wrong-doing, the less he finds of that vivid chiaroscuro of conscious goodness and badness his childish teaching has led him to expect.

Take, for instance, a conspicuous evil like the sweating system in the garment trades of New York and London. Here are people, largely women and children, forced to work twelve, fourteen, sometimes sixteen, hours a day, in the midst of dirt, bad air, and contagion, suffering the destruction of home life and decent nurture; and all for a wage insufficient to buy the bare necessities of life. But if one looks for sin dark enough to cast such a shadow, he will scarcely find it. The "sweater" or immediate employer, to whom he first turns, is commonly himself a workman, not much raised above the rest and making but little profit on his transactions. Beyond him is the large dealer, usually a well-intentioned man quite willing that things should be better, if they can be made so without too much trouble or pecuniary loss to himself. He is only doing what others do and what, in his view, the conditions of trade require. And so on; the closer one gets to the facts, the more evident it is that nowhere is the indubitable wickedness our feelings have pictured. It is quite the same with political corruption and the venal alliance between wealth and party management. The men who control wealthy interests are probably no worse intentioned than the rest of us; they only do what they think they are forced to do in order to hold their own. And so with the politician: he finds that others are selling their power, and easily comes to think of it as a matter of course. In truth the consciously, flagrantly wicked man is, and perhaps always has been, for the most part, a fiction of denunciation. The psychologist will hardly find him, but will feel that most sorts of badness are easily comprehensible, and will perhaps agree with Goethe that he never heard of a crime which he might not himself have committed.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I have not space to show at length that this view does not impair the righteousness of blame and punishment; the reader will perhaps think it out for

In all such cases the first requisite is to create a social consciousness—that is to say, a definite awareness, not only of the evils themselves, but of the conditions upon which they depend and of the means by which they may be redressed. This will open the way for an effective public opinion, a social conscience, a social will. Those having power in the matter will find a fairly definite course of right marked out for them, and will not be inclined—or, if inclined, will not be permitted—to depart much from it.

Thus it is not bad will, but lack of will, that is mainly the cause of evil things; they exist outside the sphere of choice. We lack rational self-direction, and suffer not so much from our sins—dark as those may be—as from our blindness, weakness, and confusion.

It is true, then, as socialists tell us, that the need of society is rational organization, a more effectual social will. But we shall not agree with the narrowness of this or of any other sect as to the kind of organization that is to be sought. The true will of society is not concentrated in the government or any other single agent, but works itself out through many instruments. It would simplify matters, no doubt, if a single, definite, and coercive institution, like the socialist state, could embrace and execute all right purposes; but I doubt whether life can be organized in that way.

The real ground for expecting a more rational existence and growth is in the increasing efficiency of the intellectual and moral process as a whole, not, peculiarly, in the greater activity of government.

In every province of life a multiform social knowledge is arising and, mingling with the moral impulse, is forming a system of rational ideals which, through leadership and emulation, gradually work their way into practice.

himself. Men are justly praised or blamed in order to support or discredit the ideals they stand for. It matters little whether their sins and virtues are conscious or not. As to the comparative unimportance of conscious wickedness, note that the man who feels that he is in the wrong is divided against himself, hence weak and unlikely to carry out a sustained policy. The most efficient badness is based on a quiet conscience.

The striving of our democracy toward clearer consciousness is too evident to escape any observer. Compare, for example, the place now taken in our universities by history, economics, political science, sociology, statistics, and the like, with the attention given them, say, in 1875, when, in fact, some of these studies had no place at all. Or consider the multiplication, since the same date, of government bureaus—federal, state, and local—whose main function is to collect, arrange, and disseminate social knowledge. It is not too much to say that governments are becoming, more and more, vast laboratories of social science. Consider also the number of books and periodicals seriously devoted to these subjects. No doubt much of this work is feverish and shallow, but this is incidental to all rapid change. There is, on the whole, nothing more certain or more hopeful than the advance in the larger self-knowledge of mankind.

Ideals for the betterment of human life are products of constructive imagination, incited by sentiment and informed by knowledge. In the past the sentiment has mostly been undisciplined and the knowledge deficient. A study of the ideals and programmes that have had most popular acceptance even in recent years makes it appear that our state of mind regarding society is still much like that which prevailed regarding the natural world when men sought the philosopher's stone and the fountain of perpetual youth. A vast amount of energy is wasted, or nearly wasted, in the exclusive and intolerant advocacy of special schemes—single-tax, prohibition, state-socialism, and the like—each of which is imagined by its adherents to be the key to millennial conditions.

Every year, however, makes converts to the truth that no isolated scheme can be a good scheme, and that real progress must be an advance all along the line. Those who see only one thing can never see that truly, and so work in a superficial and mistaken manner.

Idealism ought to be organic; that is to say, each particular ideal ought to be formed and pursued in subordination to a system of ideals based on knowledge and good sense. The idealist, while putting a special enthusiasm into his own work, should have a

general understanding also of every good work, and of the whole to which all contribute. For him to imagine that his is the only work worth doing is as unfortunate as for the captain of a company to imagine that he is conducting the whole campaign. Other things equal, the most effective idealists are those who are most sane—who have a sense for the complication, the interdependence, and the inertia of human conditions.

The rise of a social will means the substitution of consciousness for mechanism, of principles for formulas. In the early growth of every institution the truth that it embodies is not perceived or expressed in simplicity, but obscurely incarnated in custom and formula. The perception of principles does not do away with mechanism altogether, but makes it relatively simple, flexible, and human. Under the old system everything is preserved because it is not known just where the virtue resides; under the new, the essential is kept and the rest thrown away.

This change is not unlike the substitution of an alphabet for picture-writing. When it is once discovered that speech is made up of a few elementary sounds, the symbols of these suffice to express all possible words, and so supplant the innumerable and cumbrous characters that were used before. Language is thus enabled to become more various and flexible in its function, and at the same time simpler in its mechanism. In the same way, at the present time, the elaborate formulas of the church tend to give way to brief statements of principles based on a better insight into human nature; and all contemporary institutions show change of an analogous character.

We may, then, expect that the modern world, in spite of its complexity, will become fundamentally simpler, more consistent and reasonable. Apparently, formalism can never more be an accepted and justified condition. It exists, and will exist, wherever social consciousness is deficient, but is ceasing to be held as a ruling principle in any department. There will be creeds, but they will affirm no more than is helpful to believe; ritual, but only what is beautiful or edifying; everything must justify itself by function.

Our moral system, which is one phase of the social will, must



be on the same large scale as modern life itself. The current methods are inadequate, and we must learn to feel and to effectuate new kinds of right—kinds involving a sense of remoter results than men have previously taken into account. Our good intentions will never work out unless they are as intelligently organized as commerce and politics. All thinking persons are coming to see that those traits of decency in the obvious relations of life which we are used to regard as morality are inadequate to our needs. The great wrong-doers, as we now see, are usually decent and kindly in daily walk and conversation, as well as supporters of the church and other respectable institutions. For the most part they are not even hypocrites, but men of a dead and conventional morality, not awake to the real meaning of what they are and do. Social will means, among other things, that they should be waked up; that a social conscience, based on science as well as feeling, should see and judge things by their true results, and should know how to make its judgments effectual.

The guiding force underlying social consciousness is, now as ever, human nature itself, in those more enduring characteristics that are little affected by institutional changes. This nature, familiar yet inscrutable, is apparently in a position to work itself out more adequately than at any time in the past.

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## DISCUSSION

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I have been teaching sociology for so short a time, this being the middle of my third year in my present position, that, were I to follow my inclinations tonight, I should certainly give place to these masters in the science present who could do eminently better than I in discussing this most interesting and able paper presented by Dr. Cooley. In fact, I never felt so inclined as now to be a psychologist; for, if I were, I should be in New York at this time, and not be called upon to discuss this paper, which is so largely of a psychological character.

If time permitted, a full discussion of this paper should be undertaken along three lines—namely, the psychological, the ethical, and the sociological. This topic of "Social Consciousness" is a very timely one. Last summer a year ago President Maxwell, of the National Educational Association, said, at a meeting in Ocean Grove Auditorium, that we needed to put more emphasis, in education today, upon the social side of the individual's equipment for life. In the past we have been emphasizing the fact of making the individual a breadwinner. Now we need to put the emphasis upon relating him to society.

The dean of our Teachers College the other day declared that the emphasis in pedagogy is now being placed upon the socializing of the individual. In other words, the individual, largely because of our methods of education, has often not scrupled to take another's bread in his efforts to win his own. What we need today in every phase of human life is more of the social consciousness that will enable us as individuals and as groups to respect the rights and seek the good of others.

We need social consciousness in legislation and in the administration of justice; for only as men come to see the truth of social relations will they be able to legislate for the good of all instead of for particular individuals, corporations, or classes.

The same is true of theology and religion. An adequate development of the social consciousness would result in greater toleration, and greater federation, co-operation, and union, among the great denominations of Christendom.

In his discussion of the social mind I do not think Dr. Cooley gives us a clear understanding of what the social mind really is. He says: "Mind is an organic whole made up of co-operating individualities; social mind and the individual mind are but phases of the one mind. Every thought we have is linked with the thought of our ancestors and associates, and through them with that of society at large. The unity of the social mind consists, not in agreement, but in organization, in the fact of reciprocal influence or causation among its parts, by virtue of which everything that takes place in it is connected with everything else, and so is an outcome of the whole."

It seems to me that from these statements the moral implications that logically follow are important for society. If all mind is one, and every thought so linked with ancestors, associates, and society at large; if everything that takes place in it is the outcome of the whole, where are we to place moral responsibility? Where is the ground for justice in questions of administration of law? Who is debtor and who creditor? Who can claim patent-rights or copy-rights? Where is the ground for personal merit and demerit, rewards and punishments? Where will reform begin? What social advantage has the genius or master over the humblest member of the audience, or even the giggler in the "peanut" gallery? If Professor Cooley has in mind some future state of society like the millennium, then such views are appropriate, but for the present stages of social development it seems to me that moral implications are pertinent.

Concerning social consciousness the writer of the paper says that psychologists and sociologists are still infected with the idea that self-consciousness or individual consciousness is primary. I confess that I am still "infected." I believe the self-conscious being could never become such without society, or some form of association with other creatures of his kind. These must have their efficient influence before he, the individual self-conscious being, is able to realize the fact of self-consciousness. Had there been no objectivity for Descartes to doubt, he could never have come to the consciousness of himself as a thinking being.

We are told in this paper: "All consciousness, all vivid, wide-awake state of mind, is social consciousness, because a sense of our relation to other persons, or of other persons to one another, can hardly fail to be a part of it." Now

suppose a man comes in contact with his neighbor's bulldog, or falls over a wheelbarrow, or treads upon a tack at night, is this wide-awake state of mind, which he as an individual surely has in each case supposed, necessarily a part of social consciousness? It seems to me that we must distinguish between consciousness of persons or of society and "social consciousness." Are they necessarily the same psychologically? Self-consciousness involves self-determination, or the consciousness of ability to make use of ideas for self-advantage. Social consciousness is distinct from consciousness of persons or the group, in that it implies the ability of the individual or social group to make use of ideas for the advantage of society as well as for self. Both imply a moral element in consciousness, or obligation and utility. In fact, no idea, whether in the consciousness of the individual or in that of the group, can be properly called social until it can be measured in terms of social activity of some kind. To be aware of persons or of a social group does not prove that I have social consciousness, in the true sense of the term, any more than to be aware of a pack of wolves would prove the fact. The elements of self-initiative and of self-determination seem to be given no place in Professor Cooley's view of the social consciousness.

The emphasis today in education implies the priority in development of the "self or I-consciousness." So does the difference between religious denominations in history and the more recent federative movements. The same fact might be illustrated from a study of commerce and politics. In fact, if we take a survey of society, we shall discover that many of the conflicts between groups have been the result of the lack of social consciousness, or the primary development of, and the resultant actions growing out of, the individual or personal consciousness.

I wish to say just a word in reference to the last two divisions of the paper, namely, "public opinion" and "social will." In nearly everything in this part of the paper I am in agreement with Dr. Cooley.

With regard to public opinion: A distinguished missionary recently returned from the Philippine Islands said: "In the Philippines there is no public opinion, because there is no way of creating it. They have no newspapers. In this country you buy your public opinion for two cents in the morning and one cent at night." The point of importance for us as sociologists is to see that there is created in this country and for the world at large the proper means of communication that will make an enlightened and intelligent public opinion possible.

In the last part of the paper, which treats of the "social will," I cannot agree altogether with the writer when he says, "The wicked man is a fiction of denunciation," and that there is very little wrong-doing with ill intent. You will recall the words of a very prominent leader of a great organization who, when arraigned before an investigating committee, said he and his associates were working for their own pockets all the time. Recent investigations in various quarters have revealed the fact that in most instances of wrong-doing to society these were individuals who intentionally committed certain specific acts knowing all the time that they were breaking laws, statutory and moral.

I believe it is possible so to develop the social will that society by its obedience-compelling power may be able to bring all wrong-doers to justice, and

so modify legislation that the individual wrong-doer can no longer dodge behind the corporation, or the corporation dodge behind the law; then we shall have social control that will result in the greatest good to all factors of human society.

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On account of the unavoidable absence of Professor Giddings, I should like to present a thought which, it seems to me, he would have emphasized at this time. If, in spite of four years' work with him, I misinterpret his point of view, I hope that those of you who have a more accurate knowledge of his ideas will make the necessary corrections.

The speaker of the evening has apparently assumed that his subject, "Social Consciousness," is equivalent to the phrase "social self-consciousness." It is, of course, true that progress is likely to be more and more harmonious, the greater the amount of rational and purposive effort attained by a society which is capable of appreciating the results of its own action—is sufficiently self-conscious to exercise rational control over itself. It is also true, however, that social consciousness includes mental phenomena that are in large measure the result of feeling, and not of any such process of thought concerning the content of the social mind as the term "self-consciousness" implies. If any of you have been present at a negro revival meeting, you will realize what I mean. You will doubtless remember certain phenomena which may accurately be considered phases of a certain form of social consciousness, but which could hardly be described as phenomena of social self-consciousness. Certain things were going on which could not have taken place had there not been a number of persons associated. No one of the participants would have acted as he did had he been alone. It is hardly conceivable, however, that there was any rational attempt on the part of those exhibiting these phenomena to understand their significance. Of social self-consciousness there was none; of social consciousness, much.

The suggestion, then, that I wish to make is that feeling is an extremely important element in social consciousness. The members of a society like this, accustomed to rational reflection, are perhaps likely to overestimate the importance of social self-consciousness as an explanation of existing social conditions. It may be that the forces of the physical environment, the influence of which Professor Lindsay has emphasized, register themselves in social feeling far more potently than we imagine, and that social feeling plays a greater part in the social process than has yet been suspected.

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MRS. CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN

There are a number of facts which readily occur to any one of us as illustrating the social character of mental activity. Solitary confinement is known to be one of the most terrible punishments, for it drives its victims mad through the absence of intercourse with other human beings. The mind cannot live unto itself, but must have contact with other minds. Lighthouse watchmen placed at points which are isolated, and where they have practically no opportunities for contact with mankind, are never left entirely alone, but are invariably given a companion. This is not because it requires two to attend to the work,

but because the isolated individual deteriorates mentally and becomes something altogether abnormal. But even when there are two of them in the same lighthouse, it is not uncommon for them to become insane, or at least cranky—because two persons form too short a circuit for stimulating social intercourse.

Even the smallest and most selfish minds, those which seem to center wholly about themselves and to care nothing for others, need social intercourse. The intellectually lowest type of woman, capable of little truly mental life, nevertheless needs contact with other minds and finds it in the form of gossip with her neighbors over the backyard fence. Consider, again, the incontrovertible desire to impart a secret to other minds. The more important and the greater the secret, the more insistently does it press for communication to other minds. Great thinkers, no matter how profound their contempt for the "common horde" of readers, invariably seek the means of imparting their thoughts to others. Mental property is not individual, but social. Furthermore, when we read of the suffering of others, of people whom we may never have seen, and whose welfare does not concern us at all, why is it that we suffer? What is it in us that suffers, unless it be our social consciousness? We suffer in that part of us in which we are not ourselves, but a part of something greater than ourselves. When the country's flag is insulted, what need we care as individuals? The insult does not touch us. It does, however, affect our social consciousness. We are hurt as members of the social body.

Our mind is therefore part and parcel of the group to which we belong, and the interests and desires and feelings of the group become our interests, our desires, and our feelings. Take a perfectly truthful young man and make him a reporter on one of the newspapers. From that time on his group-consciousness becomes such as a member of the staff of that paper that he will work for it, fight for it, and lie for it as he never would for himself.

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PROFESSOR C. W. A. VEDITZ, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Had not Mrs. Gilman prepared the way for the somewhat radical point of view that I wish to present, I should have hesitated to present any remarks on Professor Cooley's exceedingly suggestive paper. As it is, however, I should like to say a word in behalf of the contention that of the two, self-consciousness and social consciousness, the former is a derivative of the latter, and not the latter of the former. Social consciousness, or awareness of society, is not only inseparable from consciousness of self, but consciousness of self is developed *later* than social consciousness. Instead of saying that self and society are in the consciousness of the individual twin-born, I would say that consciousness of society precedes consciousness of self.

We know that in the experience of infants it requires considerable time before the child learns to mark off itself from the outside world, to draw the line between the *ego* and the *altru*i. Similarly, in the domain of psychic existence the marking-off of self takes place late in the history of consciousness. Moreover, it is always a vague and indefinite marking-off—so vague and indefinite as to make it not unreasonable to contend that social consciousness is more real and more definite than self-consciousness. Any endeavor to mark off those contents of the mind which are primarily individual, which belong to

*me*, as opposed to the social group of which I am a member, at once reveals the difficulties that stand in the way of any description of self-consciousness. Language itself, in which all thought-processes find their expression and in which they necessarily take form—whether language be articulate or inarticulate does not matter—is a social product. In other words, whenever we think, we use words, either aloud or inarticulately; and these words are social things. Thus the implements of thought are themselves social implements. The assumption that of the whole field of consciousness one part—that part which belongs to me as a distinct ego—cannot only be marked off from the rest, but is more fundamental than the rest, has no foundation in fact. Not infrequently what I regard as the peculiar characteristics of myself as a psychic entity are not my characteristics at all, but are attributed to me by my fellow-creatures and represent merely the characteristics which I am striving to attain. The indefiniteness of the psychic self on this account is well illustrated by Dr. Holmes's celebrated story of John and Thomas. When John and Thomas take part in a dialogue there are, said Dr. Holmes, at least six personalities distinctly to be recognized as participating in the dialogue: first, there is the real John, known only to his Maker; second, there is John's ideal John, never the real one, and often very unlike him; third, there is Thomas' idea of John, never the real John, nor John's John, and often very unlike either. Similarly, there is the real Thomas, Thomas' ideal Thomas, and John's ideal Thomas. The real John may be old, dull, and ill-looking. But John very possibly conceives himself to be young, witty, and fascinating, and talks from the point of view of this ideal. Thomas, again, believes him to be an artful rogue, we will say; therefore he is, so far as Thomas' attitude is concerned, an artful rogue, though really simple and stupid.

Nietzsche somewhere contends that our idea of ourselves in no way corresponds with the reality, and is usually determined by other people's idea of what we are.

In brief, I am not at all certain that Professor Natorp is wrong in his statement that the individual is just as much an abstraction in the social sciences as the atom is an abstraction in chemistry—made for purposes of convenience, but possibly corresponding to nothing real and distinguishable.

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MR. JAMES MINNICK, PROVIDENCE, R. I.

I should like to say a word in regard to the line of thought suggested by Professor Earp. I could not help feeling, in listening to the paper of this evening and also to that of Professor Jenks at the opening of this conference, that in our endeavor to explain the workings of the social conscience there is a tendency to excuse too much the acts of certain individuals, that have been socially and industrially harmful. I am wondering also whether the present state of public mind in regard to social and industrial ills is due entirely to a higher state of social conscience recently developed, or whether it is that the public at large has begun to understand the influence of the acts of many of the leaders in the financial and industrial world. The game of cards is so universal that practically everyone knows what we mean by "stacking the deck," but when James Hyde invented his great gambling scheme of the tontine policies in

insurance, the public at large was not sufficiently well informed in regard to the game to understand what Mr. Hyde was really doing. It seems to me, however, that Mr. Hyde was fully aware of just exactly what he was doing, and it was just because he did understand and was so far-seeing that it was possible for him to carry on his plan so successfully. When the great railway companies obtained grants of land, and afterward, when the lands were all sold, straightened their tracks, it seems to me they understood exactly what they were doing. The public at large did not protest, because they did not know what was going on. A striking example of this seems to me to be that of the agitation about the public schools in Chicago. When years ago the attorney of the *Tribune*, a member of the board of education, forgot his obligation to the welfare of the public schools and, acting as the attorney for the *Tribune*, obtained leases of public lands that gave to that company valuable school lands at the rental of thousands of dollars per year less than their true value, it seems to me he knew exactly what he was doing. The public did not protest at the time, because the public knew nothing about it, and as the leading newspapers of Chicago are all equally guilty with the *Tribune* in similar transactions, the combined power of the press has been used to keep the public in ignorance and to attack the Federation of Teachers, which has exposed the scheme. The press did everything in its power to create public sentiment adverse to the Teachers' Federation and to confuse the public mind as to the real question at issue. It is estimated that the loss to the public-school fund in rentals in the past decade is something like twenty million dollars. Can any theory of development of social conscience justly excuse the guilty individual? When Senator Dryden persuaded a compliant legislature of New Jersey to turn over to him the accumulated surplus of his insurance company, it seems to me he knew exactly what he was doing, and it does not seem to me that any theory of development of social conscience should make us find excuses for individuals in such acts. It is important to decide, therefore, whether any particular state of public mind is due to a development of higher social conscience, or whether it is because the public is just being informed of the facts in the case. Even the socialists, whose programme demands the most complete change in the structure of society, maintain they have no quarrel with individuals, but entirely with institutions. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we should quarrel with those individuals whose acts are far-reaching and harmful to the whole country.

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PROFESSOR E. A. ROSS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

How social is man appears from a study of suicide. Few commit suicide from physical anguish—from pain, cold, or hunger. A man is far more likely to renounce life when some catastrophe happens to the image of himself he is accustomed to see in the eyes of others. A business man fails, an officer is cashiered, a woman who has made a false step is exposed, and though their physical well-being is secured, out they go. Again, there is nothing like social relations to keep down suicide. Isolated, the individual who meets with shipwreck lets go of life; knit up with others, he is supported by sympathy and encouragement and hangs on. Though all is lost, he has his social self to live for his "honor." This is why the lone suicide from three to five times as much

as the married; why the Catholics, more closely joined into a religious community than the Protestants, endure much better the shocks of life and hence suicide less; why suicide is common in disintegrating societies, while wars and revolutions that knit men afresh cut down the frequency of self-murder. We enter life as animals; so long as we have bodily health, we battle on; but gradually personality forms out of the give-and-take of social life and overgrows the physical man, constitutes, as it were, a kind of giant parasite. Presently we live or die according as the social self thrives or droops. After a man is fifty, how quickly he breaks if anything shatters the image of himself he is used to finding reflected from the faces of others! Let him suffer overwhelming political defeat, let him become a fugitive from justice, let wrongful accusations smirch his honor, let a daughter's shame make his name a by-word, or let his wife run away with another man, and he crumples like wet paper.

On the other hand, let him, as the years pass, meet with widening appreciation, love, and honor, environ him with old friends and young grandchildren, and he will live into the nineties. To explain this development of personality, to analyze the process out of which it arises, to describe its stages, to correlate it with the ideals and institutions it gives birth to—this is the supreme task of social psychology.



## SOCIAL DARWINISM

PROFESSOR D. COLLIN WELLS

Dartmouth College

It is not my purpose to advance any new social thesis, or to present a statistical elaboration of the notions which I shall suggest in the course of this brief paper. It is rather my hope so to group certain queries as to provoke discussion, and thereby suggest lines of investigation to other students in this field.

In social biology we are quite deprived of the power to experiment, and our ability to come to any accurate knowledge of the processes of social life depends upon our control of statistical machinery, as soon as we ask questions not provided for in census schedules. This is incidentally, you see, a plea for the endowment of statistical research in the field of social biology.

Let me hasten to explain the term which I have borrowed from European writers to define the field to which I venture to call your attention, admitting at once that mine is only one of the approaches to the study of social phenomena. By "Social Darwinism" I do not mean those propositions of the doctrine of evolution which Darwin chiefly emphasized, in distinction from others which, in the opinion of later students like Weismann, he overlooked; but the general doctrine of the gradual appearance of new forms through variation; the struggle of superabundant forms; the elimination of those poorly fitted, and the survival of those better fitted, to the given environment; and the maintenance of racial efficiency only by incessant struggle and ruthless elimination.

Its leading propositions are then these: In the first place, there are always more individuals born than can possibly come to maturity and propagate their kind. This is a corollary from the limitations and accidents of the physical environment, and the fact that each species is the food of others. Secondly, many at birth vary considerably from the hereditary norm, and no two

individuals experience exactly identical conditions of life. Thirdly, those poorly adapted to their life-conditions are eliminated, while those more perfectly adapted survive to the reproductive age. This may be viewed as selection by the environment, but is often mere chance. Fourthly, the efficiency of the given type is easily reduced as the rate of elimination and the severity of the struggle are lowered since, in the fifth place, the survivors transmit their qualities to their descendants, whether these are above or below the racial average. We are not vitally concerned with the question whether this transmission through heredity is of congenital qualities only, or these modified by the life experiences of individuals previous to parenthood; nor with the question whether variations are by small individual differences, or by mutations as De Vries thinks. Through variation, adaptation, the struggle of competing forms, elimination, survival, and heredity, organic life undergoes a slow modification, age after age, in a process that results in extinction, or variety, and what we call progress.

This explanation of how the infinite variety and hierarchy of organic forms came about may be, and has been, applied, as by Spencer, to human institutions and types of thought. We may note the inherited element in them, their variation in each generation, the fierce struggle of competing forms, the elimination of the weaker forms that lie buried in history like extinct fossils, or are found as survivals in the civilized or savage societies of the present day; while in the line of progress we note the slow increment of favorable social variation, and the undoubted transmission of social acquirements in social heredity through the unbroken series of the generations. This is to consider human achievement as necessarily involved in the universal process, and not due to an intervening divinity or to the lawless whims of men.

We have been forced to a more vital and organic interpretation of history, and to the obvious conclusion that the activities of human society can be better understood in their simpler, ruder stages, where the lines are fewer and the outlines less compli-

cated. Such names as Morgan, Tylor, Lippert, Frazer, and Westernmarck at once occur to us in this connection.

But, while there is here an undoubted gain in perspective and in method of approach to the understanding of social institutions, it seems to me a serious question whether biological terms can with advantage be taken over into historical sociology. We expose ourselves to the danger of needlessly playing with analogies, when there are adequate terms at hand in common use with which to describe the course of institutional development. We may and must adopt the evolutionary point of view, but do not require the biological terminology.

The application which I make, however, of the term "Social Darwinism" is to an entirely different set of relations, where the biological terms are not analogies, but are entirely appropriate. It is in the field of social biology, and to the investigation of the manner in which social institutions and doctrines influence the competition, elimination, survival of individuals and groups of individuals. These phenomena are measurable in exact terms, since they merely involve organic relations of a high order of complexity. The pioneers in this field are, as you know, Galton and Karl Pearson in England, Steinmetz in Holland, Shallmayer and the contributors to *Ploetz's Archiv* in Germany.

Allow me to remark, in passing, that the relations to which I have just referred may be reversed when human types appear as the causal force which expresses itself in varying social forms and relations. We then have racial or anthropological sociology approached by the comparative or psychological method. It may tell us, for example, how Chinese social institutions are an expression of Chinese character, and proceed to compare them with the Japanese or English as racial products. It may show how these peoples recreate their institutions in a foreign soil, or modify them as they are themselves modified under alien influence. It may set out more exclusively from racial psychology, as does Vierkandt or Fouillée. With Lapouge and Ammon it may become an apotheosis of an assumed Aryan race; or, with H. S. Chamberlain, Wilser, and Woltmann, the cult of the god-

dess Germania—a divinity with golden hair, blue eyes, and long head.

At least one difficulty with many writers of this school is that they are apt to travel in a circle. They do not know the psychology of any people except from the very data which they forthwith deduce from that psychology. Many of their inductions are inferential, and their results uncertain and inconclusive.

With the reversed direction of forces it is otherwise. Social institutions effect human lives through marriage-rates, birth-rates, disease-rates, and death-rates, in ways that are entirely capable of measurement. The same is true of schools of thought or dominant social doctrines. These may weaken or strengthen a group or race in the struggle with competitors through their bearing upon the physical units concerned. An instance of this will make my meaning clear. It is probable, as was long ago suggested by the abbé Huc, that Thibetan Buddhism, through its quietism and prevalent celibacy, so undermined the people of Mongolia that the Mongols ceased to be an aggressive and conquering nation.

Our question is then this: What is the deposit of social phenomena in terms of population? How does the given social condition as a cause express itself in measurable modification of population as effect? How is the social factor correlated with the struggle, elimination, or survival of the physical units that are competing, and with the composite classes, nations, or races? The individual is always the concrete measurable fact primarily concerned, but by the summation of its component elements we arrive at the biology of the group. We are thus able to study the life-history of all competing social groups, whether these are institutional or racial, functional or genetic.

Human selection is now chiefly social selection. What we call society is the sieve by which human beings are sifted, and, as Steinmetz<sup>1</sup> says, the sociologist should know best its construction, and the process of sifting.

Allow me to indicate at once some of the problems of social biology that await a satisfactory solution. In part these are new

<sup>1</sup> *Wolf's Zeitschrift*, 1906.

problems, in part very old; but what is new in our age is their definite recognition and segregation, as well as the control of the only machinery adequate to their solution—the machinery of statistics.

First as to certain social habits. What is the effect of a large consumption of alcohol by a given group or people, when measured in terms of the individual as a physical creature, and by the number and quality of his offspring? What sort of lives are eliminated by this form of excess? It is usually assumed that these are the inferior beings, but it often seems to me that they are the best. In Germany they are devoting much scientific thought to this question, which is not a medical question only, as with Forel, but a statistical and evolutionary one. This consumption of alcohol among occidental peoples has attained unheard-of proportions. If this is a necessary characteristic of western civilization, what is the bearing of the fact upon our competition with the Chinese or Japanese, who are comparatively temperate? Reid's theory, that immunity is gradually acquired among a people by the elimination of individuals and stocks subject to this failing, is at least important enough to receive scientific consideration, and rejection or acceptance. This it has not, as far as I know, received. If it is a sound conclusion, it has important practical corollaries.

So with syphilis and other venereal diseases. What is their meaning in the biology of the individual and society? Are their victims eliminated? Is there any connection between all these and the increasing indications of comparative sterility among the highly civilized? With these is connected prostitution as a selective agency. How does this express itself in celibacy, disease, marriage, and birth-rates? We know the answer in single cases, but not statistically. We need, not inferences, but sound inductions based upon adequate data.

Again, we know but little about the effect in the directions indicated of a large consumption of narcotics, such as tobacco, opium, and cocaine. These certainly cause direct modification of nerves and tissues, and indirectly, as modes of outlay, curtail other and more vitally important expenditure of income. In the

competition of individuals, classes, and nations, what is the selective advantage of those who abstain from these things?

Secondly: What is the correlation between biological values and the kind and degree of education? During much the greater part of the existence of the human species the life and training of the child was in the open air. It was largely also a training of the muscles and senses. It was further ruthlessly severe in eliminating the physically weak and defective. We civilized people herd our children in close rooms for the best part of at least eight years, just at the critical period of adolescence, and endeavor through books to train the purely intellectual faculties. Here is certainly a selection for other qualities than those that formerly favored survival to maturity and the multiplication of similar beings. Is this educational selection one of the causes of civilization, or does it go far to explain its decay; or both? Are the intellectual qualities that our educational methods and much of our social system favor correlated with health and fecundity, or with weakness and extinction? With physical vigor or physical degeneration? What is their sequel in insanity, sterility, celibacy, and physical deterioration?

The graduates of our colleges, the more intellectual occupations, the better-trained social classes, and the more cultured nations have in common a high age at marriage, a low birth-rate, a large proportion of celibates, and a high suicide and insanity rate. We still await satisfactory investigations into the question raised by Francis Galton as to the generative implications of a highly intellectual life. How is it correlated with fertility and with the physical and mental qualities of offspring? What is the proportion of the abnormal or degenerate among the children of the highly gifted? What is the fact as to the alleged extinction of such stocks? Galton and Karl Pearson have indicated the methods that await a wider application in this field.

It is especially necessary that such investigations should be undertaken among that half of the community that is only just beginning to participate in our modern educational advantages. We do not know the biological effect upon girls of even a high-school training, or what penalty in celibacy, sterility, or ill-health

a college education for women may involve. Several foreign scholars have arrived at the conclusion that there is an alarming increase in the proportion of mothers unable to nurse their own infants among the better social classes. Though colleges for women have not been established long enough to afford an adequate statistical experience, such facts as we have are not encouraging from a biological point of view. Nor have we as yet learned much about the children and grandchildren of our women graduates.

Thirdly, as to certain social practices. We are expending upon the defectives and dependents vast sums, which must be earned by the more capable and thrifty, and constitute a serious financial burden. Are we in this multiplying the unfit and increasing their proportion in the community? We dismiss from our insane asylums twenty thousand persons every year, and allow them to re-enter family life. We train deaf-mutes and the blind to become self-supporting, and able to marry. We care for the chronic inebriate and pauper, periodically, and let them out to become, periodically, fathers and mothers. We shield those of criminal disposition by every device known to the law, until we are the most criminal people on the face of the earth.

What are the relative fertility of these classes and the character of their offspring? Mr. Dugdale in the *Jukes*, Dr. Jorger in "Die Familie Zero,"<sup>2</sup> Charles Booth, and others have merely made a beginning of the investigation required. Everything seems to indicate that stocks of a certain type of degeneracy do not die out. If this be so, our charities can be justified only on the condition that large numbers of individuals are not allowed to become parents. I hesitate to raise the same question in regard to some incidental results of modern hygiene and medicine. In so far as these concern those in later life, they do not come within our consideration. In fact, however, the improvements which science has brought about in death-rates are at the younger end of the scale. We have bettered those at ages below forty. Does anyone know what this may involve in terms of

<sup>2</sup> *Ploetz's Archiv*, Vol. II.

selection? The answer which most people would probably give to this query may be in the words of Toennies:

It is very rarely the hardy and robust natures that manifest a taste for books, eagerness for knowledge, pleasure in solitary reflection and creation, or skill of speech and mental power. On the other hand, we sometimes meet with extraordinary mental endowments in men and women who are afflicted with tuberculosis, curvature of the spine, etc., and are forced to lead a contemplative life that produces priceless treasures even in its too brief duration. How numerous are the poets, musicians, painters, philosophers, and savants that are short-lived! All of these considerations must rid us of the notion that the gifted constitute a normal variety needing only an average fertility, when mated with the equally gifted, to produce a special race of like endowment. In truth, the most capable women have fewer children and are for the most part little suited for motherhood, while the higher social strata must always be renewed from the reservoir of vitality among the people. Heredity of rank and power corresponds but poorly with inheritance of capacity, and degeneration, not infecundity, is the curse of every ruling caste.<sup>3</sup>

This is partially true, but does not answer the questions raised by the non-selective breeding of human beings on a large scale. The human species and its foremost races developed under a rigorous weeding-out of the weak. Is it a priori likely that it can be maintained in physical efficiency upon the cessation of that rigorous selection?

We may well question, at this point, the trend of socialism, as well as of trade-unionism in some of its aberrant, and it is to be hoped temporary, manifestations. If these tend to afford an equal chance of survival and of parenthood to the incapable and weak, to discourage the energetic and ambitious, directly or indirectly, they must in time have far-reaching effects upon population. Certainly some of their features promise to modify considerably the conditions of the struggle for supremacy among individuals, classes, and nations. In a recent paper upon "Migrations," Flinders Petrie remarks:

Migrations are the inevitable means of supplanting the less capable races by the more capable, as in all the past course of organic life. Every bar to the free leveling by peaceful migration, such as exclusion laws, is a confession of weakness and shows that a convulsive migration will occur so

<sup>3</sup> *Zur naturwissenschaftlichen Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 60.



soon as the pressure becomes strong enough. The only way to save a country from immigration is to increase the capabilities of its inhabitants by thorough weeding, so that other races cannot get a footing by competition or by force. The ideals of the present time: equality of wages, maintenance of the incapable by the capable, equal opportunities of life for children of bad stock as well as good stock, and the exclusion of the more economical labor, are the surest means of national extinction. The greatest of all problems to a true statesman would be to weed as thoroughly and remorselessly as nature does, with the minimum of disturbance and pain.

Mr. David Heron, in his *Draper Research Memoir*, concludes an elaborate statistical study of certain social coefficients of birth-rates as follows:

As far as the present investigation goes, it demonstrates, I think, conclusively, that for the London districts there is a very close relationship between undesirable social status and a high birth-rate. In districts where there is overcrowding, where there is a superabundance of the lowest type of labor, where it is needful to employ many young children in order to earn daily bread for the family, where infantile mortality is greatest, there the wives of reproductive ages have most children. Where there is more culture, as shown by a higher proportion of professional men; where there is more leisure and comfort, as shown by a higher percentage of domestic servants; where the traders who appeal to the improvident and thriftless are fewer in number, there the birth-rate is least. Again, where there is more general pauperism, where the signs of bad environment, like phthisis, are prevalent, where pauper lunatics are most plentiful, there the birth-rate is highest. Nor is the higher birth-rate of the undesirable elements compensated by a higher death-rate. The net fertility of the lower status remains higher than that of the superior status. The birth-rate of the abler and more capable stocks is decreasing relative to the mentally and physically feebler stocks.

One might raise the same questions in regard to heavy taxation, which appears to be the inevitable price of civilization. What part has it played in the decline of population through its effect upon vital phenomena, at the decay of the cultured nations of the past?

With this we arrive at the characteristic habit of civilized man, which is to live in cities. Existence in great cities involves a more radical revolution in the environment of the whole life than does modern education in the life of the child. It is the most significant phase of the present period of history and bulks

larger than in any previous age. It involves the substitution of the city alley for the forest path, and of the dark room for the open air. What is the selective meaning of all this? I do not refer particularly to the anthropological theories of Ammon and Lapouge, although I think they have raised some questions that, as yet, remain unanswered. The one fundamental question is this: Is a city population self-perpetuating? It seems to me that Hansen, Otto Seek, and Eduard Meyer have proved that such was not the case under earlier urban conditions. We have not established the contradictory proposition for the cities of today when we demonstrate that they now exhibit a surplus of births over deaths, as long as from a third to two-thirds of the urban population is born in the country and reaches the city at the age of marriage and of greatest fecundity. As well claim that stationary level in a reservoir proves that the evaporation and outflow just equal the capacity of the springs at the bottom—when all the time there is a running stream entering at the upper end. Even if improved hygiene, morals, and government should ever render a city population self-perpetuating, in the entire absence of immigration from outside, there yet remain a number of biological questions. What type of man, physically, mentally, and morally, will be favored by the new urban environment? Will physical deterioration be involved, as suggested by the "Report upon Physical Deterioration," and by the undue proportion of those rejected among European recruits for military service from the cities as compared with the country? Do the conditions of city life produce low stature, small lung capacity, defective eyesight, and feeble strength? Or, to refer to a matter upon which Dr. Ward has recently commented, what is the comparative contribution to ability of the urban and the rural-born? City life is, in part, factory life, and many of the same questions confront us as we survey our factory population. Here are involved, besides, dangerous trades, and the employment of women and children. What are to be the biological consequences of our vaunted industrial system?

On the other hand, what of the rural population from which the most energetic and capable have been drafted to go to the

cities and there to breed? We should naturally expect that deterioration would follow breeding from rejected individuals. As the royal report has it:

There is a current of the better and more adventurous people into the towns, and also a smaller reverse current of the feebler and less strong and fit, who are driven back to the land again, the rural districts becoming thus both the recruiting ground and the asylum of the towns.

All recent information from the rural communities of our older states indicate degeneration. This cannot be laid at the door of social environment, for men and women create this; or to natural conditions, for where immigrants have gone in to take the place of the native-born they are rearing large and prosperous families of industrious, frugal, and capable children. We are greatly in need here of a social-anthropological survey of families through several generations, including such of the members as have remained in the country as well as those who have migrated, so as to be able to account for every individual and have accurate knowledge of the life-history of the stocks. Here is a most attractive field for the endowment of research. The question at issue is fundamental. My own conviction is that in the past rural depopulation, and then rural degeneracy, have attended the growth of every civilization, until at length the drying-up of the stream that fed the cities has brought about the inevitable collapse when pressure came from ruder, but more vigorous, neighbors, since cities have been consumers and not producers of human beings. The causes assigned for the fall of empires have been mostly mere occasions.

Finally, what is the evolutionary value of certain ideals? Let us take individualism, the ideal of democracy, which has tacitly figured in many of the phenomena to which I have already referred. Let us go back to one—the higher education of women. This involves essentially the idea that women are individuals, with all the rights and privileges of personality, and not merely the mothers of persons. The two-child system, or the limitation of offspring, is, in part, based upon a recognition of this, in part due to ambition for the children, in part to physical inability of man or woman. Sidney Webb, in one of his letters

to the *London Times*, informs us that in one-third of the reported cases of restriction the cause was the unwillingness of the women to bear children. Steinmetz says: "I incline to the opinion that all higher culture must lead to limitation of offspring. Both the fear of diminishing welfare and the increased emotional sensitiveness make children seem undesirable."

The ideal of individualism demands of women years of education, late marriage, and certain leisure comforts and enjoyments afterward which are not compatible with a large family of children. Puritan families were large, but one is impressed by the mention of second or third wives in the accounts. It was a system of female sacrifice—not to ancestors, but to descendants.

Individualism as a social ideal also accounts for much of the behavior of men upon the family question. Ambition for riches, or power, or fame, or pleasure—all non-social in motive and likely to prove anti-social in their effects—lead men in ages of culture to postpone marriage or to forego it entirely. Francis Galton has recently said<sup>4</sup> that the obligation of sound people to marry and rear sound children may need the sanction of religion, since it is in fact the one imperative of evolutionary science.

It [Eugenics] must be introduced into the national consciousness like a new religion. The improvement of our stock seems to me to be one of the highest objects that we can reasonably attempt. We are ignorant of the ultimate destinies of humanity, but feel perfectly sure that it is as noble a work to raise its level, in the sense already explained, as it would be disgraceful to abase it. I see no impossibility in Eugenics becoming a religious dogma among mankind, but its details must first be worked out sedulously in the study.

Christianity seems to me to have put its emphasis upon qualities somewhat neglected in the age of its founder, such as fraternity, chastity, and spirituality, to the partial eclipse of conjugal affection, the family sense, and the economic qualities of honesty, frugality, and industry. The disastrous celibacy of the Roman church is one result of this; another is the present helplessness of Christianity before the disintegration that threatens

<sup>4</sup> *Sociological Papers*, Vol. I.

the family as well as our industrial life. Its original motives must be recovered from the rubbish of traditional emphasis, and these logically lead to much that is meant by Eugenics. They certainly negative drunkenness and immorality, while the doctrine of self-sacrifice may easily be extended to the obligation of parenthood for all healthy men and women, as well as to abstaining from marriage wherever mental or physical defects are involved. Physical soundness of self, offspring, and neighbors is not an un-Christian criterion of the moral quality of behavior.

In China and Japan the family obligation receives the sanction of ancestor-worship. Confucianism hinges immortality upon the observance of certain ceremonies before the memorial tablets by direct male descendants. Upon this ideal celibacy and the limitation of offspring are unthinkable. The whole social system is based upon family solidarity—upon the family rather than upon the individual. It is, indeed, a question whether this can survive when European individualism comes to offer itself to the Chinese as a competing ideal. Not merely will it threaten the system of ancestor-worship and modify the aspirations of the men; it will mean new and insistent claims on the part of women as they become infected with western notions. Is it not likely that the Chinese, too, will come to postpone marriage and limit their offspring? Or possibly Confucianism will triumph because it has a stronger social ideal and inspires a people of finer industrial qualities than our own.

This contrast illustrates clearly what I mean by the evolutionary meaning of ideals. Probably many of the social and religious ideals of the past have been of importance because of their biological results rather than by virtue of such superficial expressions as have attracted the attention of historians. Such I conceive to be the case with Mormonism and polygamy; the latter has proved inferior to monogamy in its exclusive regard for masculine individualism and in its defective family training of the young; while Mormonism, in spite of this defect in its original form, is strong in its insistence upon social solidarity. Protestant Christianity is inferior to both Judaism and Catholi-

cism from the standpoint of social biology, and these will gain upon it rapidly, in numbers, because their family life is sounder.

Neither individualism nor socialism, but "familyism" in the evolutionary, biological sense, seems to me to be the true social ideal. It involves all that is sound in ethics and wise in benevolence or business. What father, under the insights of this ideal, could wish his children to be children of millionaires, or avoid the family obligations that rest upon the well-to-do? As Karl Pearson has recently said:

The great problem is whether limitation has not begun at the wrong end. If a nation is to be strong, there must be wastage; the reckless and diseased must not be in a condition to multiply like the strong and able. At present the strong and able refrain from bringing into the world those who might render it harder for the weak to multiply. They apparently prefer that the weak—too often artificially maintained in workhouse, institute, and asylum—shall pass in and out, multiply and inherit the land. It is not race-suicide; it is degeneracy of type. What is needed is a national awakening, a sense of national duties, and the primary duty of women to raise strong and healthy children.

Men are not plants, and I cannot share the optimism of Luther Burbank as to the future of man in America; but they are animals, and subject, in part, to the laws that govern animal life. Men also have intelligence, and can recognize these laws and their application to themselves. Have they faith and courage enough to make the application?

I have not suggested a social philosophy, but some possibilities of a social science and a few of its applications to practical affairs. I acknowledge freely the bewildering complication of forces that makes the solution of such problems exceedingly difficult. Many of the functions of what we call society do, however, leave a deposit in population that can be measured. For this measurement we need costly and patient investigation of concrete phenomena, by which alone we can attain to a social science which may enable us to escape that physical deterioration which has hitherto attended all civilizations like a shadowing Nemesis.

## DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR LESTER F. WARD, BROWN UNIVERSITY

The fact that I was called upon last July to reply to a paper by M. Jacques Novicow entitled "Social Darwinism," at the London Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, is responsible for the mistake in allowing my name to be placed on the programme to discuss this paper by Professor Wells. I had written out my remarks made on that occasion, and, having kept them, it seemed possible that Professor Wells would follow the same lines as did M. Novicow, and that my reply would have been appropriate. I find myself, however, in a position not unlike that of the widow who kept her husband's door-plate because, as she said, she might possibly marry another man whose name was also John Brown.

In Europe, especially on the continent, there has been much discussion of what they call "social Darwinism." Not all scholars there agree as to what it is, but certainly none of them use the expression in the sense that Dr. Wells uses it. My written remarks, therefore, have no bearing upon his paper. Over there the discussion of this topic relates to two problems: first, the economic struggle, and, second, the race-struggle. Those who appear to defend this "social Darwinism" are biologists mainly and not sociologists at all. Most of the sociologists attack it, as it is there understood. Loria, for example, in his book on social problems has a chapter under the head "Social Darwinism," which is essentially a discussion of Malthusianism. Because Darwin admitted that he received suggestions from Malthus, many people have drawn the erroneous conclusion that Malthusianism may properly be called Darwinism.

The other sense in which the expression is used abroad relates to the race-struggle. The great writers on race-struggles never use the term "social Darwinism," but a number of sociologists have called them "social Darwinists" without knowing what Darwin really stood for. In my remarks upon this topic at London I answered a paper of this character in which M. Novicow, a prominent peace advocate, attacked the doctrine of race-struggles as a cause of social progress, because he considered this doctrine an apology for war, which in his eyes is a most odious institution.

In a word, continental sociologists have usually applied the term "social Darwinism" to two different but cognate doctrines—the economic struggle and the race-struggle, considered as factors of social progress; and in both cases they have felt called upon to combat the doctrine, the first as ignoring certain moral and intellectual factors, and the second as implying a defense of war. The first of these schools are essentially socialists, and the second, like Novicow, are peace reformers. Neither of them seems familiar with the nature of Darwin's teachings.

Professor Wells, however, deals with an entirely different problem, but one that needs just such elaboration because few sociologists and few of the general public are familiar with those fundamental biological concepts which he has presented, in spite of the fact that biological literature and what might be called biological philosophy are now very abundant. The paper of this morning treats also of the problem to which Galton, Karl Pearson, Ribot, Lombroso,

Ferri, and many others are devoting so much attention—namely, the physiological improvement of the race of men. One aspect of that problem was thoroughly discussed yesterday, and it is remarkable that neither the able paper of Professor Ross nor any of the discussions of that paper once alluded to the most important and best-established law of demography—that population is inversely proportional to intelligence. Of course, there are other things of which the same general principle is true. Suicide, insanity, crime, and vice increase as we rise in the scale of intelligence. You do not find them among animals, and you find them less among savages and lower classes than in the upper strata of society. It is lowest in the scale of organic life that we find the highest fecundity, and the law goes back through the entire animal kingdom until we have those Protozoans in which one individual may be the parent of millions of offspring. This law also extends upward to the very topmost layers of society and finds its maximum expression in the very few who have attained to that lofty realm of wisdom where they not only understand the teachings of eugenics, but are capable of applying them to family life.

The doctrine defended by Professor Wells is the most complete example of the oligocentric world-view which is coming to prevail in the higher classes of society, and would center the entire attention of the world upon an almost infinitesimal fraction of the human race and ignore all the rest. It is trying to polish up the gilded pinnacles of the social temple so as to make them shine a little more brightly, while utterly neglecting the great, coarse foundation stones upon which it rests. The education and preservation of the select few, of the higher classes, of the emerged hundredth, to the neglect of the submerged tenth and the rest of the ninety-nine hundredths of society, covers too small a field. I cannot bring myself to work contently in a field so narrow, however fascinating in itself. Perhaps mine is a "vaulting ambition," but I want a field that shall be broad enough to embrace the whole human race, and I would take no interest in sociology if I did not regard it as constituting such a field.

For an indefinite period yet to come society will continue to be recruited, as Mr. Benjamin Kidd well says, from the base. The swarming and spawning millions of the lower ranks will continue in the future as in the past to swamp all the fruits of intelligence and compel society to assimilate this mass of crude material as best it can. This is commonly looked upon as the deplorable consequence of the demographic law referred to, and it is said that society is doomed to hopeless degeneracy.

Is it possible to take any other view? I think it is, and the only consolation, the only hope, lies in the truth—I call it a truth without hesitation, although, so far as I am aware, I am the only one to emphasize it, and perhaps the only one to accept it—that, so far as the native capacity, the potential quality, the "promise and potency," of a higher life are concerned, those swarming, spawning millions, the bottom layer of society, the proletariat, the working classes, the "hewers of wood and drawers of water," nay, even the denizens of the slums—that all these are by nature the peers of the boasted "aristocracy of brains" that now dominates society and looks down upon them, and the equals in all but privilege of the most enlightened teachers of eugenics.



PROFESSOR CARL KELSEY, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The time has come for all students to cease quibbling about the relative importance of heredity and environment—both absolute essentials to the life of every human being, and capable therefore of no such comparison. The increase of biological knowledge in the last half-century has given us more definite ideas as to what heredity is, and what it is not. But there is still enormous confusion resulting from the vagueness of the term "heredity." For the sake of clear thinking, in my judgment, this word should be used only to denote those physical characteristics which come to us through the germ cells of the parents. With the union of the germ cells and the beginning of the life of the child, heredity ends and environment begins. We know pretty definitely today that acquired characteristics are not passed on from generation to generation. This fact, along with many others which cannot be mentioned here, is reacting powerfully upon our social theories. We know today, thanks to the researches of our honored president, Dr. Ward, as well as to studies made by others, that social position is neither the index nor the guarantee of individual capacity. Ability is as likely to rise in the ranks of the most lowly as from those of the so-called better class. Here lies an argument for universal education that has as yet been scarcely utilized by our educators.

Another result of our studies is to weaken the belief in superior and inferior races. It now seems very probable that there is an approximate equality of mental ability among the various races, and that race differences are the result of different environments. This again throws an entirely new light upon the problem of immigration and makes restrictive barriers against healthy individuals a confession of weakness at some point. This statement is not to be interpreted as a belief in an absolute, free, and unrestricted immigration. Finally, our opinion as to the intellectual ability of women is likewise changed, and we need no longer discuss whether the education of women is worth while or not.

Society faces, therefore, the problem of the degenerate, whether the idiot or the individual (usually of the better-circumstanced classes) who misuses the opportunities given him. The problem of the physically unfit (by heredity) is, after all, relatively small, and may easily be borne if we but have the forethought to prevent the marriage of the physically unfit. The other problems are much more difficult to solve. Here we may pursue either the drastic method advocated by Dr. McKim in his book on *Heredity and Social Progress*, in which he practically advocates knocking the defectives on the head, or we may neglect the problem entirely and suffer the consequences. We may recognize its importance, but deal with it in the haphazard unco-ordinated method of the present; or we may adopt a more scientific policy, and endeavor to apply to existing knowledge social problems. It is toward this ideal that modern constructive philanthropy is trending, and it is this development of scientific methods which must be the object of the students of the problems so ably set forth in the paper of this morning.

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MR. WILLIAM H. ALLEN, GENERAL AGENT OF THE NEW YORK ASSOCIATION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONDITION OF THE POOR

I hope that Mrs. Spencer or Dr. Brackett will say what Mr. Devine would have said in reply to the statements of the morning, that modern charitable

work is making it easier for the unfit to survive. I wish to confine my own remarks to a suggestion concerning Dr. Wells' appeal for sociological inquiry. The misfortune of sociologists in being compelled to derive judgments from books, from other men's opinions, and from stray facts is analogous to the art of a certain sociologist mentioned in a current *Harper's Weekly*, who declared that he could tell a man's politics by looking at him. The crowd was very much impressed when he picked out a man who voted for McKinley, another who voted for Cleveland. One man whom he picked out as being a Bryan man, however, replied: "No I've been sick; that's the reason I look that way." Similarly, sociologists look at the poverty, overcrowdedness, wretchedness, and squalor of the East Side; they notice an increase in crime and vice among the immigrant Jews—and the decadence of the race is described in textbooks; the story goes on and on increasing in size, until someone else discovers that these same Jews are buying real estate, forcing superior races out of mercantile pursuits, and filling our high schools and colleges. Does anyone believe that competition is less rigorous because these sometime less fit have been enabled to survive?

The sociologist looks in upon an East Side class for defectives who come from the masses—criminal children, obviously anti-social—and criticizes the philanthropic effort that enables them to survive. He goes back again, six months later, and misses several of the most striking defectives. He learns that they are not in jail, but that they have passed on one, two, or three grades. He is told that the board of health physician removed some adenoids and enlarged tonsils, and that the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor took these children to the country, gave them fresh air night and day, gave them plenty of milk, plenty of bread, and made them normal, healthy, and hopeful.

Does anyone believe that competition is less active after the former defective pushes upward in his class and fights for first place? How many potentially normal children are condemned, by not having their physical defects removed, to the rank of defectives? No one knows. In the schools of New York 100,000 have been examined and 66,000 have been found in need of medical, dental, and ocular care or better nourishment. If this percentage is representative, it means that 400,000 children in New York schools need similar attention not now given. It means that 100,000 others in parochial and private schools and on the street need attention. Finally, it means that there are today in the factories, shops, and stores of New York City hundreds of thousands struggling against physical handicaps, which prevent them from deriving benefit from their schooling in proportion to the time and money spent upon them. Probably similar conditions exist elsewhere. I remember that in a small village school in Minnesota half the pupils could not be considered either physically or mentally normal.

Dr. Wells asks for the endowment of sociological research. If I should offer each university represented in this audience \$10,000 or \$100,000, you would applaud my munificence. But let me suggest what will be worth infinitely more, and I shall not even claim the title of benefactor. A movement is now on foot to secure for the National Bureau of Education an appropriation to enable it, not only to stimulate 500,000 teachers, but to secure throughout the country

original reports, which, when compiled and published, will reveal sociological data infinitely more valuable than would be possible from any private endowment. Let the federal government prepare and circulate series of questions, for instance, covering such matters of biological and sociological importance as come directly under the teacher's observation. This would mean the ultimate accumulation of an invaluable mass of instructive data such as no private enterprise could properly undertake. Unfortunately, the Bureau of Education is one of the departments of the federal government for which it is almost impossible to get any appropriations. You can get nearly as much money as you want for improving harbors, and discovering better methods of farming, or for distributing seeds; but a request for a few hundred thousand dollars for the Bureau of Education would provoke a storm of objections.

For a generation interest in sociological work has been concentrated in private enterprises or directed toward books and guesses. Meanwhile the study of facts in the possession of schools, health departments, and the offices of government officials has been neglected. When a national children's bureau was proposed, no effort was made to enlist the aid and the interest of state, city, and county superintendents, teachers, and trustees, who are in personal contact with the raw material of the inquiry. Recently, when it was proposed to establish a new bureau with a chief investigator and a staff of clerks, the President expressed sympathetic interest in the proposal that this child-study be conducted by the National Bureau of Education; that the position of this bureau be redefined; that it be given a programme commensurate with its opportunities; that teachers throughout the country be notified that they shall be expected to take an intelligent interest in all the conditions affecting child-life. There is momentum enough in this room to secure such recognition of the National Bureau of Education by an adequate appropriation. When a laboratory of this kind is established, we may be sure that among sociologists, as among school children, the competition to survive will be more strenuous, because the conditions of competition will be more equal.

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MRS. CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN

In this discussion of population, as in the discussion of Professor Ross's paper on the birth-rate, we dare not lose sight of the fundamental biological law that fecundity is inversely proportionate to individuation. The members of the society who do its specializing and higher sorts of work are necessarily less fecund than the rank and file of the people. It is not necessary that these higher kinds of work should be done by everybody, any more than the higher organic functions of seeing, hearing, and smelling shall be done in the human body by all the organs alike. Only a part of society need be and can be eyes and ears; the rest is mere meat and bones.

Nor must it be assumed that rearing enormous families is a greater social service than that performed by those highly specialized individuals who contribute to progress and to the increase of stock of human science and art and literature. Shakespeare's great service was to enrich the world with his works, the works of his mind, and whether he had many children is a matter of minor consequence. Similarly, Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote a great book. She had children

too—good children as children go—but her value to the world was through the book more than the children.

We should remember, when we see our modern women apparently unequal to the strain of specialized service and their personal functions also, that the trouble lies not in the specialization nor in the duties of wife and mother, but in the rudimentary conditions of our domestic economy, in the absurd and irrational organization of household life. There is no real reason why women should not be women, wives and mothers, and also members of society, performing that social service which is our first duty as human beings.

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G. W. COOKE, WAKEFIELD, MASS.

I wish to call attention to the fact that natural selection must work in a different manner among men than among animals. When the gregarious life appears, when speech is developed, when man organizes political institutions, however simple and undifferentiated they may be, the selective process is considerably changed in its mode of operation. Then conflict is no longer to the same extent between individuals but groups, and the social process makes the application of the law of natural selection in a strict sense an impossibility. This modification of that law is too little recognized by evolutionists, and they are led astray.

It may be true that it is harmful to the group that the defective are kept alive, but there is no other way in which the higher social motives can be cultivated. The law of sympathy is as imperative as the law of selection, and it is even more essential to the group in its more advanced stages.

It may be possible to attain as large results by the method of eugenics as its advocates assert; but there is one phase of their proposal which I have not seen noticed adequately, if at all. Wonderful results are produced with horses by the strict application of the law of selection. Can the same methods be applied by men in producing a higher human breed? It is very certain that men and women will not submit to that absolute control which is exercised on horses. If no attention were given to individual wishes and preferences, and this is essential to the proposed results, men would rebel. That the selective process can be applied by individuals themselves with the purpose of bettering the race there is no evidence to prove. It is a fine assumption, but one that gives little promise of regenerative results.

To my mind it is also a radically false assumption that a higher class can be produced in society by the selective process as artificially applied by man, whether called eugenics or by any other name. After all that is claimed in regard to genius in certain families, the patent fact remains that in no recorded instance has such superiority continued beyond eight generations. Eugenics suggests in-and-in-breeding, at least so far as concerns the intellectual or aristocratic class in view. The effect is physical, and then resultant intellectual, degeneration, which at last destroys the continuity of generations given to genius. On the other hand, if the selected individuals come from a wider range in society, the result is to destroy the superior mental grade, though physical vigor may be retained. Therefore, the practical problem of individual control, so absolutely

essential in horse-breeding, has in no measure been met by the advocates of eugenics.

In so far as I have been able to see, the selective process must include the whole of the given society and all its classes. No society has ever yet been able to elevate a class far above the level of the mass, and to do it permanently. It may do this temporarily, but only by a constant incorporation of new life from the lower grades. In fact, the true eugenics must contemplate the problem of advancing all classes together and the practical abolition of all classes. With the advent of the theory of universal education a new phase of social advance has appeared. The selective process clearly fails to work where we theoretically assume it ought to be operative. Under the influence of universal education no class can advance in real force far beyond any other. So long as all doors of social advance can be kept open we must expect that the wage-earning class will show as much promise as any other. If it does not, it is from want of opportunity, not from lack of capacity. In that class today there is as much thoughtfulness, as much studiousness, as in any to be found in American society. Even more than this may be said, for this class shows an openness to the real problems of the world's growth shown by no other in the same degree.

What we need, then, is a real universalization of education, and the opening of opportunity to all. Any other selective process misses the mark, and grants to the privileged what they have not earned and do not deserve. Until these conditions are met any theory of eugenics is petty in its nature and must prove ineffective.

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PROFESSOR E. A. ROSS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Strongly attracted as I am by the hopeful and noble views that have been expressed, I cannot but feel that Dr. Wells's is right. The theory that races are virtually equal in capacity leads to such monumental follies as lining the valleys of the South with the bones of half a million picked whites in order to improve the condition of four million unpicked blacks. I see no reason why races may not differ as much in moral and intellectual traits as obviously they do in bodily traits. Among those of the same race I think I detect great differences in capacity. Of course, the worth-grading of people is not to be identified for a moment with actual social rankings; but nevertheless they are there. In my classes, among students of equal opportunities, I am struck with the contrasts in character and in intellectual power. If such worth-differences exist, the recruiting of the stock from the worthier elements of a population is a supreme desideratum, and any practice that interferes with this presents a social problem. Consider the higher education and employment of women. A class of girls finishing a high school or normal are examined. Those that win high marks receive first-class certificates, get well placed, and are quite likely not to marry. Those with low marks find the extra-matrimonial path barred, and so nearly all marry and perpetuate their mediocrity. Is not this something to think about? Our girls used to marry men in order to reform them. I rejoice that this practice is passing away; for those who need reforming are probably less fitted for fatherhood than those who need it not. I am glad, also, that men of uncontrollable thirst are inexorably being eliminated from the more desirable

employments, and dropped to the rank of unskilled or casuals where they are little likely to mate or breed. On the man who is the victim of his own evil inclinations we squander much sympathy and effort that ought to be reserved for the worthier persons who are the victims of the evil inclinations of others. We war feebly against sin because so energetically against vice. As regards hell, there is something to be said for the open-door policy.

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PROFESSOR WELLS

I do not wish to be understood as being opposed to a wise philanthropy, but as insisting that our philanthropy cannot safely overlook the biological consequences of its activities. It should not favor the multiplication of weaklings, or put degenerate and defective human beings in a position to propagate their kind. Nor am I opposed to the widest measures of popular education; but I do believe that we must modify our methods. We need more industrial and manual features, shorter hours, more playgrounds and gymnastics, fewer subjects and a shorter period of training. In time we may get back to the saner notions of the Greeks upon these subjects. I suppose we must submit to the higher education of women. It appears inevitable; but it seems to me not yet proven that this education should be the same in kind and amount as that afforded to men. Not identical educational environment, but one nicely adapted to natures and needs, appears to me to be a sound ideal. These natures and needs are physical in great part, and not purely intellectual, and cannot be neglected without damage to the individual, the nation, and the race.

# INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE

## II

### LOCAL RELIEF SOCIETIES

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CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON

University of Chicago

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The most simple and primitive form of industrial insurance is found in the numerous mutual benefit associations which exist everywhere and under many forms. Some of these are aided by the employers and others are supported entirely by the contributions of the members. These mutual aid associations are the elementary school of thrift, of brotherhood, and of the future social policy which is growing up within these voluntary organizations. These societies rarely have any centralized organization to bind them together, the state does not recognize their existence until they become federated and important, and their by-laws have no direction from actuarial experts. They spring up spontaneously and by imitation in response to economic necessity, and they are found among wage-earners of many occupations and of many nationalities in our large cities. German, Scandinavian, Italian, and Hebrew immigrants find in their little unions protection and support in the hour of sickness and sorrow. The negroes have similar organizations and are greatly attached to them. Reliable statistics are not accessible, because there is no central office nor general system of reports. The administration is often changed and usually inadequate, while the bookkeeping is ordinarily very crude and unsatisfactory. It would be almost impossible to reduce their premiums and benefits to tabular form, because each society has its own peculiarities. All that is here attempted is to give a certain number of significant illustrations and to call attention to certain general tendencies.

*Mutual aid societies of immigrants from Europe.*—In a foreign land and among strangers the poorer immigrants seek

fellowship, encouragement, and care among those who understand their language and sing the songs of fatherland. In the large cities the people of the same race or nationality establish societies of a charitable nature in order to succor their countrymen who have not yet won a secure place and means of self-support. Those who have lived in this country some time and have become prosperous are proud to relieve the distress of those recently arrived. Public relief and the alms of other races are felt to be disgraceful, and soon the industrious immigrants prefer to aid each other through contributions to a mutual benefit society where the thought of alms is not present. For some time the benefit societies retain something of the character of their origin in charitable relief, but the tendency is to remove them as fast as possible from this ground. Naturally these independent new citizens associate themselves with persons of their own race and language. This tendency is fostered by the fact that immigrants often form "colonies" of members of the same nationality and religious confession, and thus we have Bohemian or Italian quarters and sometimes a Ghetto. Frequently these colonies contain thousands of persons who come from the same land, speak the same tongue, and worship after the same ritual. The Russian Jews dwell in the same region of a city, the Italians are for the most part Catholics, and the Bohemians are Catholic or free-thinkers. It follows very naturally that many of these local societies are composed of families of the same language and religion. The synagogue or church may easily become the social center of the organization, and on festival occasions the place of public worship may witness their ceremonies and incidentally advertise their advantages.

In the city of Philadelphia, in the year 1892, was founded the society of the Independent Chevra Kadisho, whose purpose was to furnish poor families with money for funeral expenses. It has about 3,000 members, each of whom pays ten cents each month as dues. There are three other societies of a similar character in the city. Mr. Bernheim tells us that the lodges furnish social recreation and contribute materially to the elevation of the social condition of the residents of a Ghetto. Various branches



of the brotherhoods extend in every direction and there are few families which are not connected with some organization. The Ghetto in Chicago contains seventy-five registered lodges, of which thirty-two belong to the federation B'rith Abraham and twenty to the Western Star, and others to less conspicuous unions. In this respect they resemble the lodges so popular among their Christian neighbors which furnish life insurance to their members and so render an important economic service which is the principal ground for their existence. Here we see a common tendency to federate local lodges into larger societies or brotherhoods, a form of union which will be studied more closely in the chapter which will follow later on "Fraternal Benefit Societies."

*Mutual benefit societies in mercantile establishments.*—Common employment in the same house furnishes a convenient basis for organization of a mutual benefit society in a simple and imperfect form. Here again the mutual benefit fund is established to avoid dependence on charitable appeals. Wherever people come together in considerable numbers and with moderate and small incomes, a prolonged illness, a serious accident and the extraordinary demands of a funeral inevitably start someone to collect money to meet the emergency. This instinctive appeal to humanity is enforced by the reflection that no one knows who may require assistance next. The employer is usually asked to contribute to this fund. But the whole arrangement is unsatisfactory. The liberal pay relatively much, the stingy shirk duty, yet will sometimes make heavy demands when trouble strikes them, while the vicious or thriftless make special burdens for others. It is found that a regular payment provides a fund, even if a small one, that it lasts longer than spasmodic charity, that it distributes the burden more fairly, and that no one feels himself disgraced by taking his share when it becomes necessary. Without attempting any classification a few examples will illustrate the variety of methods and the general tendencies of this type of mutual benefit associations.

The Employees' Mutual Benefit Association of the department store of Carson, Pirie, Scott & Company, Chicago, is a

specimen of this group. This association was founded in the year 1895. All employees of the firm are eligible for membership. The officers are elected by the members, and the element of self-government is strong. The members are divided into two classes: (1) Class A, composed of those who receive more than \$5 weekly wages; (2) Class B, those who receive \$5 or less. The initiation fees are \$1 and 50 cents, the monthly dues are 35 cents and 15 cents, which are collected by the simple process of deducting the dues from payments of wages. The sick benefits are \$6 or \$3, according to the class, paid during 6 weeks after the first week. The death benefits are \$100 or \$50, paid out of a fund raised by assessments of 25 and 15 cents on the occasion of a death. In a report of January 1, 1906, it is said that there were 790 members, an increase from 525 of the year before. On April 18, 1906, there were 1,056 members, indicating a rapid growth. During the year 1905 the expenditures for sick benefits were \$3,194; funeral expenses, \$100; medical attendance, \$142.50; costs of administration, \$75.50; charitable relief, \$25. Of the members 394 participated in benefits during 1905. The entire expenditures since the establishment of the fund had been \$20,870.37. Membership is voluntary. Significant is the opinion of the administrator of this fund based on his observation of its value and limitations. He has reached the judgment that the success of the fund proves that it is desirable to secure sickness insurance at low cost. In order to be successful a benefit society must meet all claims promptly after careful investigation. What is good for a few must be good for all wage-earners, and therefore he recommends that the state levy a small tax on all employers according to the number of their employees. The premiums should be fixed by a competent actuary according to the rates of wages paid. From this tax a fund would furnish safer and cheaper sickness and invalidity insurance and death benefits than could be furnished by fraternal organizations. Branch societies could be organized and administered by unsalaried officers in each store and factory, and in each office the premiums could be collected and the benefits paid out. In case of change of employment the employee could be transferred

to the society of the place to which he goes. The only condition of membership would be employment in some particular enterprise. One consequence of this arrangement would be that an employee would rarely desert his position without good reason and thus lose his claims by a strike or unworthy conduct. Many employers already expend considerable sums for charity and for protection against strikes which might much more profitably be paid out in insurance. The state as well as employers would derive advantage from this organization because the tendency would be to diminish the causes of social disturbance. This opinion is given at this point as an indication of the influence of practical administration of such funds on a business man. Criticism is reserved for a suitable place.

The Siegel-Cooper Company Employees' Association was organized in Chicago in 1893, and later an association was formed among the employees of the house of this firm in New York. Only employees of the firm can become members of the society. The members are divided into four classes according to their rates of wages; and the contributions are scaled in the same way: wages per week, \$2.50 or less, 10 cents monthly dues; wages \$2.50 to \$5, 20 cents; wages \$5.01 to \$9.99, 30 cents; wages \$10 and over, 40 cents monthly. When the fund falls below \$500 an assessment of 25 cents per member is levied to provide means. The benefits received are free medical care and \$5 weekly sick benefits during six weeks for those whose wages are over \$10 weekly and half wages for the others. In cases of chronic disease no benefits are paid. In exceptional cases a gratuity of not more than \$50 is paid to needy members who are sick. Death benefits of \$100 in the higher classes and \$50 in the two lower classes are paid, but lower sums in case dues have not been paid a full year.

The Mutual Aid Association of employees of J. H. Williams & Company, Brooklyn, New York, was formed in 1901. The members, who are employees of the firm, are divided into two classes according as their wages are above or below \$12 weekly, and the weekly dues are 20 and 10 cents. The benefits paid are \$11 weekly in the first class and \$6 in the second class. During

the first week of inability to work nothing is paid. The member must pay dues six weeks before he can receive benefits. During six weeks the person disabled receives the full benefit and if the sickness continues the rate is reduced to one-half and paid for twenty weeks. The total amount which one member can receive is limited to \$176 in the first class and to \$96 in the second class. A member who leaves the employment of the firm after he has paid dues for a full year without having drawn upon the fund receives back one-half of the sum he has contributed to the fund. The family of a member who dies after having paid dues six months receives \$50 death benefit, and if he has been a member one year the family is paid \$100. In case of the funeral of a member \$5 may be expended for flowers, but no other gratuities are permitted.

The Sherwin-Williams Employees' Mutual Benefit Society admits only employees of the firm, and membership is voluntary. The members agree to permit the paymaster of the firm to deduct from the weekly wages one cent from each dollar due where the wages are under \$10. The benefits cannot exceed one-half the wages of \$10, and none are paid during the first week of absence from work. Where the disability is caused by vice or drunkenness no sick benefit is paid. The death benefit is \$25.

The Mutual Benefit Association of the Cleveland Hardware Company, according to the by-laws of 1901, has two classes of members, "Seniors," who are over 19 years of age, and "Juniors," who are under 19 years. The weekly dues are 25 and 12½ cents, according to the class. The senior members receive in sickness \$6 for two weeks, \$5 during twelve weeks, \$2.50 per week for the next thirteen weeks, and \$1 per month during the remainder of the illness. The period of payment of benefit is limited to twenty-six successive weeks in any one year. The Junior members receive half as much as the Seniors. At the death of a member an assessment of 50 or 25 cents, according to class, is levied. Drunkenness and immorality exclude the sick member from participation in the benefits. This is an almost universal rule in such associations. It is a rule which may be necessary, but it must be examined critically as to its justice, for

it does not seem fair to accept the dues for a long time and then refuse to pay benefits. It would seem that at least part of the contributions should be returned to such persons. The German insurance law formerly contained this rule, but it has been changed. No person needs more medical care, even in the public interest, than one afflicted with a contagious disease, no matter how it has been caused. The necessity for the rule reveals a radical and incurable defect in all merely local insurance funds.

The Brown & Sharp Mutual Relief Association, Providence, Rhode Island, was organized September 10, 1886. The officers, chosen by the members, are president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and directors. The president appoints visiting committees who visit the sick in order to manifest fraternal interest and, incidentally, to prevent fraud of malingerers. Membership is open only to employees of the firm. Members of the first class, receiving over \$8 weekly wages, pay 5 cents weekly dues, and members of the second class, receiving less than \$8 per week, pay  $2\frac{1}{2}$  cents weekly dues. The dues are collected monthly by the secretary. In order to cover unusual drafts on the funds an assessment of 50 cents in the first class and 25 cents in the second class may be levied by the directors, but not more than twice in any one year. Higher assessments can be laid only by a two-thirds vote of the members. The sick benefits are \$1 and 50 cents daily, according to class, paid during thirteen weeks, Sundays not included. A person must pay dues four weeks before he is entitled to receive benefits. Immoral conduct excludes from rights to benefits.

The Clerk's Benefit Society of Montgomery Ward & Company, Chicago, receives a small contribution from the firm. Membership is voluntary and there are between four hundred and five hundred members. A reserve fund of \$1,000 to \$3,000 is kept. Members of class A are employees of the male sex over 18 years of age, and female employees who are accepted by the board of directors; members of class B are male employees under 18 years of age and female employees not eligible for class A. The entrance fee is \$1 and the monthly dues are 50 and 25 cents. The weekly sick benefit is \$10 or \$5, and is paid for thirteen

weeks beginning with the fourth day of absence from work; but benefits may not exceed the wages. When a member of class A dies, each member of this class pays an assessment of \$1, and each member of class B pays 50 cents; and when a member of class B dies, each member of class A pays 50 cents and each member of class B pays 25 cents to pay death benefit. The secretary receives \$50 yearly for his services.

The Seroco Mutual Benefit Association (employees of Sears, Roebuck & Company, Chicago). The employees are divided into two classes: class A consisting of those who receive weekly wages of \$9 or more and class B, those whose weekly wages are under \$9. The monthly dues are graded according to the wages, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, or 60 cents. The assessment to provide benefit on the occasion of a death is the amount of dues for one month. Membership is voluntary. Sick benefits are paid according to the wage group, after three days for eight weeks:

Weekly Wages	Weekly Sick Benefit	Death Benefit
Under \$4 .....	\$ 2	\$ 25
\$ 4-\$ 6 .....	4	50
6- 9 .....	6	75
9- 12 .....	8	100
12- 15 .....	10	125
15 and above .....	12	150

The administration is conducted by a president and the other customary officers and five directors who must be foremen of the firm. The president of the society sends a circular letter to each new employee and advises him to become a member of the society and describes the advantages it offers. From one of these circulars we may learn something of the motives of the organization:

In nearly all large institutions where many people are employed, and who become closely allied with each other in the daily routine of their work, it is customary when a co-worker has the misfortune to become incapacitated for work to render him such financial aid as is possible by "passing the hat" or raising money by subscription. To overcome such conditions in our house the Seroco Mutual Benefit Association was organized on June 1, 1902. A member is not a subject of charity, as he pays for what he receives. . . . From the

standpoint of insurance, the rates are much lower than similar insurance can be procured for from any regular insurance company; furthermore, there is no company that will issue a policy covering all the conditions at such a small cost as the S. M. B. A. offers, and our society, being conducted virtually without expense, makes it possible to give its members such liberal returns.

The application for membership includes a statement which is intended to show what physical infirmities affect the health of the applicant and to exclude those who suffer from rheumatism, cancer, heart disease, insanity, consumption, paralysis, or apoplexy. The association is virtually self-supporting and not dependent on contributions from the firm. Since May, 1905, no initiation fee has been required. The firm supplies free printing and stationery, free services of the visiting nurses from the hospital department, and medical attendance of the physicians in service of the company. Higher officials pay dues but do not receive benefits from the fund, since their salaries are continued during illness. The manager of the society says that his experience has taught him that "the laboring classes are not quick to discern what is undoubtedly a great benefit to them." Since membership is voluntary, only 2,610 out of 7,500 employees have become members. It is suggested that many of them prefer to insure themselves in regular insurance companies and with fraternities to which they have social attachments. The manager says that at the time of writing the expenditures were in excess of receipts, and they were considering more stringent rules for the exclusion of persons affected by rheumatism and tuberculosis. The manager admits the desirability of insurance which has the generality, safety, and adequacy of the German methods of private insurance associations organized under state laws, which at once make insurance obligatory on all and provide means for meeting the obligations. But he, like most American business men, with the instinctive feeling that government is a necessary evil, shrinks from state "compulsion," although he clearly sees that nothing short of state requirement will ever guarantee needed protection to all wage-earners. It is the attitude of the typical American. The results of this association are indicated in the report:

Year Ending	Payments	Expenditures	Membership
May 1, 1903.....	\$ 3,404.18	\$ 2,230.93	972
" 1, 1904.....	5,200.70	3,747.95	1,150
" 1, 1905.....	5,949.80	4,137.00	1,350
" 1, 1906.....	8,486.80	6,369.95	2,275
Total .....	\$23,041.48	\$16,485.83	2,610*

\* June 1, 1903

These figures indicate a steady growth and considerable satisfaction with the administration; perhaps some pressure from the firm.

The Solvay Mutual Benefit Society, Geddes, New York, was organized in 1888, and the by-laws were revised in 1905. The members elect twelve trustees, and these choose the president and vice-president. The treasurer and physician are appointed by the firm and are paid by the society. The society is not responsible for the payment of the services of physicians other than their own. The members must pass a medical examination before being admitted and only employees of the firm are eligible for membership. The admission fee is 90 cents and the monthly dues 30 cents. The employees who earn less than \$5 weekly wages pay half the rate and receive half the ordinary benefits. The dues and fees are collected by the cashier of the firm who retains the amount from the payroll in accordance with a previous agreement. A new member does not receive sick or accident benefits until he has paid dues 90 days. Members who receive over \$5 weekly have during illness or disability to work on account of accident \$6 weekly; others receive only half as much, and the period of payment of benefits is twenty-six weeks. There is no further protection, and nothing is paid in benefits during the first week of disability. A member sick with small-pox is attended by a physician not connected with the society and during his disability is paid his sick benefit. If a member is placed in quarantine he is paid his benefit, but may not permit visits in his house. A member affected by venereal disorders or who is a drunkard is excluded from the benefits. The firm makes no direct contribution to the fund. The death benefit paid to the family is \$100; the husband being paid \$50 for funeral



expenses in case of the death of his wife. Benefits cease after twenty-six weeks. The nurse is paid by the society \$1 each night of service. Extra assessments may be levied on members by the vote of two-thirds of the trustees.

The Estey Organ Company Benefit Association, Brattleboro, Vermont, was organized in 1902. The ordinary yearly dues are \$1, and an assessment of \$1 may be levied. The firm contributes to the fund 20 per cent. of the payments made by the members. The executive committee has three members of whom two are chosen by the employees and one by the firm. A sick benefit of \$1 daily is paid during ten weeks, Sundays excepted. A death benefit of \$60 is paid to the family of a deceased member.

Allis Mutual Aid Society, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In the introduction to the by-laws we find an explanation which is applicable to all organizations of this kind which are efforts to escape from charity methods. The founders of this society had for their purpose to furnish aid in time of need without carrying around a begging list, and to give help on the basis of a business contract. The initiation fee is 50 cents, the monthly dues 25 cents, and extra assessments may be levied. Sick benefit, after the first week of illness, is 75 cents daily up to 90 days, and gratuitous medical attendance is furnished. The death benefit is \$100. In the report for April 15, 1901, it was shown that \$4,204.75 had been received from members, \$3,993.93 from the firm, and that \$9,026.56 had been expended.

The Deering Workmen Mutual Benefit Association, Chicago, requires an entrance fee of 50 cents, fortnightly dues of 15 cents, and a yearly payment of 10 cents for administration; and also an assessment of 10 cents on the occasion of a death or when the fund falls below \$150. A sick benefit of \$5 after the first week during eight weeks is paid, or longer by special vote of the trustees. The death benefit is \$50.

The Natural Food Company Relief Association, Niagara Falls, New York, collects weekly dues of 5 and 2½ cents according to wage rate, over or under \$6.50 per week; and the collection is made by deducting the dues from the fortnightly wage payments. The firm contributed as much as the members until the

fund reached \$1,000. An assessment of 50 or 25 cents may be levied according to wage class. The entrance fee is 50 cents. The sick benefit is a daily payment of \$1 or 50 cents during twelve weeks, after seven days, Sundays being excepted. The death benefit in the higher wage class is \$75 and in the lower \$37.50.

The Employees' Aid Association of the Moline Plow Company, Moline, Illinois, is a voluntary organization. Money is raised by assessments levied according to demand. Sick benefits are paid for twelve weeks after the first week, and not more than \$50 death benefit. In the report for the year ending January 2, 1906, it was said there were 513 members, 121 orders on the treasurer, 16 regular and 2 extra assessments, and \$1,865 benefits paid out.

In the Deere & Company Employee's Association, Moline, Illinois, membership is voluntary; the executive committee is elected by the members who are divided into two classes, the Senior whose wages are over \$7 weekly, and the Junior who receive less than \$7. The entrance fee is 25 cents; the assessment for paying indemnity is 25 or 15 cents. The weekly sick benefit is \$5 or \$3 weekly, after the first week, during twelve weeks; the funeral payment is \$25 or \$15. The report of December 9, 1905, mentions 582 members, 9 payments of funeral benefits, and 100 cases of aid to the sick. The average cost per member was \$3 and the total expenditures for the year \$2,041.80. The firm contributed \$250 to the fund.

Gas Company Mutual Aid Society, New York. Only employees of the corporation under 45 years of age, after medical examination, can become members. The mortuary fund must be invested either in federal, state, or municipal bonds, or in mortgages. Each member pays an entrance fee for medical examination of \$2, yearly dues of 50 cents for costs of administration, and monthly dues of 50 cents. The death benefit is \$300. If a member leaves the employment of the corporation, he receives back all he has paid into the mortuary fund. There is a Friendly Aid Society of employees whose members pay monthly dues of 30

cents and receive in sickness, after five days \$6 weekly during twelve weeks.

Osborne Relief Association, Auburn, New York, now a branch of the International Harvester Company. This society of employees was organized in 1878. In the first class, where wages are over \$1 per day, the monthly dues are 50 cents, while those in the lower wage class pay 25 cents. The weekly benefit in case of illness or disability caused by injury is \$6 during two weeks and afterward \$4 during twelve weeks; only by consent of the executive committee may the sick benefit be granted for a longer period. The death benefit is \$100.

The Mutual Aid Society of the McCormick Reaper Factory, Chicago, was organized in 1882. Employees of the firm, between 18 and 45 years of age, sound in body and mind, and moral in conduct, are eligible to membership. The entrance fee for new members is ordinarily \$3, but for those over 40 years and under 45 years it is \$5. The quarterly dues are \$1. Fines are imposed on members or officers of the society for the neglect of their duties. Assessments are levied to keep up the fund.

After the second week a weekly sick benefit of \$5 is paid during twenty-six weeks in the same year. A member placed in quarantine is paid his sick benefit. The funeral benefit is \$50. The by-laws are printed in both German and English, as many of the members are Germans. This is a significant fact in many localities, for the Germans generally are aware that in their fatherland the methods of insurance are vastly superior to those in this country, and they are quietly but steadily creating a public sentiment in favor of better plans.

The Garden City Sick Benefit Association of the painters in the Deering Works, Chicago. A new member pays 30 cents for entrance fee and must submit to a medical examination. When a member dies or his wife dies an assessment is levied for the fund. Sick benefits of \$5 are paid during thirteen weeks, unless the cause of the illness is vice or drunkenness. The funeral benefit in case of the death of a member or a member's wife is \$50, and \$10 are granted for flowers for the funeral.

The Adams & Westlake Employees' Benefit Association,

Chicago, was organized in 1888. A representative of the company administers the fund and membership is obligatory on all employees. All new employees must sign a contract as a condition of employment. Here as in some other cases we discover that "compulsory insurance" is not, as some claim, foreign to the American mind, when common-sense shows that it is a condition of efficient working of the plan; but compulsion by employers is apt to be more unfair than compulsion by law. The entrance fee in this association is 50 cents, or 25 cents for the lower wage class; the dividing line between the two classes being the rate of more or less than 12½ cents per hour. The monthly dues are 25 or 15 cents; the weekly sick benefit is \$6 or \$3.90, after the first week, during three weeks; and the death benefit is \$50 or \$30. The report for the year ending December 31, 1905, shows receipts, including \$150 from the company, of \$1,976. The expenditures were in ninety-six cases of sickness and two of death, \$1,363.00. In 1906 the receipts were doubled.

The Silversmiths' Beneficial Society, Providence, Rhode Island, was organized by the employees of the Gorham Manufacturing Company in 1889. The administration is conducted by elected representatives of the membership. The physician receives \$2 annually from each member, payable quarterly from the fund. The monthly dues are \$1; the weekly sick benefit, during the first week, is \$5 and during the following thirteen weeks \$10, then during twelve weeks it is \$5. The treasury pays the fees for surgical or medical treatment. At the end of the year all the money in the treasury is divided among the members. The membership reported was 397, and the expenditures during 1905 were \$2,397. The Silversmiths' Mutual Aid Society was organized in 1865, has 670 members, and paid out in 1905, \$6,112. The weekly dues are 20 or 12 cents according to wage class; sick benefits, \$4 for the first week, \$8 during thirteen weeks, and then \$4 during disability. The death benefit paid is \$40. In the second class half the rate of benefits prevails. The Gorham Manufacturing Company does not contribute to the fund of the association, but has its own pension fund.

The Elgin National Watch Company Employees' Aid Fund,

Elgin, Illinois. The object of this society is to provide sick, accident, and death benefits for employees of the company. The managers have an agreement with the society under which the company pays about \$5,000 each year to the fund, or about half the amount paid by the employees. Membership is voluntary, and the management rests with officers elected by the society itself. The men pay 25 cents and the women 15 cents monthly dues, and these dues are collected by the cashier of the firm by deductions from the payroll in accordance with the contract. The benefit paid after the first week during six months is \$1 per day, and for women 60 cents; the death benefit is \$50. The reserve fund may not fall below \$3,000 nor rise above \$5,000.

Quite similar arrangements are found among the employees of the Atlas Works, Indianapolis, Indiana, and of T. B. Laycock Manufacturing Company, in the same city, and with the National Cash Register Company of Dayton, Ohio, and Halle Bros., Cleveland, Ohio. Indeed, only a thorough investigation by the agents of the national government can adequately present the statistics of the numerous associations of this kind found in all parts of the nation.

Some of the street railway companies favor and aid the mutual benefit associations of their employees, although these societies have an independent and self-supporting existence. Thus there is the Chicago City Railway Employees' Mutual Aid Association, which was organized September 26, 1894. Any employee of the corporation may become a member after medical examination and payment of an entrance fee, if under 50 years of age. Any member may continue to retain his claim for benefits after leaving the employment of the company if he pays his dues, but he is not permitted to become a bartender or saloon-keeper. Any member who drinks alcoholic liquors to excess is first warned, and if he persists is expelled. The society elects directors and they choose the president, vice-president, and medical examiner. The dues are 50 cents a year and assessments are levied to cover the expenditures. The contributions are collected by the cashier of the company who deducts the amounts from wage payments and pays over the amount to the treasurer of the society. The

death benefit is \$500, whether the cause of death is accident or sickness.

*Defects and limitations of the local mutual aid associations.*—The principal evil in connection with these voluntary local societies is that they are generally organized and administered without the aid of competent actuaries and are utterly without scientific foundations. A new society copies the by-laws of an older society without any kind of understanding of the probable outcome of the plan. The state, which is just now so solicitous for the life insurance arrangements of rich insurers who are able to take care of their own interests, totally neglects these obscure, but well-meaning, insurance societies of the workingmen. For this reason many of the local societies are deprived of that scientific guidance which they so greatly need in order to make them safe and economical, and adapt their tariffs to age, sex, and conditions of employment. Usually the officers of the societies are honest, and even if they were thieves there would not be much to steal; at best they are without business knowledge and without acquaintance with actuarial requirements. Membership is purely voluntary in most cases, and the claims of members rest on no legal protection. There is no bond of connection, no federation, no system covering a large territory. An epidemic which prevails in a shop or neighborhood destroys the fund when it is most needed. If the officers are untrue to their trust they can be reached only through a tedious process, and it is cheaper to let them run away. The local society is, in respect to the state, an independent organization, not a part of a great body in which the union of members makes each secure. If a member moves from one place to another, he loses his insurance and all his rights. It is sometimes argued that we cannot have state insurance in the United States because our working population is so mobile; a moment's reflection will turn this fact into an unanswerable argument for compulsory insurance on the widest scale possible. Just because the wage-earners are so fond of going from place to place, just because they are forced by the rapid fluctuations and changes in industry to pass from employer to employer, is a general system desirable and even necessary to genuine

insurance. No doubt these societies are serving a good purpose in slightly mitigating the sufferings of families in distress, they are a little better than taking up collections; but they remain still on the borderland of charity, with much of the injustice, hardship, and uncertainty of dependence on gifts. Their best permanent service is to educate the nation to a sense of obligation to provide an adequate system of insurance for all citizens.

There is positive injustice in the arrangement whenever the burden of accident insurance is thrown on these local shop associations without substantial contributions of at least half the cost from the employers; for in such arrangements the modern principle of *risque professionnel* is completely ignored, and the workmen are compelled to bear unaided the cost of production which arises from injuries due to the industry.

Thus far neither employers nor workmen in this country have given much consideration to this aspect of the situation, and therefore the moral sense has not been wounded. But in no other great nation has this principle been so thoroughly set at naught as with us where the risks are greatest. It is altogether incredible that this injustice will long remain hidden, and the discussions of the last year have placed it in clearer light than ever before in our history.

It is to be hoped that the noble revelation of Miss Jane Addams will speedily help to work the cure of the disease which she describes.

In a Republic founded upon a revulsion from oppressive government we still keep the police close to their negative rôle of preserving order and arresting the criminal. The varied functions they perform in Germany would be impossible in America, because it would be hotly resented by the American business man who will not brook any governmental interference in industrial affairs. The inherited instinct that government is naturally oppressive, and that its inroads must be checked, has made it a matter of principle and patriotism to keep the functions of government more restricted and more military than has become true in military countries.

And then she pleads for the union of local pride in associated effort for the common good with patriotism itself and describes the genuine joy of immigrants in their societies of insurance, imperfect as we have seen they are.

Almost every Sunday in the Italian quarter in which I live various mutual benefit societies march with fife and drum and with a brave showing of banners, celebrating their achievement in having surrounded themselves by at least a thin wall of protection against disaster, upon having set up their mutual good will against the day of misfortune. These parades have all the emblems of patriotism; indeed, the associations present the primitive core of patriotism, brothers standing by each other against hostile forces from without. I assure you that no Fourth of July celebration, no rejoicing over the birth of an heir to the Italian throne, equals in heartiness and sincerity these simple celebrations. Again one longs to pour into the government of their adopted country all this affection and zeal, this real patriotism. A system of State insurance would be a very simple device and secure a large return.<sup>1</sup>

The state might well accept this genuine product of elementary patriotism, these little groups of brave pioneers, adopt their societies into a great and powerful system covering the land, and at the same time retain all the advantages of self-government in small societies in which men gain their best preparation for participation in the larger affairs of political action.

<sup>1</sup>*Newer Ideals of Peace*, pp. 90, 91.



# CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

## ARTICLE I—NAME

This society shall be known as the American Sociological Society.

## ARTICLE II—OBJECTS

The objects of this society shall be the encouragement of sociological research and discussion, and the promotion of intercourse between persons engaged in the scientific study of society.

## ARTICLE III—MEMBERSHIP

Any person may become a member of this society upon payment of Three Dollars, and may continue such by paying thereafter annually a fee of Three Dollars.

By a single payment of Fifty Dollars any person may become a life member of the society.

Each member is entitled to a copy of the current publications of the society.

## ARTICLE IV—OFFICERS

The officers of this society shall be a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, a Treasurer—elected at each annual meeting—and an Executive Committee consisting of the officers above mentioned *ex officio*, together with six elected members whose terms of office shall be three years; except that of those chosen at the first election two shall serve for but one year and two for two years.

The offices of Secretary and of Treasurer may be filled by the same person.

## ARTICLE V—ELECTION OF OFFICERS

All officers shall be elected only after nomination by a special committee of the society appointed by the Executive Committee; except that the officers for the first year shall be nominated by a committee of three, to be appointed by the chairman of the meeting at which this constitution is adopted.

All officers shall be elected by a majority vote of the members of the society present at the annual meeting.

## ARTICLE VI—DUTIES OF OFFICERS

The President of the society shall preside at all meetings of the society and of the Executive Committee, and shall perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him. In his absence his duties shall devolve, successively, upon the Vice-Presidents in the order of their election, upon the Secretary, and upon the Treasurer.

The Secretary shall keep the records of the society, and perform such other duties as the Executive Committee may assign to him.

The Treasurer shall receive and have the custody of the funds of the society, subject to the rules of the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee shall have charge of the general interests of the society, shall call regular and special meetings of the society, appropriate money, appoint committees and their chairman, with suitable powers, and in general possess the governing power in the society, except as otherwise specifically provided in this constitution. The Executive Committee shall have power to fill vacancies in its membership occasioned by death, resignation, or failure to elect, such appointees to hold office until the next annual election.

Five members shall constitute a quorum of the Executive Committee, and a majority vote of those members in attendance shall control its decisions.

#### ARTICLE VII—RESOLUTIONS

All resolutions to which objection is made shall be referred to the Executive Committee for its approval before submission to the vote of the society.

#### ARTICLE VIII—AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this constitutions shall be proposed by the Executive Committee and adopted by a majority vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting of the society.

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#### MEMBERS

- Aburatani, Jiro, 700 Park Ave., New York City.  
 Adams, Charles Francis, 23 Court St., Boston, Mass.  
 Adams, Frank S., Eureka, Cal.  
 Addams, Jane, Hull House, 335 S. Halsted St., Chicago, Ill.  
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## SOCIOLOGY AND THE OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES: A REJOINDER<sup>1</sup>

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Professor Small is again engaged in scientific warfare. His attack on this occasion is directed primarily against the social "specialisms;" secondarily it is evidently intended to put a quietus on certain claims of economics. What has moved Professor Small is the assumed independence and authority of existing social sciences. He would have these sciences apparently recognize the suzerainty and all-inclusiveness of sociology. From a manifesto issued some time since, under the title "The Relation between Sociology and the Other Social Sciences,"<sup>2</sup> is drawn the following statement of Professor Small's claims, and of the grounds upon which they rest:

"There is one great overtowering task of the human mind. That task is to find out the meaning of human experience."<sup>3</sup> Human experience is one related whole. "Each series is a function of all other human experiences that have occurred antecedent to it, and that are contemporary with it."<sup>4</sup> "Human experience therefore cannot be understood or explained if it is

<sup>1</sup> A paper read at a joint meeting of the Sociology and Political Economy Clubs of the University of Chicago, January, 1907.

<sup>2</sup> *Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, No. 1 (July, 1906).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XII, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

divided up for study into independent parts or isolated series."<sup>5</sup> "The moment we propose the question, What is the meaning of life? we imply an impeachment of the conception that the truth can be told about life if we divide it off into isolated unities."<sup>6</sup>

But this apparently is what independent social sciences are doing with life. As at present constituted and understood, these sciences are in the nature of isolated studies of particular materials or subject-matters.<sup>7</sup> Hence they tend to be scientific abortions, and their claims to authority in the interpretation of life are altogether unfounded.<sup>8</sup> Especially is this the case with political economy. "The economists have proceeded on the assumption that, being an economist, one thereby is at once social philosopher, moralist, and statesman to the extent necessary to furnish an authoritative interpretation of life."<sup>9</sup> This is

<sup>5</sup> "No single connected series of human experiences can explain itself. . . . Neither can any single cross-section of human experience explain itself, because it is a mere passing phase of a myriad series of causes and effects which are making the life of one moment and unmaking it the next."—*Journal of Sociology*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>7</sup> "The actual form and content of the social sciences, as we find them at any moment, are reflections of the limitations within which the thinkers have been willing to confine themselves."—*Ibid.*, p. 15.

"So long as we think of reality as cut up into detachable parts, which may be treated as entities in and of themselves, it is possible and natural to think of sciences of these parts of knowledge, clearly distinct from each other, and accurately definable in terms of the subject-matter which they monopolize."—*Ibid.*

"The primary significance of the sociologists is in this message to their fellow-scientists. . . . We shall never learn the meaning of human experience until we learn the meaning of all human experience. *You cut human experience into little abstract sections and thin layers, and when you have applied the microscope to them, you think that you have found the secret of life.*"—*Ibid.*, p. 18. Italics mine.

[Political economy] "deals with material things and the means of obtaining them."—*Ibid.*, p. 24. Italics mine.

<sup>8</sup> "When we have divided life up into an indefinite number of series of continuities, we have not found out the meaning of life. We have merely made the enigma of life more perplexing."—*Ibid.*, p. 19.

"Your abstractions will be abortions until you learn the meaning of them in relations to the living whole."—*Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

"Economists have gravely assumed that their economic knowledge qualifies them to settle all sorts of questions of public policy. . . . The most convenient case in point is General Walker's volume, *Political Economy*, published in 'The American Science Series for Schools and Colleges' in 1883."—*Ibid.*, p. 25.

absurd, since the economic problem is "merely a fragment of the problem of life."<sup>10</sup> "On its merits as a section of science, and not according to its capacity to stir up popular interest, political economy subtends relatively a very small angle of knowledge. *It deals with material things and the means of obtaining them.*"<sup>11</sup> "But things are merely preliminaries of life. They bear the same relation to life that dealing out rations to an army bears to fighting battles."<sup>12</sup> "If our problem is enlarged in scope from that of material gain, to that of the meaning of life in its whole intent and extent, the economic problem falls into a perspective which gives it very much the same relation to the life-problem at large that a supply of paint and a few yards of canvas would bear to the production of another Raphael."<sup>13</sup>

"We shall never learn the meaning of human experience until we have learned the meaning of *all* human experience."<sup>14</sup> "The problem of human knowledge is an endless task; first, of analyzing all the experiences of life into their elements; second, of reconstructing these elements in such a way that they will interpret each other to our understanding, as they do not to our direct observation."<sup>15</sup> Hence the need exists for a single all-inclusive social science, to which all others are allied and subordinate.<sup>16</sup> Such a science is sociology.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24. Italics mine.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>16</sup> "My argument, then, is that there is one great overpowering task of the human mind. That task is *to find out the meaning of human experience*. This is the inclusive, architectonic task of analysis, and then of synthesis, as we transfer knowledge into purpose."—*Ibid.*, p. 14.

"The problem of human knowledge is an endless task; first, of analyzing all the experiences of life into their elements; second, of reconstructing these elements in such a way that they will interpret each other to our understanding, as they do not to our direct observation. The sociologists are attorneys for this latter share of the process of knowledge."—*Ibid.*, p. 23.

"Many German political scientists apparently mean just what I do by sociology, when they use the term *Staatswissenschaft*." . . . "Interpreted by what some of them actually put into the term, it leaves out of the schedule nothing that occurs in human experience." . . . "The chief strategic method for which the sociologists are fighting is the interpretation of the parts of life by the whole of life."—*Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> If the writer has been guilty of any misinterpretation, it has been inadvertent. In case of any such misinterpretation cheerful retraction will be made. In the body of the argument reliance for statements of Professor Small's position

There is a certain vigor about this attack of Professor Small's that tends to carry conviction. There is also a convincing ring in his conclusions, for the human mind strains ever after unity. But in science we must not be rushed into conclusions nor charmed into acquiescence by poetic or philosophic art. In spite of Professor Small's vigorous argument and the charm of his conclusions, in spite of the highest faith in his fairness and in the breadth and depth of his scholarship, I believe that in this attack upon the independent social sciences he has fallen into a goodly number of grave errors of fact and of logic.

Among the errors of which I believe Professor Small to be guilty there are four which seem to me especially well worth considering in this connection. These concern (proceeding from the less to the more general): (1) the conception which economists have of the character and scope of their science; (2) the present actual basis of differentiation between the social sciences; (3) the scientific and practical possibility and desirability of independent social sciences; and (4) the possibility of a single all-inclusive science of human experience. With no special attempt to keep these topics distinct from one another, I shall consider them in this general order.

To one who has followed the development of economic science during the past twenty years the characterization of it by Professor Small is at least surprising. One is almost tempted to assume that, in his enthusiastic study of Adam Smith and General Walker, Professor Small has forgotten that economics, like other branches of social inquiry, has been undergoing constant revision in respect to its aim, scope, and method. Certainly no reputable economist of today would venture to furnish in the name of his science an "authoritative interpretation of life," nor, on the other hand, ought he to dream of defining economics as a science which "deals with material things and the means of obtaining them."

It is not to be denied, of course, that the economist, like other men and scientists, speaks his mind in matters involving philosophical, ethical, and political concern. He is inclined, indeed, is based on direct quotation. Any misinterpretations here therefore need not invalidate argument or conclusions.



on certain occasions to say to the philanthropists and statesmen of the hour: "You must," and "You must not." Nevertheless, I venture to affirm that he is a modest fellow enough, never dreaming of arrogating to himself the title and dignity of social philosopher. Unlike some others in the field, he is willing to admit the validity of independent research in the realms of morals, politics and philosophy; and he is willing also to admit the possible validity of conclusions reached by students in lines of research other than his own. In fact, if the economist can be said at times to assume in a measure the rôle of social philosopher, he does so unwillingly. It is because he recognizes, more clearly perhaps than his fellow-scientists, that we live in a world of action—a world in which decisions involving individual and social welfare *must* be frequently made; where neither individual nor society can wait months, years, perhaps generations, for evidence to be presented by social philosophers with undoubted credentials. In such crises the economist speaks and acts simply because he often seems to be the one who possesses evidence of a scientific and positive nature. Is anyone better qualified? Or, lacking such a one, should we leave social choice altogether unguided by the truths of science?

Even more unfortunate is Professor Small in his attack on economics and economists because of the alleged nature of the science. What is political economy? It would be a bold economist indeed who would today answer this question dogmatically. Economics is a world of intense ferment. The fundamental conceptions of the science are changing rapidly. So rapid indeed is the change that contemporary leaders find much of their early work robbed of all but its historical value. Mere authority under such circumstances should go for nothing. The face of every man should be set toward the future. Every student should be eagerly reaching out for new evidence and fresh facts. And at such a time Professor Small apparently accepts the dictum of a past generation concerning a fundamental of fundamentals.

The result is a definition that cannot fail of being thoroughly obnoxious to all reputable economists. Economists do not any longer speak of the material of the science as though certain facts

were its exclusive property. If they were bent on thus staking out the economic claim, they certainly would not confine their pre-emption merely to "material things and the means of getting them." They surely would attempt to include all things of value. But things of value are not merely the "rations" which are dealt out to the army, nor the "paint and canvas" for the picture. Would Professor Small deny value to activity of the army itself, to its organization and discipline; would he deny value to the picture, or even to the genius of "another Raphael"? If not, how can he ask credence for his definition of economics, or patience from those who are attacked on the basis of it?

But the economist is, after all, not the one chiefly injured by Professor Small's definition of his science. The social scientist, as such, should be the one most vigorously to protest. If a definition of this kind be allowed to stand, it is evident that a social science, as at present constituted, is something which deals with a particular body of facts, and that each social science is marked off from the others by the nature of the material with which it deals. It is to these assumptions that Professor Small has apparently committed himself in his definition of economics as "merely a fragment of the problem of life" dealing "with material things and the means of getting them." Such assumptions as these are of course contrary to the whole spirit of modern scientific thought, at least in the field of human action. The scientific spirit of today unequivocally condemns as archaic the notion that the facts of human experience can be parceled out to this and that science for exclusive examination.

Professor Small himself would be the first to deny the validity of the mode of distinction between social sciences for which he has become sponsor through his attack on economics. In this very manifesto he rails against the notion that human experience can be understood if it is cut up into "abstract sections and thin layers." The errors into which he has fallen have resulted apparently from a too strenuous attachment to the notion that distinct social sciences are incompatible with the understanding of human experience, and from too hasty deduction from this notion. Human experience is one whole. It must be studied as such.

Therefore sciences cannot be distinct. But they seem to be. Therefore they cut human experience up into "little abstract sections and thin layers." Here is a break in logic. Has it occurred to Professor Small that social sciences may be distinct and still not be distinguished by means of the material with which they deal?

The real ground of distinction between modern social sciences is, I take it, the fact that human experience presents to the observer a number of distinct problems. That is to say, human experience is capable of being viewed, and is habitually viewed, from the standpoint of many different interests, and presents thus many different aspects. To one man it is all a matter of ethical relations; to another, a struggle for wealth; to a third, a process of political institutional development; to a fourth, a congeries of aesthetic phenomena, etc., etc. To each of these observers human experience is a special problem to be explained. Each classifies its elements from the standpoint of his special interest or problem. Each seeks for the explanation of human experience as thus reconstructed about his own special interest. Each thus develops a social science. Each science thus developed is distinct. Still there is here no thinking of reality as cut up into detachable parts, which may be treated as entities in and of themselves; no dividing of life into "isolated unities." On the contrary, what we have here is a series of distinct and independent sciences, *each of which deals with human experience as a whole*; i. e., each of which interprets all other human experience in terms of one kind of human experience—or vice versa, as you please.

Such tends to be, I venture to assert, the real situation today in the realm of social science. It is no valid argument against this assertion that, as a matter of fact, certain social activities and institutions are usually assigned for examination to each of the recognized sciences. It is well understood that no science holds any material field except by virtue of squatter sovereignty. No ethical student, for example, hesitates to deal with the trust question, nor does the political scientist feel that he must slur over the political influence of monopolies, because trusts and

monopolies are current subjects in economic discussion. Nor are our conclusions invalidated by the fact that no single science has ever examined the whole field of social activity from its own special standpoint. Science is young, and scientists have been slow to learn the gentle art of co-operation. But it is a well-recognized fact that gradually each social science is annexing to itself an ever larger body of social facts. In short, each independent social science is in process of becoming an explanation of human experience in terms of some predominant human interest.

It must be admitted that it is somewhat difficult to define specifically the special standpoint of each of the recognized social sciences. This, however, is no necessary part of my task. So far as political economy is concerned, the difficulty does not seem to be great. Without wishing to dogmatize, I should venture to assume that this science deals with human activity and the social process from the standpoint of market choice or market valuation. Moreover, as thus conceived I should not hesitate to affirm that there is no single matter of fact within the whole realm of social activity that does not conceivably lie within the field of political economy; for there is no single social fact, from the esoteric cogitations of the social philosopher down to the mudsills of human experience, that may not in some way directly or remotely affect human choice in the market.

While, then, we may agree with Professor Small that human experience is one organic whole; that no part of it can be abstracted and examined separately with any hope of a complete, or even a partially undistorted, explanation of the whole of experience as such; that therefore social activity cannot give rise to a series of distinct sciences, each dealing with an abstract portion of human experience; still we may hold that human experience does present several relatively distinct aspects; that, as a whole, it can be examined separately with respect to each of these; and, as thus examined, it can and does give rise to a series of independent social sciences, each of which has as its material the whole social process—action and institution—in short, all social facts; and each of which is endeavoring to explain

human experience as such from the standpoint of some distinct and legitimate human interest.

The time has now come to turn defense into attack. In his eagerness to discredit the social "specialisms," Professor Small has fallen into the error of assuming altogether too much for sociology. From the manifesto are culled the following significant statements:

There is one great overpowering task of the human mind. That task is to find out the meaning of human experience. This is the inclusive architectonic task of analysis and then of synthesis.<sup>18</sup> . . . The problem of human knowledge is an endless task, first, of analyzing all the experiences of life into their elements; second, of reconstructing these elements in such a way that they will interpret each other to our understanding.<sup>19</sup> . . . The sociologists are attorneys for this latter share of the progress of knowledge.<sup>20</sup> . . . We shall never learn the meaning of human experience until we learn the meaning of *all* human experience.<sup>21</sup>

It seems clear from these and other statements that Professor Small intends to assert the desirability and possibility of sociology in the sense of a single all-inclusive social science. I intend to attack the validity of this assertion.

It is not quite clear on what grounds Professor Small would take his stand against independent social sciences as we have characterized them, and in favor of one science inclusive of them all. It seems hardly possible that he intends to deny the fact that human experience does present these distinct aspects or problems of which we have spoken. It must be, then, that he assumes that these aspects or problems are not scientifically independent. But such an assumption apparently can have but two reasonable interpretations in this connection. Either it must imply that human experience can be examined and explained from all of these aspects at once, or that there is some one supreme aspect or problem of life which includes and unifies all these special aspects and problems. If Professor Small accepts the first of these implications, I contend that he is setting up an ideal humanly and scientifically speaking impossible. If he adheres to the second, I

<sup>18</sup> *Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII p. 14.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

think I can show that he is allying himself with an outworn and scientifically discarded conception of life and its interpretation.

Science is essentially analysis and classification, or at least analysis and classification are essential processes in science. But analysis or classification on the basis of a plurality of principles is impossible. A simple example will make clear the present significance of this rather commonplace statement.

Suppose one were interested in the significance of human experience, ethically, aesthetically, and economically. Would it be possible to perform the "architectonic task of analysis and then of synthesis" on the basis of these three interests? Clearly it would not. You could view human experience as an ethical problem. Conceivably you could analyze human experience into its ethical, or its aesthetic, or its economic elements. But would this threefold analysis give you the elements of human experience from the combined standpoint of ethics, aesthetics, and economics? It seems not. But suppose somehow you could get human experience just analyzed into its elements—whatever that may mean. You could, of course, then classify these elements according to their ethical import. You could do the same separately for human experience viewed aesthetically and economically. Every element would thus appear in each separate classification. But then how could you conceivably unite these three classifications so as to get an ethico-aesthetico-economic arrangement or classification of your elements? Such a classification would be possible only on the assumption that the ethical, aesthetic, and economic values of any element were always equal. But any such supposition would of course be absurd. Human experience which, for example, is economically of very high value is often of very low value indeed from the standpoint of ethics and aesthetics.

To make this matter more concrete, let us take a very simple example. Suppose that we had before us a haphazard pile of apples, varying in color, size, and sweetness. We could take from the pile and put together all the apples of each color, and then we could arrange the color units or groups according to some color scheme. We could do the same for size and for

sweetness. That is to say, we could analyze this pile of apples into its elements, and classify these elements from the standpoint of color or size or sweetness. But now could we analyze the pile into color-size-sweetness elements? If we attempted this, we surely would find that apples of one color group or unit varied in sweetness and in size; that there were no such things possible as units of color-size-sweetness. Even if we were allowed to consider each apple as a unit, we should never be able to arrange or classify them at one and the same time, according to color, size, and sweetness. Very sweet apples would be of all sizes and colors, and very large apples of all colors and degrees of sweetness; etc., etc.

So with human experience. According to the interest of the observer, it is an expression of goodness or badness, beauty or ugliness, wealth or poverty, order or anarchy, freedom or determinism, of progressive adaptation physically or spiritually, morphologically or functionally; etc., etc. It can be viewed as a whole from a hundred different aspects, and as a whole analyzed and reconstructed with reference to any one of these. But it cannot be analyzed in part or as a whole from more than one aspect at a time, or reconstructed on the basis of more than one principle of classification at a time.

So long, then, as we assume the scientific plurality of human interests, and look upon social sciences as interpretations of human experience in terms of these interests, we are bound to think of them as relatively independent. One science may, of course, make use of the conclusions of another. That is to say, one science may examine the conclusions of another from its own peculiar view-point. Thus ethics may put its stamp upon the market-valuation process. But this does not destroy the independence of economics as a science. Such scientific interactivities are mutual. While ethics is judging the morality of the market-valuation process, economics is considering ethical standards in their relation to that process.

Moreover, once these assumptions are accepted there seems to be no scientific ground for any hierarchical arrangement of social sciences. If each science deals with all human experience, we

cannot speak of more or less general sciences from the standpoint of extent of material made use of. The mere fact that one science may in a way make use of the conclusions of another does not in itself subordinate either of them, as we have just seen. Finally, if we hold to our assumptions, there seems to be no case where one social science can be said to be elevated above others, as being a classification of their classifications or as bringing together for examination the results of their individual examinations. Where such a relationship appears to exist, careful examination will show, I think, that the sciences are not hierarchically arranged but lie, so to speak, in different planes.

Take as an example of this the relationship that exists between psychology and social sciences of valuation like economics and aesthetics. At first sight it might appear that the valuation process, as found in these other sciences, is special psychological material; that therefore these sciences are in a way special psychologies, and subordinate to psychology as such. The truth seems to be, however, that what psychology concerns itself with here is not the valuation process itself, but the mode of action of the mind engaged in the valuation process. The problems of economics and of aesthetics, therefore, can in no legitimate sense be considered as subordinate to psychological problems, nor can these sciences be looked upon as special psychologies.

This independence and practical equality of the sciences for which we have contended are supported by the practical ends of social investigation. Viewed from this standpoint, all social science is bound to be selective. This is a well-recognized characteristic of scientific method. We go to science because we wish to control the forces at hand so as to realize better some human purpose. What we seek is to comprehend the existing situation from the standpoint of the purpose or interest in question. It follows that all scientific investigation is bound to be highly specialized. We do not seek to understand the existing situation as a whole—i. e., in all its aspects and relations; that would be both practically useless and scientifically impossible; but we do seek to understand the situation in its relation to the interest at stake, the problem in hand. This is just as true, and



must be, of the sociologist who has risen above the level of mere narration or description, as of the economist or the moralist.

On practical grounds, then, as well as on the assumption that human experience presents scientifically distinct problems because different aspects of it cannot be scientifically examined all at once, sociology, if it signifies anything scientifically, must be simply a new independent social science based on a new principle of classification. We can leave to sociologists the statement of what that principle of classification really is. That is to say, we can let them fight the matter out among themselves.

But now I am perfectly aware that Professor Small is likely to say: All this is beside the point. I do not admit that your special aspects and problems of life are distinct and independent. Human experience is at bottom a unity. All these aspects and problems are bound up together in one unified whole. They all stand definitely related to each other and to the whole. There must then be a science of the whole in which these special problems and explanations—these special sciences—find their proper and subordinate places. In other words, the conception of a hierarchy of sciences is firmly based upon the fact that all problems of life are in the end aspects of one single problem—that human experience is one related whole.

All this sounds well. Its very familiarity tends to carry conviction. But it is just here that Professor Small is likely to make his final and most fatal mistake.

It is one thing to assert that human experience is one unified whole. It is quite another to assert that it can be scientifically apprehended as such. What is science? It is not mere immediate or intuitive realization. It is explanation, interpretation. But a thing cannot be explained in terms of itself. Identical statements do not explain each other. Therefore, in the very nature of things, there can be no single, *all-inclusive*, *all-sufficing* science of human experience in which all the facts "interpret each other to our understanding." So long as we introduce no extra-experiential element, the nearest we can get to this ideal is in the independent social science as it has been conceived of in this paper. In this all human experience is ideally included, but one

special phase of it is thought of as in a sense outside of and interpreting the rest of it. We can thus range over the field of human experience and interpret it as a whole many different times. But we have seen that it is impossible at one and the same time to think of more than one phase of it as outside and interpretative of the rest of it.<sup>22</sup>

If, then, there is to be a single, *all-inclusive, all-sufficient science* of human experience, the explanation must be in terms of something altogether outside this experience. In terms of what? Presumably in terms of some intuitively established end of life or ideal of society. But the initiatory assumption of such an end or ideal outside of human experience is altogether archaic and anti-scientific. Applied to society it brings in the Middle-Age conception of the Divine Architect engaged in the task of constructing on earth an ideal or absolute individual or social type.

Is it, then, to some such Middle-Age, theological conception that Professor Small comes in his insistence on the unity of social science as deduced from the unity of human experience? In his mind is there some one supreme, all-inclusive significance of life, outside of life, and therefore some one normal and exclusively valid scheme of relationship in human events? Is the task of social science to discover, through analysis and synthesis of all human experience, this ideal, typical, or normal relationship? Is this the "inclusive architectonic task" for which the sociologists are "attorneys"? If so, is the task a possible one? Can any analysis and synthesis of life discover what is not in life?

<sup>22</sup> The following most serviceable formulation of what I have here in mind I owe to Professor Henry W. Stuart, of Lake Forest University, to whom I am also indebted for many valuable suggestions in the preparation of this paper:

"Each social science is a science of all human experience in the sense that it is the science of everything it can see or conceive in the way of experience as objective or significant from its point of view. There is no limitation of the subject-matter *in* the subject-matter itself, but only a limitation and an emphasis that the point of view prescribes from *its* side." This must not be taken to mean that a thing can explain itself. "The purpose or interest from which all experience is studied in any given social science is a fact of experience to be sure, but when it is so taken as a point of view it is thereby made in a sense 'absolute,' and the rest of experience becomes objective, descriptive, categorized with reference to it, i. e., becomes its experience or experience of it."

Or shall we take the more poetic view? Shall we assume that Professor Small really has in mind an immediate and intuitive knowledge of all human experience, and that therefore he would have a science of it? Shall we, in short, liken him to the dreamers of the age of poetic theology? If so, we can find the parallel in Dante's *Paradise*, where he says:

I saw that in its depths is enclosed, bound up with love in one volume, that which is dispersed in leaves through the universe; substance and accident and their modes fused together as it were in such wise that that of which I speak is one simple light. The universal form of this knot I believe that I saw because in saying this I feel that I rejoice more spaciouly.<sup>23</sup>

But Dante found that this unity of which he dreamed and in which he believed was not capable of human expression. He confesses:

Thenceforward my vision was greater than our speech which yields to such a sight and the memory yields to such excess.<sup>24</sup>

Beyond doubt Professor Small will be inclined to treat lightly both the implied poetical and theological attributes of his proposed science of sociology. But he may not attempt to escape these implications through resort to such expressions as "the science of human personality," "interpretation of the process of becoming," "synthetic, co-ordinating conception," etc., etc. All social sciences are sciences of human personality; but a complete expression of human personality would not be science. All social sciences are interpretations of the process of becoming, but the attempt to interpret this process as such in terms of any extra-experiential end or ideal of life is theological rather than scientific in its essential nature. All sciences are synthetic, co-ordinating studies; but there can be no final or absolute synthesis of these synthetic studies, except on the basis of some extra-scientific presupposition—some standard of values intuitively or authoritatively established. In order, then, that we may have new cause to "rejoice more spaciouly," Professor Small must invent other phases to reach the eternal mystic that lies in the heart of all men. But rather would we have him descend to the matter-of-fact level of science. If he can bring

<sup>23</sup> Canto 33; Norton's translation.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

with him there his sociological ideal, he may be sure of a welcome for it.

I should be glad to stop here; but Professor Small's courtesy in standing out for an exchange of buffets certainly entitles him to a definite summarization of the points raised in this paper. Let the following declarative propositions therefore serve as a manifesto counter to his own:

1. Social sciences are not to be differentiated from one another on the basis of the special material or subject-matter of each.

2. All the facts of human experience may fall legitimately within the field of each of the independent social sciences.

3. Social sciences are therefore not examinations of isolated fragments of human experience, nor of sequences unrelated to human experience as a whole.

4. A social science is an examination and interpretation of human experience as such from some distinctive human standpoint, aspect, or interest; or it is an attempt to describe and explain or interpret human experience as it is ranged about and related to some one special interest which is for the time being regarded as the end of human experience and in a sense outside it.

5. It is only thus that human experience as such can be studied and comprehended, since analysis and classification of events cannot be made on the basis of a plurality of principles, nor can the whole of human experience explain itself as such.

6. There must, then, always be as many independent social sciences as there are important or legitimate human interests from which to view human experience.

7. Sociology itself, as a science—call it the science of human personality, or what you will—can be nothing but a study of human experience from the standpoint of some one interest; i. e., an explanation on the basis of one principle of classification.

8. Political economy is simply one of a series of social sciences.

9. It is an examination of human activity and institutions as related to a certain species of choice or value estimate which we call market.

10. As such it is not merely a study of material things and the means of getting them.

11. Just as there is no other fact in the whole realm of human experience that either may not have its influence, direct or indirect, in determining market choice, or be to a degree a resultant of market choice, so there is no fact in human experience that may not have its place in the field of economic study.

12. Present-day economists do not claim for themselves any special authority in the interpretation of life; they do not as economists claim to be social philosophers.

13. But economists, like all other scientists, are men with men's practical interests, and as men they offer their opinions in regard to social welfare, pending the time when others shall be better equipped; and,

14. Like sociologists, they sometimes state conclusions on the basis of insufficient data.

# INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE

## BENEFIT FEATURES OF THE TRADE-UNIONS

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In the United States, according to a recent list, there are in affiliation with the American Federation of Labor 113 national and international unions, organized in 23,631 lodges or local unions. The total membership was estimated at 1,500,000, but this estimate was not based on reliable statistics, and it is well known that the number of members fluctuates, sometimes rapidly, with changes in economic conditions. The accompanying table represents the names of the unions, their membership, and their total expenditures for various kinds of insurance for the year 1905.<sup>1</sup>

American Federation of Labor (local organizations) .....	28,600
Actors' National Protective Union of America .....	1,100
Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International Union of America..	12,000
Barbers' International Union, Journeymen .....	22,700
Bill Posters and Billers of America, National Alliance .....	1,400
Blacksmiths' International Brotherhood .....	10,000
Blast Furnace Workers and Smelters of America .....	1,500
Boiler Makers and Iron Ship Builders of America .....	13,400
Bookbinders' International Brotherhood .....	6,600
Boot and Shoe Workers' Union .....	32,000
Brewery Workmen, International Union of .....	34,000
Brick, Tile and Terra-Cotta Workers' Alliance, International .....	4,100
Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, International Association of .....	10,000
Broom and Whisk Makers' Union, International .....	1,000
Brushmakers' Union, International .....	700
Building Employees of America (in January, 1904, 800) .....	
Cap Makers of North America, United Cloth Hat and .....	2,600
Carpenters and Joiners of America, United Brotherhood of .....	143,200
Carpenters and Joiners, Amalgamated Society of .....	4,800
Carriage and Wagon Workers, International .....	3,200
Car Workers, International Association of .....	5,000
Cement Workers, American Brotherhood of .....	3,600
Chainmakers' National Union of the United States of America .....	600
Cigarmakers' International Union of America .....	41,400
Clerks' International Protective Association, Retail .....	50,000
Clerks, International Association of Railway (in January, 1904, 600)..	
Compressed Air Workers, International Union .....	1,200
Coopers' International Union of North America .....	5,600

<sup>1</sup> *Bulletin of the Department of Labor* (New York, 1906), p. 110; *Chicago Daily News Almanac*, 1906, pp. 114-16.

Curtain Operatives of America, Amalgamated Lace .....	700
Cutting Die and Cutter Makers' International Union .....	300
Electrical Workers of America, International Brotherhood .....	21,000
Elevator Constructors .....	2,200
Engineers' International Union, Steam .....	17,500
Expressmen, Brotherhood of Railway (in January, 1904, 300) .....	
Firemen, Stationary .....	12,200
Flour and Cereal Mill Employees .....	900
Foundry Employees .....	1,000
Freight Handlers and Warehousemen's Union .....	3,400
Fur Workers .....	400
Garment Workers of America .....	31,900
Garment Workers' Union, Ladies' .....	1,800
Glass Bottle Blowers' Association .....	7,000
Glass House Employees .....	200
Glass Snappers' Protective Association, Window .....	1,200
Glove Workers' Union .....	1,100
Gold Beaters' Protective Union .....	300
Granite Cutters' National Union .....	10,300
Hatters of North America, United .....	8,500
Hod Carriers' and Building Laborers Union .....	4,700
Horseshoers' Union, Journeymen .....	4,200
Hotel and Restaurant Employees' Alliance and Bartenders' League ....	38,700
Insulators and Asbestos Workers .....	300
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, Amalgamated Association of .....	10,000
Jewelry Workers' Union .....	700
Knife Grinders' Union, Table .....	300
Knife Blade Grinders' and Finishers' Union, Pocket .....	200
Lathers' International Union, Wood, Wire and Metal .....	4,300
Laundry Workers' Union, Shirt, Waist and .....	4,600
Leather Workers on Horse Goods .....	4,000
Leather Workers' Union, Amalgamated .....	1,000
Longshoremen's Association .....	47,800
Machinists, International Association of .....	48,500
Maintenance-of-Way Employees, International Brotherhood of .....	12,000
Marble Workers' Association .....	1,900
Mattress Spring and Bedding Workers' Union .....	1,500
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen .....	6,200
Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers and Brass Workers .....	10,300
Mine Managers and Assistants' Mutual Aid Association .....	400
Mine Workers of America, United .....	261,900
Molders' Union, Iron .....	30,000
Musicians, Federation of .....	30,800
Oil and Gas Well Workers .....	400
Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers, Brotherhood of .....	54,200
Paper Box, Bag and Novelty Workers' Union .....	900
Paper Makers, United Brotherhood of .....	5,000
Pattern Makers' League .....	3,600
Pavers and Rammermen, Union of .....	1,000
Paving Cutters' Union .....	1,300
Photo-Engravers' Union .....	2,200
Piano and Organ Workers' Union .....	9,000
Plumbers, Gas Fitters, Steam Fitters, Helpers' Association .....	15,000
Potters, Operative .....	5,600
Powder and High Explosive Workers .....	500
Print Cutters' Association .....	400
Printers and Color Mixers, Association of Machine .....	400
Printers' Association, Machine Textile .....	400
Printers' Union, Steel and Copperplate .....	1,100
Printers' Association .....	200

Printing Pressmen's Union .....	17,000
Roofers' Union, Slate and Tile .....	600
Quarry Workers' Union .....	3,600
Rubber Workers' Union .....	100
Sawsmiths' Union .....	300
Seamen's Union .....	19,500
Sheet Metal Workers' Union .....	13,000
Shingle Weavers' Union .....	1,600
Shipwrights, Joiners and Calkers .....	2,400
Slate Workers .....	900
Spinners' Cotton Mule Union .....	2,200
Stage Employees' Alliance, Theatrical .....	5,500
Stereotypers' and Electrotypers' Union .....	2,800
Stove Mounters' Union .....	1,500
Street and Electric Railway Employees' Association .....	30,000
Tack Makers' Union .....	200
Tailors' Union, Journeymen .....	16,000
Teamsters' Brotherhood .....	78,300
Telegraphers, Order of Railroad .....	15,000
Telegraphers' Union, Commercial .....	2,000
Textile Workers, United .....	10,000
Tile Layers and Helpers' Union, Ceramic, Mosaic and Encaustic .....	1,400
Tin Plate Workers' Protective Association .....	1,400
Tobacco Workers' Union .....	5,400
Travelers' Goods and Leather Novelty Workers' Union .....	1,300
Typographical Union .....	46,700
Upholsterers' Union .....	2,800
Watch Case Engravers' Association .....	300
Weavers' Association, Elastic Goring .....	100
Wire Weavers' Protective Association .....	300
Wood Carvers' Association .....	1,600
Woodsmen and Saw-Mill Workers' Brotherhood .....	1,100
Wood Workers' Union, Amalgamated .....	20,000
Total membership .....	1,494,300

During the year 1905 the national unions of the American Federation of Labor paid out in benefits as follows:

Death benefits .....	\$ 742,421.23
Death benefits (widows) .....	24,800.00
Sick benefits .....	582,874.13
Traveling expenses .....	62,989.71
Insurance of tools .....	5,180.41
Out-of-work benefits .....	85,050.72
Total .....	\$1,503,316.20

But these figures do not by any means represent the expenditures and services of the unions, because the local lodges assist with their funds and care, very often without reporting to or acting through the national officers. Of much of this kind of service we have no records.

*Accident insurance of the trade-unions.*—A few examples of methods described in the letters from secretaries and in the



annual reports and by-laws will serve to explain the working of this kind of insurance in the unions. The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners pays a lump sum of \$700 in case of complete disability, and from \$175 to \$350 in case of partial disability. From the year 1860 to 1904 this organization paid out in accident-insurance benefits \$335,825. The Cigarmakers' Union pays a lump sum when a member has become blind or lost both hands. The Iron Moulders' Union pays to the partially disabled workman from \$100 to \$200, and to the totally disabled member a sum which is determined by the administrators of the fund according to circumstances. In the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees the injured member receives \$100. The International Brotherhood of Maintenance-of-Way Employees pays in case of total disability from \$500 to \$1,000. The Amalgamated Glass Workers pay in case of permanent disability from \$75 to \$100. So far as we can draw conclusions from correspondence with the unions in affiliation with the American Federation of Labor, it must be said that they have rarely achieved important results in the field of accident insurance. The tables of statistics furnish, it is true, only a part of the facts; perhaps a considerable part of the expenditures credited to sickness insurance and death benefits is really accident insurance. Disability to labor, prolonged illness, and death are not infrequently the results of accidents of occupations or of other causes. There are some special reasons for the reluctance of the unions to take up accident insurance. It seems probable that many members of the unions fear to pay premiums into a common treasury for this purpose, for fear the money might be expended upon strikes. Further, the traditional law of employers' liability has educated the workmen to expect their protection from the awards of courts. This hope is generally illusory; but the occasional enormous awards awaken a gambling instinct in thousands of persons where only one will receive substantial indemnity by prosecuting the employer. The workmen in certain dangerous occupations, especially the railway employees, enjoy the protection of the relief departments as well as of their union benefits. Well-paid workmen in dangerous trades can

secure accident insurance by paying relatively high premiums in casualty companies, or they can make special contracts with private hospitals to furnish medical care during illness, a frequent rate of payment being \$10 to \$12 a year for assurance of such relief in hospital or at home. In certain localities the employers have become accustomed to paying the costs of medical care, and at least part of the wages, when the accident was due to mishap in the industry itself. All these causes co-operate to diminish the interest of workmen in their union accident benefit, and they are much more likely now than in former years to regard the organization of such insurance as a duty to be laid upon the business which causes the risks. The doctrine of *risque professionnel* is very rapidly gaining adherents in this country.

*Sickness insurance of the unions.*—If we turn to sickness insurance, we are upon ground where the local unions are found to be admirable organs of administration. The members of a lodge are exposed to similar risks, they resemble each other in physical nature, they know each other's habits, they are able to detect imposture, and they are able to manage the simple affairs of a form of insurance which does not require heavy reserves and large investments of funds. Therefore it is that there are very few organizations for sick insurance directly by national trade-unions, but very many among the local lodges of the national bodies. At the same time we have not adequate statistics of the extent of this insurance, because the lodges are not required, as a rule, to report their work in this field to the central office. Sometimes we read in the reports and correspondence the statement that the members of the unions seek their sick insurance in the fraternal societies which are to some extent in rivalry with the unions. The members of a union in this country have been taught by circumstances and by discussions to regard their trade organization as militant, as an army to wrest concessions from employers in relation to wages, hours, and conditions of employment, while the more pacific and constant needs of sociability and provident thrift may be met in other ways. In new unions the leaders find it very difficult to induce members to set the dues high enough to cover more than the bare costs of administration

and war. Our unions have not been so long established as those of Great Britain, and have not yet settled down as permanent organizations with varied ends; and their fluctuating membership, composed of men of all nationalities, have only imperfectly learned as yet how to trust each other and maintain large funds under the control of leaders who sometimes betray them. Many of the members of unions are connected with powerful church orders, whose funds furnish means in sickness and brotherly attention in trouble. After making deductions for all these reasons, there still remains a very important work of sickness insurance in the hands of the lodges of trade-unions. Of these we may cite certain typical examples, although complete records are not available.

In the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners sick benefits are provided by local lodges without interference from the national officers. The International Association of Machinists reports 200 lodges, and during the year 1905 they paid out in sick benefits the sum of \$26,617.43. Some of the lodges of the Carriage and Wagon Workers' International Union have a sick-benefit feature, but this is not general in this organization. Very peculiar and interesting is the method of Union No. 144 of the Cigarmakers' Union in the city of New York. The members pay monthly dues of 25 cents, and one who is disabled by illness is paid \$5 a week during 13 weeks. If a surplus remains in the treasury after paying benefits, it is divided at Christmas among the members. The union is composed of auxiliary associations, each having from 25 to 30 members. In the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners the sick benefit is \$4.20 weekly for 26 weeks, and afterward \$2.10 per week; the younger members pay half-rates and receive half-benefits. The entire sum expended for sick insurance during the years 1860 to 1904 was \$3,446,465, and in addition to this \$233,170 were expended in special relief. The Iron Moulders' Union of North America designates 8 cents of the weekly contribution of each member to the sick-benefit fund, and out of this fund a sick member receives \$5.25 per week after the first week during 13 weeks. The United Association of Journeymen Plumbers, Gas Fitters, Steam Fitters'

Helpers pays weekly benefits of \$5 for 13 weeks, after 7 days. The Tailors' Union pays the men in case of illness \$4 a week, and the women \$3. In the year 1904 the 61 divisions of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America paid out \$20,002.73, the rates of benefits ranging from \$2 to \$7 weekly. The Journeymen Barbers receive \$5 weekly during 20 weeks. The Tobacco Workers have a sick benefit of \$3 weekly for 13 weeks, after 7 days, on condition that the person at the time of illness has already paid contributions during 6 months. The Boot and Shoe Workers' Union pays \$5 weekly for 13 weeks after 7 days.

*Old-age and invalidism insurance.*—While the direct provision for old-age insurance is rare among the trade-unions, it is probable that other benefits occasionally cover the wants of members who are too feeble or aged to work steadily. It is just this class of members who would be most severely tempted to work for lower than union rates of wages if they were not protected by benefits. The Cigarmakers' Union expends a great deal of money on out-of-work benefits, and the managers of this fund inform us that a large number of the recipients of this relief are infirm persons who cannot earn the average wages, and that many of these are advanced in years. Here we have the beginnings of old-age pensions concealed under other forms of insurance. The Granite Cutters' Association has begun to organize its old-age pension fund. The Fraternal Association of Machinists has approved a system under which it is proposed to pay to a member on reaching the age of 65 years the sum of \$500, if he has already paid dues as member during 10 years. But the money for establishing the scheme was not in hand at last report. The United Association of Journeymen Plumbers offers an old-age pension of \$300 after a person has been a member for 20 years, of \$400 after 25 years, and of \$500 after 30 years. The Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees accepted a plan in 1905 according to which any member over 65 years of age would receive from \$1 to \$3 per day; but the fund is not yet provided. The Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners pays to the aged member weekly from \$2.45 to \$2.80.

This union has thus paid, during the years 1860 to 1904 the sum of \$1,273,915. The Amalgamated Society of Engineers, a union of English origin, pays old-age pensions. The Pattern Makers' League of North America has adopted the plan of paying old-age pensions after the year 1920.

A diligent and extended correspondence has thus far revealed only the feeble beginnings of care for old age and for permanent invalids. So far as the past gives evidence, we must look in an entirely different direction for this form of protection; although under suitable legal conditions the machinery of the unions may become useful in building up a system of old-age pensions.

*Death benefits.*—In the field of so-called "life-insurance," or, more properly, the provision for burial benefits and some moderate fund for widows, the trade-unions have been most successful. Usually the effort does not go beyond securing money for the expenses of the last illness and the burial expenses, and in this the success has been worthy of mention; for many thousand families have been spared the misery of depending on alms at such trying times in their history. In most of the unions a lump sum, which rarely exceeds \$100, is paid on the death of a member; but in some of the stronger unions, whose members enjoy high wages, the benefit is larger.

The International Shingle Weavers' Union requires monthly dues of 40 cents per member, and the death benefit is \$75. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners pays \$100 to \$200 at the death of a member, and \$25 to \$50 in case of the death of the wife of a member. There is a class of members called "semi-beneficiary" who receive \$50 funeral benefit. The monthly dues of the Granite Cutters are \$1, and the death benefit varies according to classes of members. The union of Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers pays a funeral benefit of \$50 to \$100. In the city of Chicago the local lodges of the Elevator Constructors pay a funeral benefit of \$120, which they raise by means of an assessment. The union of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers collects monthly dues of 35 cents, and pays a death benefit to the family of \$100. The Slate and Tile Roofers, with monthly dues of 13 cents, pay \$100 death benefit. The Amal-

gamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners pays \$84 on the occasion of death of a member, and \$35 at the death of the wife of a member. During the years 1860 to 1904 this union paid out in death benefits \$617,905. The Association of Machinists pays from \$50 to \$200. The members of the Stove Mounters and Steel Range Workers pay monthly dues of 5 cents, and also an assessment at the death of a member; but under this plan the promised death benefit of \$100 is not entirely covered. The death benefit in the National Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel and Tin Workers amounts to \$100; the contributions are 10 cents, paid quarterly, and a general fund is maintained. The members of the union of Iron Moulders pay 10 cents weekly into a fund and 16 per cent. of the proceeds is set apart for the death-benefit fund, and the family receives according to graded scale from \$100 to \$200. The Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers, Brass Moulders, and Brass and Silver Workers pay \$50 to \$100 death benefit and cover the cost by a monthly payment of 25 cents. Some of the local lodges of the Carriage and Wagon Workers' Union pay death benefits, but not the majority of them. The Journeymen Plumbers, Gas Fitters, Steam Fitters and Steam Fitters' Helpers pay \$100 death benefits, and the same sum is paid by the Elastic Goring Weavers and the Electrical Workers. At a cost of 70 to 74 cents' annual contribution from each member the Journeymen Tailors are able to pay a death benefit of \$25 to \$100. Some of the local lodges of the United Garment Workers pay funeral benefits. The members of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees contribute 5 cents monthly dues, and a funeral benefit of \$100 is paid the family of a deceased person. During the year 1904 the expenditures of 22 local unions for death benefits in 152 cases were \$6,949.25, and of the national organization \$15,850. The monthly dues in the International Brotherhood of Maintenance-of-Way Employees are 50, 60, 75 cents, according to age, and the life-insurance policy promises \$500. The Photo-Engravers' Union, which has few members, paid out during the year 1905 to 11 families \$825 in death benefits. The members of the Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees pay yearly premiums of \$3,

and in case of a death the family receives \$100. The Watch Engravers' Association pays a benefit not to exceed \$75, which is raised by levying an assessment of 50 cents after each death. A small sum for funeral expenses is paid by local lodges of the National Print Cutters' Association. The monthly dues in the International Typographical Union are 7½ cents, and the local lodges pay \$70 funeral expenses. In the year 1905 this union paid out \$39,690, and since 1892 in all \$367,995. The death-rate is said to be 12 per thousand. Most of the local lodges of the Coopers' International Union pay funeral expenses. The Glass Workers' Association take out of their common fund \$50 to \$75 for funeral expenses; during the year 1905 there were 9 deaths, and the sum expended was \$600. The death benefits in the union of Piano, Organ, and Musical Instrument Workers are \$50, \$100, or \$200, according to class. The members of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters' and Butcher Workmen's Union pay monthly dues of 5 cents, and the death benefits are \$50 to \$100. The Journeymen Barbers expend for a funeral or for life insurance \$60 to \$500. The funds of the Bakery and Confectionery Workers are raised by monthly dues of 50 cents and by levying occasional assessments. At the death of a member the widow receives \$50 to \$150, and at the death of the wife of a member he receives \$25, \$50, or \$75, according to class. The weekly dues of the Brotherhood of Leather Workers on Horse Goods are 25 cents, and twice in the year an assessment of 50 cents is levied; the death benefit varies between \$40 and \$100. Local lodges of the Federation of Musicians pay for funeral benefits from \$25 upward. The Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders pay 5 cents monthly dues, and the death benefit is \$50 to \$100. Between February 23, 1903, and May 1, 1905, this union paid out \$48,650 for death benefits. The Tobacco Workers' Union pays \$50, and the Paving Cutters' Union \$75. Each member of the Boot and Shoe Workmen pays 50 cents into the fund at the death of a member. The death benefit is from \$50 to \$100. In the year 1905 the expenditures were \$16,175.

The union of cigarmakers deserves special attention in this connection because its organization and success have been so

remarkable. This union was founded in 1864, and its insurance scheme was introduced in 1879. Its record and statistical reports during the past 26 years have been carefully kept, and its presentation of results is complete and accurate. Between the years 1865 and 1904 the number of members rose from 984 to 41,536. The union is built up out of local lodges, all of which recognize the international union and send elected delegates to the general conventions of the national organization. Even the officers of the international society are elected by a majority of votes of members. Any cigarmaker may belong to the union, with the exception of Chinese laborers and working men or women in tenement-house shops. An applicant for membership is received upon his own statement after payment of an entrance fee. Applicants who are suffering from chronic diseases, or who are more than 50 years of age, may be received into membership and pay 15 cents weekly dues, but are not entitled to sick benefits nor to more than \$50 death benefits. Only a minority of cigarmakers are members of the union, and therefore the insurance plan does not protect the greater number engaged in this trade. The entrance fee is \$3, which may be paid in 6 weekly instalments. The regular dues are 30 cents a week, which is paid into the treasury of the local lodges. A member may be excused from payment of dues for 16 weeks of unemployment, but must repay the amount in arrears after he secures employment. A member who has paid dues for 3 years can receive a card, by means of which he is authorized, by paying 20 cents weekly dues, to retain his claim to sick and death benefits, even if he is no longer in the trade. The benefits are as follows: In case of a strike or lock-out the unemployed workman receives during the first 16 weeks \$5 per week, and afterward \$3 per week until employment is resumed. In case a member is compelled to seek work in a distant place he may obtain an advance of \$8 to \$20 to cover expenses of travel. When he secures employment he must begin at once to repay the loan in instalments of at least 10 per cent. of the amount. A member who for 2 years has paid his dues is entitled to receive during unemployment \$3 weekly during 6 weeks; after a suspension of payment for 7 weeks he may again



## BENEFITS PAID BY THE CIGARMAKERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICA IN TWENTY-SEVEN YEARS AND TWO MONTHS

(From the Cigarmakers' Official Journal)

Year	Loans to Travel- ing Members	Strike Benefit	Cost per Mem- ber per Year	Sick Benefit	Cost per Mem- ber per Year	Death and To- tal Disability Benefit	Cost per Mem- ber per Year	Out-of-Work Benefit	Cost per Mem- ber per Year	Contributing Members	Dues Paying Members	20c Refunding Card Holders	Balance on Close of Fiscal Year
1878		\$ 3,668.23	\$1.34 <sup>1</sup>							2,720	...	...	\$ 124.55
1879	\$ 2,868.15	4,050.36	1.11 <sup>1</sup>							2,720	...	...	5,066.22
1880	12,747.09	21,707.08	1.49 <sup>1</sup>							14,604	...	...	11,155.62
1881	20,386.04	44,850.41	3.02 <sup>1</sup>	\$ 3,087.73	\$ 3.27 <sup>1</sup>	\$ 75.00	\$ 0.00 <sup>1</sup>			11,400	...	...	37,740.79
1882	37,135.20	27,812.13	2.10 <sup>1</sup>	17,145.28	1.50	2,600.00	0.14 <sup>1</sup>			14,034	...	...	126,763.20
1883	39,032.08	143,547.30	12.02 <sup>1</sup>	22,450.50	1.08 <sup>1</sup>	2,600.00	0.20 <sup>1</sup>			13,214	...	...	77,506.29
1884	30,683.54	61,487.28	5.09	31,551.50	2.77 <sup>1</sup>	3,020.00	0.34 <sup>1</sup>			11,371	...	...	70,078.73
1885	31,835.71	54,402.61	2.20	29,370.80	2.44 <sup>1</sup>	4,214.00	0.35 <sup>1</sup>			12,000	...	...	85,511.46
1886	40,281.04	13,871.62	6.74	42,225.59	1.71 <sup>1</sup>	4,820.00	0.10 <sup>1</sup>			24,072	...	...	172,813.25
1887	43,804.75	45,393.02	2.66 <sup>1</sup>	63,000.88	3.10 <sup>1</sup>	8,850.00	0.43			20,560	...	...	227,228.24
1888	43,540.44	5,202.52	0.20 <sup>1</sup>	58,824.10	3.40 <sup>1</sup>	21,310.75	1.23 <sup>1</sup>			17,133	...	...	230,100.53
1889	37,014.72	18,414.27	0.74 <sup>1</sup>	59,519.94	3.20 <sup>1</sup>	19,175.50	1.00 <sup>1</sup>	\$ 22,700.50		17,555	...	168	285,136.54
1890	53,535.73	33,531.78	1.38 <sup>1</sup>	84,600.47	2.55 <sup>1</sup>	26,043.00	1.02 <sup>1</sup>	21,223.50	5.25	24,024	...	496	383,072.87
1891	47,732.47	37,477.60	1.40 <sup>1</sup>	87,472.97	3.40 <sup>1</sup>	38,008.35	1.51 <sup>1</sup>	17,400.75	6.88	24,221	...	957	421,050.06
1892	66,475.11	18,226.15	1.40 <sup>1</sup>	80,906.30	3.22 <sup>1</sup>	44,701.07	1.00 <sup>1</sup>	89,402.75	9.45 <sup>1</sup>	26,788	...	1,220	503,829.20
1893	47,154.17	44,666.70	1.01 <sup>1</sup>	104,391.83	3.08 <sup>1</sup>	49,458.33	1.74 <sup>1</sup>	174,517.25	3.33 <sup>1</sup>	27,828	...	1,518	456,732.13
1894	41,657.16	27,446.40	1.58 <sup>1</sup>	106,758.37	3.04 <sup>1</sup>	62,158.77	2.11 <sup>1</sup>	166,377.25	5.90 <sup>1</sup>	27,760	...	1,497	340,788.66
1895	33,070.22	27,446.40	1.00 <sup>1</sup>	119,808.62	3.74 <sup>1</sup>	78,708.07	2.09 <sup>1</sup>	175,767.25	6.43 <sup>1</sup>	27,318	...	1,044	230,213.05
1896	25,207.04	12,175.00	0.46 <sup>1</sup>	112,774.63	3.90 <sup>1</sup>	69,186.67	2.44 <sup>1</sup>	117,471.40	4.40 <sup>1</sup>	26,347	...	1,873	177,033.12
1897	42,234.33	12,331.03	0.42	111,283.60	3.90 <sup>1</sup>	94,939.83	3.30 <sup>1</sup>	70,107.70	2.05 <sup>1</sup>	26,460	...	1,859	104,240.30
1898	33,238.13	137,823.33	3.08 <sup>1</sup>	107,765.07	3.44 <sup>1</sup>	98,903.83	3.13 <sup>1</sup>	38,037.00	1.31 <sup>1</sup>	28,904	...	2,049	227,597.01
1899	44,652.73	105,215.71	3.02 <sup>1</sup>	117,455.84	3.21 <sup>1</sup>	68,201.00	2.04 <sup>1</sup>	23,607.00	0.70 <sup>1</sup>	33,955	...	341	292,407.95
1900	45,374.14	20,528.15	2.23 <sup>1</sup>	134,014.11	3.05 <sup>1</sup>	138,440.38	3.07 <sup>1</sup>	27,083.76	0.70 <sup>1</sup>	33,974	...	2,584	314,866.24
1901	52,821.41	32,888.68	0.70 <sup>1</sup>	137,493.45	3.47 <sup>1</sup>	138,440.38	3.11 <sup>1</sup>	21,071.00	0.30 <sup>1</sup>	37,023	...	866	321,124.33
1902	58,728.71	44,732.02	0.70 <sup>1</sup>	147,054.50	3.42 <sup>1</sup>	138,075.01	3.14	15,558.00	0.30 <sup>1</sup>	36,301	...	1,103	301,811.20
1903	55,203.93	44,732.02	0.70 <sup>1</sup>	103,226.18	3.59 <sup>1</sup>	131,752.03	3.24 <sup>1</sup>	20,872.50	0.71 <sup>1</sup>	41,530	...	1,343	405,117.91
1904	55,203.93	44,732.02	0.70 <sup>1</sup>	103,226.18	3.59 <sup>1</sup>	131,752.03	3.24 <sup>1</sup>	20,872.50	0.71 <sup>1</sup>	41,530	...	1,343	530,234.20
1905	55,203.93	44,732.02	0.70 <sup>1</sup>	103,226.18	3.59 <sup>1</sup>	131,752.03	3.24 <sup>1</sup>	20,872.50	0.71 <sup>1</sup>	41,530	...	1,343	688,070.13
1906	55,203.93	44,732.02	0.70 <sup>1</sup>	103,226.18	3.59 <sup>1</sup>	131,752.03	3.24 <sup>1</sup>	20,872.50	0.71 <sup>1</sup>	41,530	...	1,343	714,506.14
Total	\$1,042,428.19	\$1,136,830.58	.....	\$2,364,172.25	.....	\$1,700,040.16	.....	\$1,069,777.11	.....	30,250	.....	.....	

Total benefits paid during 1906, \$467,716.63.

Grand total benefits paid in twenty-seven years and two months, \$7,313,257.20.

\* The weekly dues were 10c.

† The weekly dues were 15c.

‡ The weekly dues were 25c.

§ The weekly dues were 30c.

receive the same sum for another 6 weeks. Not more than \$54 in one year may thus be received. Every regular member who has paid his dues for an entire year has the right to receive \$5 weekly during the time of disability on account of sickness. During the first week nothing is paid, and when the sickness is due to drunkenness or vice all claim is forfeited. Sick benefits are paid only upon the certificate of the physician that the member is unable to work, and only for 13 weeks in any one year. A committee of the lodge visits the disabled member in his home and establishes the fact of his illness. Women who are members are not permitted to draw sick benefits 3 weeks before and 5 weeks after confinement.

Death benefits are paid after the death of a member who has paid dues for 2 years to the family or person who provides for the funeral, to the amount of \$50 for the expenses of burial; but the entire life insurance payable, including this \$50, is fixed by classes, according to the period during which dues have been paid: (1) members of 5 years' standing, \$200; (2) members of 10 years' standing, \$350; (3) members of 15 years' standing, \$550. The member may designate the beneficiary who is to receive the death benefit. A member may receive funeral benefit in case of the death of wife, or mother who is dependent on him. A person who has been a member for 15 years may keep his claim to death benefit alive by paying monthly dues of 10 cents, by quarterly instalments, after he has become disabled for work.

The beginnings of invalid insurance are found in this system. A member who has become blind, or who has lost both hands, is entitled to receive a lump sum as large as his family might receive if he had died at the same time. Upon receiving such payment the person loses his membership and his claims. In case the illness or death is caused by military service the benefit is not paid; nor is there need, as the government pension then makes further insurance unnecessary. The union has also considered and worked out a plan of old-age pensions; and it is thought that an addition to the weekly dues of 10 cents would cover the cost of such insurance. The indemnity for the loss of time through unemployment is, as already explained, frequently a kind of old-age pension;

because most of the members who are continuously out of work are old and feeble, and a payment of \$3 weekly during a part of the year prevents the necessity of appealing to public or private charity.

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*Studies in American Trade Unionism*, by Hollander and Barnett, p. 66.

Mr. A. M. Sakolski has described the organization and activities of the strong Iron Moulders' Union of North America with great care, and has given an excellent account of its development and administration. This union was organized in the year 1859. Before 1895 its sick-benefit department was left entirely with the local unions, and the administration in some of the lodges was quite successful. But this form of organization, natural in primitive stages of growth, proved to be unsatisfactory. In a country like the United States, where the workmen either voluntarily or necessarily move very much from place to place, the local system is found to work badly; a member who goes into a new city may find himself in need of help during the first weeks of his stay, and he may not have acquired right to relief at that moment, or there may be no lodge with sick-relief features in his new home. The General Convention in 1895<sup>2</sup> adopted a rule according to which any member disabled by accident or sickness may receive a weekly benefit of \$5 after the first week and during 13 weeks. A member who has paid dues for 6 consecutive weeks and is not in debt for dues of more than 13 weeks has claim upon this relief. The weekly dues are 25 cents, out of which amount the local lodge retains 8 cents on deposit, and transmits the remainder to the national treasury to cover costs of strikes and of administration. Any surplus of the local treasury is sent to the national treasury, and from the central fund relief is given to local lodges which may be unable

<sup>2</sup> *Constitution and Rules*, Article 17, section 1.

to meet extraordinary claims on the sick fund. Thus each lodge has behind it the strength of the entire national body. The system has worked admirably. Since the first of January, 1896, at which date sick insurance was first introduced, the expenditures have been as shown in the table:

Year	Membership	Sick benefits
1896.....	20,920	\$ 38,510.00
1897.....	23,003	36,720.00
1898.....	25,072	37,710.00
1899.....	28,941	57,495.00
1900.....	41,189	102,936.00
1901.....	48,115	118,515.00
1902.....	54,251	134,116.00
1903.....	64,472	179,355.00
1904.....	76,416	193,214.25

One part of the experiment is so important and significant that it deserves special remark. The winter of 1904 was very cold, and the iron industry was temporarily depressed. The number of members who resorted to the sick-benefit fund for relief was unusually large. The official organ of the union<sup>3</sup> explained this fact by saying that these payments were more generally due to unemployment than to actual illness which incapacitated members for work, and that it was a consequence of the depression in the industry. It is possible that idleness may cause sickness in many instances, though this subject has not been thoroughly studied.

The provisions for unemployment are worthy of mention. The actual cost of the sick insurance is about 6 cents per member per week for the entire membership of the national union, the benefit being \$5 per week. The weekly dues of 8 cents per member therefore leave a surplus in the national treasury. In 1897 the general convention voted to set apart 1 cent of this surplus from the dues to pay the dues of members who happen to be out of work. Between the year 1897 (October 1) to the end of 1900 the total expenditures for dues of unemployed members amounted to the sum of \$6,577.38, from which fact it is apparent that fewer than 500 members were unemployed. Since the year

<sup>3</sup> *Journal*, August, 1904, p. 590.

1900 conditions have been even more favorable. Yet a few years of industrial depression would exhaust a very large reserve fund.

The union provides life insurance, and indemnity in case of total disability. The death benefits and the indemnities for total disability vary with the duration of membership in the union. A member who has paid dues during 5 to 10 years is able to claim a death benefit or indemnity for total disability of \$150, when membership has continued for 10 to 15 years the sum is fixed at \$175, and after 15 years at \$200. The monthly dues for this fund are 6.4 cents per member, and deficits are avoided by devoting to this fund the entrance fees of new members, \$2 each.

Years	Receipts	Expenditures	Monthly Dues
1880-82.....	\$16,597.00	\$12,000.00	\$0.07 1-2
1882-86.....	32,429.92	32,400.00	0.07 1-2
1886-88.....	22,182.01	16,350.50	0.10
1888-90.....	20,988.05	21,919.00	0.08
1890-95.....	54,179.19	58,512.90	0.64
1895-99.....	54,631.56	40,499.00	0.64 (and \$2 en-
1899-02.....	111,916.13	75,631.36	0.64 [trance fee)

The expenditures for strikes during the 3 years 1899-1902 were \$111,571.22; for the organization of new local unions and the general work of propagandism, \$16,000 annually; for the expenses of the general convention in the year 1902, \$50,670.72. The general convention meets once in three years. The *Financier* of the national union receives from the local secretaries monthly reports containing the names of all contributing members, the amount of each payment for sick benefits, and the condition of the treasury. The account of each member is kept on a separate card. A physician is appointed to examine the applicant and give a certificate—a measure employed to assure the union that deception is not practiced. In order to insure the funds against fraud, all officials intrusted with handling funds must give bonds which cover the risk to the organization. The union was driven to adopt these measures because it had learned, by the bitter experience with dishonest officials in former years, that they are necessary. The method of keeping accounts is uniform in all

lodges, and the national office supervises and controls the entire proceeding. During the year 1904 the Iron Moulders' Union paid for strikes \$266,283.43; sick benefits, \$198,214.25; death benefits and indemnity for total disability, \$53,786.40; costs of administration, \$74,586.97; entire expenditures, \$592,871.05.

In general we may cite the expression of Mr. Samuel Gompers as typical of the convictions of the leaders of the unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. He said substantially that he deemed it his duty to urge upon the unions to make themselves useful to the members, not only in securing higher wages and better conditions of hours and work-places, but also by furnishing relief in times of distress of members. The first condition of such a measure would be that the dues should be increased. There is no good reason why the union should not, in addition to protection of trade interests, secure to the workers support in time of sickness, unemployment, old age, and invalidism.<sup>4</sup>

*Unions of the Railroad Employees.*—These unions do not belong to the American Federation of Labor. There are seven of these brotherhoods, of which five consist of workmen engaged directly in the dangerous labors of train service. The following table presents a summary of the facts relating to these organizations:

Organization	Membership	Payments (1905)	Number of Payments
Conductors.....	36,000	\$ 825,000	423
Engineers.....	47,000	1,327,500	594
Firemen.....	55,287	810,250	...
Switchmen.....	23,000	154,200	151
Brakemen.....	74,539	1,545,236	1,154*
Total.....	235,826	\$4,662,186	...

\* The number of payments by the brakemen is one-half the total for the two years 1903 and 1904.

From the year 1868 to 1905 the Locomotive Engineers' Mutual Life and Accident Insurance Association paid out for 6,232 cases of relief the sum of \$14,983,038.71. The employees

<sup>4</sup>Quoted from a speech in 1905 in *Die bestehenden Einrichtungen zur Versicherung gegen die Folgen der Arbeitslosigkeit im Ausland und im Deutschen Reich*, Part I, p. 357.

of the railroad corporations which have established relief departments must not only pay their dues to the relief departments, but also to their brotherhood funds for sick and accident benefits. Fortunately their wages are relatively high, and they are generally able to provide this double insurance. But they frequently complain that the companies throw on the employees an excessive burden of cost in the relief departments. Mr. J. B. Kennedy has recently made a careful study of the insurance funds of these railroad unions, and from his account the most important facts may be obtained.<sup>5</sup>

The number of railroad employees in the United States is estimated to be over 1,000,000 persons, and one-sixteenth of the population depends on them for support. Over 300,000 of these workmen are members of trade-unions which offer sickness and accident and death benefits. There are two noteworthy characteristics of these railroad unions: the members are workmen in a particular occupation of railroad service, and any member is entitled to change from one company to another without losing his claims in his union.

The Grand Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, at first called Brotherhood of the Footboard, was founded August 17, 1863. In the year 1890 the number of members was 8,000. In 1904 the number had reached 46,400, and the local lodges numbered 652. Since January 1, 1890, all members under 50 years of age must be inscribed in the insurance department of the union as a condition of membership.

The Order of Railway Conductors was founded July 6, 1868. In the year 1891 all members were obliged to belong to the insurance department, and from that time forward the union grew rapidly. On December 31, 1903, the number of policies in force was 27,875, and since the union was founded \$6,329,067 have been expended.

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen was founded December 1, 1873, and in 1878 membership in the insurance department was made obligatory for all members of the union.

<sup>5</sup> *Studies in American Trade Unionism*, edited by Hollander and Bennett (1905), p. 323.

In 1904, 98.59 per cent. of all members were insured, and the policies in force had a value of \$75,559,000. Since its foundation the union has expended \$7,941,065 in indemnities and life insurance.

The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, at first called Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen, was organized September 23, 1883. In the year 1903, 95.55 per cent. of all members held life-insurance policies. Up to April 1, 1904, the union had paid \$8,987,284.54 indemnities and death benefits. The *New York Bulletin of Labor* for 1906 gives the later figure, \$10,491,101.20.

The Order of Railroad Telegraphers was organized June 9, 1886, and in 1898 insurance was made obligatory on all members. Twelve monthly payments of 20, 30, or 60 cents are required, according to class, and the death benefits paid vary from \$300 to \$500 and \$1,000. The mortuary fund remains intact and cannot be used for other purposes, and on November 30, 1905, it amounted to \$126,730.16—a recognition of the need of a reserve fund to meet the claims. The entire expenditures up to December 1, 1904, were \$170,450.

The Switchmen's Union, at first under the name Switchmen's Mutual Aid Association, was organized in 1886. In 1901 the statutes of the union made insurance obligatory on all members. At the end of the year 1903 the policies had a face value of \$6,679,200, and the expenditures since organization had been \$207,336.75.

The International Brotherhood of Maintenance-of-Way Employees was organized in 1887. Insurance in the union fund is at present voluntary, although it was formerly obligatory. Many of the members who held life-insurance policies in ordinary companies, and who had some doubts on account of the uncertainty about assessments, induced the general convention in 1896 to recede from the former position favoring compulsory membership in the life-insurance fund. Up to the year 1903 the fund had expended in relief \$150,000. On January 1, 1904, the number of members was 40,000.

All these unions distinguish between the funds for death benefits and indemnities for disability, which are managed by the national organization, and the sick and accident insurance



which is carried by the local lodges. The by-laws of the Conductors' Union in the year 1868 prohibited the local lodges from administering death benefits and indemnities for disability, on the ground that this would weaken the national society. The Locomotive Engineers followed the example of the conductors in 1869 and established similar regulations. The national association makes the rules for the management of the local funds for sickness and accident insurance. In consequence of improved conditions and administration, the number of claims on the disability fund has gradually diminished. The employees on railroads regard the disability insurance as very important on account of the liability to injury in their occupation.

NAME OF UNION	PERIOD	NUMBER OF CLAIMS		PER CENT. OF CLAIMS FOR DISABILITY	CLAIMS FOR DISABILITY PER 1000 MEMBERS
		Death	Disability		
Conductors.....	1893-94	265	49	15.6	3.8
	1895-96	274	46	14.3	3.1
	1897-98	363	63	14.8	3.6
	1899-00	440	55	11.1	2.6
	1901-02	523	81	13.4	3.2
	1903-04	688	92	11.8	3.0
Firemen.....	1894-96	295	145	32.9	6.0
	1896-98	349	118	25.3	4.3
	1898-00	488	174	26.3	4.7
	1900-02	655	186	22.1	3.9
	1902-24	857	234	21.4	4.3

Total disability has been defined in the by-laws and practice of these unions of railroad employees in a specific sense, and it is made to include only incapacity to work at the usual occupation. In 1898 the rules of the engineers had described total disability as the loss of a hand at or above the wrist, or the loss of a foot at or above the ankle, or the loss, complete and permanent, of the sight of an eye or of both eyes; and provided in such cases that the member should receive the entire amount of the face of the policy, the same as in case of death. The by-laws of the conductors recognize loss of hearing, if it amounts to total deafness, as total disability. The regulations of the switchmen go farther and add the loss of four fingers of one hand at or above the second joint, or of three fingers and a thumb on one hand at or above the second joint. These conditions are more liberal and

explicit than those of the policies customary with the ordinary casualty companies, which add limitations and conditions which impair the value of the policy for men in such occupations. The rules as described are more satisfactory and involve smaller cost. It is probable that members of a union do not require the same exacting restrictions as the customers of a corporation engaged in the insurance business, because the comrades of a wounded man will know whether he is deceiving the union or not, and a private company has not this protection. If a member desires to buy accident or sickness insurance, he can do so through the local lodge. The telegraph operators have not thought it desirable to establish accident insurance, because their employment is not specially hazardous. Not without unfortunate experiences and mishaps have the unions developed their systems of insurance during the early experimental years, 1886 to 1880. Since 1880 the methods have been comparatively uniform and efficient. During the early years of the life of the unions the benefits were very fluctuating and uncertain in amount, depending on the accident of the state of the treasury; but since the revision of the regulations the indemnity in case of total disability and the death benefits have been fixed and stable. During the years 1890 to 1900 the principle has gradually been established that the

Union	Age Class	Amount of Policy
Locomotive engineers.....	Under 40	\$4,500
	40-45	3,000
	45-50	1,500
Conductors.....	Under 35	3,000
	35-45	2,000
	45-50	1,000
Firemen.....	Under 45	3,000
	Over 45	1,500
Trainmen .....	No age classes	1,350
Telegraph operators.....	18-45	1,000
	45-50	500
	50-60	300
Switchmen .....	No age classes	1,200
Trackmen* .....	18-45	1,000

\* Only exceptionally does this union pay policies according to age class.

benefits should be diminished with advancing years, the premiums remaining the same; while in ordinary insurance companies the premiums change according to the age of the insured. The table on p. 776 shows the amounts received in each union according to the age classes.

In former years the death benefits and indemnities for total disability were raised by assessments upon the members after the accident happened; but now all the brotherhoods, with the exception of the engineers, maintain reserve funds to cover the expenditures for claims as they arise. **The premiums must be fixed in each organization according to the wages of the members, taking into account also the indemnities they desire to secure and the number of claims.** The expenditures have steadily increased. Among the locomotive engineers, the conductors, and the firemen, the policies of \$1,500 are preferred. Step by step, since the firemen in 1878 introduced the requirement, has insurance of all members been made obligatory. Is not this a proof that the tendency of all industrial insurance is toward compulsory insurance? In all unions there are non-beneficiary members who are not admitted to the insurance privileges because they are disabled from employment or have become old. The cost of life insurance per \$1,000 varies in the brotherhoods: <sup>6</sup>

Engineers, Dec. 31, 1903 . . . . .	\$17.80
Conductors, Dec. 31, 1903 . . . . .	16.00
Firemen, June 30, 1904 . . . . .	12.00
Trainmen, Dec. 31, 1903 . . . . .	18.00 (or \$17.78)
Telegraph operators, Dec. 31, 1903 . . . . .	7.20
Switchmen, Dec. 31, 1903 . . . . .	20.00
Trackmen Dec. 31, 1903 . . . . .	12.00 (or \$15 and \$18 by class)

The corresponding premiums in ordinary casualty insurance companies would be in the age class of 35 years, per \$1,000 of insurance: locomotive engineers, \$27.23, and the same for firemen, trainmen, switchmen, and trackmen; for conductors and telegraph operators, \$22.23; or about 30 per cent. higher for death benefits alone; while the brotherhoods also guarantee benefits of equal amounts for total disability. It is observed that the premiums vary in the different unions according to the degrees of risk. Thus the premiums for the telegraph operators are relatively low because they are not exposed to unusual dangers in their

<sup>6</sup> Hollander and Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

occupation. The firemen pay a lower premium because they are young, and when they become older they pass up into the ranks and society of the engineers. Among the switchmen advancement is not so frequent; there are no age limits of membership, and therefore the rates are relatively high.

As a rule, the unions require their grand-master and grand-secretary to give bond for the security of funds managed in the sum of \$10,000 to \$100,000. The funds of the insurance departments are kept separate from other funds of the unions, and a separate assessment is levied for the support of these funds. Regulations have been passed to prevent the use of insurance funds for other purposes. State laws also govern the management of regular insurance companies, and these funds come under state supervision by insurance commissioners—a further security that they will not be scattered for strikes or other alien objects. In this way one of the weaknesses of trade-union insurance is removed, for the entire scheme is rendered unstable if money paid for benefit funds may be diverted by action of officers, or even by vote of the representative conventions.

In the future development of industrial insurance we must reckon with the trade-unions as among the most important agencies for promoting the movement, especially as legal compulsion seems to be remote. The stronger unions have long since learned that an insurance fund is the first, most sure, and most permanent foundation for the popularity of the union. Only in extraordinary, uncertain, and unforeseen circumstances is a strike fund needed, while, on the contrary, provision of benefits in cases of sickness, accident, and death is a permanent and certain need of members. If compulsory insurance were introduced, the legislatures of the states would find it desirable and necessary to bring these powerful organizations into the system by recognizing, regulating, and controlling their by-laws and administration. The state governments could well afford to follow this course, because the unions have shown that they can administer insurance funds at low cost and in an efficient and satisfactory way. Up to this time the trade-unions are the only organizations which have shown ability, even in moderate measure, to provide unemployment insurance.

# PROGRESS AS A SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPT

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## I. THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT STUDY

The idea of progress is one of the most elusive notions which the student of society is called upon to examine. This is painfully evident in the indiscriminating and chaotic use to which the term has been put. What scheme of social rearrangement, however fantastic, impossible, or vicious, has not been hailed as the very embodiment of progress? Like the much abused liberty of Madame Roland's pathetic lament, progress has served as the excuse for reckless iconoclasm of every sort.

Yet, in spite of despair on the part of some sociologists of so defining the idea of progress that it may win a generally recognized meaning, there seems to be no prospect that the word will die out of the language.<sup>1</sup> If it is likely to continue in constant use, it is possible that some merit may attach to an effort to assort and criticize, in the light of present sociological theory, a few of the various significations which it has acquired, to analyze out of the mass of meanings a few definite characteristics, and to formulate them into a criterion which may serve as a measure of social progress.

Some of the pitfalls into which users of the term have fallen are suggested by the word itself. Its most obvious implication is movement, change (*progreior*, "to walk forth, to advance"). Hence there have been those who have felt that the essence of progress is a break with the past, and that whatever is new and different must also be higher and better. This idea has often been associated with some phase of the age-long notion of evolution, which, dressed in one philosophic garment or another, has appeared in almost every century since speculative thought commenced. Whatever the evolutionary process has brought

<sup>1</sup> Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 185-89.

has been accepted somewhat in the spirit of the stoic emperor: "Nothing is for me too early or too late which thy seasons bring, O Nature." It is perhaps enough to insist at this point that "evolution" and "progress," although closely related in meaning, are far from being synonymous terms which may be used interchangeably.

Another notion, implicit in the term, should have gone a long way toward preventing the undiscerning glorification of change *per se*. The most literal kind of progress—e. g., that of an army up a hill—is clearly not fixed in the nature of things, but is relative to the purpose of the general in command, or to the larger purposes back of the military movement. If the enemy be found to have a vastly superior force, skilfully concealed behind impregnable fortifications, it may turn out that the attacking general finds progress to lie in the direction of his own camp. Again, a certain social or religious club has been organized. A civic crisis has resulted in its taking an active part in municipal politics. Let us inquire whether the club is progressing. Clearly the answer depends upon the purpose which is held to be embodied in it. A, who is enthusiastic over the municipal programme which the club has espoused, will think that the club is progressing admirably, while B, who regards politics as no proper concern of the organization, regrets its evident decline. In national groups the dependence of judgments regarding progress upon the national types venerated by the judges is a matter of common knowledge. To the thorough-going individualist the amplification of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission is held to be a national calamity, while to a believer in the efficacy of state intervention it may seem the only hopeful solution of a threatening national problem.

If, then, men are found to differ in their practical judgments as to what constitutes progress in the case of the various kinds of enterprises which make up the business of human association, it is not to be wondered at that the sociologists have been of many minds in regard to a proper standard of human progress in general.

The aim of the present paper will be to examine some of the

most noteworthy formulations of progress, and with their aid to attempt to frame a definition of a rational purpose suitable to serve as the standard of judgment of social change.

A word of caution may perhaps be needed at this point. Much valuable work has been done in the direction of defining the causes of social evolution, both progressive and regressive.<sup>2</sup> It is no part of the plan of the present study to enter into any discussion of the "factors of social change." The idea of progress, not its methods or means of accomplishment, is the subject to which attention will be confined. It is true, however, that in one or two instances the standards or definitions of progress which will be examined confuse the mechanism of social change with the essence of progress. This will be pointed out in the proper place somewhat at length.

It would doubtless be unwise to attempt any demonstration of the fact of progress before entering upon a criticism of the meaning of the term. Let it suffice to say that the progress which the present study seeks to define does not imply continuous, uninterrupted advance along a smooth path, but rather the halting, infrequent lunges forward which the actual page of history discloses. It is possible to assume a consistently agnostic attitude upon the subject of human evolution and to deny all significance to judgments of better or worse, passed upon human life-conditions in different ages, on the ground that the standards for such judgments are a set of mere unanchored relativities. No writer has, however, been met with who is ready to deny all relations of forward or backward or of higher or lower in the different stages of human advancement. Such denial could proceed only from one to whom life is a moral and intellectual jungle, chaotic and meaningless.

If, then, social valuations are universal, and, indeed inevitable, it is decidedly worth while that they should be founded, not on narrow interests or artificial conceptions of life, but upon a survey of the largest horizon of truth about humanity which it is possible for the eye to sweep.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf., e. g., Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*; Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, chap. viii; and Carver's compilation entitled *Sociology and Social Progress*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, Part VIII.

The human race must have passed through a considerable portion of its history before any very definite notions of the succession of generations and of areas could have been formed. When the tribal past first rises to the rank of a clearly grasped idea, it is associated with the very natural view that the present times are distinctly inferior to the days of old, that the golden age lies in the far-distant past.<sup>4</sup> This notion is closely analogous to the common experience of individuals who, as the poet tells us, feel that as youth vanishes there passes away a glory from the earth.

Only with the development of a technique of tradition more perfect than that of primitive peoples can a sufficient sweep of history be brought into view to lead to the conclusion that the past was crude and imperfect, while the present shows increasing measures of advance. Such a view, although rarely if ever formed in the Orient, was reached by many of the classical philosophers.<sup>5</sup> The oriental idea of cycles of change, rather than of gradual and continuous progress, was, however, usually woven into the fabric of ancient views of human history. This was suggested no doubt by the regular succession of changes seen in the movements of the heavenly bodies, the return of the seasons, the course of growth and decay in the animal and vegetable world, as well as by periods of degeneration and decline visible in the history of nations.<sup>6</sup>

Through the early Christian centuries the doctrine of progress in human affairs was held in many forms, which were characteristic of the theological views of their advocates. Thus Tertullian, Augustine, Vincent of Lerins stood forth as champions of a progressive advance in history.<sup>7</sup> During the Middle Ages, as indeed in most other periods, the history of the idea of progress is hardly more than the record of partial perceptions of an advance movement in human affairs. These partial con-

<sup>4</sup> Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, pp. 90 ff.; De Greef, *Le transformisme social*, pp. 21, 31 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 90 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 90 ff.; De Greef, *loc. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 98, 100, 101, 152 ff.



ceptions related themselves to different aspects of human life. They ranged from the extremely theological idea of a progress in revelation to the doctrine of the progress of knowledge. Partial views of human progress, however, such as a recognition of improvements in the arts or of the increase of knowledge, are to be sharply distinguished from a belief in progress as a universal law of history. And this latter, moreover, is quite different from a belief in human perfectibility or in the constant improvement of "human nature" or of the individual human organism. A detailed account of the growth of the idea of progress will be found in the works of Flint and De Greef to which reference has already been made in the footnotes.

It is not possible to discuss here at greater length the extent to which belief in progress has prevailed in different ages, nor would an extended discussion of the mere existence of such belief possess any intimate relationship to the purpose of this paper, namely, to formulate a standard of social progress. With these few words upon the general course of the history of the idea of progress, let us turn to an examination of some of the principal views which have been entertained with regard to the nature of progress.

## II. EARLY FORMULATIONS OF A STANDARD OF PROGRESS

Assuming a view of human society which recognizes a gradual improvement visible in history, let us examine briefly some of the conceptions which have been held of the nature of this progress. Throughout this section the writer desires to acknowledge a special obligation to the summaries and criticisms contained in Flint's work on the *Philosophy of History*.

One of the most common forms in which the doctrine of progress has been cast is that which regards it as the working-out of a divine plan or purpose whose details have in some manner been arrived at by the one who holds the view in question.<sup>8</sup> It often regards revelation or deduction from revelation as the ultimate source of knowledge about the development and destiny

<sup>8</sup> Ward's term for this view is "theo-teleology," which he distinguishes from "anthropo-teleology."

of human society. Progress in such a view is approximation to an ideal which is attributed to the Divine Will.

The *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* of Bishop Bossuet affords an excellent example of the use of this method.<sup>9</sup> From first to last this work is an interpretation of human history in terms of the purposes of the Creator, who is represented as making "use of the Assyrians and Babylonians to chastise his people; of the Persians to restore it; of Alexander and his immediate successors to protect it,"<sup>10</sup> and of many other agencies; all to the intent that in the end, after centuries of this sort of intervening care, the Christian faith might spread and triumph in the world. Hegel also regarded the process of human history as the working-out of the Divine Will, which he identified with the "Idea of Freedom," thus "translating the language of Religion into that of Thought."<sup>11</sup> Baron Bunsen likewise found that "the principle of the progress of humanity necessarily has its root in the law of divine self-manifestation."<sup>12</sup> This law he regarded as the increasing consciousness of God which is the motive force in the development of the race and the inspiration of all progress in language, politics, and culture.<sup>13</sup>

The criticism which is suggested by this view of progress is not directed against the belief that "through the ages one increasing purpose runs," but against the doctrine that the nature of progress can be given a final statement in terms of the Divine Will. As Flint points out in this connection, "religious truths are inferences from scientific laws, not these laws themselves nor the rationale of them."<sup>14</sup> Thus, to take any given formulation of the Divine Will and, losing sight of the inference from which it arose, to turn it backward upon the facts of social phenomena as the standard of progress, is a false and fruitless method of procedure. Of course, such a concept as the Divine Plan is

<sup>9</sup> Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-34.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 222.

<sup>11</sup> Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, Sibree's translation, p. 21.

<sup>12</sup> Quoted by Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, p. 558.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 559.

<sup>14</sup> Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, p. 226.

merely formal, and hence entirely lacking in significance and applicability, except in so far as it has been given a content from the observation and experience of human life.<sup>15</sup>

The value, therefore, of such a measure of progress, like that of all other terms out of which can be drawn only the meaning that is first put into them, will vary greatly from one user to another, according to the breadth and loftiness of the conceptions for which the term stands in their minds.<sup>16</sup>

Another somewhat naïve formulation of social progress is that implicit in the venerable idea of natural law. Like the view already discussed, it treats of progress in a more or less a priori fashion from the standpoint of some objective reality or criterion external to the social process itself. It may perhaps be objected that those who have made the greatest use of this conception can scarcely be classified as holding a genuine theory of progress at all, for, as in the case of the eighteenth-century adherents of natural rights, the doctrine was generally associated with a profound conviction of the retrograde movement of the history of civilization. Progress with them did not mean belief in a law of advance in human society, operative from the first, but rather in the possibility of winning back by an appeal to reason the primitive state of man lost since the days when he was unshackled by artificial restraints and oppression. There are, however, two reasons for some consideration of natural law in this connection. The first is the anticipations which the idea contains of a later and more adequate view of human progress, and the second is the fact that the notion, freed from the doctrine of retrogression, still persists in the minds of some recent writers as a sort of hazy expression for the anticipated moral achievement of the race.

Professor Ritchie has pointed out the important service which was rendered by the Roman idea of the law of nature:

When the codification of Roman law by Justinian . . . had given it a character of finality, the conception of the law of nature was received by the mediaeval world as the conception of something not merely more perfect than

<sup>15</sup> Small, *op. cit.*, p. 669; cf. Flint, *loc. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> Small, *op. cit.*, pp. 669, 670.

any positive human laws, but as something distinct from them. It came to be thought of as an ideal code, not merely as the common or universal element amid the varieties of human usage, but distinct from positive human laws, which might very often conflict with this code. This reverence for the law of nature did good service in helping to bring some degree of order and system into the chaos of French law.<sup>17</sup>

In modern times we find the idea given clear expression at least as early as the Puritan Revolution. Its appearance at this time seems to have been inspired by the influence of the Reformation, which tended to substitute for the authority of the church the appeal to the individual reason and conscience. A larger measure of political privilege likewise was demanded on the ground of "natural rights derived from Adam and right reason."<sup>18</sup>

Striking examples of adherence to this theory of natural law are found in the writings of the Physiocrats and in the philosophy of Adam Smith. Says Dugald Stewart:

The great and leading object of his speculations . . . is to illustrate the provisions made by Nature in the principles of the human mind, and in the circumstances of man's external situation, for a gradual and progressive augmentation in the means of national wealth, and to demonstrate that the most effectual means of advancing a people to greatness is to maintain that order of things which Nature has pointed out.<sup>19</sup>

In criticism of this purely formal conception of natural law as the criterion of individual and social progress, no extended discussion is necessary. It must be evident that neither nature nor natural law can suffice to point out human destiny. The only sense in which the terms can be significant is that which makes them synonymous with the *ideal*. And to say that the moral progress of the individual or the goal of social progress lies in the direction of the ideal is mere tautology.

The attempt has been made, however, to free the notion from all objectionable features and to render it consistent with the results of the history of moral standards, while maintaining the formula of Wolff that "natural law is that for which there is sufficient reason in the very nature of men and things."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Natural Rights*, p. 41.

<sup>18</sup> Ritchie, *op. cit.*, pp. 6 ff.

<sup>19</sup> T. E. Cliffe Leslie, *Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy*, p. 152.

<sup>20</sup> Fred M. Taylor, "The Law of Nature," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. I, p. 564.

When all proper concessions and limitations have been imposed upon this formulation, it turns out to mean simply the "law which is determined by the nature of men and circumstances."<sup>21</sup> The course of action prescribed by this law is declared to be one, eternal, immutable, because it is determined by the unchangeable nature of things. Yet it is admitted that human nature and circumstances undergo change, and that the "conditions under which the applicability of a law of nature is determined must be empirical, and so subject to the limitations of time, etc."<sup>22</sup> In other words, when we have examined a given situation in the light of all that we know of human experience and of human nature, and have given due weight to all the special circumstances of the case, and have at length arrived conscientiously and soberly at a judgment regarding what is right and proper to do—then, if our judgment turns out to be a true one, we may have the satisfaction (if we could only be sure it were a true judgment) of knowing that we are acting in accordance with an immutable, eternal law of nature; but if, alas, our judgment is not true, we may yet have the satisfaction of knowing that somewhere in the heavens above, or wherever the immutable laws of nature may choose to dwell, there is a conceivable course of action exactly and eternally fitted to this particular situation.

The alternatives which this illustration offers are sufficiently clear; either natural law is simply a somewhat more glorious appellation bestowed upon a judgment of human values arrived at in the usual painful human way, or it is a term absolutely empty of content, and hence without significance for the student in search of a valid criterion of human progress.

While the doctrine of a law of nature has, then, little to offer in the way of positive results, nevertheless, in its classical form it contained foreshadowings of a great truth, viz: that the chief worth and value of life, and at the same time the measure of progress of the race, is not to be found in the degree of *complexity* and *artificiality* which life assumes, but rather in the presence and diffusion of those essentials of human well-being which a rational study of the nature and history of man may reasonably be expected to yield.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 578.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 579.

The last of the purely formal notions of progress which will be included in this brief sketch of earlier views on this subject is that exemplified in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. It involves a belief that there is something inevitable in human progress; that deep down in the nature of things there is some hidden spring which is infallibly urging forward the movement of history. This extremely comfortable conviction need not necessarily rest upon the metaphysical foundation which Hegel provided for it; it may be traceable to a strong reliance upon the spread of enlightenment such as prevailed during the later years of the eighteenth century,<sup>23</sup> and which led to extreme optimism such as that of the doctrine of human perfectibility held by Condorcet.

On the other hand, it may be induced by intoxication with the notion of biological evolution,<sup>24</sup> which produces upon some writers an exhilarating sense of swing and sweep in human affairs, leading them to disdain sober, analytical methods and to devote themselves to accounting for human progress by easy references to the biological laws of struggle and survival, or even of constructing by the aid of mental imagery a more or less spectacular notion of ascending series of phenomena, each of which is felt to be intrinsically "higher" than those which preceded it. It is very easy to describe the course of natural and social evolution in terms of pageantry and spectacle—to see the succession of types and species, and in the contemplation of the splendidly ascending series to lose all thought of the more fundamental questions of *how* and *why*. This notion of a so-called ascending series, once imported from biology into the account of human history, loses its primarily anatomical character and takes on in the social series a moral character, by virtue of which it figures as an "ameliorative trend." This ameliorative trend may even arise in the biological series itself; but, wherever its origin, it is apt sooner or later to attach itself to the whole evolutionary process, not in the legitimate character of a reasoned induction, nor yet as a frankly avowed article of a cosmic faith, but rather

<sup>23</sup> Balfour, *Essays and Addresses*, 2d ed., pp. 244 ff.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 244 ff.

as a pseudo-scientific world-view which obscures and misinterprets the actual evolutionary processes which it seeks to explain. Hence arises the popular use of evolution as synonymous with advancement and progress. Thus an optimistic conclusion with regard to the trend of movement of the evolutionary processes is allowed to elbow exact conceptions of these processes out of the circle of attention, and, instead of the pursuit of the painfully slow methods of scientific investigation, we have results which break full-fledged from the shell of an a priori moral assumption. But a full discussion of the place of biological conceptions in the doctrine of progress must be reserved for a later section.

The most frequent occasion of the view which sees in human progress the outworking of an inner necessity is a fondness for metaphysical speculation which leads to the development of all human history out of some fundamental conception, such as Hegel's self-realization of the infinite Spirit.

Starting from Spirit or "self-contained existence," Hegel traces human history to a single principle, namely, the unfolding or actualization of the potential nature of Spirit, whose essential attribute is freedom, which, in "coming to a consciousness of itself," thereby realizes its existence. Thus:

The history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom; a progress whose development, according to the necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate.<sup>25</sup>

This passage, brief as it is, suggests two very pertinent criticisms which have been passed upon the view of history which it contains. As Flint has pointed out in connection with a similar conception held by the historian Michelet:

Growth in freedom is only one of several facts all equally essential to humanity and its development. Truth, beauty, and morality can no more be resolved into freedom than freedom into any of them.<sup>26</sup>

A still more fundamental error lies in the inevitable character with which the great philosopher invests this age-long achievement of freedom. What we are led to seek in history is a growth in the consciousness of freedom which is itself not

<sup>25</sup> Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, pp. 18-20.

<sup>26</sup> Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, p. 542.

free, but strictly conditioned by the "necessity of the nature" of this progress.<sup>27</sup> The Hegelian conception of progress turns out to be only an aprioristic deduction as empty of positive content as the purely formal ideas of a Divine Purpose and of a Law of Nature.

### III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THEORIES OF EVOLUTION TO THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS

In Parts I and II we have followed in outline the origin and development of the notion of progress through some of its earlier forms. The next step will be to trace the characteristic forms which the idea has assumed during the latter half of the nineteenth century under the influence of modern evolutionary conceptions. Given a belief in human progress defined, for example, in terms of the Hegelian metaphysics without a belief in an advancing order in the organic world (Hegel regarded nature as stationary, while society was marked by the peculiar characteristic of progress), what will be the effect produced upon the idea of human progress by the appearance of a theory of universal evolution such as that contained in Spencer's system, or by the appearance of an authoritative doctrine of the gradual modification of species through the selective agency of environment?

This is our problem from the historical point of view. A further question relates to the value for the concept of progress of the contribution made by these readings of the law of evolution.

As early as 1857, or more than a year before the publication of the *Origin of Species*, Spencer's essay on "Progress—Its Law and Cause" appeared in the *Westminster Review*. This essay, as Spencer went to some pains to point out in a later work,<sup>28</sup> contains in outline the scheme of evolutionary philosophy which is

<sup>27</sup> Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, p. 528; cf. Carrau, "La philosophie de l'histoire et la loi du progrès," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September-October, 1875, pp. 584-86.

<sup>28</sup> Preface to fourth edition of *First Principles*, pp. vii, viii; and note printed above the essay in the collection of *Essays*, Vol. I, p. 8.



associated with his name. The purpose of the argument may be indicated in a few words. Discarding current teleological conceptions of progress, which focus attention upon human happiness, Spencer proposes to leave out of sight "concomitants and beneficial consequences, and to ask what Progress is in itself."<sup>29</sup> He holds that

It is settled beyond dispute that organic progress consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous [cites Wolff, Goethe, and Von Baer].

Now, we propose in the first place to show that this law of organic progress is the law of all progress. Whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, in the development of Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, Art, this same evolution of the simple into the complex, through a process of continuous differentiation, holds throughout. From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous is that in which Progress essentially consists.<sup>30</sup>

It will be seen that as in each phenomenon of today, so from the beginning, the decomposition of every expended force into several forces has been perpetually producing a higher complication; that the increase of heterogeneity so brought about is still going on, and must continue to go on; and that thus Progress is not an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity.<sup>31</sup>

With this idea of increasing heterogeneity there were later incorporated the other elements of increasing definiteness and increasing integration, which indeed Spencer had already recognized in essays written previous to 1857.<sup>32</sup>

In subsequent statements of this law the title was changed from the "law of progress" to the "law of evolution." Referring to this essay in his *Autobiography*, Spencer writes:

Though it began by pointing out that the word progress is commonly used in too narrow a sense; yet the fact that I continued to use the word shows that I had not then recognized the need for a word which has no teleological implications.<sup>33</sup>

Whatever the wording used, it is clear that Spencer saw in

<sup>29</sup> *Westminster Review*, April, 1857, p. 446.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 446, 447.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 484.

<sup>32</sup> Spencer, *Autobiography*, Vol. I, p. 586.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*; cf. Saleeby, *Evolution, The Master Key*, p. 281.

human affairs the operation of the same universal cosmic law of change that is working out its "beneficent" results in every other class of phenomena.

Now, the crucial point concerns the significance to be attached to the term "beneficent" as applied to the cosmic process. Two alternatives present themselves. It is possible, consistently with a belief in a law of universal evolution, either to regard the evolutionary process as removed entirely from the realm of evaluative judgments—that is to say, to make of it purely a sequence category; or, on the other hand, to attribute to the process of evolution thus defined the character of "goodness," "beneficence," upon the ground of its own contained elements—or, in other words, to constitute its leading characteristics a standard of values and the criterion of human progress. The first of these alternatives is expressed in the words of a recent writer: "Science knows no law of progress, but a law of change. Progress is obviously an anthropic term, denoting merely an ideal of ours."<sup>34</sup> And it is this view of the matter which Spencer, as a matter of fact, seems to have adhered to, at least in his later writings.

We see from the significant statement in the *Autobiography* that Spencer regarded himself as having described, not, as he had supposed, a beneficent ascending series or process, but rather simply the mode of procedure visible in the universe, viewed under the aspect merely of a category of change. This view of the matter is confirmed by reference to other works in which Spencer gives us clearer statements of his social ideals. For example, in the following passage, after showing that, while in a primitive stage of social development the militant type of organization is highest, during a later stage, industrial rather than military competition underlies the success of nations, he makes the following formulation:

Social organization is to be considered high in proportion as it subserves individual welfare, because in a society the units are sentient and the aggregate insentient; and the industrial type is higher because, *in that state of permanent peace to which civilization is tending*, it subserves individual welfare better than the militant type.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Saleeby, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

<sup>35</sup> *Principles of Sociology*, 3d ed., Vol. I, postscript of Part II, pp. 587, 588.

Professor Sorley has phrased this rather vague moral ideal of Spencer as follows:

The moral criterion . . . may be derived from a problematic future state of the human race on this earth when the need for struggle has disappeared and all things go smoothly.<sup>26</sup>

Again, in *Social Statics, Abridged and Revised*, Spencer writes:

There is another form under which civilization can be generalized. We may consider it as a progress towards that constitution of man and society required for the complete manifestation of every one's individuality. To be that which he naturally is—to do just what he would spontaneously do—is essential to the full happiness of each, and therefore to the greatest happiness of all. Hence, in virtue of the law of adaptation, our advance must be towards a state in which this entire satisfaction of every desire, or perfect fulfilment of individual life, becomes possible.<sup>27</sup>

Thus we may conclude that, in spite of early tendencies toward the identification of human progress with a cosmical process, Spencer has laid the greater emphasis upon the realization of individual happiness through an age-long process of adaptation.

It has remained for De Greef to push through to logical consistency and to enunciate in the clearest terms the biological view of progress which is always lurking, albeit a little unsteadily, in the background of Spencer's writing. While the Darwinians who have made excursions into sociology, as we shall see, have generally mistaken the principal mechanism of biological evolution—that is, the process of natural selection—for progress, De Greef, on the other hand, is careful not to overemphasize the significance of this factor for the theory of social progress; but he has nevertheless fallen into a similar error in confusing one of the chief incidents of biological and social evolution—namely, increasing organization—with social progress.

In common with other writers already cited, he distinguishes progress from the simple filiation of past with present and of present with future, which constitutes merely successive development; for example, successive adaptations to a changing environ-

<sup>26</sup> W. R. Sorley, *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, p. 44.

<sup>27</sup> P. 253.

ment form an evolutionary series, but they may or may not constitute progress.<sup>38</sup> Progress

implies a perfecting of the social organization, a perfecting such that the new society represents a variety superior to the mother society. This superiority should appear in a greater structure, and one, moreover, that is more differentiated and better co-ordinated, and in a corresponding vital functioning.<sup>39</sup>

This general conception is later made the basis for the formulation of a semi-mathematical law: "Social progress is directly proportional to the mass, to the differentiation, and to the co-ordination of the social elements and organs."<sup>40</sup>

This criterion of social progress is, indeed, nothing less than the criterion of progress for all living things.

We understand . . . that the growth or the degeneration of life in general, including that of the social life, always and necessarily corresponds with the growth or the degeneration of the organization, including the social organization.<sup>41</sup>

From this point of view progress is seen to involve better and better co-ordination in higher centers.<sup>42</sup> A final quotation will illustrate the relation in De Greef's mind between organization and social achievement:

Neither the development nor the amount of wealth, of population, of art, of knowledge, constitutes in itself progress, but only the conditions which may favor it; organization and progress are synonymous; they are substitutes the one for the other, as money is for merchandise.<sup>43</sup>

De Greef's idea of social progress is a purely biological one. The perfecting of social organization by constantly greater specialization and co-ordination of parts is less crude, it is true, than the view which sees in the process of natural selection itself a sufficient definition of social progress, but it nevertheless significantly fails to furnish a definite content to the term "welfare" which is fundamental to any definition of progress. To suppose that degree of organization is the only measure of social progress, or even that it is a valid criterion at all, is to mistake one of the most conspicuous incidents in the general evolutionary process for the chief element of value from the human point of view.

<sup>38</sup> *Le transformisme social*, pp. 416, 417, 422, 423.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 337.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 353.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 295.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 353.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 355.

As a matter of fact, advanced societies do pass, as Spencer pointed out, from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, which is accompanied by a more and more complete integration of the whole and by increased interdependence of the parts. But such an evolution in itself offers no ground for evaluation of any sort. In the case of the organism it is only when we recognize the connection between complexity of structure and the range of sensibility and of consciousness which this makes possible, that the use of the term "progress" is justifiable.<sup>44</sup> So in human societies the degree of organization is unimportant, except in so far as it is accompanied by a larger human welfare measured by the type of consciousness diffused through the society, or, in other words, by the degree to which the distinctly human aspects of welfare are realized. We may, therefore, conclude that social evolution is marked by increasing social integration and specialization, and by continuous adjustment to environment, but that these things do not constitute nor define progress.

We pass now from the first evolutionary definition of progress, that of the degree of organization theory, to a second, the Darwinian, or, more exactly, the Darwinistic, for Darwin himself made no attempt to derive from biological processes the sole criterion of moral or even physical well-being. Although the Spencerian version of evolution was universal in its scope, while that of Darwin concerned a single phase of organic life, nevertheless it has been the latter which during the past half-century has revolutionized the natural sciences and profoundly modified methods and tendencies in the social sciences. Here too we find materials which seem adaptable to use in framing a definition of social progress. Here are special processes of undeniable importance in explaining social evolution, which may easily be mistaken for categories of evaluation, instead of categories of simple sequence, which in reality they are.

Professor Sorley has pointed out three different positions which have been taken relative to the value of the evolutionary

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, pp. 176 ff.

process for purposes of judging worth and goodness in human life.<sup>45</sup> The first is that of Darwin, who held "that natural selection is a criterion of moral fitness only up to a certain stage, and that the noblest part of man's morality is independent of this test."<sup>46</sup> The second position is that of Huxley, who set the cosmic and ethical processes over against one another as direct opposites. Neither of these views falls within the limits of the present criticism. But when we come to the third position, which goes to the opposite extreme from that of Huxley, we come upon a view having a very vital bearing upon the theory of progress. This third view varies from the belief that the process of organic evolution, commonly identified with natural selection (although in part mistakenly), is the only clue to judgments of worth in human life and society, to an adherence to a vague natural-process theory of moral values which stands in a certain relationship to the natural law conception of the Physiocrats.

For purposes of criticism it will be convenient to take up briefly three writers, working from widely different points of view, who nevertheless share this general tendency. They are Benjamin Kidd, Ludwig Gumplowicz, and Friedrich Nietzsche.

The theory of Benjamin Kidd presents an interesting case of the evolutionary, or more specifically of the natural-selection, theory put to an extreme use in the explanation of human progress. It is the application, in a diluted and rather vague form, of a perfectly definite biological process to the problem of developmental phenomena in society. Mr. Kidd's point of departure from the side of biology seems to be the fact of the ultimate survival of certain species whose individual members at a given time are apparently outclassed by individual members of competing species; yet so effective is the subordination of the good of the individual to that of the species that the former species, even at the expense of its individual members, achieves ultimate victory over its less well-regulated competitors. From the point of view of human society, Mr. Kidd seizes upon that rather large class of attainments, such as mathematical, artistic, metaphysical, and

<sup>45</sup> W. R. Sorley, *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, p. 51.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

particularly religious qualities, which apparently are without significance in the struggle for existence in the immediate present. All that seems to be necessary in view of this situation, according to Mr. Kidd, is "a considerable extension of the conception of the method in which the principle of natural selection operates in life."<sup>47</sup> This extension is found in the principle of *projected efficiency*.

It was evident that when we conceived the law of Natural Selection operating through unlimited periods of time, and concerned with the indefinitely larger interests of numbers always infinite and always in the future, that we had in view a principle of which there had been no clear conception at first, namely, a principle of inherent necessity in the evolutionary process compelling ever towards the sacrifice on a vast scale of the present and the individual in the interests of the future and the universal.<sup>48</sup>

In this somewhat remarkable passage we have an excellent example of an indiscriminating use of the results of natural science. From the law of natural selection, with its even-handed preservation of the "fit," which may mean the short-lived, or the rudimentary, or the inferior, rather than the long-lived, or the individually perfect, Kidd deduces a semi-mystical law of future efficiency, in accordance with which he declares the age-long process of evolution works.

Now, quite apart from the question as to exactly how large a figure the process of natural selection makes in social evolution—a question entirely removed from the present discussion—it is pertinent to point out the obvious implications for the theory of progress of such a view as this, which seeks so assiduously to demonstrate evolutionary—that is, survival—value, in the case of the whole range of human characteristics and qualities. Human progress is thus regarded as the necessary outcome of a universal biological process conceived, if only grasped with sufficient comprehensiveness, as working out the noblest results in every branch of human activity.

<sup>47</sup> "The Application of the Doctrine of Evolution to Sociological Theory and Problems," Prefatory Essay, *Encyclopædia Britannica* (10th ed.), Vol. XXIX, p. 14.

<sup>48</sup> Benjamin Kidd, *Western Civilization*, p. 57.

Gumplowicz divides all attempts to understand human life and society into three classes, according as theistic, rationalistic, and naturalistic explanations are resorted to.<sup>49</sup> The first two classes belong to the past and the present; the third only, the naturalistic, will suffice for the future. But in seeking a naturalistic interpretation of history, it is not individuals but groups which must be made the basal elements in sociological theory; for it is group reactions which, conformably to law, make up the content of history.<sup>50</sup> In Gumplowicz we find the union of a purely naturalistic account of history, which he regards as the necessary development through group-struggle of purely natural tendencies, and an unusual degree of skepticism with regard to the fact of human progress.<sup>51</sup> Although he avoids identifying the social organism with other organisms purely biological in character, nevertheless, as Barth points out, he contents himself with "the very well-worn opinions of the less historical than natural-historical Darwinistic habit of thought."<sup>52</sup> This natural-history view of society, indeed, is the reason for the mention of his system of thought in the present section, although it would not have been far out of place in a previous chapter on progress as increasing conformity to a law of nature. Thus in the *Outlines of Sociology* he writes:

There can be but one principle of human rationality and of human morals and ethics: to be governed by the import and tendency of nature's sway. . . .

As man himself is subject to nature, . . . he can scarcely conceive another mode of existence; and this one seems right and just, reasonable and moral (*sittlich*). He has no other standard for the events of life than the assumed will, i. e., the visible tendency, of nature.<sup>53</sup>

But the central idea, and the one which furnishes the title to Gumplowicz' earlier work, is the evolutionary incident of struggle. It is by virtue of this struggle among themselves that "the heterogeneous ethical and even social groups and communities carry forward the movement of history."<sup>54</sup>

<sup>49</sup> *Der Rassenkampf*, p. 5.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>51</sup> *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 207 ff.

<sup>52</sup> *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, p. 246.

<sup>53</sup> P. 176.

<sup>54</sup> *Der Rassenkampf*, p. 193, et *passim*.



In this respect Gumplowicz relates himself to a certain extent to the German philosopher Nietzsche, who has also made such heroic use of the primarily biological concept of struggle. To Nietzsche the essentially noble and admirable end and goal of life is the "will to power"—the triumphant self-expression of human nature after the fashion of the primitive Teuton. "At the ground of all these noble races," he says, "the beast of prey, the splendid, *blond beast*, lustfully roving in search of spoils and victory, cannot be mistaken."<sup>55</sup> Again: ". . . all noble morality takes its rise from a triumphant Yea-saying to one's self;"<sup>56</sup> and once more he writes of "the positive fundamental conception of the noble valuation which is thoroughly saturated with life and passion and says: 'We, the noble, we, the good. we, the fair, we, the happy!'"<sup>57</sup> Thus, by restoring to honor the fullest expression of life-impulses, by denying all value to self-repression and weak-kneed altruism, "we restore to men," according to this philosophy,

their cheerful courage for such actions as are reputed selfish, and re-establish their value—we relieve them of their evil consciences. And as up to our time these have been by far the most frequent, and will be so in all future, we deprive the whole conception of actions and life of its evil appearance. This is a very important result. If man would no longer think himself wicked, he would cease to be so.<sup>58</sup>

Here once again we see an incident of the evolutionary process exalted into a measure of worth. As an expounder of Nietzsche has well said, his system was "a transference to the sphere of human action of the unceasing warfare of the organic world with which Darwin had made men familiar."<sup>59</sup>

Similar lines of inquiry might be pursued through other portions of our sociological literature, with the result of showing that in a large number of instances the attempt to explain society, and particularly social advance, has led far afield from the significant and essential characteristic of human beings, the striving

<sup>55</sup> *Genealogy of Morals*, p. 41.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 36.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>58</sup> *The Dawn of Day*, pp. 150, 151.

<sup>59</sup> Grace Neal Dolson, "The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche," *Cornell Studies in Philosophy*, No. 3, p. 100.

after the accomplishment of certain life-purposes, and has substituted for this characteristic all manner of interpretations of and variations upon particular processes and incidents, borrowed in large measure from the sciences of external nature. Such terms as "struggle," "conflict," "survival," and "adaptation" stand for legitimate and highly important concepts in social theory, but concepts nevertheless which can give us no clue to the true nature of human progress.

Progress is essentially a teleological idea, an idea of *value*. It cannot, therefore, be reduced to a formulation in terms of mechanism. And the theory of natural selection is essentially a theory of the mechanics of a process. Evolution in general is either the name for a process judged to be good, and connoting not only the process, but the judgment also; or else it is the name universally applicable to change, to becoming, wherever observable in the world. In the present paper the term is used in the latter and colorless sense.

Now, in separating the sequence category from the value category, the chief danger lies in the direction of supposing that the value category itself is in some way independent of the sequence category. This is manifestly an error. The problem then lies in reconciling a standard of human values, which is valid not because it corresponds to a social actuality, but to a social desideratum—that is, to a social need—with that other dominant conception, that whatever exists in the world is the surviving term of an age-long series, the final member, up to the present, of a vast company of which every particular is linked to those which go before and after by genetic ties.

It is one thing to trace the evolutionary history of standards of value—to show that the progress of society depends upon successive readjustments passed upon its technique of living at every point in its life-history; that the standards of today are but the standards of yesterday rejudged and restated in the light of a new and different and presumably better-analyzed situation; but it is quite a different thing to insist that this dialectic of reaccommodation between social experience and social ideals considered as an actual process constitutes the standard of progress. It is

undoubtedly the evolutionary mechanism by which we win all of progress that is attained.<sup>60</sup> But there is as yet no ground for a judgment of values. The later stages of this process, simply because they are later, are no better, no higher, than the earlier, any more than what the geologists call an old mountain range is better than a young range which is just commencing the life-process through which mountain ranges pass. All stages of both processes are mile-stones in the universal becoming—all are good, we may believe; but why are any better?

It is more than likely that we shall be constrained to say in the end that what the social process has worked out is very good; but why should we be reduced to the necessity of adding that it is very good because the social process has worked it out? The idea of progress contains something more than the trend of the process by which progress has been reached. It involves a subjective evaluative element which might conceivably point in a direction quite opposed to the observable trend of the social process. This process, as a matter of fact, registers, like the needle tracing upon the cylinder, the movement of past social reaccommodations. Inasmuch as the changes in situation and environment form a series displaying a more or less continuous and cumulative character—e. g., continuous accumulation of wealth, increase of population, overcrowding, breaking-over of frontiers, etc.—it is not at all strange that the value series likewise displays a certain observable trend and not a series of mere oscillations. There are, moreover, certain fundamental human reactions which similar situations almost never fail to evoke—reactions some of which, indeed, are shared with the higher mammals; for example, love of offspring. In other words, successive generations have in many fundamental particulars reaffirmed the judgments of their predecessors, and in all probability will continue to do so until the end of time. But this reaffirmation of value elements in the life of society is only one side of reality; it must be supplemented by the process of reaccommodation mentioned above.

Now, at this point we might seem justified in concluding

<sup>60</sup> Cf. W. B. Pillsbury, "Trial and Error as a Factor in Evolution," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. LXVIII, pp. 276-82 (March, 1906).

that whatever seems valuable to a given generation, whatever its own judgment affirms, constitutes a valid standard of progress for that generation. The act of social deliberation which precedes such a judgment embraces countless judgments of previous generations, and the resulting judgment doubtless possesses much in common with these past judgments, and in other respects continues certain tendencies which may be traced throughout the series due to the fundamental facts which have already been mentioned; but it is not inconceivable that a social valuation should make in many respects a well-marked break with the past. The continuity of social judgment, in other words, is not the test of its validity.

But it may be objected that the present argument leads to a sort of social subjectivism; whatever a tribe or a society affirms in its practice or its code is *ipso facto* worthful, and a valid criterion of social attainment. By no means. The largest social survey which the present generation is able to make is in no sense to be identified with the partial conceptions of life which may prevail in a given society at the present time. We may, therefore, maintain that that is valid for us, that that constitutes progress in our day, which, in the light of all human experience and all human striving and attaining, makes strongest appeal to the informed judgment of our generation. For the present it is enough to repeat that the criterion of progress, like everything else under the sun, is a product of evolution, but that it owes its validity, not to its evolutionary past, but to its efficiency in the present, in formulating the worthful elements which the whole process of human experience has disclosed.

The theory of evolution makes no contribution at all to these questions of worth or validity, or moral value. . . . All one can get out of it is certain canons for living, but none for good living. It may draw one's attention to this fact, if anybody's attention needs to be drawn to it, that existence is prior to well-being; but what the nature of well-being is—upon that it throws no light.<sup>61</sup>

#### IV. THE ECONOMIC VIEW OF PROGRESS

The economic interpretation of history is primarily a theory of social causation. In the place of anthropogeographic, or ethno-

<sup>61</sup> W. R. Sorley, *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, pp. 75, 76.

logical, or political, or ideological<sup>62</sup> factors, the advocates of this theory insist upon the fundamental significance for historical development of the industrial and economic arrangements of an age or of a society. These economic facts alone, it is asserted, furnish the key to all the other phenomena of social life. Now, in so far as economic conditions have been held to be simply exceptionally important and decisive factors of social change, to that extent their present discussion is out of place, for the same reasons that discussion of many other factors of social development have been eliminated. But, as a matter of fact, have these interpreters of history been content to assign to the economic factor the rôle which this view of the matter presents? Let us turn to the theory itself and ascertain its bearings from the forms which it has assumed in the writings of its principal advocates.

Although anticipations of the so-called materialistic view of history are found in earlier writers, especially in Saint-Simon and Louis Blanc,<sup>63</sup> yet it is to Marx alone that the credit of being in a true sense the originator of the theory belongs. According to Barth,<sup>64</sup> we have nevertheless a considerable variety of conceptions of society from the economic point of view. For example, one writer, Durkheim, seizes upon division of labor—that is to say, upon the technique of human participation in the economic process—as the significant variant in the evolution of society. Another, Patten, sees in the augmentation of goods, which appears under the pleasure economy, the keynote to social development. While yet others must needs perceive in the technical aspects of the process of production—that is to say, in the series of stages which the history of industry exhibits—the true clue to the ongoing of the social process. Here, of course, belong Marx and the Marxians.

Inasmuch as what usually passes as the economic interpretation of history bears the undoubted impress of Marx's thought, it may be well to state in his own words, or in those of his col-

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Barth's classification of the "einseitigen Geschichtsauffassungen" in his *Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*.

<sup>63</sup> Barth, *op. cit.*, pp. 304, 305; Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*, Part I, chap. 4.

<sup>64</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 303.

league, Engels, the essential points which the theory was supposed by its authors to contain.

According to Engels, the fundamental proposition of the famous Manifesto of 1848 is very concisely stated to be in part:

That in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch.<sup>65</sup>

In his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* Marx made the following statement of the theory:

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.<sup>66</sup>

To quote from the manifesto:

When people speak of ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express the fact, that, within the old society, the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup> *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, authorized English translation of 1888, p. 5.

<sup>66</sup> English translation of N. I. Stone, author's preface, pp. 11, 12.

<sup>67</sup> P. 21.

Thus religious liberty and freedom of conscience in the eighteenth century are represented as the spiritual counterpart or expression of "the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge."

It is not to be supposed, however, that Marx and Engels were blind to the presence of other factors than the economic nor to the constant interaction which goes on between them and the economic factor.<sup>68</sup> The latter, however, was held to be the most important and to "exert a preponderant influence in shaping the progress of society."<sup>69</sup>

It is not that the economic situation is the cause in the sense of being the only active agent, and that everything else is only a passive result. It is, on the contrary, a case of mutual action on the basis of the economic necessity, which, in last instance, always works itself out.<sup>70</sup>

That the socialistic turn given to the theory is not essential to it is made clear by the number of writers outside the ranks of the socialists who accept this view of history,<sup>71</sup> as well as by the possibility of foreseeing an economic necessity of quite a different type from that which Marx regarded as about to usher in the socialistic régime. W. J. Ghent, for example, has given us a more or less fanciful sketch<sup>72</sup> of the results of present social tendencies working out exactly the opposite result. There certainly is nothing inconsistent with a strictly economic interpretation of history in the belief, if anyone feels justified in entertaining it, that democracy is a transitory stage of development, and that, with the increasing centralization of production and the accumulation of wealth, a new form of aristocracy, suited to the new economic conditions, will gradually work itself out. That such a result seems far from probable is entirely apart from the point here emphasized.

<sup>68</sup> Th. G. Masaryk, in *Die philosophischen und sociologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus*, especially pp. 92-100 ff., makes a very penetrating analysis and criticism of this element of uncertainty as to the meaning and scope of the economic factor as used by Marx and his followers.

<sup>69</sup> Seligman, *op. cit.*, p. 67, in summing up the final statement given the theory by its founders.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64; translated from Engels' letter of 1894, *Der sozialistische Akademiker*.

<sup>71</sup> Seligman, *op. cit.*, Part II, chap. 2.

<sup>72</sup> *Our Benevolent Feudalism*.

A closely related view is that held by Lassalle, who unites with the purely economic factors of social development the Hegelian concept of freedom and rationality, which, in ever greater measure, work themselves out in human history. Indeed, Lassalle carried with him through life so much of the Hegelian point of view that it is only within well-defined limits that he may even be mentioned in the same category with the economic interpreters of history. Bernstein specifically charges him not only with failure to trace mental concepts back to the circumstances from which they have developed and "to the economic conditions whose expression they are,"<sup>73</sup> but also with actually reversing the process and deriving the concrete materials themselves from the mental concepts which have grown out of them.<sup>74</sup> Thus in his *System der erworbenen Rechte* his treatment of the laws of inheritance among the Romans is ideological rather than historical, and involves constant use of the concept of the Roman *Volksgeist*, which is made to do duty in explaining the principles of the Roman legal system.<sup>75</sup>

Yet, in spite of these facts, Lassalle's lucid analysis of the course of European history shows that he had grasped the significance of economic arrangements as few men have ever grasped it, even if he chose to disguise under the title of the laws of history what Marx would have pronounced economic necessity. For example, in the *Working Man's Programme* he said:

A revolution can never be *made*; all that can ever be done is to add external *moral recognition* to a revolution which has already entered into the actual relations of a community, and to *carry it out accordingly*.

To set about to *make* a revolution is the folly of immature minds which have no notion of the laws of history.

And it is for this reason equally foolish and childish to attempt to repress a revolution which has once developed itself in the womb of a community, and to oppose its moral recognition, or to utter against such a community, or the individuals who assist at its birth, the reproach that they are revolutionary. If the revolution has already found its way into the com-

<sup>73</sup> Edward Bernstein, *Ferdinand Lassalle as a Social Reformer*, p. 74; cf. Brandes, *Ferdinand Lassalle*, pp. 26, 27.

<sup>74</sup> Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*



munity, into its actual relations, then there is no help for it, it must come out and take its place in the constitution of the community.<sup>76</sup>

In discussing earlier in the same address the causes which led to the downfall of the feudal system, he said:

. . . the progress of industry, the productive energy of the towns, the constantly developing division of labor, and the *wealth of capital*, which came into existence by these means, . . . these were the really and truly revolutionary forces of that time.<sup>77</sup>

Again, speaking of the inventions which marked the close of the eighteenth century, he says:

A stage had thus been reached, at which production itself, by its steadily advancing development had brought into existence instruments of production which were destined to shatter the whole existing system of society; instruments of production and methods of production, which could find no place or room for development in that system.

In this sense I say that the first machine was already in itself a Revolution, for it bore in its cogs and wheels, little as this could be seen from its outward appearance, the germ of the whole of the new conditions of society, founded upon free competition, which were to be developed with the vigour and necessity of a living force.<sup>78</sup>

This whole discussion of the fundamentally economic character of the changes which marked the close of the feudal era constitutes the most clear-cut and luminous exposition of the dependence of social arrangements upon the conditions of economic production which the present writer has had the good fortune to read. Yet, in the face of all this keen analysis, Lassalle still regarded history as the outworking through inner necessity of reason and human liberty, as "a struggle with nature; with the misery, the ignorance, the poverty, the weakness and consequent slavery"<sup>79</sup> of primitive society. The speech from which the extracts above have been taken he later declared to be

an exposition of that inner soul of things resident in the process of history that manifests itself in the apparently opaque, empirical sequence of events and which has produced this historical sequence out of its own moving, creative force. It is, . . . the strictly developed proof that history is nothing

<sup>76</sup> Pp. 22, 23.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 54.

else than the self-accomplishing, by inner necessity increasingly progressive unfolding of reason and of freedom, achieving itself under the mask of apparently mere external and material relations.<sup>80</sup>

The contrast between the terms in which Lassalle worked out the admirable analysis of modern European history in the *Working Man's Programme* and the Hegelian gloss in which he enveloped his analysis in the subsequent speech before the tribunal is very striking indeed. Doubtless the well-worn phrases of the Hegelian metaphysic were better adapted to the purpose of a defense in court against the charge of inciting class-hatred than were the clear-cut formulas of economic causation.

We have sufficiently indicated the essential features in the economic interpretation of history. Let us now consider the bearings of the theory upon the sociological concept of progress. This conception of history taken as an explanation or formulation of human progress is open to two objections. In the first place, it makes out of the merely economic aspects of social life an evaluative category which is set up as a standard of measurement of the worth of social change in general; that is to say, it mistakes *economic* values for *human* values. Even when this crude and one-sided view of social phenomena is avoided, a second weakness is evident in the inadequacy of a theory which fails to provide any closer measure of progress than the consistency of ideas and of the whole so-called superstructure of life with the existing form of economic technique. What constitutes this consistency and how it is to be gauged are questions to which only a hesitating and uncertain answer is given, and it is at precisely this point that the student of progress desires the clearest light.

Let us take up the first of these objections. That this is not merely an academic question a moment's consideration will make evident. Whatever its relation to the important place assigned economic phenomena by the economic interpreters of history, it is an undoubted fact that a view of progress is entertained by untold thousands of our people in every part of the country to

<sup>80</sup> *Science and the Workingmen*, translated by T. B. Veblen, pp. 30, 31.

the effect that the one inevitable sign of advance in a community is the increase of its productive establishments, and the complication and augmentation of the scale upon which it does business. A progressive town is understood at once to mean one whose factories are sending out an increased product from year to year, whose post-office receipts, bank clearings, and building operations are expanding, whose population is advancing in numbers. By the same token the progressive institution of learning and the "successful" individual are those whose incomes and whose visible material possessions are increasing from year to year. That this popular notion, which finds a particularly fertile field in the social consciousness of new and vigorous communities, received very material aid and comfort from the economic writings of the orthodox school throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century is too well known to require comment.

This particular form of the economic evaluation of social change which sees in economic advance—that is, in the augmentation of wealth and especially of capital—an end in itself, independent of its social consequences, is to be distinguished from the other and more subtle theory of the Marxian school. The fallacy of this identification of the increase of goods with advance toward the socially good<sup>81</sup> cannot be better expressed than in the words with which Barth criticizes Durkheim's theory of the division of labor:

He forgets entirely that moral ideas are ideas about values, and that they cannot hinder progress toward greater wealth of values since they themselves first fix these values, first create them. A society, for example, permeated by the ascetic morality, might restrict its production; it would nevertheless make no economic retrogression since these diminutions in goods would not be felt as such. Durkheim always assumes that society has no other end than to produce goods.<sup>82</sup>

It is true, of course, that economic goods form an indispensable condition of social progress; that without the mastery of *things* man would never have emerged from the position of one of the weaker mammals. Out of the discovery of the buoyancy of water, the useful qualities of fire, and the possibility of aug-

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Barth, *loc. cit.*, p. 302.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 296.

menting by pieces of stone or wood the force and range of blows delivered by the human arm, there came a security and an adaptability into human life which were the guarantee of all future progress. The primitive significance of these material facts must not be overlooked, nor indeed the importance of the economic basis of modern life. But human nature, as we know it, is many-sided, and human wants reach out in a multitude of directions toward things which have only a remote relation to economic goods. Any careful definition of progress must take full account of the satisfaction of the social, intellectual, aesthetic, and moral sides of life.

Let us turn now to the Lassalle-Marxian view of progress as the result of a "technico-economic" process.<sup>83</sup> The central idea in both the Lassallean and Marxian schools, as we have seen, is that progressive social change is nothing but the necessary, indeed the inevitable, readjustment of human institutions and activities to a changing economic environment, which, in general, is accepted as an ultimate datum back of which it is not necessary to go. But the present criticism concerns precisely this economic environment. What is *its* law of development, its principle of progress? Surely it can exhibit no unconditioned process which works out its results in entire independence of human will or welfare; it, too, must be subject to conditions and amenable to evaluation. If political and social institutions are viewed as the expression of underlying economic conditions—and this view is measurably correct in the case of many institutions—and if, furthermore, these institutions may be pronounced good only because of their adjustment to the fundamental economic basis of life, then the analysis must simply be carried back one step farther in order to lay bare the ultimate standard of human progress. But the economic interpreters of history do not take this step; they do not go back of the economic environment. This is held to be the criterion in itself. Thus Sombart writes:

History teaches us that what we call advance has always been only change to a higher system of economy, and that those classes thrive who represent this higher system. Behind capitalism there is no "development;" possibly

<sup>83</sup> Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

there may be ahead. The degree of production which has been reached by it must in any case be rivalled by any party that will secure the future for itself. In that is shown, I think, the standard of any advance movement."<sup>84</sup>

Thus the process of economic development is regarded as exhibiting in itself, as distinguished from its social results, a principle of progress.<sup>85</sup>

In Engels' *Feuerbach* we find cropping out the same complacent assumption that whatever the economic process of development brings forth is good, and that social progress consists in the adaptation of life to these economic bases.<sup>86</sup> Now, clearly, if maladjustments and misadaptations of the various activities of social life are found to exist, their elimination in some sort must form a part of the process of progress. But the question is always in order: To what extent does progress consist in the conforming of social and intellectual activities to economic conditions, and to what extent in the modification of these economic conditions due to the reacting influences of evaluative concepts?

It should be pointed out in this connection, first, that the adjustment of social and intellectual activities to the economic environment is far from being a self-directing process which produces certain predictable results with the precision of clock-works. Far from it, the very elements which require adjustment emerge through the operation of processes which are relative to the type and intensity of human wants at a given stage of evolution. And, furthermore, inasmuch as it is these human wants or interests which in the last analysis lie behind all technical processes of production, so changes in the intensity or proportionality of these different wants are constantly reacting upon the economic environment.

The concept "means of production," upon which the whole economic view of history is built, can connote nothing else than those forms of economic activity which turn to account all the

<sup>84</sup> *Socialism and the Social Movement in the 19th Century*, pp. 156, 157.

<sup>85</sup> Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 211: "While Marx rejects all ideology, he judges and measures progress from the standpoint of his materialism, which is wherever possible mechanical, and particularly in accordance with the progress of technique."

<sup>86</sup> Pp. 96, 97, 110-25.

knowledge and skill available at a given time for the satisfaction of human wants. It is clear that, if the steam-mill yields a greater satisfaction of human wants at a smaller cost than the hand-mill, there is no possibility that society will return to the latter. And, furthermore, it is evident that in passing over from a hand-mill economy to a steam-mill economy certain social readjustments are inevitable. But to make the passage from the one system to the other the final cause of this social readjustment, as though its exact form could be deduced from the series of economic changes, is almost to erect once more a shrine to the Absolute, whose cult these socialistic zealots have striven so energetically to discredit.

In one of Engels' letters is found this passage:

Although technique is mainly dependent on the condition of science, it is still more true that science depends on the condition and needs of technique. A technical want felt by society is more of an impetus to science than ten universities.<sup>87</sup>

Here we find a slight clue to the relationships existing between the succession of economic stages and the rest of life. These stages, we may infer, are directly influenced by human wants—"technical wants" they are called; but how do technical wants make themselves felt, if not because of the perceived inadequacy of the output of the technical productive process for the satisfaction of human desires. Results yielded by technique do not measure up to felt needs. The essential factors lying back of innumerable social readjustments are then human wants and human control of nature, and the second of these must not be overestimated at the expense of the first.

The fundamental series of social changes viewed from the standpoint of progress is not a series of constantly "higher systems of economy," to quote Sombart's phrase (whatever "higher" may mean in such a connection), but rather a double interwoven series of human wants developing in the presence of a constantly increasing knowledge and control of the physical environment. In so far as this idea of an increasing conquest over nature, or

<sup>87</sup> Letter of 1894 in *Der sozialistische Akademiker* (1895), p. 373; reprinted in L. Woltmann, *Der historische Materialismus* (1900), p. 248; quoted and translated in Seligman, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

the progressive winning of human freedom from the shackles of the external world, forms a part of the theory under consideration, to that extent the theory contributes a most valuable element to the concept of progress. But, after all, the most important factor in history, and the converse of the principle which has just been stated, is the indefinite expansibility of human interests.<sup>88</sup> Nothing is gained by the attempt to depersonalize and objectify these essential human forces. For example, when Engels compresses the whole argument of his *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, into the formula, "The mode of production is in rebellion against the mode of exchange,"<sup>89</sup> he is simply expressing in terms of economic processes the fundamental truth that human progress is a dialectic of growth which involves in every stage the breaking of old conventions and the substitution for a little time of new ones.

Thus we conclude once more that the center of gravity of the notion of progress is located, not in an external process, be it conceived in terms of divine will, natural order, metaphysical necessity, cosmic or biological causation, or economic processes, but rather in the expanding content of the human life-interests whose increasing realization constitutes progress.

This leads to a final remark upon the fundamental inconsistency of the Marxian economic philosophy of life. While professing to ground itself solely upon the objective and unmoral sequence of economic relations, it nevertheless clings to a belief in progress and to moral judgments drawn from quite other than economic sources.

Marx took over from Hegel's pantheism the teleological idea of progress without understanding that it does not fit his positivistic materialism; at all events his belief in progress is an inexplicable dogma.<sup>90</sup>

Marx and Engels attempted to establish in history the same sort of an objective evolutionary series that Darwin was tracing out in the organic world. Communism in their view was not something which was to be demonstrated better and more just than the present system, but it was presented rather in the light

<sup>88</sup> Small, *General Sociology*, chap. 31.

<sup>89</sup> P. 65, 66.

<sup>90</sup> Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

of an evolutionary necessity; its advent could no more be thwarted than could the laws of biology.<sup>91</sup> Yet, in spite of this fact, the writings of Marx, as Masaryk has pointed out, are full of fierce moral judgments;<sup>92</sup> his cry is in behalf of the oppressed, whose unrighteous exploitation makes possible the present system. But judgments such as these are derived from no colorless, objective, unhuman standard such as is afforded by the sequence of economic relationships. These judgments, whether right or wrong, are bedded, although unconsciously, upon the deeper principle of the imperative demands of human interests for satisfaction.

#### V. TELIC ETHICS AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

The point has now been reached at which an attempt may be ventured to bring together the scattered threads of the argument and to weave them into a positive concept of progress. In the chapters which have preceded an effort has been made to divest the really indispensable term "progress" of some of the more conspicuous elements of error which have been associated with it.

In the first place, the idea has been freed from the mass of irrelevant, and at the same time purely formal, notions which early thinkers upon this subject very naturally resorted to in order to bring the conception of an advancing order in human society into consistency with the other elements of their world-view. When these guiding conceptions of a divine purpose, of a universal natural law, of a continuous unfolding of the human spirit, are spoken of as errors, it is not in the sense that they are wholly erroneous, nor indeed that they do not each contain most important elements of truth; but only in the sense that they do not adequately express the whole truth. They are properly elements of belief rather than portions of the content of scientific knowledge. They constitute a world-view profoundly religious in character, which is at once incapable of demonstration and hence no part of positive science, and yet at the same time absolutely fundamental in the thought of the man who entertains it.

<sup>91</sup> Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 118-20; see also X, *Die ethische Frage*, and especially p. 486.



All three point in varying terms to a Significance and a Reality that are higher than we. In this sense they form a part of the conviction of the present writer; yet, as has been pointed out more than once, they are inadmissible as elements in a scientific formulation of the notion of progress.

In the section on progress and evolution the essentially evolutionary character of progress and of its criterion was pointed out, and at the same time it was maintained that this genetic quality inhering in the standard of progress does not, however, constitute its sanction, give it its validity; nor can it alone serve as a measure of progress. This distinction is practically identical with that made by Professor Sorley between the "evolution of ethics" and the "ethics of evolution."<sup>93</sup>

It has also been pointed out that the idea of progress is essentially an anthropic conception—one relative to human attainment and welfare. Its elements must be sought, not in some non-human cosmical or vital process or mechanism, nor in some incidental organization or specialization which life has assumed, but rather in the variety, intensity, and diffusion of the essential human interests and their normal satisfaction.

And finally an effort has been made to guard the idea of progress from partial and one-sided interpretations, the most conspicuous of which is the so-called economic interpretation of history. This hasty summary of the course of the argument to the present point reveals, what has been implied throughout, the standpoint of the system of sociology, and particularly of the telic ethics, set forth in Professor Small's *General Sociology*.

From the preceding criticism it is evident that a valid conception of progress must, first of all, depend upon results drawn wholly from an inspection of reality. In the second place, it must present not merely a descriptive or genetic account of the course of human evolution through successive eras, but a distinctly evaluative—that is, a teleological—formulation of the worthwhile elements in this evolution. And finally, in the endeavor to frame such a criterion, one must be content with nothing less than an impartial and comprehensive survey of the whole of human life.

<sup>93</sup> *Recent Tendencies in Ethics*, pp. 36 ff.

These conditions, it is believed, are realized in the system of sociology just referred to, whose central thesis forms the point of departure for the present study. That thesis may be stated as follows:

The infinitely diverse phenomena of human association are thus particular situations presenting peculiar variations and combinations of the same fundamental elements; viz.: the physical universe; human wants; combinations of these wants in individuals; contacts between individuals, each pursuing purposes given by his wants; conflicts or correspondences of the purposes of the associated individuals; adjustment of the individuals to each other in accommodation of their purposes; consequent union of effort producing new situations, which in turn become conditions for another cycle of the same series, each term having a content somewhat varied from that in the previous cycle, the process continuing beyond any assignable limit.<sup>94</sup>

Now, the strategic importance for the idea of progress of this view of society lies in the fact that it selects for its analysis precisely those aspects of human association upon which the notion of progress must be built, if it is to be given a scientific content at all. In other words, the emphasis is laid directly upon the worth or value side of human life; that is, upon the progressive satisfaction of human wants in all their ramifications and complexities. It is this inner kernel of human satisfactions which gives character to the whole account of social evolution; which is interpreted, not in terms of mechanism, of morphology, or of physiology, but of *purpose*. Society is a process of realizing purposes in the presence of one's fellows. In this view the whole course of social becoming is seen to constitute in its broader outlines a vast progress from an incoherent, feeble, and discordant winning of meager satisfactions of half-felt wants, to an organized and harmonious satisfaction of universally appreciated and highly developed interests diffused throughout the society.

The central importance of the fundamental life-interests which are classified briefly as the health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness interests,<sup>95</sup> is attested by the following brief quotations, which might be multiplied almost at will:

<sup>94</sup> *General Sociology*, pp. 186, 187.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. 32.

The initiative of interests in each individual remains always the key to the whole process.<sup>96</sup> The process, then, which we discover, is a *progress from the least realized individuals in the least realized association, to the most realized individuals in the most realized association.*<sup>97</sup> The success or failure of the social process to promote the postulated requirements of the persons engaged in the process is now the ultimate test of the process.<sup>98</sup>

So much will serve as a brief indication of the point of view of the *General Sociology*. Several additional remarks should be made upon the details of this view in its relation to the idea of progress. In the first place, it employs a multiple standard for the measurement of social progress.<sup>99</sup> Inasmuch as life is the resultant of many sorts and intensities of purposes, striven for by individuals and by groups, it follows that any definition of advance in human affairs must be made in terms of the number, intensity, and proportionality of these purpose-interests which constantly act and react upon one another in such a way that the development of each is relative to that of all the others. De Greef hints at something of this sort when he declares that a complete inventory of social activity is necessary for an adequate exhibit of social progress.<sup>100</sup> But the idea is incidental to his main criterion of increasing organization.

Progress in an individual or in a community is thus a function of all the various qualities and aspects of life which are there realized. Not physical well-being alone, nor the abundance of wealth, nor even the moral advance which has been attained, may serve as the measure of progress; all of the interests are required because all are phases of normal human life.

In the second place, the view here advanced implies a multiple standard, not only in the sense that it is a composite standard the use of which involves the consideration of attainments as diversified as life itself, but in another sense as well; there is not only a proportionality in which interests are brought to full expression so as to preserve due symmetry and balance among themselves, but it is also essential that there be the realization in

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 304.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 350.

<sup>100</sup> *Le transformisme social*, pp. 409 ff.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 218, 540-43.

society of a symmetrical and well-distributed realization of the possibilities of life among the associating individuals, such that the various satisfactions shall be generally diffused throughout society and not concentrated in the bosoms of the chosen few, the natural lords and leaders, who, as Nietzsche would have us believe, compensate by their excellence of development, by their surplus of strength and beauty, for all the hideous inferiority of the lower orders. This diffusion of the fruits of culture results in a true "equilibration of persons."<sup>101</sup>

More and better life by more and better people, beyond any limit of time or quality that our minds can set, is the indicated content of the social process.<sup>102</sup> The ultimate social end which we can discover is progressive improvement in so accommodating ourselves to each other that increasing proportions of the world's population will share in a constant approach toward more and better satisfaction of the health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness desires.<sup>103</sup>

In the third place, this telic view of progress is genuinely dynamic. It contemplates an infinite series of reaccommodations between human experience and human ideals in view of all that becomes known of the possibilities of realizing fullness of life. It is thus confined within no narrow circle marked "pleasure" or "perfection" or "perfect adjustment to environment," but looks out upon the illimitable future, content with the simple affirmation that "the highest thinkable good is a variable condition."<sup>104</sup>

Finally, it is important to notice the philosophical basis upon which the telic standard of progress rests.

We may say that all moral judgments are *telic* in form; that is, they are estimates of the relations of actions to ends. The last recourse in practice, for testing the finality of moral judgments, has to be an appeal to the *relative value of the ends* which in turn are held to sanction or condemn conduct.<sup>105</sup>

This, then, is the present problem: to arrive at the reasons for believing in the superior value of the general end or criterion described in the preceding paragraphs. The attempt to frame a

<sup>101</sup> *General Sociology*, p. 348.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 671.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 523.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 668, 669.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 683.

satisfactory answer to this demand reveals at once the axiomatic character of the assertion that life is good, and that the fullest, richest, and most widely diffused life is the best of all. As Professor Small puts it, "The only intelligible measure of good is human condition."<sup>106</sup> If the reader is convinced that life is evil, no further appeal can be addressed to him. The conception of progress which we are considering rests upon the empirical fact of life as the ultimate basis of valuation. It must be clear from what has preceded that this view is not cramped by any statical circumscriptions. Fullness and richness and diffusion of life is a concept which takes its content from the eternally shifting dialectic of the social process itself. Consequently, it is always expanding and enlarging and undergoing profound change. If by the social process we understand that endless series of reaccommodations between social experience and social ideals which was referred to in a preceding chapter, then we are justified in the judgment: "This is good, for me or for the world around me, which promotes the ongoing of the social process."<sup>107</sup> But this social process is not good *as process*, but as an illimitable series of moral judgments every one of which is vitalized and rendered valid by precisely that axiomatic postulation of the worthfulness of life which, as we have just seen, is the ultimate ground of moral judgments.

Such, in brief, are the outlines within which may be built an adequate criterion of progress. In the very nature of the case, every generation and every community must fill in for itself, out of the materials of its own situation and its own experience, the concrete details which are to be substituted for such generalizations as have been used in the preceding argument. The standard of progress which we have thus arrived at, stated in its briefest terms, reduces to this: "an increased aggregate and juster proportions of the health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness satisfactions in the persons associating."<sup>108</sup> In other words, the standard has been phrased in terms of the realization of the essential activities and enjoyments of individuals;

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 673.<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 676.<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 682.

and this must, in any view of the case, constitute the ultimate criterion.

There are, however, two or three questions concerning the form in which these results are realized which require notice. Although, as has just been stated, the ultimate form of the criterion of progress must be in terms of the realization of the life of individuals, who constitute, from the point of view of consciousness, the ultimate social fact, nevertheless there are certain mediate ends in which this result expresses itself, which afford materials for an alternative rendering of the fact of progress. These mediate ends may be defined as the perfecting of the technique of control over nature and of the technique of co-operation among the members of society. The two terms "culture" and "civilization," as used in the *General Sociology*,<sup>109</sup> come very close to expressing these ideas. Human progress has proceeded with giant strides when it has received the impetus of a continuous and progressive exploitation of natural forces. Thus, in one view of the matter, the whole process of human advance has been the drama of the increasingly effective struggle of the human mind in its efforts to rise superior to the exigencies of the external world. Science and all the arts are the forerunners of a full realization of the meaning and possibilities of life.

The other result which must precede and accompany the fullest realization of individual life is continuous advance in the technique of social co-operation. Institutions, which are only the structural side of processes of getting things done by men in association, are of course constantly reacted upon in turn by the persons concerned in them.<sup>110</sup> It is just at this point that such facts as division of labor, specialization of social structures, and organization of social effort may properly be considered, not indeed as constituting in themselves criteria of advance, but as agencies which in the past, whatever rôle they may play in the future, have proved essential conditions of progress itself.

A strikingly lucid exposition of the part played by increasing rationality in the organization of society has been made by L. T. Hobhouse.<sup>111</sup> His work affords clear evidence that the general

<sup>109</sup> DeGreef, *op. cit.*, p. 59, *et passim*.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 552.

<sup>111</sup> *Mind in Evolution*.

point of view set forth above is not in any degree inconsistent with a full recognition of the importance of organization in assuring social advance. A brief reference to some of the conclusions reached in this work may not prove an unfitting close to the present study.

According to Hobhouse, human progress consists in movement toward a point "where all that has made the race what it is is brought into the account and made to prove what it has in it to be."<sup>112</sup> The goal of this movement, "as far as we can foresee at present, is the mastery by the human mind of the conditions, internal as well as external, of its life and growth."<sup>113</sup> "Could we arrive at a complete conception of human nature and its possibilities, we should possess final moral truth."<sup>114</sup> Here we find an unmistakably telic conception of progress built about the essential human interests which are implied in the somewhat objectionable term "human nature," which in the hands of less skilful users is in danger of taking on a static signification.

We can conceive as not indefinitely remote a stage of knowledge in which the human species should come to understand its own development, its history, conditions, and possibilities, and on the basis of such an understanding should direct its own future, etc.<sup>115</sup>

This, of course, is a point of view familiar since the publication of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology*. Hobhouse interprets human progress in terms of the organization of mind, which, like the ultimate fact of life, is assumed to be a good. Thus we are told "it is the final goal of reason . . . to bring all the experience of the race to bear in organizing the whole life of the race."<sup>116</sup> A final sentence from Hobhouse may serve as our conclusion:

Remote as this ideal organization of life may be, it is suggested that the trend of theoretical science is toward the discovery of the conditions of human development, while the trend of the ethical spirit is toward making that development the supreme object of action. In the union of these movements, human thought would seem to come as near as possible to the limiting conception of the correlation of all experience with all action.<sup>117</sup>

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 336, 337.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 350.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 402.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 336.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 357.

## PROFESSOR HAYES'S SOCIOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION LINES—A REPLY

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In the fourth of his series of papers entitled "Sociological Construction Lines," appearing in the March number of this *Journal*, Professor Hayes makes some criticisms of my paper, "Metaphysical Elements in Sociology."<sup>1</sup> As they rest largely upon a misapprehension of my position, it is proposed here to consider some of them.

The original contention, very roughly stated, was that, on account of the nature of the elements with which sociology has to deal—viz., conscious selves and their interaction—purely descriptive categories will not give us any explanation; and description must be reinforced and supplemented by appreciation which is the characteristic method of metaphysics. But the conclusion was not asserted as arising from the mere fact of the psychic nature of fundamental societary fact.

It might be well to consider Professor Hayes's criticisms in order. The position here defended in no wise asserts that description does not enter *at all* in sociological study, as my critic's statement would seem to indicate. In support of this we might quote the following statements from my original article: ". . . nor do we hold that sociology is a metaphysic. We do not wish to be understood to hold that consciousness of kind is exclusively appreciative; but what is insisted upon here is that sociology does contain—and if it would be adequate to the facts that it is called upon to interpret, must contain—a metaphysical element;"<sup>2</sup> or the following: "The fact, however, that description still retains such a high degree of importance in it shows that sociology cannot be fused with metaphysics."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, Nos. 3 and 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 523.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 529.



Professor Hayes states that appreciation is based on Royce's metaphysical doctrine. This cannot be verified, since it is used by men of essentially different metaphysical views, as, for example, Professors Ormond, Royce, Münsterberg, and Urban. Furthermore, the notion of appreciation has its origin much earlier in the history of philosophy than Royce. Kant, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, says: "Man . . . cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through pure apperception; and this in actions and internal determinations which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions."<sup>4</sup> This shows that Kant realized that self-apprehension involves more than description. Neither are appreciation and description completely sundered categories, as one would be led to think, so that where one is there the other cannot be. Appreciation steps in just as soon as description cannot give a completely adequate interpretation. Professor Royce holds that every experience contains both appreciation and description, but in different degrees;<sup>5</sup> and Professor Ormond takes practically the same position. Professor Urban, in a recent series of articles in the *Philosophical Review*, comes to the same conclusion. It is as a result of the failure to see this interrelation that a number of Professor Hayes's criticisms arise. Moreover, the statement of Professor Royce's metaphysical doctrine given by my critic is taken from one of his earlier writings, and the position which he defends there cannot be said to characterize correctly his present position and that of his more recent works.

My critic writes: "We are told that certain essential spiritual realities with which sociology must deal can be known only by appreciation."<sup>6</sup> Here his location of the word "essential" distorts my meaning, for it would make me assert that the essential subject-matter of sociology can be gotten only by appreciation; whereas my statement on the same page which he cites will be found to be: "The point of view of observation unsupplemented as a method of sociology will not be adequate. . . . The outer

<sup>4</sup> *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, herausg. v. B. Erdmann, p. 390.

<sup>5</sup> Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 388 f.

<sup>6</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XI, p. 624.

manifestations of society which the sociologist classifies of course belong to the world of description."<sup>7</sup>

Professor Hayes holds that his subject-matter is the "permanent," and that it is this alone with which description and the sociologist have to deal. The descriptive sociologist, however, admittedly deals also with thoughts. But these as motives of society are not permanent; for psychologists—led by Professor James—contend that we never even get the same sensation twice. He advances the argument that appreciation is not a valid process, and the reason given is: "They are not permanent, because appreciation is a fleeting experience that cannot be recalled at will."<sup>8</sup> This argument, which gives reality only to an experience at the moment that it is experienced, is valid only on the Berkeleyan basis of *esse est percipi*; or, in other words, that reality exists only at the moment of apprehension—and this I doubt whether he would be willing to accept. Again, the argument is advanced that appreciable realities are not describable, because they do not appear in the categories of description.<sup>9</sup> This rests partly upon the impression that appreciation and description are absolutely sundered categories—which was considered above—and then it forgets that my statement was *not* that they do not appear, but that the categories of description are not sufficient to cover the facts adequately. My argument for an appreciative element in self-apprehension, based on James's analysis of self-consciousness, is cited as evidence for this contention.<sup>10</sup> My contention never has been that there are sociological data which cannot at any rate be approached by description; but it did assert that adequate interpretation of the facts demands more than description.

The author of "Sociological Construction Lines" holds that the sociologist must confine himself to observation and description. He says: "We hold that sociology does not need to teach anything about any causal energy whatever, but only about phenomena and the conditioning relations among them."<sup>11</sup> This statement is too vague to give a clear idea of the extent of the

<sup>7</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 374.

<sup>9</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 624.

<sup>11</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 633.

<sup>8</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 624.

<sup>10</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 509.

etiological element present in description. But if one may take his argument concerning the describability of emotional phenomena as a clue, he would restrict description to collating the phenomena into general statements concerning their customary time sequence, and not attempting any further causal diagnosis. But will not a narrowing procedure of this sort take the life out of sociology and transform it from a valuable branch of knowledge into little more than a poor history? It will give us nothing more than a bare statement of the actions of individuals; for, since it is description, it, by its starting-point, denies itself the right to make anything more than a superficial answer to the question of *why* these actions happen. The purely descriptive sociologist is never justified in asking anything more than merely customary temporal sequence. The explanatory school of physicists, headed by Lord Kelvin, shows that even the physicist is not satisfied with a physics that does not interpret phenomena in terms of the inner nature of their elements; it shows also that pure description does not satisfy the demand of the human intelligence to know his world and to know it more than merely superficially. Every science, in its youth especially, is forced to combat a tendency to fly off along the line of least resistance into superficiality. Professor Lester F. Ward's definition of sociology in his *Pure Sociology* shows a strong desire to combat this superficializing tendency of the descriptive sociologist, when, after fully caring for the claims of the descriptive side, he says: "and an etiological diagnosis that shall reach as far back as the state of human knowledge will permit, into the psychologic, biologic, and cosmic causes of the existing social state of man."<sup>12</sup> This tendency is represented by another statement: "The scientist has to do only with appearance."<sup>13</sup> If this were so, the scientist would have no warrant whatsoever for saying anything concerning the ether, atoms, and motives. In sociology this would restrict the investigator completely to the dry, historical recording of phenomena and their sequence spoken of at the beginning of this paragraph, and compel him to admit that *why* things hap-

<sup>12</sup> Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 4.

<sup>13</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XI, p. 636.

pen he does not and cannot know, because the reasons do not appear with the phenomena. Especially is this true in the case of human actions caused by motives.

Professor Hayes says (p. 626): "We are told that emotions are not describable *at all*."<sup>14</sup> I challenge him to find that statement either verbally or in meaning anywhere in my paper which is under discussion. As a consequence, his lengthy argument for a descriptive element in emotions is not germane to the point at issue, and so is an example of the logical fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi*. It therefore demands no further consideration. But, waiving that question for the moment, let us examine the intrinsic value of his own argument concerning the describability and publicity of emotional phenomena. I do not in any wise assert that description of emotions is impossible; but his argument, in principle, is that the description of a phenomenon is all that is necessary for its explanation, and it is that principle that I combat. He says: "A great portion of the world's literature exhibits the success with which the emotional phase of human experience can be described."<sup>15</sup> But we in turn ask: Did any of these descriptions ever explain what an emotion is in its inner nature? Again, we are told: "Since one can so far describe his own or another's emotion as to convey by language all this which one keeps in remembrance, can indeed convey all this just as well as what we call the description of a percept can be conveyed, therefore descriptions do in this sense make emotional phenomena public by similarity of testimony, as well as that result is accomplished by the kind of remembrance and description which applies to material things."<sup>16</sup> If it is true that the description *conveys* the emotion, as the above quotation asserts, then does it not follow that the reader has the emotion? Or, in other words, if this were so, the novel reader would fall in love with the heroine as precipitately as does the hero. We are to use the physical analogy, and it teaches that if you convey a force from one object to another, that force will reside in the other either actively or potentially; and so this basis can permit no other conclusion than that the emotion is

<sup>14</sup> Italics his.

<sup>15</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 630.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 637.

transferred to the reader by the description—and yet that is a conclusion which scarcely any of us would be ready to admit.

To return to the main question. I am accused of misapprehending and misinterpreting Professor Giddings' position in saying that the latter holds that the real causal energy in social phenomena is physical energy. I gave a page of quotations from Professor Giddings in support of my statement and interpretation.<sup>17</sup> That page did not even include the following, which, among others, might be added: "If social will is conditioned by natural selection, not less is the power to convert will into deed conditioned by conservation of energy."<sup>18</sup> On the contrary, my critic dogmatically accuses me of misapprehending Professor Giddings' statements, but gives not one single quotation from Professor Giddings in support of his statement.\*

<sup>17</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, p. 503.

<sup>18</sup> Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 419.

\* As the best means of settling this mooted point, a proof of Mr. Fogel's communication was sent to Professor Giddings, with the request that he would restate his own position with reference to the present form of discussion. Professor Giddings has kindly returned the following statement for publication.—Ed.

"I certainly hold, and, so far as I can remember, I always have said when discussing this subject, that all the energy of society is physical energy. The very term "energy" I understand to be a term of physics—in the largest sense of the word including the dynamics of living matter—and expressions which seem to imply that subjective mind, as such, is a mode of energy seem to me to be contradictions in terms. On the other hand, I quite as strongly hold that all the important propositions of sociology may be stated in subjective terms, quite as well as in terms of the objective phenomena of energy. And this because my philosophy itself, back of all my sociological conceptions, is reducible to the proposition that all experience is given to us in two expressions, which are correlated and exchangeable—the objective or material expression, the subjective or spiritual expression. Calling the one  $x$  and the other  $y$ , we can get our values of  $y$  in terms of  $x$  (materialism), or we can get our values of  $x$  in terms of  $y$  (idealism). But inasmuch as we have two unknown quantities, and only one equation (individual experience), our values—that is to say, our philosophical or scientific formulas—cannot possibly be anything more than correlations. We can show that when certain arrangements of  $x$ —for instance, a brain and nervous system—are given, we may expect to find therewith certain arrangements of  $y$  in the form of thoughts, feelings, and volitions. Or, we can show that when certain arrangements of  $y$  are given—for instance, certain motives or desires—we may expect to find associated with them certain rearrangements of  $x$  taking

In reference to the discussion of consciousness of kind, he is willing to admit that it contains appreciation, but denies that appreciation is metaphysical. But an examination of his text will show that he uses the term "metaphysical" in at least four different senses on four successive pages; and so the problem arises as to what he means by the term. On p. 634 (top of page) it is used in the sense of *non-phenomenal*; in the middle of the same page, in the sense of *speculative*; on p. 636, in the sense of *non-scientific*; and on p. 637, in the sense of *mystical insight*. The result of this confusion is that some of his denials concerning a metaphysical element are non-significant, such as when he says: "Even the self-consciousness involved is not metaphysical." Here he has used the term in the sense of "non-phenomenal," and I never claimed that the self was non-phenomenal. What I did contend was that complete self-knowledge involves a kind of apprehension different from that of physical objects.

Let us, for the moment, consider his denial of an appreciative element in self-apprehension. That there is such an element present is not in the least a new idea, as was shown by the quotation from Kant's *Critique of the Pure Reason* given at the beginning of the present paper. Professor Hayes makes the statement that "self-consciousness is a *phenomenon* . . . it is both the awareness and the phenomenon that are one."<sup>19</sup> Up to this point in his discussion a phenomenon has been something which was public, which was permanent, and which was outside of me; in other words, the phenomenon, according to his meaning of the term, always is the external object as opposed to the subject per-

the form of energy discharges in the objective world. Society, then, can be interpreted subjectively—i. e., in terms of *y*—as an expression of motives or interests, and we shall have a sociology such as Ratzenhofer and Small have so admirably constructed; or it can be interpreted objectively—i. e., in terms of *x*—as a complex response to stimuli, and we shall have the kind of sociology that I have tried to formulate in my own writings. Either of these sociologies is translatable into the language of the other, but neither can possibly tell us whether spirit is the cause of matter, or matter the cause of spirit, and I regard any attempt to get back of the correlations of objective with subjective phenomena to what might be called a metempirical (to use Lewes' word) or an ontological sociology, as an utter waste of time and energy.—FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.

<sup>19</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 634.

ceiving it. It must be this, or else it could not be "public" and "permanent." Now, when occasion demands, a something in which the subject and object sides are fused into unity ("it is both the awareness and the phenomenon which are one") is again a phenomenon. How can such a procedure possibly be consistent? Consequently when, in opposition to my contention, he argues that this brand of a phenomenon needs nothing but direct *observation*, his conclusion carries no weight.

He denies that "appreciation involves anything more metaphysical than observation of conduct like our own and inference of experience like that of which we are conscious" (pp. 633, 634). But the question still remains: Does not this term "inference" covertly include the element contended for, viz., the metaphysical element? It is inference in terms of one's own experience, he says. But is it not just this interpretation in terms of one's self, one's own experience, that is the great differentiating element and makes the metaphysical method different from the method of the physicist or the biologist? The physicist takes the fact as it is, states it, and then refers it causally to *other facts also outside of him*. He never thinks that in order to explain that fact, or even to get the real nature of the fact, he must interpret it in the light of his own experience. The metaphysician, however, realizes that in order to understand the world which is given in his experience as a unity—and that is his problem—he must use the categories which he has nearest at hand, and they are naturally those of his own self-consciousness. This is one of the fundamental elements of appreciation. The physicist or the chemist never "inferentially interprets" in the light of his own experience, which, my critic admits, the sociologist is called upon to do; he observes directly and does not explain by inference from his own experience, nor is he called upon to use the principle of the similarity of experience unless he begins to reflect upon the reality of his individual experience—at which point he is in the domain of metaphysics. The difference of procedure is evident. The metaphysical method is inferential as well as the physical or the sociological, but it includes a special type of inference, viz., interpretation in terms of one's self—a type not present in pure description. And so the

presence of an over-descriptive or appreciative element in sociology is in no wise disproved by applying to it the very general term of "inference." The very point under discussion is found hidden in his term "inference," thus making the argument closely resemble the fallacy of *petitio principii*. The same argument is applicable also to my critic's statement that ejective interpretation is only inference, for here again his term "inference" must be taken to include just that interpretative element which—might we call it—descriptive inference does not possess.

In considering my discussion of imitation as a social principle, the question was asked: "Is it not enough for the imitator to see the outer act and its observable consequences?"<sup>20</sup> The answer is: Yes, that is enough for the occurrence of the fact, but it is not enough for the *explanation* of that fact, and for making it socially available. It is just this sort of a question that Professor Baldwin meets when he says: "Merely the fact of social imitation does not necessarily make things socially available. If so, my parrot would, by imitating me, come into social status with reference to me. Another factor is necessary, i. e., imitative assimilation and growth, whereby what is imitated is also organized in the individual's own thought, and imitatively ejected into others."<sup>21</sup>

In conclusion, it might be said that a number of the criticisms against my paper seem to have arisen as a result of a misapprehension of the relation of description and appreciation, and out of the notion that I was trying to make sociology a metaphysic. I have already stated that such is not my claim; but I wish to reiterate also my former conclusion concerning the presence of a metaphysical element in the method of approach. Sociology, without doubt, holds a place of its own among the sciences as unique as any science, but, on account of the advanced place in the scale of cosmic evolution that its data occupy, it needs a broad method of approach—broad enough to admit and to interpret all possible societary facts; and this can be done only by the introduction of the appreciative moment.

<sup>20</sup> *Loc. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 635.

<sup>21</sup> Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 3d ed., p. 536.



## A REJOINDER TO DR. FOGEL

PROFESSOR E. C. HAYES

Miami University

The foregoing "reply" has reference to only one of the series of articles mentioned in its caption. It rests mainly on the claim that I misunderstood Dr. Fogel, and not that the positions which I advocated in that article were erroneous.

It disclaims that Dr. Fogel ever said that "description does not enter *at all* in sociological study." That would have been an absurdity too great to be discussed.

It then objects to the statement that the metaphysical use of the word "appreciation" is based on the metaphysical doctrine of Professor Royce. It is true, no doubt, that metaphysicians who disagree with Royce on other points adopt the distinction between "appreciation" and "description" which he worked out. Professor Baldwin in his *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, in connection with this definition of "appreciation," states that these terms are due to Professor Royce, so that in selecting early elaboration of them it seems proper to choose, as I did, that early elaboration of them which, together with still earlier writings of Professor Royce, sufficed to secure their incorporation in the current philosophical vocabulary. No disagreement as to the history of these terms, if any be possible, has the least bearing on the present discussion. And no metaphysical implications peculiar to Professor Royce are essential to my argument; on the contrary, I expressly and repeatedly show that, if my argument is valid at all, it is as valid with reference to one set of metaphysical suppositions as another. Consequently a criticism or reply of this kind is a case of *ignoratio elenchi*, or argument beside the issue.

Next the objector says that when I attribute to him the view that "certain essential spiritual realities with which sociology must deal can be known only by appreciation," my "location of

the word 'essential' distorts his meaning." As evidence that he *nowhere* said such a thing he quotes *one passage* in which he did not say exactly that. Such logic also deserves a bad name, especially when his very next words, after those which he quotes (p. 14), are:

But when we get to the real study of social phenomena, and want to get the inner springs of sociality—or, to speak in a physical analogy, the "energetics" of sociality—we must go to appreciation; for it seems to me that those motives or inner springs which lead to the interaction of conscious wills, and which as such are an *essential* and self-expressive part of human life and activity, are *beyond* [this word he italicizes] the sphere of description, . . . but are *indispensable* in the search for social causality.

The reason he gives for objecting to my "location of the word 'essential'" amounts to this, that "certain" included parts are the whole, if essential. Odd logic again!

The next paragraph reveals such a misapprehension of my article as to suggest that, in the way of misapprehension, all things are possible to one who is searching for something to which to reply. It sets out with the assertion that "Professor Hayes holds that his subject-matter is the 'permanent;'" when, in fact, I state (p. 636) that there is a sense in which the social realities under discussion are "neither describable, permanent, nor public," when my whole series of articles is based upon the reiterated doctrine that the reality to be studied is the process of interweaving experience-activities, and the entire discussion to which this reply refers is devoted to showing how prevalent activities, even prevalent sentiments and motives, which have neither permanence nor publicity of the kind belonging to mountains and buildings, are nevertheless amenable to truly scientific study, without the intervention of metaphysical elements. The remainder of the paragraph quotes, and discusses, *as arguments of mine*, portions of my opening statement of the position which I proceed to repudiate and set aside!

The next criticism states that a reference made to the etiological element in description of social phenomena is not adequate to give a clear notion of that subject. The objector fails to note that the paragraph of which he complains (p. 633) includes the

statement, "This requires to be read in the light of what was said in sec. v," which gave an extended discussion of sociological etiology. He not only complains, in spite of this, that I give only a vague reference to this subject, but thereupon proceeds to criticize what he chooses to guess—and guesses erroneously enough—is my position in the matter.

The succeeding paragraph challenges me to show that in words or in meaning he denies that emotions are "describable *at all*." I specify *emotions* in his denial rather than using a more inclusive term, because with reference to emotions it is least easy to disprove his denial. Thus I give to the view I oppose the benefit of drawing attention to its most plausible point. His challenge is already sufficiently met by the previous quotation in which he declares, with italics, that the "motives and inner springs of sociality" are "*beyond* the sphere of description." Without looking farther than the fourth page of his first article, I come upon this: "Real meaning in the world of objective experience is gotten *only* through appreciation." On page 362 he says: "We cannot get at those appreciations descriptively. But those appreciations are an essential (the objectionable word again) and determining element," etc. It seems unnecessary to look over the remaining forty-nine pages of his discussion for other repetitions of the position. In the second half of this paragraph he tests the "intrinsic value" of my argument by a touchstone which deserves attention for the diversion which it affords. He objects: "If it is true that the description *conveys* the emotion . . . then does it not follow that the reader *has* the emotion . . . falls in love with the heroine?" etc. But all I claimed was that one can "convey by language all this, which one keeps in remembrance, just as well as what we call the description of a percept can be conveyed." Now when one "conveys by language the description of a percept," say of a Chinese pagoda, does he convey the pagoda so that the reader has it, or does a description of the measles impart the disease?

Dr. Fogel's next imputation is: "My critic dogmatically accuses me of misapprehending Professor Giddings' statement." My dogmatic accusation was worded thus (p. 633):

May not this merely indicate, either that this particular sociologist [Professor Giddings] has not set forth clearly the relation of sociology to metaphysical concepts [a kind of task no more incumbent on him than on the physicist], or possibly that Dr. Fogel has not so perfectly apprehended the sociologist's position as to avoid misunderstanding?

It would have been better first to say that he was right with reference to Professor Giddings' form of words, and then to proceed, as I did, with the question of interpretation, saying: "Might not" the words of Giddings "in reality mean precisely what the metaphysical monist means when he asserts that there is but one causal energy in all the universe, whose operations appear both in physical and psychic phenomena?" The misunderstanding suggested as possible would consist in thinking that Professor Giddings meant to assert anything whatever concerning the metaphysical nature of energy. I was inclined to think that he would regard that as a work of supererogation and hold that it is only to the phenomenal manifestations of energy that we apply, as descriptive terms, the adjectives "physical" and "psychic." By the expression "all social energy is transmuted physical energy" does he mean that all social energy is of a particular kind, or only that there is, so far as we know, but one energy operative in the causation of all phenomena, including social phenomena? Does Professor Giddings really mean the word "physical" to be descriptive of the nature of ultimate causal energy, as opposed to its effects? If so, I erred in attributing to him my own reticence in regard to the nature of ultimate causation, interpreting his language too much in terms of my own thought. However, neither interpretation would conflict with the point of my paragraph, which was that "as the biologist no longer makes reference to a 'vital force,' so the sociologist need make no reference to a social force" (p. 633). Here as elsewhere the real issue is untouched by the reply.

The next criticism offered is that I use the word "metaphysical" in four senses, viz., to mean non-phenomenal, non-scientific, speculative, and mystical. But the objector points out with no difficulty what I mean in each case, and he does not, for

he certainly cannot, say that the meanings are inconsistent with each other; and if the meanings given the word are both intelligible and consistent, the fact that I load it with significance certainly does not make the denial that sociology requires anything metaphysical "non-significant." If he had shown that these four epithets are not applicable to the metaphysical elements for which he contends, he would have done something to the purpose—though it might have been to corroborate my view that nothing of that sort is essential to sociology.

The quotation from Kant alluded to is so far from being contradicted by me that it might be inserted in my discussion without a jar.

The inconsistency next attributed to me is made apparent only by ignoring my frank qualifications and explicit statements of the sense in which I use the words "public" and "permanent."

An apparent *petitio principii* is constructed by forcing upon me what I definitely exclude from my claim. The charge is that I "covertly include" a metaphysical element when I admit the importance of the inference of similarity of experience which we make when men under similar conditions evince conduct like our own. On the contrary, I make a positive and a detailed argument for the completely non-metaphysical character of such inference. This argument is contained in pages 626, 627, 628, also 631, 632, and summarized on pages 637, 638. Moreover, the gist of what he says in this connection seems to be the assumption that whenever one includes in his reasoning facts "of his own experience" he is in the field of metaphysics—which is a *petitio principii*.

The quotation of Professor Baldwin's remark about the parrot has no bearing on my argument. I did not mistake parrot imitation for real and "available" social imitation, and it is hard to see how anyone could think that I did. I argued that to observe the outward acts of others, and to interpret them in the way which I described, sufficed to account for our imitating, either by mere "idiomotor suggestion," for the sake of the outward act, for the sake of the outward consequences of the act,

or for the sake of *inner experience*. Indeed, this particular misapprehension of my position seems perhaps a little more surprising than any other could; to one who has read my discussion of the proposition "social phenomena are psychic" the ineptitude of attributing this superficiality to me will be additionally manifest.

The argument contained in the last seven and a half pages of my article, which seems to me as vital to the question as any, is not referred to in this reply.

It seems particularly unfortunate that Dr. Fogel did not turn to my discussion of sociological explanation, to which allusion is made above,<sup>2</sup> for it is especially in sociological *explanation* that he thinks metaphysical elements are necessary. The divergence between his conception of sociological explanation and mine is so great that it is probably fruitless for us to argue the matter until he becomes aware that to me "motives" do not, in and of themselves, afford sociological explanations, but that prevalent sentiments, desires, and motives are among the social phenomena requiring to be identified and explained.

The case appears to be this: Dr. Fogel proclaims that metaphysical elements are necessary to sociology. His statement seems to throw a kind of haze over the objects of sociological study, to which I object, claiming that they are as truly phenomenal, and amenable to as purely scientific treatment, as are the objects studied by other sciences. To make that position clear, I outline an adequate method of approach to the very heart and center of the stream of psychic activities which, together with their physical manifestations, constitute the social reality. The adequacy of the method proposed is the only significant question in the premises. If he had shown that my proposed method, by excluding everything "non-phenomenal, non-scientific, speculative, or mystical," omits some essential element from the treatment of sociological facts, I might have had the opportunity to prove my sincerity and good-will by thankfully accepting his

<sup>2</sup>I have a forthcoming article further discussing the causation of psychic phenomena.

criticism. But he practically confines himself to saying that I "covertly include" an undefined metaphysical element, and to attempting an *argumentum ad hominem* by attributing to me (justly or otherwise) certain misunderstandings and inaccuracies, thus, if I interpret him fairly, reducing the present discussion to the question whether I misunderstood Dr. Fogel's original article or Dr. Fogel misunderstood me, or each misunderstood the other—a problem of no scientific importance.

## SOCIOLOGY AND THEISM

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LOUIS WALLIS

Columbus, O.

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In an earlier paper we argued that higher criticism of the Bible must be made in the light of sociology before its work is completed.<sup>1</sup> The present paper claims that sociological criticism delivers the biblical material over to theism in better form than do preceding stages of inquiry into the Bible. We reproduce, by way of introduction, the following excerpts from a recent article by a theological scholar:

For twenty-five years or so biblical theology in America has been in the antithetical swing of the pendulum, and many of our foremost scholars have denied the fundamental postulates of the older theology on account of facts observed in the biblical literature. The thesis from which these scholars have turned maintained the transcendent operation of God in the gift of a revelation external to the mind of man; the antithesis is that the truths of the Bible have proceeded from the human mind by purely natural means. The latter has been presented in our day with great power, and the evidence has been collected with marvelous skill, so that few theological circles remain in which the so-called modern conclusions are not accepted either wholly or in part. It has been observed, however, by more than one lover of the Bible and of men, that the new phases of truth are not paralleled in the church by that careful attention and enthusiastic interest which alone can make the new views effective in the production of character. The people have not assimilated them. They appear indifferent to them. It would seem that a synthesis of the opposing views must be made before the Old Testament can have vital interest for men; and many scholars are endeavoring to effect the synthesis. . . . It must be recognized that historical criticism thus far has done little more for the popular mind than to demonstrate facts in the biblical domain which must be considered by all lovers of truth, and that a decided readjustment of theology is demanded.<sup>2</sup>

The idea that the Bible is the result of a revelation in which men are mechanical agents, or mediums, was inherited by Chris-

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, No. 4 (January, 1907); also in *Egoism: A Study in the Social Premises of Religion* (University of Chicago Press, 1905).

<sup>2</sup> Professor Charles Rufus Brown, in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XI, No. 6 (May, 1906), pp. 850, 851.



tianity from Judaism. It may be said, for the sake of characterizing this view briefly, that old theology practically regards the Bible as the product of a wholesale spiritistic séance. God is contemplated as imparting messages to the world through the medium of certain Hebrews, and enforcing these messages by physical marvels which contravene the ordinary course of nature. The first shock to this view came through literary criticism, which showed that the biblical documents represent a greater diversity of standpoint, authorship, and age than was formerly held. These facts, however, were reconciled with old theology on the view that inspiration was distributed over a wider area than had been supposed, and that there is an internal agreement in cases of apparent contradiction. The next shock came through historical criticism which indicated that the Old Testament system, instead of being given at a single stroke at the outset of the national history, was the result of a long development. The attempt is made to adjust this proposition with old theology by the same methods with which the difficulties of literary criticism have been treated, save that the idea of inspiration is given broader scope to include the religious genius of Israel—a factor which the older theology did not assume. At the same time it becomes evident that the historical phase of criticism has introduced a larger element of doubt than ever before. The investigation has not reached a standpoint of sufficient authority to command general allegiance; and the spread of critical views has raised problems which have not yet been satisfactorily solved for any large number of people. Not only are there many schools within the camp of the critics; but there still exists within the field of scholarship a respectable opposition which adheres to unmodified old theology. This opposition is naturally recruited more from the smaller institutions than from the larger centers of learning. But that it still must be reckoned with as an important force is clear from the recent appearance of such a work as Professor James Orr's *Problem of the Old Testament*. It is no exaggeration to say that Professor Orr speaks for a larger number, clerical and lay, than do his critical opponents.

The literary and historical stages of biblical higher criticism

have supplied an indispensable clearing of the atmosphere; but it is beginning to be felt that they do not go far enough down to the root of the problem. It is coming to be seen that historical criticism in general helps to pave the way to what is now called "the sociological standpoint."<sup>3</sup> And since historical criticism of the Bible is an application of a general principle, it follows that Israel, equally with the rest of the world, offers a legitimate field for the method of the sociologist. The static phase of biblical sociology is represented by Edward Day's *Social Life of the Hebrews*, and incidentally in Professor W. Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites*, and Professor George Aaron Barton's *Semitic Origins, Social and Religious*. The dynamic phase of biblical sociology appears in works by the present writer mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

If the sociological view of the origin of the Bible is valid, it follows that the history of Israel can be explained in precisely the same terms that are used in describing any other history. This view results from application of sociological methods to the material which comes to us through literary and historical criticism of the Bible. It shows how the Old Testament system was developed in the process of actual experience.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> "Sociology is in part a product of the critical method which has become standard in historical investigation since Niebuhr's reconstruction of Roman history." Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York, 1894), p. 45.

<sup>4</sup> Professor Cheyne observes that "post-exilic Jewish religion is to a large extent a fusion of inconsistent elements, or prophetic and priestly origin respectively" (*Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*, New York, 1898, p. 28). In other words, the Old Testament system, as it now lies before us, is compounded of interests which, although more or less incompatible, are able to find some common ground. The factors that compose the structures of society are not generally able to function harmoniously at all points. Social institutions are those areas of human contact where otherwise jarring interests function in common. The blending of inconsistent elements in the life of Israel, then, is not so anomalous as it may seem. In fact, it is thoroughly typical of the social process. What we have been trying to show is that only by linking the Old Testament system with the actual working of Israel's interests can we expose to view the tremendous internal forces that gave us the Bible. The sketch in the preceding paper was so brief that we may profitably recur to it by help of a new illustration: As Professor Cheyne observes, the Old Testament system after the exile was a fusion of inconsistent elements, prophetic and priestly. The long process by

If the sociological position is correct the *séance* view of the Bible is entirely superfluous as an explanation of the history of Israel. From the standpoint of science we reach the end of the whole matter at this point. But just here emerges a philosophical question of the greatest importance: What is the bearing of sociological criticism of the Bible upon theistic doctrine? It is not, of course, any part of the sociologist's business, as such, to argue for theism. That is the work of the philosophic theologian, who has the right to the last word in this discussion. But if, in the phrases of our preceding paper, the Bible "is a fact for

which this fusion was effected, however, had come to a provisional period before the exile. We refer to the great reformation of Josiah, which occurred a generation prior to the carrying-away into Babylon. Guarding our statement by qualifications, we have indicated that the *prophetic* element, as it appears in the Old Testament, was derived *originally* from the reaction of the country districts against the fortified cities; while, on the other hand, the *priestly* element, as it appears in the Old Testament, stands for the reaction of the fortified cities against the rural districts. This tension of interests began in the middle of the ninth century B.C., and reached an accommodation of great importance in the seventh century. A conservative reaction on behalf of ancient Canaanite Baalism had been associated with Kings Manasseh and Amon. This movement represented formalism in religion as opposed to the ethical claims of that school of Yahweh prophecy which originated in the country districts. But now the pendulum swung back; and the country districts (*אֲרָצֵי הָאָרֶץ*, *am ha-arets*, or "people of the earth," as the Hebrew text calls them) arose and placed their candidate on the throne in the person of Josiah, the "good" king. But the victory of the country party was not substantial. In return for its hold upon the throne, it was compelled to relinquish the Yahweh shrines at the *bamoth*, or "high places," which, until now, had been located all over the land, "on every high hill and under every green tree." This innovation, along with other changes, was formally based upon a book brought forward from the temple by a priest. The writing was a short form of our present Book of Deuteronomy; and its official adoption at this late date in the history marked the early stage of the canon of Old Testament literature. Yahwism now began to be a *book* religion. Since the requirements of religion could now be announced from sacred writings by the priesthood, the voice of the prophet—the advocate of the commonality—was therefore silenced by what seems to be the victory of prophetism. The urban plutocracy, in alliance with the priesthood, thus obtained a *monopoly* of religion by its concentration at the capital city in accordance with the platform of Deuteronomy. The change in the direction of legalism and ritualism was a necessary objective step in the development of religion. Although the priestly interest is largely inconsistent with the prophetic, it is at least equally useful in the long run. Prophecy is always weak on the side of organization; and this deficiency was compensated by the priesthood.

sociology before it is a fact for theological discipline;" if it "is primarily material for scientific treatment;" if this be true—then it is the duty of sociology to bring its results to the clearest possible statement, in order that the higher disciplines may, with the greatest economy of attention, take up the subject at the point where science leaves it.

Theism contemplates the universe as grounded in a central personality, the living God. Christian theism regards this personality as having the character attributed to him by Jesus. Theism as thus defined is not bound up with the old theology. It does not stand or fall with the *séance* view of the Bible. It is not in the world as the result of a transcendent revelation external to the mind of man. Its merits, in brief, are independent of the Bible. And not only are the bases of theistic doctrine untouched by sociological higher criticism of the Bible, but its foundations are brought into clearer light by this new phase of biblical inquiry. The *séance* view of Israel's religion is exactly what that religion has in *common* with other ancient beliefs. If the god of Israel sent messages through holy men, and worked physical marvels contrary to the course of nature, so did the gods of other peoples. That is to say, not only do the writings handed down to us from Israel contain *accounts* of such occurrences; but the writings that come from other ancient sources contain precisely the same element of crude supernaturalism.<sup>5</sup> If this were all that Israel possessed, it would have nothing to distinguish it. The crude supernaturalism of old theology is exactly what fails to authenticate theism to the modern mind—i. e., to the mind that has a comparative insight into the movement of universal history. Suppose we do read that Yahweh supernaturally sent messages to mankind through certain Israelites, and accompanied these messages by various physical marvels; suppose we grant that all this literally occurred; and what have we gained? Would not the supernatural experiences have to be repeated afresh for each one of us in order to authenticate the doctrine that there is a personal God in the universe? Once

<sup>5</sup> We distinguish between supernaturalism as above and the Supernatural as the essence of the world. We may be skeptical about the former; but the latter is implicit in everything.

admit that we are to take religion by authority upon the séance basis, and the door opens to the principle of subjection to anybody who claims to be the recipient of a supernatural revelation. But at this juncture the old theology invariably shifts the emphasis of the argument, in self-defense, by calling attention to the *nature* of the biblical message, with its demand for *righteousness*, and its ascription of a *moral* character to Yahweh in contrast with other gods. It is very significant that the old theology, when pressed about this point, withdraws temporarily from its main position, and virtually appeals to reason by comparing biblical religion with other ancient faiths. Although the old school is not hereby constrained to abandon supernaturalism, it is forced into a position from which the claims of sociological higher criticism of the Bible can be more clearly seen and appreciated.

The present revival of interest in our sacred literature is not emphasizing the supernaturalism of the Bible, but is coming to a focus upon its ethical character. With reference to Scripture, the function of sociology is to give the final expression to this revival. *Sociology shows that the religion of Israel became fit for the world because it succeeded in dramatizing the divine principle as a factor in the reaction of interests that pervades the process of social evolution.* As observed in the preceding paper, the reaction of interests is always based on moral grounds. It is universally a struggle between "good" and "evil," in which the issue is, of course, the fate of *persons*. Now, obviously, any religion which can dramatize its deity in a form adapted to all situations occupies a position of great strategic advantage as compared with religions that fail to do this. God is not impressive until he becomes dramatic. The practical religious needs of men call for a God who appears in a drama, as in the story of Israel. We are not denying the presence of the ethical element in extra-biblical religions. The point here is that the significance of Israel for mankind consists in the way—the form—in which the ethical factor appears. It is true that all ancient religions contemplated the gods as guardians of morality. The god was figured as laying moral demands upon his people; but he was at

the same time the champion of his own people against foreign foes, whether his own people obeyed the laws of righteousness or not—whether their conduct was good or bad. He must fight for them and against their enemies independently of moral considerations. But Israel's experience broke up for all time this invariable connection between people and god. The prophets declared, in opposition to what was the "old theology" of their day, that if the people broke the moral law the connection between Israel and Yahweh was broken also; and, more than this, that the god of Israel would himself aid foreigners against his own people. Although this doctrine was considered incredible and unpatriotic by large classes in the community, it was finally grafted onto the stock of Israel's official religious ideas.

Doubtless the sociological view of the Bible will be a hard saying. The proposition foreshadowed by earlier criticism, and now brought out more clearly, that Yahweh of Israel has no literal existence—no objective reality—is a shock to souls that have been fed only upon the old theology. This, however, is to be expected in such an era of readjustment as that in which we are living. But sociology has no quarrel with the doctrine of the will of God as a fundamental, essential force in human history, provided that doctrine be stated in a form compatible with the results of scientific discovery. The religious interest is but tardily persuaded of the legitimacy of higher biblical criticism; and the sociological stage of investigation into Scripture will perhaps be resented as much as were the earlier stages of critical inquiry into the Bible. It needs to be steadily insisted that sociology is part of the scientific movement as a whole, and that the problem raised by this method of handling biblical material is the same problem of readjustment that has come up at each turning-point of scientific progress. The advance of science has purged theological propositions of their cruder elements without invalidating the essential positions of theism; and no more than the Copernican astronomy, or the doctrine of evolution, does a sociological view of the Bible disprove the existence of a personal God at the heart of the universe.

## REVIEWS

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*Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology.* Edited by FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Sociology and History of Civilization in Columbia University. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906. Pp. xxiv+553.

This is a kind of source-book of sociology. The aim as set forth in the Preface has been to offer to the beginner in sociological studies "significant examples of the great facts of social evolution, and of their interpretation." The author adds that as an outline of social theory it is "more complete in scope than anything" he has offered in previous volumes.

The volume is divided into two "books": Book I, "Society and Sociology," treating of the nature and kinds of societies (64 pages); and Book II (embracing the rest of the volume), "The Elements and Structure of Society," treating in four Parts of "The Social Population" (Part I), "The Social Mind" (Part II), "Social Organization" (Part III), and "The Social Welfare" (Part IV).

The author, as in his previous writings, defends the psychological as against the organic theory of the nature of society. He distinguishes four leading forms of the psychological theory: (1) The contract theory according to which the psychological origin of society is found in a "perception of the utility of association," and is usually rationalistic in form; (2) the impression theory in which society is viewed as a "phenomenon closely allied to suggestion and hypnosis" and the elementary social fact is seen in the constraining power, the impression, the contagious influence that an aggregation, a mass, of living beings, exerts upon each individual mind; (3) the imitation theory, which explains impression, contagion, influence, as forms of the interaction of mind with mind, "as modes of example and imitation." These three he regards as simply developed forms of the "sympathy" theory of society. As contrasted with these he puts forward his own theory as a developed form of the instinct theory—the theory (4) of the consciousness of kind. This theory, as that of Aristotle, assumes that the most elementary form of social relationship is discovered in the very begin-

ning of mental phenomena. It offers, the author says, "a simple and consistent view of the relation between social life and the material universe."

It assumes that the original causes of society lie in the material environment, which may be regarded as an infinitely differentiated group of stimuli of like-response, and, therefore, of collective action; while the products of past social life, constituting the historical tradition, become in their turn secondary stimuli, or secondary causes, in the social process (p. 8).

In its simplest form mental activity is a response of sensitive matter to a stimulus. Any given stimulus may happen to be felt by more than one organism, at the same or at different times. Two or more organisms may respond to the same given stimulus simultaneously or at different times. They may respond to the same given stimulus in like or in unlike ways; in the same or in different degrees; with like or with unlike promptitude; with equal or with unequal persistence. I have attempted to show that in like-response to the same given stimulus we have the beginning, the absolute origin, of all concerted activity—the inception of every conceivable form of co-operation; while in unlike response, and in unequal response, we have the beginning of all those processes of individuation, of differentiation, of competition, which, in their endlessly varied relations to combination, to co-operation, bring about the infinite complexity of organized social life (p. 67).

While in this introductory statement the two principles appear to be assigned equal importance in the evolution of society, we find that in the course of the treatment throughout the book the principle of variation or diversification is almost completely subordinated to the principle of identity or similarity. Resemblance or likeness of organic response, of sympathetic or deliberative co-operation, like-mindedness, is the fundamental social category. This may be merely a matter of kinship, blood relationship, of potential or unconscious similarity, of mental or moral likeness, or it may be a conscious recognition of identity of interests and ideals. Before proceeding to a consideration of what to the reviewer are the dangers in this exclusive emphasis on the category of resemblance, it will be well to pause to point out certain other ambiguities in the use of terms which (perhaps inevitably in the present state of sociology) complicate the situation so far as its methodological aspect is concerned.

This has to do with certain psychological and philosophical terms which are introduced into the discussion without definition or without clearly indicating their meaning in relation to other uses current in allied sciences. Chief among these may be mentioned the terms "social mind," "mental" and "physical," "intermental action," "like-



mindedness;" the repeated distinction between "objective" and "subjective" factors in social process; and the phrase "consciousness of kind."

By "social mind" the author says that he does not mean any other consciousness than that of individual minds. The social mind is the phenomenon of individual minds acting simultaneously, and especially of individual minds in communication with one another acting concurrently. The social mind

may be defined as the like-responsiveness to stimulation, the concurrent feeling and intelligence, the consciousness of kind, and the concerted volition of two or more individuals (p. 185).

This presumably is what the author means by "social process as a psychological phenomenon." But what then is meant when the social mind is spoken of as putting "its impress on each component group" and molding it "into conformity with a certain type" (p. 499), and when it is spoken of as giving approval or disapproval, or in such a phrase as "The social mind has always perceived this truth, etc." (p. 517)? Here the social mind is all but personified. In the discussion of sovereignty attention is called to the "essentially psychological nature of the phenomenon" (p. 363), "more specifically, the mode of sovereignty . . . is determined by the type of mind and the mode of like-mindedness then and there prevailing" (p. 363). But what is meant by the word "mind" here and, furthermore, how are the minds conceived in a theory which makes use of the phrase "intermental activity" (pp. 11, 312, and *passim*)? Is it interaction between minds as such or minds as embodied in organisms? If the latter, how does intermental activity differ from the ordinary process of social communication?

One may not read the book thoughtfully and avoid asking the question what is meant by the the "resemblance of two or more minds to one another" (p. 304). Doubtless this is the key to the meaning of the "intermental action." But the problem is, in what sense does the category of resemblance apply? On p. 332 "like-mindedness" is made to result from the development of the simultaneous like-reponses of a plural number of individuals through the consciousness of kind into concerted volition. The total phenomenon of resemblance thus established is called "like-mindedness." Here obviously the term "mind" must embrace the physical and social expressions of mental states, if indeed it must not be confined to that, since there would seem to be no point (even granting that it

were an intelligible notion) in asserting similarity between minds abstracted from their physicosocial embodiments.

But if this is the meaning of the term "resemblance" what is the force of the distinction between the "subjective" and "objective" factors and conditions, which recurs throughout the book? One is led by reading certain passages to suspect that minds are conceived in an isolative individualistic way, as when "purely individualistic motives and methods" are spoken of as being made over into "socialized motives and methods" (p. 305), and when "instinctive response to stimulus," bodily appetites and desires, are regarded as more individualistic than emotion, thought, and rational desire, though in other passages the essentially social nature of the individual consciousness is emphasized. But on either interpretation the use of the terms "mental," "physical," and "subjective," "objective," remains ambiguous. In one passage the author says:

In all social as in all psychological phenomena, physical and mental processes are correlated.

Scientific psychology has found one way, and only one, to avoid any assumption of either materialism or idealism, in the philosophical sense of those words. It consists in centering attention upon the correlations of material and mental phenomena, rather than on the nature of things in themselves. External things are conceived as stimuli, and internal processes are conceived as responses to stimuli. Causation within the realm of mental phenomena, is thus regarded as psychophysical. It is a process in which the mental order changes in definite ways corresponding to changes in an external order. To discover these ways and to formulate their laws is a sufficient scientific achievement in psychology. It is unnecessary to raise any question of the identity, or of the duality, of mind and matter (p. 178-179).

Yet in another passage the author speaks of "sheer mental force" (p. 154) and of the "purely mental processes of appreciation" (p. 374) as opposed to the "motor processes of utilization," and throughout the book the distinction is made between "subjective" and "objective" conditions of social process (cf. pp. 125, 183, 299, 304, 315). There seems to be a tendency to profit by all the methodological license which the hypothesis of psychophysical parallelism affords while abjuring its metaphysical implications.

Finally it may be suggested that the meaning of such words as "stimulus" and "response" in such a connection as this is far from being self-evident. "A key to the understanding of society, in both its organization and its historical development, is always to

be found in a study of stimuli" (p. 178), says the author, and the Index refers to the discussion of stimulation and response under the heading "Formation of the Social Mind," but neither of these suggestive ideas is worked out.

The awareness of resemblances and differences by the resembling individuals themselves is called "consciousness of kind." It may be little more than "a feeling of sympathy," or it may become a "clear-cut perception." It is rooted in habitual like-responses, in mental and practical resemblance; it leads, on the other hand, to conscious "concerted volition." "In like-responses to common stimuli we have the substance, or subject-matter, of social phenomena."

Chapter iii of Part II is devoted to an analysis of the "subjective phenomena" which "accompany" at least the higher stages of "mental and practical resemblance." These subjective phenomena consist of various modes and degrees of awareness on the part of the individuals themselves *that they are alike*. Collectively these facts are designated by the phrase "consciousness of kind." This consciousness of kind is a social and a socializing force, sometimes exceedingly delicate and subtle in its action, sometimes turbulent and all-powerful (p. 275). "So far as we have any reason of knowing, the consciousness of kind is the only social consciousness" (p. 185). "The consciousness of kind," we are told, "is that pleasurable state of mind which includes organic sympathy, the perception of resemblance, conscious or reflective sympathy, affection, and the desire for recognition" blended in an integral experience. These five modes of consciousness are not independent of one another. Only by a process of scientific analysis may they be thought of singly. In actual experience they are united in a state of mind that, for the moment, seems perfectly simple (p. 288-289). "Using the word 'sympathy' as a collective word for all the feelings that are included in the consciousness of kind, the law of sympathy is: The degree of sympathy decreases as the generality of resemblance increases" (p. 298), i. e., the degree of sympathy varies directly with the concrete elements in the resemblance.

"A relatively perfect consciousness of kind can exist only in minds that are in a high degree alike" (p. 303). We experience recognition and sympathy from the human beings who surround us "in a gradation that corresponds to their degrees of resemblance to ourselves" (p. 302). And if it is not obvious upon the surface,

in the last analysis social assimilation depends upon "potential" resemblance.

The question almost inevitably arises in the mind of the reader when he comes upon these extreme statements of the resemblance theory and the consciousness of kind as the ultimate principle, whether after all the consciousness of difference is not as important a factor in friendship, say, as the consciousness of resemblance. Why the exclusive emphasis on the capacity of two people *to become alike*? May not the mutual enhancement of differences be an equally vital and fundamental basis of such a relationship? Is there not at least a grain of truth in Heraclitus and Hegel?

When individuals have become *aware* of their resemblances in purposive action they *consciously* co-operate to realize their common interests. Spontaneous like-response becomes "concerted volition" (p. 326). Here again, it is not indicated what are the types of situation, of social adjustment, which demand or permit of this transformation of the primary biological response into a conscious and deliberate co-operation. Does this take place inevitably or only under certain conditions of social stress, the clashing of social groups, of established customs, institutions, traditions, and codified beliefs? Here seems to be the point in the author's argument for the consideration of those phenomena of conflict which he himself has recognized and to which certain writers give a prominent place in their social theory under such titles as "Social Crises." Here is the natural place for the specific application of the principle of the universal process of conflict which is invoked in the earlier pages (cf. p. 97; also p. 128). All modes of activity, he says, are in one aspect a conflict (p. 161). Invention results from the combination of conflicting imitations (p. 314). Fashion is the product of the attrition of customs (p. 314). And he speaks of the substitution of intellectual for merely physical strife on the higher levels of human culture. All thought and feeling involve the conflict of sensations (p. 161). And discussion is shown to be an accompaniment if not the essential factor in progress (pp. 324, 325, 345).

But the emphasis is not placed upon the conflict as the condition of this metamorphosis, but rather on "similarities and repetitions" among the conflicts. "Some conflicts are like other conflicts" (p. 97). The author points out, to be sure, that the rapidity of the transformation from the spontaneous to the consciously concerted action, as well as its extent and the forms which

it assumes, depends upon "subjective" conditions, by which, he goes on to explain, he means "types of mind, of disposition, and of character, and the degree of the consciousness of kind" (p. 326). But the term "subjective" here as elsewhere is ambiguous. Does he mean subjective in the sense of individual or in the sense of mental? His earlier statement that all social phenomena are psychophysical in character would seem to preclude the latter interpretation, yet the former interpretation is not clearly indicated, unless the "objective" conditions (which he enumerates in the passage which immediately follows) are to be interpreted in the narrower sense of the "social."

In places the author does give explicit recognition to the function of the individual in the reconstruction of social custom and belief, as, for example, when he insists upon the necessity of freedom of speech and of public meeting (p. 346). He goes so far, indeed, as to admit that rational thinking as it takes place in the individual "consists in the interposition of new ideas between stimulation and the consequent muscular action. The tendency of the crowd, as we have seen, is to react instantly as a unit upon any suggestion, just as the tendency of non-rational man is to expend his nervous energy in reflex action. In the individual this process is interrupted by any new idea or suggestion" (p. 346). And he admits that here may be "a large factor of constraint" involved in bringing about concerted volition.

But he says that under normal conditions concerted action begins spontaneously. But if it is true that "history abounds in example of votes cast by ecclesiastical councils and legislative bodies in practically enforced obedience to the commands of a dictator" (p. 327), and if this is to be interpreted as a genuinely resistant element, the question would arise as to whether the *normal* conditions under which this transition takes place are not rather the conditions of tension or conflict which according to him are exceptions to the rule. Certainly the illustrations he cites lend themselves readily to such an interpretation: cf. the description of "The Assembly of the Argives," "The Argives' Launching of the Ships," "Wat Tyler's Rebellion," "Crying One's Wrongs in China," "The French Revolution," etc. (pp. 327-37).

As would be expected from the emphasis previously laid upon "mental and practical resemblance," this is made the basis likewise of concerted volition. "The possible extent of concerted volition" is determined by the facts of "mental and practical resemblance."

"Other things being equal, the greater the mental and practical homogeneity of a population, the greater is the possible extent of concerted volition" (pp. 330, 331). Yet is it not true that it is just the "differences of language, of religion, of education, of economic standards and opportunities, and of moral standards" which in the first instance creates the demand for and makes possible this conscious and deliberate co-operation in revision of standards and mutual adjustment of social habits? This seems to be virtually admitted when it is stated that "the more heterogeneous a group . . . the stronger must be the stimuli to produce like-response and a common will" (p. 331), i. e., stating it in the obverse form, the greater the social tension, the more violent the stimuli, the more revolutionary the transition—the greater the gain on the side of conscious co-operation when a concerted volition is finally reached.

If, as the author says (p. 334), it is under conditions of mob action that the "individual loses his own feeling of responsibility," and "gives way to impulses, which, if he were alone, he would control," then presumably it is under conditions of resistance on the part of the individual against this dominating influence of the group, that the conscious and deliberative type of action may arise.

The process by which doubt is created [says the author], by which criticism is instituted, and judgments arrived at in society, is called discussion. In discussion conflicting beliefs are compared, analyzed, and subjected to argument. So long as men accept as true everything that they hear repeated, or that they themselves are prone to believe, their talk is not to be described as discussion. It becomes discussion only when some one disputes or denies, and thereby compels those who assert to give reasons or to advance arguments in support of what they affirm (pp. 344, 345). Public opinion comes into existence only when a sympathetic like-mindedness or an agreement in belief is subjected to criticism, started by some sceptical individual (p. 345).

If this is so, if "deliberation begins when belief is assailed by doubt," and if it is only "after passing through an experience of questioning and uncertainty" that the individual arrives at "judgments for which he can give reasons," it would seem that this factor of doubt and the individual consciousness in which it appears play the crucial part in the transformation of spontaneous like-mindedness into concerted volition. And it would seem that he ought to make this principle of the "diversification of co-operation" (355) the basal category of this phenomenon of transition.

Our author speaks of "tensions in the social system consequent

upon abuses of liberty and excesses of individualism" (p. 420), as though they were abnormal phenomena instead of representing the normal way in which society differentiates. The element of conflict is attributed to the imperfection of the development of the spontaneous forms of like-mindedness which if left to themselves, he says, would "end in an aimless activity, or in mere uproar and confusion" (p. 352). The social tension which is the condition of the development of conscious individuality, instead of being given a positive function, is treated in a purely negative way as a disturbing element. But, as long as the element of conflict upon which individuality rests is treated in this way, is it possible to state the true significance of democracy which, as the author seems willing to grant, provides the machinery for utilizing just these conflicts for the progressive differentiation of the social whole?

On Professor Giddings' theory some form of static social and mental equilibrium seems to be the only possible goal, especially if it be true that "all inequality . . . is necessarily unstable, tending at all times through equilibration to break down into equality" (p. 420). "Unlike-mindedness as a means of variation and progress" deserves a place of equal importance by the side of like-mindedness which is made "the essential basis of social organization in every stage of its history" (p. 430). It is only fair to place alongside of the sentence just quoted such passages as the following (which the reviewer has not been able to reconcile with it and which do not seem to have any effect by way of modification of the fundamental principle of resemblance and consciousness of kind): "The development of the social constitution is proportional to the growth of an appreciation of the value of variety or unlikeness in society" (p. 517, 518). Society, he adds, creates the higher from the lower types of life "by multiplying helpful variations, and subsequently selecting the best results" (p. 523). But there is no attempt apparently to give even a descriptive technique of such variation. While a great deal of space is given to the statement of the principle of conservation, the principle of continuity, resemblance, consciousness of kind, etc., there is no corresponding elaboration of the facts of these variations nor of the laws of that social resistance or attrition by which these variations factor in the development of individual consciousness for the evolution of society. Progress is distinguished from mere evolution as that stage in which "the unit of the integrated mass or group becomes an end as well as a

means" (p. 523). But though "psychological" analyses recur throughout the treatment, one looks in vain for any analysis, in relation to the social process, of what is meant by this sense of *being an end*, and for any satisfactory statement of the conditions under which this remarkable transformation takes place.

One word more. It is assumed throughout that the law of action in the physical world holds for social phenomena: namely, that action is always along the line of least resistance. In the mental and social realm this becomes the law of least effort. Sympathy and affection result from habits of like-response to the same or to like stimuli. Sympathy and affection, therefore, go out most to those who most resemble ourselves, simply because, under these conditions of genesis, such is the direction of least difficulty (pp. 299, 300). But it is also stated that the higher intellectual processes are "differential consequences of mental activity in the paths of least effort" (p. 419). If this is so, what becomes of the distinction between action along the line of least, and action along the line of greatest, resistance? How are conscious reactions to be distinguished from habitual reactions? Or is this distinction of no import for sociology? It occurs to the reviewer that this difficulty at bottom is the same as that which underlies Professor Giddings' extreme emphasis upon the resemblance category.

In conclusion the reviewer wishes to add that while these remarks are mainly critical in character they express rather the deep interest which he has in the fundamental issues which Professor Giddings' book raises than any desire to ignore the many positive merits which the book has, and which will certainly secure it a wide reading among those who are interested in the sources of sociological theory and in the author's own theory of their value and interpretation for a science of society. H. HEATH BAWDEN

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*Applied Sociology: A Treatise on the Conscious Improvement of Society by Society.* By LESTER F. WARD. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906. Pp. xviii+384.

The brilliant completion of Ward's "system of social philosophy" is an event of world-wide scientific interest. As the achievement of one mind, that system challenges comparison with the



"synthetic philosophy" of Spencer. One necessarily associates the work of the two men; for the appearance of the *Applied Sociology* marks the definitive triumph of the psychological interpretation of society, of which Ward is the chief exponent, over the biological theory of social evolution, for which Spencer was mainly responsible. Moreover, in equipment the two scholars are peers; for if Spencer was almost overtrained for his great task, Ward towers above all other sociologists, European or American, in the extent, the variety, and the efficiency of his learning. From the path-breaking *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883 to the *Psychic Factors* in 1901, the *Pure Sociology* in 1903, and the *Applied Sociology* in 1906, what a quarter of a century of creative thought! During that period, in method and in principle, a true science of sociology has been constructed. Many builders in many lands have shared in the work. Among them, largely under stimulus of Ward's fruitful original conception of society as a psychic fact, has appeared an "American School" of sociologists, whose workmanship is bound to take relatively higher and higher rank the better it is understood. On the basis of the desires as true social forces, Ward has built up an enduring structure. Doubtless to erect a system of sociology on the broad platform of the social processes would secure some real advantages. It would invite, for example, a more vivid and a more copious treatment. Indeed, the *Pure Sociology* might well be expanded by a full analytical discussion of the more salient social processes. Still in the series of phenomena conceived as constituting the aggregate social life—force, process, and structure—force holds the logical vantage-ground. The series expresses a causal relation. Moreover, in appraising the lasting scientific value of *Pure Sociology*, it must not be overlooked that in principle as well as in the concrete details the treatment of the social forces has involved, and necessarily involved, a consideration of the social processes and the social products.

The *Applied Sociology* will not disappoint those who have expected much from this culmination of Ward's constructive thought. It is an epoch-making work. Not only is it a contribution to social science of first-rate value; but it is also of fundamental practical interest to education. No other book has done so much to reveal the true function of knowledge. The text is arranged in three parts: Part I, "Movement," comprising seven chapters; Part II, "Achievement," in three chapters; and Part III, "Improve-

ment," also including three chapters. "Movement" is defined as the "condition to achievement;" and "achievement," as the "means to improvement." Accordingly Part I deals with the "mobilization of the army of achievement;" with the fundamental principles and conditions of "social motion." The discussion of the relation of pure to applied sociology, in the first chapter, reveals the high originality of Ward's conception. On the one hand, applied sociology is sharply distinguished from pure sociology; on the other, from the sociological art. Pure sociology is "simply a scientific inquiry into the actual condition of society. It alone can yield true social self-consciousness." It furnishes facts, causes, and principles. "Its most important lesson is that of the great stability of social structures," while disclosing the further truth "that in most cases such structures, though they cannot be changed by the direct methods usually applied, may be at least gradually transformed by indirect methods and the adoption of the appropriate means." The scientific principles of such transformation, of "reform," are the province of applied sociology, which therefore rests upon pure sociology. "Just as pure sociology aims to answer the questions What, Why, and How, so applied sociology aims to answer the question What for." The one "treats of the subject-matter of sociology, the other its use." In harmony with the well-known principles of his system the author continues:

The subject-matter of pure sociology is achievement, that of applied sociology is improvement. . . . Achievement is individual, improvement is social. Applied sociology takes account of artificial phenomena consciously and intentionally directed by society to bettering society. Improvement is social achievement. In pure sociology the point of view is wholly objective. It may be said to relate to social function. In applied sociology the point of view is subjective. It relates to feeling—the collective well-being. In pure sociology the desires and wants of men are considered as the motor agencies of society. In applied sociology they are considered as sources of enjoyment through their satisfaction. The distinction is similar to that between production and consumption in economics. Indeed, applied sociology may be said to deal with social utility as measured by the satisfaction of desire.

"Applied sociology is egalitarian to the extent of aiming to secure" for all men equally the right to the exercise and enjoyment of whatever faculties they may possess. "But applied sociology is not government or politics, nor civic or social reform. It does not itself apply sociological principles; it seeks only to show how they may be applied. It is a science, not an art."

In the remaining six chapters of Part I this conception of the nature and purpose of applied sociological science is developed with illuminating power. At every point the reader is impressed by the author's candor and courage, and by the alertness and freshness of his thought. Interest never flags. The "efficacy of effort," as opposed to the narrow evolutionary doctrine of the extreme organicists, is convincingly presented. A rational theory of the social welfare is set up. The "happiness of mankind consists entirely in the freedom to exercise the natural faculties. The old idea that happiness is a negative state—a state of rest or repose—is completely exploded. . . . Whatever degree of happiness men enjoy is due to the power to exercise their faculties and to no other source." With equal force the claims of feeling and the new ethics are defended. Conventional ethics, which is derived from primitive race-morality, "has proved one of the chief props to exploitation and cloaks to hypocrisy from which mankind has had to suffer." The "new ethics, on the contrary, goes to the root and deals with the conditions and causes of evil." It is dynamic. It is applied sociology. "It recognizes that the *summum bonum* is the social weal, and aims, as light is vouchsafed, to labor for that end." Very enlightening is the discussion of "truth and error;" and one must perforce admire the courage with which the genetic or causal error, the belief in the existence of spiritual beings, is exposed and its sinister results described.

Of basic importance for this new-born science of applied sociology is the chapter on the "Social Appropriation of Truth." The perception of truth depends on the possession of knowledge. At present knowledge and truth are monopolized by a privileged few. The great task of society is to equalize opportunity. "None of the great errors of the world which are so effective in holding civilization back could stand for a moment if those who now entertain them were really in possession of the truth which is their natural antidote." The faculty of causation is universal. "Error is false deduction, truth is correct deduction," from facts or supposed facts. "With the same reasoning power the truth or falsity of the conclusions will depend upon the amount of knowledge." The equalization of knowledge is triumphant democracy. Moreover, all classes and races of men are equally capable of grasping the truth. What they lack is not inherited capacity, but knowledge, opportunity. With great vigor Dr. Ward sustains the doctrine of

potential "intellectual egalitarianism." There are no "lower classes," no "inferior races." Class distinctions in society "are wholly artificial, depend entirely on environing conditions, and are in no sense due to differences in native capacity. Differences in native capacity exist and are as great as they have ever been pictured, but they exist in all classes alike." Indeed, every day's increment of knowledge deepens the conviction that the observed differences in races are due far more to differences in history and environment, to social institutions, than to heredity. Sir Henry Maine's favorite theory of non-progressive races is swiftly passing. We are even beginning to suspect that craniological indexes are of slight import as indexes of mental capacity or mental difference. Yesterday occidental vanity was rebuked by the portentous rise of Japan; to-morrow it may be still more rudely shocked by the self-assertion of China; while already India seems to be stretching her limbs after a slumber of three thousand years. Nor need we exclude the black race; for the South African Bantu is raising significant questions as to the future limits of his cultural progress.

At this point Dr. Ward takes up the discussion of "Potential Achievement," to which Part II, pp. 113-281, of this remarkably fascinating and stimulating book is devoted. It consists of an elaborate exposition of theory of "potential genius" as opposed to the teaching of Galton. According to the well-known theory of Galton, "genius," i. e. "mental power or faculties," is not only "hereditary," but "irresponsible." In effect this doctrine asserts that all genius "will out;" there is no genius which does not manifest itself. To this is opposed the view, so brilliantly expounded by Alfred Odin in his great monograph, *Genèse des grands hommes* (2 vols., Paris, 1895), and in America ably supported by John M. Robertson and Charles H. Cooley, that genius or mental power under favorable conditions may remain latent and never find expression at all. For the difference between latent and manifest or dynamic genius is opportunity, and opportunity is practically equivalent to knowledge. This is the "unknown quantity" which differentiates genius from ability. Availing himself of Odin's statistics and improving upon them, Ward develops a convincing argument, of which not even a summary may here be attempted. Many a popular error is exposed. Never have the just claims of democracy been so solidly grounded, or its high destiny so clearly revealed. One is fairly carried away by the authors meliorism. The equalization of opportunity, the

thorough democratization of knowledge, will increase the intellectual fecundity of society a hundred fold. Nay, if women be admitted to equal share in the heritage of truth, it may be expanded to double that amount. At present only 10 per cent. of society's resources have been developed. "Another 10 per cent. are somewhat developed. There remain 80 per cent. as yet almost wholly undeveloped. The task of applied sociology is to show how this latent four-fifths of mankind can be turned to account in the work of civilization."

This book should be studied by every social worker and by every teacher. It is destined to have a profound influence on educational methods and ideals. For the author is surely right in insisting that education *is* the equalization of opportunity. It is the means to the end. "The equalization of opportunity means the equalization of intelligence, and not until this is attained is there any virtue or any hope in schemes for the equalization of the material resources of society." In the clear light of this philosophy, what are the merits and what the faults of the present many-sided assault on special privilege?

GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD

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## NOTES AND ABSTRACTS

**Charities and the Commons.**—The people connected with *Charities and the Commons* are doing valuable investigative work, and the paper is a growing power for good. A year and a half ago the New York Charity Organization Society appointed a publication committee, national in scope, "to get at the facts of social conditions and put them before the people." The work done by *Charities and the Commons* is of importance to sociologists, not in that it is doing the class of sociological work represented by the *American Journal of Sociology* by any means, but because those conducting the investigations presented do, for the most part, attack their problems in the scientific spirit. Professor Graham Taylor and Dr. Frankel are associated with Dr. Edward T. Devine in the voluntary work of editorship, together with seventeen departmental editors, experts in their particular lines, who give their unpaid co-operation. Press matter is sent out regularly to a hundred newspapers throughout the country, representing 1,308,000 readers; and editorial writers, preachers, legislative committees, municipal bodies, etc., are supplied with material and issues bearing on special problems. Commercial receipts increased 51 per cent. in 1906-7 and will ultimately meet the mechanical cost of publication, but cannot be expected to finance the educational work. The departmental editors show the representative character of the venture. They include Dr. Samuel J. Barrows, president of the International Prison Congress; L. L. Dock, secretary of the International Council of Nurses; Livingston Farrand, secretary of the National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis; William Byron Forbush, Detroit, secretary of the General Alliance of Work with Boys; Archibald A. Hill, secretary of the Metropolitan Parks Association; Lillian Brandt, secretary of the Social Research Committee; Emily W. Dinwiddie, of the Tenement House Committee; C. C. Carstens, assistant secretary of the New York Charity Organization Society; Florence Kelley, secretary of the National Consumers' League; Alexander Johnson, secretary of the National Conference of Charities and Correction; Mary E. Richmond, Philadelphia; Homer Folks, New York; Ben B. Lindsey, judge of the Juvenile Court of Denver; Charles Mulford Robinson. H. W.

**Women's Rights from the Sociological Point of View.**—"Women's rights" is a revolt against the restraints on the activity of women. (1) These restraints were born and sanctioned at that distant point of evolution where the difficulties arising from technique banished woman from all industrial activity, and gave to the male the control of production, and with it the control of intellectual and civil matters. These restraints lost their *raison d'être* as soon as machine production restored woman as a productive agent and reopened to her the gates of industry. (2) These restraints were made because the number of men was inferior to that of women, and it was necessary that the women give their whole attention to maternal affairs. These restraints became entirely insupportable when the progress of civilization caused an increasing excess of women over men, and the limits to marriage excluded a great number of women from sexual and maternal activity. For these women the restraints which limit feminine activity are a sentence to misfortune and death.

It is not difficult to see that the movement will be crowned in the near future with success. The mass of active forces in the world will be doubled, and an enormous qualitative amelioration will result. The inferior traits of our civilization, due to its privileged and exclusive character, will be effaced only when all the fields of physical and mental activity are opened to all the members of humanity.—Achille Loria, in *Revue internationale de Sociologie*, January, 1907.

E. H. S.

**The Grilling of Sinners.**—The community need feel no qualm when lashing the sinner. The public that turns the other cheek tempts a man to fresh sinning. It is the indulgent parent spoiling the child. There is fair hope that out of public opinion a means of rational defense may be developed, provided only we renounce certain false notions which now hinder the proper grilling of sinners. People must give up the fallacy that sinners should be chastised only by their betters. Sinners are scourged, not to proclaim moral inferiority, but to fortify people against temptation. Opportunity puts one's baser self in the saddle; whereas the comment of the disinterested spectator utters his better self. It is the onlookers, not the champions, that uphold the rules of the game, because they are in less trying positions.

*People should renounce the error that society's castigation of the sinner is merely the assertion of the self-interest of the many.* The truth is, law is shot through and through with conscience. An agitation may start, as the "we won't stand it" of a victimized class; but when it solicits general support, it takes the form, "These things are wrong," and it can triumph only when it chimes with common conscience.

*People must renounce the delusion that the non-conformist is the real peril of society.* It is human nature to resent difference, and the time was when people could afford to go asunder on the form of baptism. But such stress on the non-essential is sheer folly. Today the distinction between righteous and sinners is the main thing. It is the honest man that falls into heresy. But the latter-day sinner is sleek, orthodox, and unoffending. He conforms in everything but conduct. Adulterators and commercial crooks rally as "enterprising business men."

*People must renounce the false doctrine that the repression of the vicious is more important than the repression of sinners.* Our moral pace-setters strike at bad personal habits, but act as if there were something sacred about money-making, and seeing that the master-iniquities of our time are connected with money-making, they do not get into the big fight at all. The child-drivers, monopoly-builders, and crooked financiers have no fear of men whose thought is run in the molds of their grandfathers. Go to the tainted-money colleges, and you will find that drink, not graft, is the nation's bane. If you want a David-and-Goliath fight, you must attack the powers that prey, not on the vices of the lax, but on the necessities of the decent. They are able to gag critics, hobble investigators, hood the press, and muzzle the law. Because society develops, comes into new situations, runs into strange perils, finds old foes with new faces and enemies masquerading as friends, it is folly to train its guns ever on the same spot. Yesterday's battle-cries of conscience cannot thrill us, and so the battle-cries of today may have little meaning for our children's children.—E. A. Ross, in *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1907.

L. W.

**Some Aspects of the Labor Problem.**—In considering our labor problem, it should be noted that our prosperity is more largely staked upon manufacturing, as apart from agricultural enterprise than is that of any other nation. This means that a larger proportion of our workers are obliged to live and work under artificial conditions. Another point to be kept steadily in view is that we have to deal with a human, and not a mechanical, problem—a problem with which are closely bound up all the fads and fallacies, sentiments, and susceptibilities, emotions, and passions, and prejudices that humanity is heir to and no efforts to solve this problem can be successful without adequate regard for the human element involved. As means toward a solution of the labor problem in accordance with national welfare, I suggest: (1) cleaner and more healthy workshops; (2) better relationship between employers and workmen; (3) an eight-hour working-day; (4) a five-day working-week; (5) absorption of the unemployed by (a) reducing the hours of the employed as above; (b) providing military training for unemployed young men; (c) pensions for old men; (6) model dwelling villages; (7) cheap traveling facilities between the villages and factories; (8) a more rational system of education; (9) pure food and drink; (10) women able to cook and willing to nurse.—T. Good, in *Westminster Review*, March, 1907.

J. A. F.

**Why the Workingman Is without a Church.**—The ritualistic churches of Christendom grew directly out of the feudal system, reflected the semi-barbaric culture of the Middle Ages, and supported, by means of the terrors of superstition, baronial oppression. This of course left the bourgeoisie, after their revolt, without a church. But these middle-class men had use for a church and organized a group of them which served to check in the wage-earner the vice which would impair his efficiency as a laborer, and the personal indulgence and amusement which would lead him to demand higher wages for its satisfaction.

Today the wage-worker is rising in opposition to this bourgeoisie class, and naturally finds himself outside of the church; for the church belongs to his master and voices only the interest of the capitalistic class. Now we find this churchless revolutionary proletariat to seem serenely indifferent either to the organization of a new church, or to accept the eager offer of the Catholic church in America, or of certain of the smaller Protestant denominations, to function as a proletarian church.

The proletarian is without a religious organization because it has no subject class to oppress and exploit. There being no subject class to be kept in unwilling subjection there is no economic service that a church can render to the proletariat. To the laboring-man religion is a private affair. It has no economic importance to him, and hence no place in his social life. He may be religious or irreligious as he may privately choose. The failure of modern churches to espouse the cause of the workingman is due to a deeper cause than the question of their financial support. It is fundamental, unbridgeable because the proletariat has no end to serve by maintaining an ecclesiastical establishment, and for a church to become a distinctly proletarian organization would be to disband. It is the half-unconscious perception of this lathal atmosphere which compels all churches to remain the instruments of the oppressing class. Since individual workingmen may hold any belief conceivable, and since religion has no economic importance for them, there can be no "religion of socialism" or "religion of the proletariat." The proletarian attitude on these matters must always be, from the necessities of the case, one of perfect individual freedom and collective indifference.—Clarence Meily, *International Socialist Review*, February, 1907.

W. J. B.

**The Social Science Literature of the World.**—This literature consisted, according to the returns to the International Institute for Social Bibliography in Berlin, of 8,590 books and 10,848 articles (together 19,438 works) in 1906. Of these, 9,455 originated in German-speaking countries, or about 55 per cent. There follows in French-speaking territory, 18 per cent.; English, 16 per cent.; Dutch, 4 per cent.; Russian,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.; Italian,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.; Scandinavian, 3 per cent. The Russian literature production is, as against 1905, three times as great within the scope of the institute—a consequence of the freedom of the press which, though still limited, was started in Russia.

The most works were written on the subject of social politics, viz., 6,134. Then follow political economy, with 3,830; general politics, home and foreign (except colonial), with 1,847. Colonial politics alone brought out 469 works. It is interesting in this connection that in the Romance literature the Kongo question in the German-speaking naturally the German Southwest Africa question, gave rise to a tremendous number of works. The Russian literature included, beside the translations of formerly forbidden works of the German, Romance, and English social literature, single works about constitutional questions, agrarian questions and land reform, etc. In the French literature the separation of church and state played a conspicuous rôle, while in Germany and England the school question stood in the foreground.

As against 1905, in which year the Institute reported 12,526 titles, the production increased by about 7,000 works. This difference arises less from an absolute increase of production than from the fact that 300 more publications and a number of parliaments were added to working territory of the Institute.—*Kritische Blätter für die gesamten Sozialwissenschaften*, January, 1907.

V. E. H.







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